Announcements

1
Announcements

• For Thursday we are going to complete Searles
  Minds, brains and programs the Chinese room
  and get to Heidegger On Dasein and Anxiety
• Tutorial Questions will be posted tomorrow night

2
Nagel Continued The Nature of the Problem

• The First Person Standpoint vs. the Third Person
  Standpoint
• The Subjective vs. the Objective
• Being-for-us vs. Being-in-itself
• Phenomenological vs. the Representational
• The problem with reductionism the idea that
  the mind smoothly reduces to the brain is going
  to be to negotiate all these vs.

3
Three Arguments

• (2) The Appearance/Reality Distinction
• Third Person Objective Representational point of
  view the distinction makes sense
• First Person Phenomenological Point of View the
  distinction makes nonsense. Appearance is the
  reality of conscious mental life
• It is difficult to understand what could be
  meant by the objective character of an
  experience, apart from the particular point of
  view from which its subject apprehends it. After
  all, what would be

4
Three Arguments

• (2) continued
• ..left of what it was like to be a bat if one
  removed the viewpoint of the bat?(364)
• We apply a reality/appearance distinction in
  physical reductions. When we define heat as mean
  molecular kinetic energy or colour as light
  reflectances of a certain frequency we have in a
  sense redefined heat and colour in such a manner
  that no reference to subjective experience is
  necessary.

5
Three Arguments

• (2) continued
• The subjective experience is left unreduced. The
  subjective experiences are carved off, so to
  speak, from such a definition. Such experiences
  are simply the appearances of heat or colour for
  us while the underlying physical processes are
  said to be its reality. Such moves are
  inappropriate when we wish to understand
  ourselves

• the subjective experience is left

6
Three Arguments

• (2) continued
• The idea of moving from appearance to reality
  seems to make no sense here (365)
• By way of elucidating Nagels argument, consider
  the following quote from Colin McGinn ( from The
  Mysterious Flame, p.20-1) it is basically the
  same argument.
• The trouble with this reply think of Argument
  B above is that there is no way to distinguish
  mental and physical concepts without appealing

7
Three Arguments

• to a distinction at the level of facts. What
  makes the concept pain different from the concept
  C-fiber firing is precisely that the two concepts
  express distinct properties, so we cannot say
  that these properties are identical. The
  materialist is forced to introduce the idea of
  two different appearances of the same fact, but
  this notion of appearance itself depends upon
  there being facts of appearance that cannot be
  identified with brain facts. The appearance of
  pain cannot be reduced..

8
Three Arguments

• to C-fiber firing, just as the appearance of
  water cannot be reduced to H2O. But appearances
  are what the mind consists of. So the mind
  cannot be reduced to the brain.
• How something appears to us is what it means to
  be conscious of it appearance with respect to
  consciousness is the reality. Thus, to state
  that a conscious state may appear to us in a
  certain manner i.e., qualitative feels, belief
  states while its reality is an underlying
  physical process..

9
Three Arguments

• not only misunderstands what is involved in
  physical reductions a methodological mistake
  but mistakes what consciousness itself is.
• Lets relate this argument to last term with
  respect to Descartes distinction between primary
  and secondary properties. The mind-brain
  identity theorist wishes to state that the
  primary property of the mind is just the brain.
  It just appears that we have a mental thought
  that is distinct from this primary property.

10
Three Arguments

• In having a thought we are utterly unaware of
  what brain processes are going on so it appears
  to us that the thought is different. However,
  such a mental thought is just a different
  description of this primary property. This
  appearance is, in effect, its secondary property.
• But now, where do we locate such secondary
  properties? In our observation of the external
  world this is unproblematic the secondary
  properties are subjective, in our heads.

11
Three Arguments

• However, we have now internalized the distinction
  itself so we can no longer state that it is
  subjective. So where are these secondary
  properties or as Nagel and McGinn would say,
  these facts of appearance?

12
Three Arguments

• (3) Failures of Analogies to Other Fields of
  reduction
• Key quote here The idea of how a mental and
  physical term might refer to the same thing is
  lacking and the usual analogies with theoretical
  identification in other fields fail to supply it.
  They fail because if we construe the reference
  of mental terms to physical events on the usual
  model, we either get a reappearance of separate
  subjective events as the effects through which
  mental .

