MPS Commissioning Report from the MPSC subgroup

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MPS CommissioningReport from the MPSC subgroup

• Jan Uythoven
• For the Members of the MPSC subgroup

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Membership

• Jan Uythoven (chairman), Alick Macpherson
  (secretary),Ralph Assmann, Roger Bailey,
  Bernd Dehning, Brennan Goddard, Eva Barbara
  Holzer,Verena Kain, Mike Lamont, Blanca Perea
  Solano,Laurette Ponce, Bruno Puccio, Stefano
  Redaelli, Rudiger Schmidt, Benjamin Todd, Jorg
  Wenninger, Markus Zerlauth.
• (Other) EICsReyes Alemany Fernandez,Magali
  Gruwe,Walter Venturini-Delsolaro.

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Outline

• General description, plans
• Based on presentation to the MAC on 15th June
• Present status
• Based on presentation in MPSCWG on 12th September
  by Alick Macpherson
• Detailed info at
• http//lhccwg.web.cern.ch/lhccwg/MPS/mps.htm

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Mac Talk
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Introduction

• Core elements of the LHC Machine Protection
  System
• Beam Interlock System
• Beam Dumping System
• Beam Loss Monitoring System
• Collimation System
• Quench Protection System Powering Interlocks
• Injection System
• Together with other elements they will need to
  guarantee the safety of the LHC equipment
  protection
• Detect any equipment state or beam state that is
  potentially dangerous
• Dump the beam before damage to equipment can
  occur
• This safety of the system needs to be guaranteed
  (SIL 3) by
• Good system design
• Redundancy between subsystems
• Redundancy within critical subsystems
• Reliable system components
• Careful follow-up during production and
  installation
• Thorough commissioning of the system
• Individual System Tests
• System commissioning with and without beam

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The LHC Machine Protection System Interfaces
Movable Detectors
Beam Loss Monitors BCM
Experimental Magnets
Environmental parameters
LHC Devices
Collimator Positions
LHC Devices
Safe Beam Parameter Distribution
LHC Devices
SpecialBLMs
LHC Experiments
Collimation System
Transverse Feedback
Beam Aperture Kickers
Operator Buttons CCC
Safe LHC Parameter
Software Interlocks
Sequencer
Beam Dumping System
Beam Interlock System
Safe Beam Flag
Injection Interlock
Powering Interlocks sc magnets
Powering Interlocks nc magnets
Magnet Current Monitor
Beam LifetimeFBCM
Screens / Mirrors BTV
Access System
Vacuum System
Beam loss monitors BLM
RF System
Timing System (Post Mortem Trigger)
Monitors aperture limits (some 100)
Monitors in arcs (several 1000)
Power Converters
Magnets
QPS (several 1000)
Power Converters 1500
AUG
UPS
Cryo OK
Doors
EIS
Vacuum valves
Access Safety Blocks
RF Stoppers
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Commissioning has Started!

• LHC Hardware Commissioning
• Individual System Tests of LHC on the way
• Experience of MPS equipment with the powering of
  the first LHC sector
• SPS operation 2006 and 2007
• Fast Magnet Current Change Monitoring in 2006 and
  later in 2007
• Beam Interlock Systems following same design as
  LHC BIS being used for
• CNGS and TT40/TT60 (towards LHC!) extraction
  interlocking
• SPS ring interlock in 2007
• LHC-like beam permit loop with clients connected
  to the dump through one of the 6 BICs connected
  to the loop
• Safe Beam Flag for CNGS operation

• Proof of the hardware and the design choices
  that have been made
• Experience concerning commissioning and
  operations of systems similar to those that will
  be used in the LHC

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SPS Extraction towards to LHC Using SPS
Extraction BIS
J.Wenninger
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SPS extraction BIS information
Signals as seen on an oscilloscope for testing
the interlock system
Beam Energy Tracking System considers dipole DCCT
and HV of extraction kicker Same hardware as for
the LHC Beam Dumping System (but reverse logic)
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SPS extraction BIS information
Bar graph summarising the status of the interlock
system
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Fast Magnet Current Change Monitor MBG 4101M
Interlock Triggers at 10-4 change of I nominal
FMCM triggers _at_ 3984.4 10E-4
3 FMCMs were operational last year and tested
following well defined procedures. Modified CERN
types (better adapted for pulsed magnets and
additional controls interface) will be installed
later this year
M. Zerlauth,Adapted DESY design
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LHC Hardware CommissioningD2.L8 presently under
test
Quench event at 17018 ms

