DTRA template

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THE NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION
PROGRAM DISMANTLING THE FORMER SOVIET UNIONS
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Charles L. Thornton Research Seminar School of
Public Affairs, University of Maryland
4 December 2002
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Agenda

• Nunn-Lugar Overview Background
• My Qualifications Research Questions
• Assessments
• Criticisms of the Nunn-Lugar Program
• Measuring Nunn-Lugars Effectiveness
• Future of the Program
• Nunn-Lugars Drivers Fundamental Concepts
• Generalizing the Nunn-Lugar Model
• Request your ideas, guidance, and ...

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OVERVIEW PROGRAM BACKGROUND
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Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Mission
Provide assistance to eligible states of the
former Soviet Union in order to dismantle weapons
of mass destruction and to reduce the threat of
weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
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Research Questions

• Have the Nunn-Lugar programs been effective?
• are the programs making tangible progress toward
  their stated goals and objectives?
• Does the Nunn-Lugar cooperative security model
  have applications beyond the current FSU WMD
  programs?
• is the program a unique solution to a unique
  problem/event, implemented under unique
  conditions?

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My Qualifications Research Assets

• Over 7 years direct experience on CTR, including
  over 30 trips to Russia
• Access to the relevant U.S. governmental
  community
• Access to the relevant Russian governmental
  community
• Well known to the U.S. and Russian
  non-governmental communities
• Increasing interaction with Pakistani and Indian
  governmental and NGO officials
• UMD Professors Fetter, Gansler, Schelling,
  Steinbruner, Turner, and Quester Dr. Gallagher
  Ms. Harris Mr. Leitenberg
• CISSM

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The U.S. GovernmentNunn-Lugar Programs

• Department of Defense
• depicted on following slides
• Department of Energy
• (Fissile) Material Protection, Control,
  Accounting
• Reactor Core Conversion Nonproliferation
  Russian Transition HEU Transparency Plutonium
  Disposition
• Department of State
• Science Technology Centers Nonproliferation
• Others
• Department of Commerce
• Department of Treasury
• 10 billion total USG obligation authority thru
  FY 2002
• 10 billion total allocations planned over the
  next 10 years

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The Former Soviet Union Challenge
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U.S. Department of DefenseCTR Program Objectives

• 1. Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms
  reduction to Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction
  Treaty (START) levels.
• 2. Enhance safety, security, control, accounting,
  centralization of nuclear weapons fissile
  material in the former Soviet Union to prevent
  their proliferation encourage their reduction.
• 3. Assist Ukraine Kazakhstan to eliminate START
  limited systems weapons of mass destruction
  infrastructure.
• 4. Assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate
  prevent proliferation of biological chemical
  weapons associated capabilities.
• 5. Encourage military reductions reform,
  reduce proliferation threats in the former Soviet
  Union.

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Nunn-Lugar Process
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U.S. DoD-Russian Cooperative Threat
ReductionOverview of Implementation
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Eliminating Delivery Systems
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Securing Warheads Fissile Material
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ASSESSMENT
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Why Study Nunn-Lugar?

• 1991 a new idea to address an acute threat
• Any historical precedence?
• Marshall Plan?
• Now it exists as a policy tool
• proliferation is a prominent issue and generally
  considered to be a serious security issue
• Nunn-Lugar addresses the supply side of the
  proliferation problem

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Criticisms of Nunn-Lugar

• Nunn-Lugar is allowing Russia to sustain and
  even expand its vast and dispersed WMD complex
• Nunn-Lugar funding allows Russia to divert its
  limited resources to operational military
  activities
• this, in turn, may actually increase the threat
  to the U.S. in the long run
• The U.S. government bureaucracy that has evolved
  is not centrally managed and often works at cross
  purposes
• Some aspects of the program have not begun to
  address their core missions
• so, after 11 years is there really a threat?
• The broader context reducing Russias
  capabilities while simultaneously sustaining U.S.
  offensive and building U.S. defense capabilities
  sends a threatening message

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Existing Common Measures of Effectiveness

• Financial Appropriations Obligation Rates
  Disbursement Rates
• most commonly used within DoD USG
• least helpful/explanatory
• Program Management Cost, Schedule, Performance
• fine for contract evaluation, but what do they
  say about meeting policy programmatic goals?
• Scorecard
• All MOEs should be based generally on threat
  reduction and more specifically on cooperative
  threat reduction

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DoD CTR Scorecard Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus
are Nuclear Weapons Free
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Potential Category FSU WMD Rollback

• Has the existence of the Nunn-Lugar program
  tangibly reduced the FSU WMD threat to the U.S.?
• How would the threat have changed if there were
  no Nunn-Lugar program?
• Does the U.S. have greater insight into the FSU
  WMD programs?
• Has the routinization of interaction between the
  U.S. and FSU military, bureaucratic, scientific,
  and industrial communities reduced the FSU WMD
  threat?