13
Three Arguments

• .reference to physical events is secured, or
  else we get a false account of how mental terms
  refer(366)
• We do not have a clue when it comes to ourselves
  how we would perform a reduction how we bridge
  the interlacing of the subjective and the
  objective. From other fields of scientific
  reduction this is unproblematic the
  species-specific viewpoint is omitted from what
  is to be reduced.

14
Three Arguments

• However, will this approach be appropriate when
  we wish species specific understanding? Nagel
  No. In two respects. First, as mentioned, when
  what we precisely wish to understand is
  ourselves, thinking subjects, adopting a method
  of subtracting the subjective omitting the
  species-specific viewpoint to get to pure
  objectivity is counter-productive, not to mention
  silly. Second, understanding what a term means
  in order to reduce it to a physical event
  presupposes an

15
Three Arguments

• ..understanding not explainable in physical
  terms, in physicalist theory. Therefore, the new
  theory does not encompass or replaces the old but
  rather depends on it.

16
D. Conclusions

• Physicalism where do we go from here?
• Has Nagel refuted physicalism?
• Nagels response No.
• It would be truer to say that physicalism is a
  position we cannot understand because we do not
  at present have any conception of how it might be
  true. (365) and
• But nothing of which we can now form a
  conception corresponds to it nor have we any
  idea what a theory would be like that enabled us
  to

17
D. Conclusions

• to conceive of it.We cannot genuinely
  understand the hypothesis that their nature is
  capture in a physical description unless we
  understand the more fundamental idea that they
  have an objective nature (or that objective
  processes can have a subjective nature) (366)
• If we are to understand what physicalism is
  saying, how it could be true, we need greater
  conceptual shifts and conceptual resources than
  we presently have according to Nagel.

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D. Conclusions

• We have to derive a way theoretically of bringing
  together the first person introspective account
  of knowing conscious experience with the third
  person perceptual account of brain science in
  such a way that we can conceive how neural tissue
  is connected to and generates consciousness.
  Some philosophers are not as optimistic on this
  score as Nagel. For example, McGinn quoted
  earlier, who is a materialist believing there
  must be some physical property that explains
  consciousness,..

19
D. Conclusions

• .believes the very dichotomies that Nagel
  mentions points to consciousness forever being an
  intractable natural mystery.
• What we need (1) a developed phenomenology
• (2) a re-conceptualization of the subject/object
  distinction

20
D. Conclusions

• Problem given (1) and (2) above, it will no
  doubt result in quite a conceptual revolution in
  the understanding of our terms, it it can be
  pulled off. Why assume that physicalism will
  not be altered in such a revolution? What we
  mean by the physical and by object will no
  doubt change. We know perfectly and exhaustively
  what physicalisms claims are presently, what it
  is saying and what its concepts are.

21
D. Conclusions

• Therefore, if we cannot incorporate, as Nagel
  states, this what it is like phenomenon, as
  Nagel concedes, then should not one conclude that
  in the very least that physicalism as presently
  understood is simply false and who knows what it
  will look like, if anything at all, consequent to
  theoretical revolutions?

22
Dennett, The Intentional Stance
23
An intentional system

• I wish to examine the concept of a system whose
  behavior can be at least, sometimes explained
  and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the
  system of beliefs and desires.I will call such
  systems intentional systems, and such
  explanations, and predictions intentional
  explanations and predictions in virtue of the
  intentionality of the idioms of belief and
  desire..(375)

24
An intentional system

• A system any entity whose activity we ate
  attempting to predict. It could be as simple as
  a stick or as complex as a person
• Intentional system its defining
  characteristic is that in its interpretation
  essential and ineliminable reference to
  rationality, to beliefs, desires, norm-governed
  behaviour must be made in order to make sense of
  the agent and its behaviour.

25
An intentional system

• What do we mean by the intentional here?
• For me, as for many recent authors,
  intentionality is primarily a feature of
  linguistic entities idioms, contexts and for
  my purposes here we can be satisfied that an
  idiom is intentional if substitution of
  codesignative terms do not preserve truth or if
  the objects of the idiom are not capturable in
  the usual way by quantifiers (376)

26
An intentional system

• What does Dennett mean here?
• Usually referred to as intensionality and
  semantic opacity
• Whats that?
• Note this move is not universally accepted.
  Many philosophers would regard intentionality
  to be the directedness of conscious mental
  states and not necessarily a characteristic of
  linguistic idioms.

