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Outcomebased conditionality: Too good to be true

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Title: Outcomebased conditionality: Too good to be true


1
Outcome-based conditionalityToo good to be true?
  • Brussels, 29 January 2008

2
Policy conditionality is both an infringement on
sovereignty and ineffective Africa Commission,
2005
  • True partnership supposes autonomy of
    beneficiary countries in requesting aid and in
    determining its objectives Often programs are
    imposed on us, and we are told it is our
    programPeople who have never seen cotton come to
    give us lessons on cotton No one can respect the
    conditionalities of certain donors. They are so
    complicated that they themselves have difficulty
    getting us to understand them. This is not a
    partnership. This is a master relating to his
    student.

3
World Bank Conditionality Review, 2005
  • Traditional conditionality in policy-based
    lending has often been criticized as being
    ineffective and intrusive

4
But what do we mean when we talk about results?
  • Outcome-based conditionality means different
    things to different people
  • Senior IMF official

5
Outcomes a la IMF
6
The WB and the EC logics compared
7
For the purpose of this study
  • Outcome-based allocations or conditions refer
    to
  • disbursements linked to performance measured by
    indicators at the outcome level
  • which refrain from spelling out concrete policy
    measures that should be adopted in order to
    obtain certain results and
  • which refer to outcomes in areas clearly linked
    to human development and poverty reduction.

8
The ECs shift to outcome-based conditionality
  • Drawing on lessons from previous structural
    adjustment programmes and the recognition of the
    central importance of ownership, the European
    Commission has moved to an approach based on
    linking their aid to poverty reduction results

9
ECs expectations for outcome-based conditionality
  • - Encourage a focus on results by using
    indicators of
  • service delivery / poverty reduction
  • Protect the political space for governments to
    determine policy
  • Streamline conditionality
  • Promote domestic accountability
  • - Stimulate demand for quality data on poverty.

10
What has been the impact of outcome-based
conditionality?
  • Positive effects
  • 1. Outcome-based conditionality has pushed a
    results based approach
  • 2. It has managed to streamline conditions
  • 3. It has managed, generally, to refrain from
    spelling out economic policy conditions
  • 4. It has been a catalyst to increase
    governments focus on poverty reduction results.

11
Operational challenges too soon or too hard to
tell?
  • The not so good news
  • Not enough funds to make a difference
  • Cryptic data failing to improve downwards
    accountability
  • Outcome indicators cure or curse?
  • The problem of attribution
  • Mechanistic links to disbursement
  • Time lags
  • Limited CSO participation.

12
Political challenges letting go of the reins
  • Opening-up policy space contextual burdens or
    business as usual?
  • The problem of conditionality baskets
  • The problem of creating incentives
  • The other side of the coin not enough buy-in
    from Southern governments

13
Conclusions and Recommendations
  • Outcome-based conditionality can be based in
    internationally agreed development goals
    increase policy space and put results in the
    spotlight. To fully unleash this potential
  • The process of choosing outcome indicators should
    be much more inclusive and genuinely led by
    recipient countries
  • Indicators should also try to grasp qualitative
    aspects
  • Data should be collected and displayed to
    strengthen downwards accountability
  • Assessments with financial implications should
    take place on a multi-year basis
  • A less mechanistic link between targets and
    disbursement
  • Avoid double-conditionality

14
  • By Nuria Molina-Gallart
  • EURODAD
  • nmolina_at_eurodad.org
  • www.eurodad.org
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