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Potential Category U.S. WMD Defense

• Has the U.S. WMD-defense program benefited
  technically from the Nunn-Lugar program?
• Note this subject may be politically sensitive.
  It may be one that, while important to U.S.
  national security, proponents would not want to
  advertise. Russia has long been concerned that
  the U.S. is dismantling Russias military
  capabilities on the one hand, while
  simultaneously using what it learned through
  Nunn-Lugar to enhance U.S. defensive capabilities.

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Potential Category FSU Nonproliferation I

• FSU Threat Perception
• has the existence of the Nunn-Lugar program
  reduced Russias threat perception, and therefore
  its need to retain a substantial WMD capability?
• Treaties Regimes
• are the existing international regimes helpful to
  the Nunn-Lugar program?
• do they contain MOEs that could be applied to the
  Nunn-Lugar program?

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Potential Category FSU Nonproliferation II

• Political
• have the FSU domestic political conditions
  changed in favor of the Nunn-Lugar program?
• have the U.S.-FSU international political
  conditions changed in favor of the Nunn-Lugar
  program?
• has the Nunn-Lugar program had a positive effect
  on the FSU domestic political conditions?
• has the Nunn-Lugar program had a positive effect
  on the U.S.-FSU international political
  conditions?
• Human
• is the FSU WMD scientific community meaningfully
  engaged?
• is the brain drain problem being effectively
  addressed?
• are the human elements of the program reducing or
  sustaining the WMD threat?

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Potential Category FSU Nonproliferation III

• Culture
• has Nunn-Lugar improved the security culture
  among FSU personnel?
• has Nunn-Lugar contributed to an overall
  awareness of the proliferation threat among FSU
  WMD personnel?
• FSU International Cooperation
• has Nunn-Lugar facilitated a greater U.S.
  understanding of FSU WMD cooperation with other
  states?
• has Nunn-Lugar provided a greater U.S.
  understanding of what types of WMD capabilities
  other states possess?

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Potential Category Security

• Physical Security
• has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the security
  of the FSUs existing stocks of WMD materials?
• Export Controls
• has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the FSUs
  export control capabilities?
• has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the FSUs
  export control statutes and regulations?

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Potential Category Programmatic

• Has the Nunn-Lugar program met the technical
  implementation challenges?
• are the solutions unique, or generalizable?
• Does the U.S. have control of the financing for
  the critical path parts of each Nunn-Lugar
  project?
• if Russia is responsible for any show-stopper
  funding requirements, what assurances are in
  place?
• Are the program and policy objectives being met
  in a timely manner?
• if not, what are the obstacles to rapid
  implementation?
• if not, have the original objectives evolved
  appropriately, or are the current objectives
  outdated?

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FUTURE
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Preventive Defense Continuum
formal arms control treaties
confidence security building measures
parallel unilateral initiatives
formal cooperative security arrangements
military alliances
executive agreements consultative arrangements

• CTR links with above, but something new
• an arrangement through which states work together
  to address common security objectives, generally
  implemented below the formal treaty level, and
  usually involving the donation of assistance from
  one state to another

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Nunn-Lugars Drivers

• Arms Control Treaty/Agreement Obligations
• Safety Security
• Economic Disintegration
• Military Security
• Political Instability
• Other

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Nunn-Lugars Principles Concepts

• Cooperation
• Expectations
• Flexibility/Adaptability
• Relationships
• Economic and Industrial Development

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Venues for a General Model

• Bilateral Programs
• Multilateral
• Non-Governmental Organizations
• Commercial Associations
• Scientific Laboratories
• International Organizations
• International Groups

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Candidate Applications for a General Model

• Supplement to Formal Arms Control
• Replacement for Formal Arms Control
• Beyond WMD Threats
• HIV/AIDS
• Migration
• Environmental Concerns

• India-Pakistan
• North Korea
• Post-Hostilities Iraq
• Tactical Nuclear Weapons
• Global Fissile Material Accounting

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Expanding the Nunn-Lugar ConceptAlready Underway?

• G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
  Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
• Pakistan
• North Korea
• Yugoslavia
• Sense of Congress

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Conclusions

• Nunn-Lugar appears to be a policy tool with an
  established record and some momentum
• but, not without its problems and detractors
• Therefore, it deserves academic attention
• PLEASE HELP ME GET STARTED!