27
Section One Three Stances

• The key point to remember with respect to all
  these stances is that they are only in relation
  to the strategies of someone who is trying to
  explain and predict its behaviour (376).
• The Design Stance
• Whats that?

28
The Design Stance

• Different varieties of design-stance predictions
  can be discerned, but all of them are alike in
  relying on the notion of function, which is
  purpose-relative or teleological. (376).
• When we approach a system from the design stance
  we do not care what it is made of its physical
  composition but rather what its function is.
  Understanding how a system was designed and
  designed for is a great aid.

29
The Design Stance

• For example, knowing what a spark plug was
  designed for to create a spark will aid us in
  repairs and observing whether it performs as
  designed. In fact, the only way to ascertain
  whether a sparkplug was malfunctioning would be
  to adopt the design stance purely physically it
  is behaving just as it should. Though the only
  way we could tell whether a system was
  malfunctioning is from the design stance, the
  only way to predict such malfunctioning is

30
The Physical Stance

• from physical knowledge the physical stance.
• From this stance our predictions are based on
  the actual physical state of the particular
  object and are worked out by applying whatever
  knowledge we have of the laws of nature. (376)

31
The Intentional Stance

• The intentional stance as in interpreting an
  intentional system, the defining characteristic
  of this stance is an essential and ineliminable
  reference to rationality, to beliefs, desires,
  norm-governed behaviour in order to make sense of
  and predict the behaviour of the system.
• Now that we are familiar with such stances lets
  apply them to playing a chess computer.

32
Playing the Chess Computer

• Scenario we are playing a chess computer and we
  want to win. What stances, strategy for
  predicting its behaviour, do we adopt?
• The Design Stance?
• That is, one can predict its designed response
  to any move one makes by following the
  computation instructions of the program. (376)
• No. We will lose every time. For each move the
  computer executes thousands and thousands of
  program instructions.

33
Playing the Chess Computer

• Each move would take hours, days, weeks to grasp
  from the design stance (algorithmic) a game
  would take a lifetime.
• From the physical stance?
• No. We will lose every time.
• Attempting to give a physical account or
  prediction of the chess-playing computer would be
  a pointless and herculean labor, but it would
  work in principle (376) yeah, for a god

34
Playing the Chess Computer

• To trace all the atoms, electrons and physical
  movements involved in each move would be quite
  the task.
• Thus, a mans best hope of defeating such a
  machine in a chess match is to predict its
  responses by figuring out as best he can what the
  best or most rational move would be, given the
  rules and goals of chess.(377)

35
Playing the Chess Computer

• It is only when we adopt the intentional stance
  towards the chess computer that we have a chance
  of predicting its behaviour and winning. It is
  only when we ascribe rationality and beliefs to
  the computer plus the desire to win that we can
  effectively predict its behaviour what moves it
  will make next that is, only when we interpret
  the computer in such a fashion.
• So what? Big deal? What does that tell us?

36
Playing the Chess Computer

• Here Dennett is agnostic This celebration of
  our chess-playing computer is not intended to
  imply that it is a completely adequate model of
  simulation of Mind, or intelligent human or
  animal activity nor Am I saying that the
  attitude we adopt toward this computer is
  precisely the same that we adopt toward a
  creature we deem to be conscious and
  rational.(377)

37
Playing the Chess Computer

• Given this, one wonders what to make of Pojmans
  intro. to this article that implies that Dennett
  believes that computers and machines think.
• Pojman is correct however, it is a latter more
  radical development of Dennetts building upon
  what is said here.
• What are these radical moves?

38
Playing the Chess Computer

• Dennett will adopt a qualified instrumentalism
  with respect to intentional states beliefs,
  desires, thoughts, rationality etc.
• He construes their reality as abstracta as
  opposed to illata.
• The abstracts/illata distinction
• Illata atoms, electrons, planets
• Abstracta centers of gravity, the equator,
  magnetism, a haircut

39
Abstracta/Illata

• Abstracta are not concrete we will not bump
  into them. They are not particulars that figures
  in causal laws nor are they objects, like
  Descartes believed thoughts were before the mind.
  Think of magnetism when iron atoms are
  aligned in the same direction, a block becomes
  magnetized. However, there is not a magnetic
  object or entity in the block itself it is an
  abstract term describing the arrangement of iron
  atoms. Or think of a haircut. We do refer to
  haircuts and they have .

