Title: Summer 07, MFIN7011, Tang
1Subprime Mortgage Crisis
2Subprime Mortgage Crisis The Roadmap
- Prime Rate the interest rate commercial banks
charge their most creditworthy customers. - Subprime loans are characterized by low
introductory interest rates, usually for the
first two or three years. These rates frequently
rise rapidly in subsequent years - Regulation change prior to 1992, only commercial
banks offered almost exclusively fixed-rate,
prime-market mortgages - The subprime mortgage market has expanded
dramatically in the US, growing at an annual rate
of 25 per cent between 1994 and 2005, a tenfold
increase in a decade. - Homeownership increased 1.94 per year during
Clinton administration, reached 67.7 in 2000. - In 1994, fewer than five percent of mortgages in
the US were subprime, but by 2005 nearly 20
percent of new mortgage loans were subprime - In the United States today, there is
approximately 10 trillion in outstanding
mortgages, and of these, about one-quarter are
subprime and Alt-A loans (1980s SL crisis cost,
by comparison, about 240 billion in today's
dollars, blamed for the 90-91 recession) - Interest rate rose since 2004H2, housing price
dropped and mortgage payments increased ? default
rate rose!
3Subprime Mortgage Crisis
4Subprime Mortgage Crisis
5Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)
- A CDO is an asset backed security (ABS) whose
underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of
bonds (corporate or sovereign) or bank loans.CDO
can be classified according to debt type - Collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
- Collateralized bond obligations (CBO)
- Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO)
- The first CDO was created in 1987 by the famous
Drexel Burnham Lambert, for a 100 million loan.
6Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)
- A CDO cashflow structure allocates interest
income and principal repayments from a collateral
pool of different debt instruments to a
prioritized collection (tranches) of CDO
securities. - First tranche covers x of notional and absorbs
first x of default losses - Second tranche covers y of notional and absorbs
next y of default losses - Etc.
- A tranche earns a promised yield on remaining
principal in the tranche
7Cash CDO Structure Illustration
Tranche 1 1st 5 of loss Yield 35
Bond 1 Bond 2 Bond 3 ? Bond n Average
Yield 8.5
Tranche 2 2nd 10 of loss Yield 15
Trust
Tranche 3 3rd 10 of loss Yield 7.5
Tranche 4 Residual loss Yield 6
8Typical CDO Contractual Relationships
Ongoing Communication
Collateral Manager
Trustee
CDO Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)
Underlying Securities (Collateral)
Hedge Provider (If Needed)
Senior Fixed/ Floating Rate Notes
Mezzanine Fixed/Floating Rate Notes
Subordinated Notes/Equity
9CDO Example
NationsBank 1997-1 CLO tranches
Obligors 2.164 billion
Interest Rate Swaps
Issuer
B. 43 million (A)
C. 54 million (BBB)
D. 64 million (NR)
10Single-Tranche CDO
Senior Tranche
Bond 1 Bond 2 Bond 3 ? Bond n
Selected Tranche
Trust
investors
Equity Tranche
11CDO Squared
Senior Tranche
SelectedTranche
Equity Tranche
Senior Tranche
Senior Tranche
SelectedTranche
MezzanineTranche
Equity Tranche
Equity Tranche
Senior Tranche
SelectedTranche
Equity Tranche
12Subprime Mortgage Crisis and CDO
- CDOs are the power packs of the late housing boom
- Hedge funds invest in CDO tranches backed by
residential mortgages backed securities (RMBS)
with large portion in subprime - CDOs have become an important part of the
mortgage market because they buy the riskier
parts of MBS that others don't want. The
higher-rated portions, or tranches, of MBS are
sold to pension funds and insurers. But if the
riskier tranches aren't sold too, the whole deal
is off - Causes? Reckless lenders Greedy
investors/borrowers - Rating agencies are criticized. Most CDOs had A
rating - Effect on baby boomers' retirement
13Subprime Mortgage Crisis Direct Causes
- Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2007)
- Higher loan-to-value mortgages from riskier
borrowers - Less housing price appreciation in 2006-2007
- Causes of housing bubble? (media politics)
14Subprime Mortgage Crisis Winners and Losers
- Winners? (are you kidding me? Yes there are
winners such as the first batch investors.) - Big losers http//ml-implode.com/
- Bear Stearns two hedge funds (1 billion)
- Australia Basis Capital (1 billion?) Absolute
Capital (200 million?) IKB Deutsche
Industriebank - May take two more years to completely resolve!
- Big losers
- Citigroup (18B)
- Merrill Lynch (11.5B)
- UBS (17.8B)
- Morgan Stanley (9.4B)
- Bank of China (initial estimate 223 million, now
could be 4-5B) - Effect on baby boomers' retirement
15Subprime Mortgage Crisis Consequence
16Subprime Mortgage Crisis Delinquencies