Geography test:

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• Geography test
• - Please make sure you map each feature (once,
  and only once)
• - Do not leave any room for ambiguity
• Today finish federalism power-sharing
  (consociationalism)
• Tomorrow Political culture (Hague Harrop
  chapter Inglehart Norris piece)
• Thursday finish PC (review?)
• Review session? (Monday?)

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Federalism

• (Alfred Stepan)

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Importance of federalism

• An essential institutional tool for conflict
  management
• Federacy
• Confederacy
• The misleading picture of federalism

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Federal vs. unitary states

• Federalism the principle of sharing sovereignty
  between central and local government
• Federation any political system that puts this
  idea into practice
• Confederation participating countries retain
  their separate statehood

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Federalism the misleading picture

• Too much focus on the US model
• William Riker three features of US federalism
• Stepan these features do not necessarily apply
  elsewhere
• The misleading picture indicates a narrower
  range of choices than the existing one

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American federalism three features

• (i) origins coming-together federalism
• (ii) central goal protecting individual rights
  (demos-constraining institutional devices)
• (iii) federalism is symmetrical (each unit/state
  has equal constitutional competences)

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(i) Origins of federation coming-together vs.
holding-together

• Coming-together existing independent units
  (states) create a federal system (e.g., the US)
• Holding together an existing unitary system
  devolves authority to component units (e.g.,
  India)
• Putting together federalism a coercive effort
  by a powerful state to create a federal system
  (e.g., Soviet Union)

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(ii) "Demos-Constraining" vs. "Demos-Enabling
federalism

• Democratic federations inherently more
  "demos-constraining" than unitary democracies.
• Why? Three reasons

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The inherent demos-constraining nature of
federalism

• (i) The existence of policy areas
  constitutionally assigned to the exclusive
  competence of the states.
• (ii) Bicameralism (one chamber representing the
  states, not the people)
• (iii) A more powerful and salient judiciary

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Is this good or bad?

• Riker the demos-constraining aspect of
  federalism protects individual rights
• Stepans caveat federalism violates the
  principle of equality (one citizen, one vote)
• (Tension between liberal and democratic ideals)
• However

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Federal systems are demos-constraining to various
degrees

• A function of three constitutionally embedded
  variables
• Overrepresentation in the upper chamber
• Policy scope of the upper chamber
• Policy issues off the agenda of the demos
• the nature of the party system

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(1) Overrepresentation

• Empirical range
• Austria 1.5
• USA 66
• Brazil 144
• (Moreover, overrepresentation is further
  replicated in Brazils lower chamber)
• Overrepresentation neither a logical
  requirement, nor a universal feature empirically

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(2) Upper chamber's majority-constraining powers

• Range from very weak upper chambers (India,
  largely a revisionary chamber)
• through upper chambers having equal powers to the
  lower chamber (US, Senate House)
• To an upper chamber more powerful than the lower
  chamber (Brazil)
• Again, countries have a lot of flexibility here

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(3) Symmetrical vs. asymmetrical federalism

• Symmetrical each state has the same
  constitutional competences
• Asymmetrical grants different competencies and
  group-specific rights to some states
• Symmetrical mononational states (USA, Brazil)
• Asymmetrical multinational states (India,
  Belgium, Canada, Spain) group-specific
  collective rights

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Conclusion?

• The US model of federalism is "coming-together
  in origin, "constitutionally symmetrical" in
  structure, and "demos-constraining" in its
  political consequences
• Such a model is unlikely to have much appeal for
  new democratic federations these will likely be
  territorially based, multilingual, and
  multinational

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Consociationalism

• (Arend Lijphart)

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Constitutional Design

• Institutional choices for countries with deep
  cleavages
• Three points of broad agreement
• (i) Deep cleavages a major problem for democracy
• (ii) Problem is greater in emerging or
  unconsolidated democracies
• (iii) power sharing and group autonomy

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Criticisms of power-sharing

• Cooperation without cooptation
• (straightforward majority rule in which both the
  majority and the minority behave)
• Problematic
• Centripetalism
• (Almost) never implemented (?)
• Is this enough to reject centripetalism?

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Prescriptions (not one size fits all)

• Success of a power-sharing system contingent
  upon specific mechanisms devised to ensure the
  road representation that constitutes its core
• (1) Electoral system (legislature)
• Proportional Representation
• ensures proportionality minority representation
• treats all groups in a completely equal and
  evenhanded fashion

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2. Guidelines within PR

• Simplicity criterion (easy to use understand)
• (relatively) high proportionality
• moderate magnitude district (voter-representative
  linkages)
• list PR (why?)
• closed lists ? development of strong cohesive
  parties

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3. Parliamentary vs. presidential govt

• Advantages of parliamentarism
• Cabinet as a collegial decision-making body ?
  broad-sharing executive
• In parliamentary systems, elections are not
  zero-sum (vs. winner-take-all presidentialism)
• (iii) Presidentialism also encourages
  personalistic politics (at the expense of party
  development)
• (iv) Presidentialism executive-legislative
  stalemates
• (v) Rigidity (presid.) vs. flexibility (parliam.)
• ? Most scholars favor parliamentary regimes

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4. Power-sharing in the executive

• Cabinet as a collegial decision-making body
  facilitates, but does not ensure, power sharing
• (a) Belgian solution constitutional provision
  stipulating that the cabinet must comprise equal
  numbers of Dutch-speakers and French-speakers
• (b) S African solution all parties with more
  than 5
• Belgian model
• Power sharing without mandating a grand coalition
• Allows deviation from strict proportionality
• Drawback non-applicable in situations when
  ethnic racial classifications are controversial
  (S Africa)

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5. Cabinet stability

• Parliamentary regimes are flexible too much
  flexibility?
• (a) Constructive vote of no confidence (Germany
  Papua New Guinea)
• eliminates negative legislative majorities
• potential for stalemate
• (b) Making legislative proposals matters of
  confidence (France)
• No country has yet combined the two (a) (b)

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6. Selecting the head of state

• Parliamentary regimes a head of government and a
  (ceremonial) head of state
• Two recommendations (republics)
• Ceremonial office, and
• No direct elections
• Australian solution joint nomination, 2/3
  confirmation
• South African solution no separate head of state
  (president, but subject to parliamentary
  confidence)

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7. Federalism decentralization

• (i) (Echoing Stepan) US-like federalism violates
  the principle of one person, one vote
• (ii) Even more problematic in a parliamentary
  system
• Two legislative chambers with equal powers and
  different compositions makes difficult the
  formation of cabinets that have the confidence of
  both chambers

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(8) Nonterritorial autonomy (9) power-sharing
beyond cabinet and parliament

• Nonterritorial autonomy e.g., educational
  autonomy equal state support for all schools,
  public and private (subject to satisfying minimum
  requirements) India
• Power-sharing broad representation in the civil
  service, judiciary, police, and military