40
Abstracta/Illata

• .that reality however, a haircut is an abstract
  term in which nothing exists over and above the
  individual haircuts that are cut.
• So mental states are abstracta they have that
  form of reality. Adopting the intentional stance
  in predicting behaviour is practically
  indispensable. We cannot do without it however,
  the main point of focus for Dennett is that it is
  practically indispensable which itself does not
  entail any ontological commitments.

41
Instrumentalism

• What is this?
• A view from the philosophy of science regarding
  the ontological status of hidden entities or
  theoretical posits
• For example, the electron. We do not directly
  observe an electron. Its justification, the
  reason we believe it exists, is the success of
  the theory positing them in terms of prediction
  and explanatory coherence.

42
Instrumentalism

• Realists electrons are real just like rocks and
  trees. They just cannot be observed directly.
  After all, if the theory positing them has such
  predictive success, then there must be something
  to its posits.
• Instrumentalists if the only reason we believe
  in such theoretically posited entities such as
  electrons is the predictive success of the
  theory, then the only rational conclusion to take
  is to restrict the reality of the electron to
  just that its usefulness...

43
Instrumentalism

• for prediction. The electron theory is an
  instrument for the prediction of phenomena that
  we do observe. And who knows, future scientific
  theories may dispense altogether with the notion
  of an electron.
• Dennett is slippery. In numerous articles
  Dennett appears robustly instrumentalistic
  concerning the mental. He refers to the myth of
  our rational agenthood, belief as virtual
  realityThree Kinds of Intentional Psychology
  and belief as useful fictions

44
Instrumentalism

• So many philosophers have, with good reason,
  interpreted Dennett as claiming that beliefs are
  only instrumental in adopting the theory of the
  intentional stance. Dennnett as claimed that
  this interpretation is mistaken, though in his
  more finer moments he concedes it is a mistake
  that his writings has encouraged they are
  abstracta
• The story gets more complicated in Dennetts
  later works i.e., the paper Real Patterns (1991)

45
Real Patterns

• Real Pattern think of economic laws (
  generalizations lets be strict with what we
  call a law) of exchange. Describing such
  exchanges purely physically i.e., the currency
  in terms of paper bills, coins, sticks, cows,
  etc., - will cause us to miss what all these
  exchanges have in common and what is their
  point. We need to adopt the intentional stance
  in order to see this real pattern of behaviour.
  In fact, with such an adoption we couldnt see
  all these physical goings on as a

46
Real Patterns

• .pattern to begin with, as an exchange. We
  behave in certain patterns such behaviour is
  out there, quite real and not simply in the
  eye of the beholder. If we are to have any
  understanding of the regularity of such patterns,
  if they are not to appear as mysterious
  happenings and even more strongly, if they are to
  appear to us at all, we must of necessity adopt
  the intentional stance. It is only by
  understanding beliefs, desires, and rationality
  that such a pattern comes to light think of 3-D
  pictures. Do you see it?

47
Real Patterns

• But then if this is the case, do not the
  beliefs, intentions and desires, rationality
  that make up the intentional stance have a
  reality akin to electrons on the realist picture?
  Are not beliefs then just as real as the
  patterns themselves? Dennett, in my opinion, is
  unsatisfying here.
• Given all this, to return to the chess computer
  example, the argument becomes

48
Playing the Chess Computer

• (1) If it becomes practically indispensable in
  predicting the moves of the chess computer to
  adopt the intentional stance, then since what we
  mean by beliefs, desires and rationality, our
  mentalistic concepts, is just this practical
  indispensability, a chess computer has beliefs
  it is an intentional system.
• (2) It is practically indispensable to employ
  the intentional stance with respect to a chess
  computer.

49
Playing the Chess Computer

• (3) Therefore, the chess computer has
  intentional states.
• (4) Therefore, the chess computer is a genuine
  rational agent.
• Obviously, our beliefs and rationality differs
  from the chess computers we can reflect upon
  our beliefs, discard some, self-consciously
  adopt some etc.

