Title: IS 6973
1IS 6973
- Secure Network Design
- Chapter Seven
- Network Security Platform Options and Best
Deployment Practices
2Secure Design Decisions
- What kinds of devices should be deployed?
- Where should they be deployed?
3Network Security Platform Options
- General purpose OS security
- Appliance-Based security
- Network-Integrated security
4General Purpose OS Security
- Security admin. Build a general-purpose PC and
install the technology of top. - PC runs some form of generally accepted OS
Windows, Unix, etc.
5Pros
- Flexibility wide range of security s/w is
available not tied to one vendor (tell that to
MS) - Use the same platform, h/w cost are low, system
less complex
6Cons
- Need to manage two systems the security s/w and
OS PLUS the hardware - Security system sits on top of PC platform (e.g.,
not fully integrated) - Support who are you going to call system
vendor, PC vendor, OS vendor, NIC manufacturer,
etc?
7Appliance-Based Security Devices
- General purpose hardware/OS with appliance
packaging (purchasing total system from single
vendor) - Pros one place for support (maybe)
- Cons not very versatile, locked into one
vendor, lack of flexibility - Fully Custom Appliance proprietary OS
- Pros usually means better performance, one
place to call - Cons more likely to have undiscovered problems,
locked into one vendor
8Network-Integrated Security Functions
- Takes advantage of your existing n/w
infrastructure. Security capabilities are
embedded inside a router or switch using either
s/w or h/w - Router/switch s/w integration Stateful
firewall, IDS, IPsec VPN - Pros reduces number of devices to support and
maintain can add functions without impacting
design - Cons making a device do something is wasnt
designed to do more complex can impede
performance - Router/switch h/w integration (Fig. 7- 1 vs. Fig.
7-2) - Pros less performance impedance than above
- Cons more complex configuration than above
9Network Security Platform Option Recommendations
- Which platform should you use? How qualified are
your staff? - Appliance-Based Convery suggests should be bulk
of security system because of ease of support,
configuration, and deployment. Use appliances in
locations with high performance requirements and
where uptime is critical (VPN gateways, stateful
firewalls). - General-Purpose OS use for specialized security
functions (proxy servers, antivirus, URL
filtering) - Network-Integrated use in remote locations with
minimal IT staffing, or an existing n/w that is
rarely modified (integrating h/w NIDS into a
switch allows remote monitoring)
10Network Security Device Best Practices
- Technologies discussed include
- Firewall
- Proxy servers/content filtering
- NIDS
11Firewall Best Practices
- Generally the principal element is secure n/w
design - Topology options
- Basic filtering router
- Classic dual-router DMZ
- Stateful firewall DMZ design
- Modern 3-interface firewall design
- Multi-firewall design
12Basic Filtering Router (Fig. 7-3)
- Easy to implement, but least secure
- Public servers are on the internal side of the
router compromised public server can attack
internal systems without further filtering - Single point of access control failure
- Requires multiple open ports
13Classic Dual-Router DMZ (Fig. 7-4)
- Public servers are separated from the rest of the
internal n/w - Filtering (2nd) router should have more
restrictive ACLs
14Stateful Firewall DMZ (Fig. 7-5)
- Improves dual-router DMZ by allowing strong
filtering between the internal n/w and the public
servers and the Internet - BUT, can impact performance, some firewalls do
not support advanced routing or multicast
functions
15Modern 3-Interface Firewall Design (Fig.
7-6)
- Most common topology used today
- Considered best balance of security, cost, and
management - All traffic must flow through the firewall
- Caution remember to limit access from public
server to the internal network
16Multi-Firewall Design (Fig. 7-7)
- Many variations primarily used for e-commerce
or other sensitive transactions - Organizations may require multiple levels of
trust - Trusted servers may support transaction requests
from less trusted servers - Attackers must first compromise untrusted
servers, but there is a very limited number of
ports available to more trusted servers
17General Firewall Best Practices
- Expressly permit, implicitly deny
- Block outbound public server access (web servers
dont need to surf the web)
18Proxy Servers/Content Filtering
- Internal User Aggregation (Fig. 7-9)
- Firewall access rules define who can initiate
outbound web requests - Firewall-Enforce User Aggregation (Fig. 7-10)
- Firewall enforces who can access the proxy
servers adds a significant load to the firewall - DMZ Proxy Design (Fig. 7-11)
- Commonly used with SOCKS-based proxy servers
- Supports applications that dont work with
traditional access control techniques
19Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)
- Major areas of concern
- Device placement
- Tuning
- Management (discussed in ch 16)
20NIDS placement
- Either before or after the firewall the closer
to the core of the n/w, more characteristic of
the pre-firewall NIDS employment - Pre-firewall NIDS (Fig. 7-12) manpower
intensive many alarms not practical in most
cases, except for securing SECOPS jobs - Post-firewall NIS (Fig. 7-13) detected attacks
have already passed through the firewall,
increasing degree of severity deals with limited
number of hosts and services, so it is easier to
tune
21NIDS General Best Practices
- Deploy close to the systems you are trying to
protect (Fig. 7-14) - Monitor your NIDS 24/7/365
22NIDS Tuning
- Implies focusing on the events you care about and
ignoring the rest. Could take weeks, and is on
on-going process from initial tuning - Want to report actual network attacks
- Dont monitor n/w management traffic
- Turn off alarms to benign attacks
- Turn off alarms you dont care about
- Reduce priority of low-impact attacks
- Match NIDS events against systems affected by
this event - Clean up remaining false positives
23NIDS Attack Response
- Determine which attacks (if any) you want to
attempt to stop - Most common response
- Shunning when attack detected, INS reconfigures
the router or firewall with an ACL blocking the
source IS address (Fig. 7-15) Caveats if false
positive, are blocking legitimate user could be
blocking spoofed IP address damage could already
be done - TCP Resets use sequence and ACK numbers in a
TCP session to reset the session, thereby
stopping the attack. Concerns not foolproof
may not guess correct sequence number on faster,
more active sessions spoofing not much concern,
because TCP sessions are hard to spoof works
only with TCP communications monitor constantly
24Chapter Seven Review Questions
- How do you determine what devices to deploy and
where to place them? - Compare and contrast the following options
- General purpose OS security
- Appliance-Based security
- Network-Integrated security
- Discuss the network security best practices for
the following - Firewall
- Proxy servers/content filtering
- NIDS
- Compare and contrast the following firewalls
- Basic filtering router
- Classic dual-router DMZ
- Stateful firewall DMZ design
- Modern 3-interface firewall design
- Multi-firewall design
- What is a false positive? How can you delete the
occurrence of NIDS false positives? - What is NIDS tuning? Compare and contrast
shunning and TCP resets.