• Presently being commissioned
• Quench Protection System PIC system
• Obtain experience with
• Tools for Post Mortem and Logging
• Sequencer

Current ramp
Current starts to change 17.027 ms
Quench heaters efficient 17.026 ms
Quench loop reading PIC 17021 ms
Signal to BIC
Quench detected 17018 ms
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Plans for (further) Commissioning and follow-up

• Thorough commissioning of the Machine Protection
  System
• Individual System Tests
• Part of the LHC Hardware Commissioning
• LHC Cold Check-Out period (machine closed, ready
  for beam)
• System commissioning with beam
• Different phases depending on beam intensity and
  beam energy
• Special attention to the links between the
  different systems

Most hours of MPS testing before first beam, Some
systems completely tested before beam ?
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100 Tested before First Beam
Movable Detectors
Beam Loss Monitors BCM
Experimental Magnets
Environmental parameters
LHC Devices
Collimator Positions
LHC Devices
Safe Beam Parameter Distribution
LHC Devices
SpecialBLMs
LHC Experiments
Collimation System
Transverse Feedback
Beam Aperture Kickers
Operator Buttons CCC
Safe LHC Parameter
Software Interlocks
Sequencer
Beam Dumping System
Beam Interlock System
Safe Beam Flag
Injection Interlock
Powering Interlocks sc magnets
Powering Interlocks nc magnets
Magnet Current Monitor
Beam LifetimeFBCM
Screens / Mirrors BTV
Access System
Vacuum System
Beam loss monitors BLM
RF System
Timing System (Post Mortem Trigger)
Monitors aperture limits (some 100)
Monitors in arcs (several 1000)
Power Converters
Magnets
QPS (several 1000)
Power Converters 1500
AUG
UPS
Cryo OK
Doors
EIS
Vacuum valves
Access Safety Blocks
RF Stoppers
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MPS Commissioning Working Group

• Sub working group of the LHC Commissioning
  Working Group
• Six Nine meetings since November 2006
• 20 Members
• Two people per main system
• Engineers in charge
• a few others
• Webpage http//lhccwg.web.cern.ch/lhccwg/MPS/mps.
  htm

Mandate of Sub-Working Group on the Commissioning
of the Machine Protection System   " Produce the
detailed (step by step) description of the
commissioning of the LHC Machine Protection
System and record the test results. " The aim is
to have a first version available by June / July
2007. 
...but was defined with circulating beam in mind
for November 2007
That is going to be tight.
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Detailed Procedure for Each System

• Follow standard format for tests to be performed
  at the different phases
• Identical to LHC HC strategy
• To be published and approved by MPS comm. wg
  members
• Specific tests are listed and tabulated

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Format of the Procedures
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Manufacturing and Test Folder (MTF)

• Each Described Test is to be found back in the
  MTF system
• The Status of the Test (passed, not passed,
  pending) and possible test reports are kept in
  this system
• Identical system to what is being used for the
  LHC Hardware Commissioning
• Many of the MPS tests will be done during the LHC
  Hardware Commissioning
• Need to have compatible systems
• MPS commissioning procedures can refer to LHC HC
  procedures

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The Hardware Commissioning Manufacturing Test
Folder
B. Perea Solano
Organization of the stored information within
arborescence
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Validation of the tests performed to the equipment
External Properties (LDB) Property Values
(test variables) Parameters (historical
tracking)
Report documents, journals, EDMS, etc.
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Within MTF specific reports (views) can be
created to show the progress of the commissioning
as an example by region for all the systems
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Status of Written Procedures
See Update on Later Slide