50
Playing the Chess Computer

• None of this the computer does however, the way
  in which the chess computers states have
  intentionality is exactly the same as the way in
  which a persons states have intentionality the
  chess computer is directed towards the rook in
  the same way we are, qua directedness.
• The chess computer is rational rationality does
  not require self-consciousness
• When a physical system becomes so complex that we
  must interpret it as rational it is rational.

51
Section Two

• There are two key points here
• (1) the taking out of intentionalist loans.
• (2) the necessity of logical rationality in
  interpretation and flexibility
• There is also an interesting critique of
  behaviourism in this section arguing how
  Skinners experimental design illicitly attempts
  to covered over the mental and intentional
  however, that is not essential for our purposes.

52
Intentionalist loans

• Any time a theory builder proposes to call any
  event, state, structure, etc., in any system (say
  the brain of an organism) a signal or message or
  command or otherwise endows it with content, he
  takes out a loan of intelligence. He implicitly
  posits along with his signals, messages, or
  commands, something that can serve as a
  signal-reader, message-understander or commander,
  else his signals will be for naught, will decay
  unreceived, uncomprehended..

53
Intentionalist loans

• The loan must be repaid eventually by finding and
  analyzing away these readers or comprehenders.
  (380)
• What does Dennett mean here?
• Simply this. Dennett is not a reductionist. We
  cannot reduce mental concepts to physical ones.
  There is no way of explaining intentionality in
  non-intentional terms. In themselves, understood
  purely physically, from the physical stance, a
  brain state does not bear information.

54
Intentionalist loans

• We have to PRESUPPOSE, based upon mental criteria
  and rationality what information is before we
  can look at any neural process and say thats
  it. This presupposition is taking out a loan.
  And this presupposition is only accessed via the
  intentional stance.
• If the agent level, the intentional stance, were
  abandoned, then all of this would become
  invisible. The intentional cannot be reduced to
  the physical or design stance.

55
Intentionalist loans

• Neurons, programs, do not of themselves bear
  information. They work to show at best the
  underlying mechanism for such information bearing
  that way we do not have to appeal to anything
  supernatural. However, no amount of analysis or
  understanding of neurons or syntax will get us to
  the very idea of information.

56
Intentionalist loans

• But now, how do we, on Dennetts account, pay
  back the loan? By analyzing away these readers
  or comprehenders (380)
• How so?
• One answer Yes, we have to presuppose
  rationality and mental criteria in order to get
  our brain science going but such a science will
  eventually become so sophisticated and detailed
  that we can kick this ladder away and no longer
  rely on such presuppositions we will pay back
  the loan.

57
Intentionalist loans

• Dennett suggests such an approach in part (382)
  though for him it is never the case that we can
  eliminate such presuppositions that is, capture
  the intentional stance in non-intentional terms.
• Problem most philosophers and neuroscientists
  think this is a pipe dream.
• The Lashleyan doctrine of neurological
  equipotentiality
• Whats that?

58
Intentionalist loans

• Multiple realizability any of a wide variety of
  psychological functions can be served by any of a
  wide variety of brain structures. Therefore,
  there are no type-identical physical structures
  no neurological evidence of such type identities.
  Thus, pointing to a particular brain process
  in-itself does not necessarily answer our
  question of what amental state it is.
• But lets do some science fiction and assume that
  this is possible.

59
Intentionalist loans

• Can we say that we have paid back the loan?
• Are we entitled to sweep such presuppositions
  under the rug and downgrade their importance if
  at every stage of testing the evolving theory we
  have had to rely upon them?
• Or, in other words, is it still the case that
  correlation is not reduction?

60
(2) Necessity of rationality and flexibility

• The intentional stance is central to all of our
  interactions
• We apply it even to animal behaviour i.e., a
  mouse sees a cat in one mouse hole and cheese at
  another. We will predict what the mouse will do
  by ascribing beliefs and desires.
• But does the animal believe in the truths of
  logic?
• Is the mouse making rational logical inferences
  here?

61
Rationality and Flexibility

• The assumption that something is an intentional
  system is the assumption that it is rational
  that is, one gets nowhere with the assumption
  that entity x has beliefs p.q.r unless one also
  supposes that x believes what follows from p, q,
  r otherwise there is no way of ruling out the
  prediction that x will, in the face of its
  beliefs p,q,rdo something utterly stupid, and,
  if we cannot rule out that prediction, we will
  have acquired no predictive..

62
Rationality and Flexibility

• power at all. So whether or not the animal is
  said to believe the truths of logic, it must be
  supposed to follow the rules of logic. Surely,
  our mouse follows or believes in modus ponens,
  for we ascribed to it the beliefs (a) there is a
  cat to the left and (b) if there is a cat to the
  left, I had better not go left, and our
  prediction relied on the mouses ability to get
  to the conclusion (379-80)

63
Rationality and Flexibility

• We have flexibility here. It doesnt matter how
  we answer the question in terms of predicting its
  behaviour. Whether the mouse thinks logically
  grasping theorems such as If A then B, A,
  therefore B and guides its action in such a
  fashion or whether after seeing a cat it simply
  follows a rule telling it not to make its
  acquaintance without any such deduction, is
  simply our choice nothing hinges on it. Or so
  it is claimed.

64
Section Three

• Two Main Points
• (1) How are we to understand the normative
  character of belief?
• (2) Problems in interpretation when such norms
  conflict.

65
The normative character of belief

• How ought we to believe?
• We should believe the truth?
• This seems problematic what else are we going
  to do? Can we believe what we know to be false?
• Could one abandon ones sloppy habit of
  believing falsehoods? If the advice is taken to
  mean believe only what you have convincing
  evidence for, it is vacuous advice believe only
  what you believe to be true. If alternatively it
  is taken to mean believe only what is in fact
  

66
Normative character of belief

• the truth, it is an injunction we are powerless
  to obey.(383)
• So how do we think of the normative character of
  belief?
• Answer look at the preconditions for what is
  involved in assigning beliefs.
• We can note two

67
Normative character of belief

• (1) in general, normally, more often than not,
  if x believes p, p is true. (2) in general,
  normally, more often than not, if x avows that p,
  he believes p(384)
• One way of elucidating the necessity of such
  norms in understanding the nature of belief
  Donald Davidsons project of radical
  interpretation.
• Such norms leads to what Dennett calls pragmatic
  implications of our utterances

68
Normative Character of belief

• However, they appear to be more than just
  pragmatic implications they appear to be
  normative requirements themselves.
• I assert that p
• What is my responsibility here? What burden do I
  or rather ought I to assume?
• (1) Evidence for the truth of p should be
  presented why I believe it, upon what basis.
• (2) Evidence that I do believe it behavioural
  evidence (384)

69
Conflicts in Interpretation

• Truth and rationality of belief vs. accuracy of
  avowal in our interpretive practice.
• Conflict arises, however, whenever a person
  falls short of perfect rationality, and avows
  beliefs that either are strongly disconfirmed by
  the available empirical evidence or are
  self-contradictory or contradict other avowals he
  has made. (384)
• Is she lying or is she irrational?
• How do we tell?

70
Conflicts

• One Answer Introspection the person herself
  knows
• (1) Wont help us we still are relying on
  verbal reports thus, do we opt for sincerity of
  avowal or a rationality judgment.
• (2) An even deeper more interesting problem
• If we try to fix minimum standardsof
  rationality at something less than perfection,
  what will guide our choice? Not phenomenological
  data, for the choice we make will determine what
  is to count..

71
Conflicts

• As Phenomenological data.(385)
• Perfect rationality is beyond us so what should
  be our standards of rationality? This question
  needs to be answered in order to assess whether
  the person is rational.
• However, two, maybe implicit, consequences
  follows.
• (1) given that standards of rationality is what
  constitutes beliefs being able to determine such
  standards will constitute the introspective data
  itself.

72
Conflicts

• (2) The same conflict between rationality vs.
  sincere avowal can be internalized. If you are
  introspecting your false, seemingly irrational
  belief p, is it the case that (1) you really do
  believe p but are disobeying standards of
  rationality or (2) you are lying to yourself.
  What is the authentic phenomenological data here?
  Without assessing what are standards of
  rationality can we even tell?