• Some of the procedures exist and are well
  advanced, (almost) ready for distribution within
  edms
• PIC, FMCM, Vacuum System
• Advanced (already presented)
• BIS system, BLM system
• Next presentations
• Injection System, WIC System
• Outstanding main systems (but already worked
  upon)
• Beam Dumping System, Collimation System
• Other systems need to be assigned to people to
  write procedures
• Experiments, RF Feedback, Aperture Kickers AC
  dipole, Safe Beam Flag etc.
• After comments and approval to be described in
  MTF
• Results of tests to be entered in MTF
• Custom reports to be created to follow progress

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Different Procedures Work in other Groups

• LHC Hardware Commissioning WG
• Procedures per System create for MPS if it does
  not exist
• LHC Commissioning Working Group
• Procedures are given per phase of LHC
  Commissioning
• First Injection (pilot), energy ramp, increasing
  the intensity etc.
• MPS commissioning
• Procedures are per System, over all phases

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Besides Procedures

• MPS Commissioning Working Group is a forum to
  discuss different items related to the MPS
  commissioning and operation
• Establishes a team of experts who can be called
  in during LHC operation when required
• Training for Engineers In Charge

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Topics concerning the MPS under discussion in the
different working groups

• BLM operation
• Which thresholds to set?
• Proposed 30 of quench level, for the arcs, this
  concerns operational efficiency and not machine
  protection
• When and How to change BLM settings?
• Are remote changes via Management of Critical
  Settings more risky than a local change?
• Procedure for disabling single BLMs when required
• Protection settings (collimators) during the
  different phases of LHC commissioning
• Relation with limits on beam parameters (beta
  beta, orbit etc.) during the different
  commissioning phases
• Interlocking Strategy of the Aperture kicker and
  Ac Dipole
• Based on keys and LHC Safe Beam Flag

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MPSC Procedures Status
Some slides from the presentation by Alick
Macpherson in the MPS Comm. Wg. Of 12th September
2007
To be started MKA AC dipole, movable objects
of experiments, Safe
Beam Flags,
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Timetable for Completion of Procedures

• All out-standing procedures submitted to Jan by
  1st October.
• Procedures returned to groups after review/cross
  check by Jan/Alick
• Expect 1 week per procedure for review and
  feedback and 2 weeks for corrections.
• Target Review 1 procedure per week.
• Review process started with BIS procedure
• From 1st October, start EDMS checking procedures
• Target 1 per week.
• Start with BIS procedure
• As EDMS approval finishes, transfer to MTF.
• Allow 1 week for transfer to MTF
• Look to have all procedures in MTF by mid
  December
• Collimator procedure linked to presentation at
  MPSCWG on 3rd 10th Oct

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Procedures More Observations

• Most procedures have had a first revision
• Still awaiting some procedures
• Question is data/state logging considered part
  of MPS commissioning?
• MPSC Commissioning should (where possible) be
  modular
• Use hardware commissioning to set entry
  conditions for front end systems.
• HWC Procedures results (MTF) to be confirmed by
  MPSC procedure
• Test the interface with the BIS gt complementary
  to BIS Commissioning
• Set exit conditions that allow the system to
  proceed to validations during cold machine cold
  checkout or validation with beam.
• MPSC validation must insure that there is no
  possibility of machine protection risks due to
  operator controls
• gt procedures to confirm that operators cant
  change critical settings?
• Dependency on info from BIS and other systems
  must be made clear
• Beam Info flag should not be used for any
  critical action!

Answer no
Nice discussion point
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Conclusions

• The Commissioning of the LHC Machine Protection
  System has already started
• LHC Hardware Commissioning
• SPS extraction and ring Beam Interlock System,
  FMCM
• Proof of the hardware design choices that have
  been made
• Experience concerning commissioning and
  operations of systems similar to those that will
  be used in the LHC
• To guarantee a Safe LHC operation, the
  commissioning procedures of the different MPS
  components
• Are being described in detail following a fixed
  format, distributed and agreed upon
• Will be followed up in the Manufacturing and Test
  Folder
• A lot of work still to be done
• On paper (procedures, MTF, reports)
• In reality, following the paper work
• The fruits of the work should be
• Limited confusion during LHC commissioning, with
  and without beam
• Never see the destructive potential of the LHC
  being confirmed