73
Conflicts

• Neurophysiological data can it help? A
  non-starter. We must have already fixed our
  standards of rationality, of what identifies a
  belief, in order to point to some neural
  process going on and say thats it.
• The problem mutates
• Not just rationality vs. sincere avowal but also
  how we are to understand the constitutive
  character of rationality as normative for belief

74
Conflicts

• The problem none of us are perfectly logically
  consistent not even the greatest philosophers
• We need to accommodate for this
• One obvious reason already alluded to for the
  need to so accommodate if rationality is
  constitutive of the very concept of belief and if
  rationality can only be ideal rationality, then
  none of us have beliefs
• But how do we accommodate?

75
Conflicts

• If we make exceptions to the rule, have we make
  it the new rule and therefore losing its status
  as exceptions?
• But any attempt to legitimize human fallibility
  in a theory of belief by fixing a permissible
  level of error would be like adding one more rule
  to chess an Official Tolerance Rule would we
  claim that these people actually play a different
  game from ours, a game with an Official Tolerance
  Rule with k fixed at 3? This would be to confuse

76
Conflicts

• the norm they follow with what gets by in their
  world.(385)
• With such confusion, this is not the right
  approach.
• But then, why do we not simply do an empirical
  study of what people do in fact believe?

77
Conflicts

• If one wants to get away from norms and predict
  and explain the actual empirical behavior or
  the poor chess-players, one stops talking about
  of their chess moves and starts talking of their
  proclivities to move pieces of wood or ivory
  about on checkered boards..(385)
• The problem rationality is still constitutive
  of what we mean by belief thus any attempt to
  analyze it from some other perspective to help us
  in our dilemma just changes the subject.

78
Conflicts

• It is no longer belief that is being talked
  about.
• The solution?
• More philosophical work

79
Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs The Chinese
Room
80
Some Background

• (1) Machine Functionalism
• (2) Turing Test for Intelligence

81
Machine Functionalism

• Predicated upon a functionalist theory of mind
• Whats that? Based upon the idea of functional
  explanations.
• What is a functional explanation?
• A functional explanation relies on the breaking
  down of a system into its various component parts
  and then seeks to explain the workings of the
  system in terms of the capacities of the parts
  and the way the parts are integrated with one
  another.

82
Functionalism

• A functional explanation is very similar, if not
  identical, to what is called an operational
  definitional in that instead of seeking the
  essence of something, a what it is, we define
  that something in terms of what it does,
  operationally, the roles and purposes it
  fulfills. That is what it primarily IS in a
  functional explanation i.e., a VP in a
  corporation it can be you, me, or anybody with
  the requisite training thus, what makes a VP in
  a corporation is not the .

83
Functionalism

• particular physical instantiation, in this case
  what particular person it happens to be, but
  rather the tasks, purposes and experience in the
  business setting. A VP is defined by his or her
  role in the company not body size, ethnicity,
  hair colour, etc.
• Functionalism in the philosophy of mind
• The defining feature of a mental state is the
  causal role it plays with respect to (1) inputs
  (i.e., environmental effects on the body

84
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• (2) other mental states and (3) outputs (i.e.,
  behaviour)
• Mental state defined by causal relations or as
  is the case in machine functionalism a
  programmable set of instructions, to sensory
  stimulations (inputs), behavioural outputs and
  other mental states.

85
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• A Metaphysical thesis metaphysical
  functionalism as a theory of mind. The
  complexities of the functional analysis of how
  mental states causally interact with each other
  given inputs leading to behavioural outputs is
  just WHAT MENTAL STATES ARE. In itself,
  functionalism doesnt care what physical
  realizations brains, silicon chips or whether
  there are any such instantiations disembodied
  spirits underlying such an analysis.

86
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind

• Mental terms are characterized by their
  functional role not physical composition think
  of the VP example.
• Machine Functionalism The Turing Machine
  Example of functionalism
• Turing machine specified by two functions
• (I) from inputs and states to outputs
• (II) from inputs and states to outputs

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Turing Machine Outline

• Turing machine finite number of states, inputs
  and outputs and the two functions mentioned above
  specify a set of conditionals, one conditional
  for each combination of state and input.
• Conditionals if the machine is in state S1 and
  receives input I, it will then emit output O and
  go into the next state S2. These conditionals
  are often expressed in a machine table.

88
Turing Machine Outline

• Simple version each system that has mental
  states is described by a least one Turing machine
  table of a certain sort. Also, each type of
  mental state of a system is identical to one of
  the machine table states specified in the machine
  table
• An illustration sufficient for our purposes on
  board