WHY THE DROP IN CRIME

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Executive Issues Seminar Series
Executive Issues Seminar Series
1998
1998
Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas
Sam Houston State University
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PATROL RESEARCH

• Dr. Larry Hoover
• Police Research Center
• Sam Houston State University

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Last Years ProgramWhy the Drop in Crime?

• Social-demographic Trends
• Economic Conditions
• Drug Use Prevalence
• Incarceration Rates
• Police Programs.

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Myth The Police Make No Difference

• Borne first of the lack of clear relationship
  between staffing levels and crime rates
• Reinforced by the Kansas City Preventive Patrol
  Experiment and the Rand Criminal Investigation
  Study.

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Crime-Specific Policing

• Clearly defined intervention strategies
• Targeted at particular offenses
• Committed by particular offenders
• At specific places
• At specific times.

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Crime-Specific Policing is NOT

• Unfocused Strategies
• Non-Directed Patrol
• Simple Saturation Patrol

• Change in Style
• New York City COMSTAT Program
• Houston Proactive Effort in 1992

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However, Crime-Specific Policing is Not
Necessarily

• Focused upon only a single offense
• Conducted solely by Patrol
• Always a direct field based intervention
• Antithetical to Community Oriented Approaches

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We Will Examine

• Neighborhood Centered
• Targeted Enforcement
• Youth Gang Programs
• Problem-Oriented Strategies
• Proactive Investigative Techniques

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The 25 Year Research Legacy on PatrolA Brief
Synopsis

• Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1973)
• San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (1975)
• Directed Patrol in New Haven and Pontiac (1976)
• Split Force Patrol in Wilmington (1976)
• Newark and Flint Foot Patrol (1981)
• Minneapolis Repeat Call Address (Recap) (1988)
• Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment (1993)

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Other Research(examined later)

• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News
• Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment and Its
  Replications
• Investigative Effectiveness Research

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Preventive Patrol Experiment
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Preventive Patrol Experiment Beat Configuration
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Generalizing the Results

• Results
• No effect on crime
• No effect on citizen perceptions
• No effect on traffic accidents

• However
• Routine Preventive Patrol is Non-directive
• Activity varies by Dept./Shift/Officer
• Only about 2 hours of an 8 hour shift
• Results apply only to beat level perceptions

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San Diego Field Interrogation

• Three Areas
• Control
• Specially Trained Officers
• No Field Interrogations

• Time
• Pre - 7 months
• Experimental - 9 months
• Post - 5 months

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Measured Suppressible Street Crime

• Part I offenses of robbery, burglary, auto theft,
  street rape, street theft
• Other offenses included other sex crimes,
  vandalism, and disorderly conduct.

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Effect on Crime in Experimental Areas
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Other Results

• No change in control or specially trained areas
• About one month lag time in effect
• No effect on community relations
• In San Diego, 17 of all arrests attributed to
  FIs, but less than 2 of FIs result in an arrest
• About 3 of all citizen complaints result from
  field interrogations.

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Directed Patrol in New Haven Pontiac

• Use of crime analysis to direct non-committed
  patrol time to problem locations
• Direction by dispatchers proved problematic
• Reduction in criminal incidents (but lacked
  control areas)

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Wilmington Split-Force Concept

• Bifurcated patrol, 70 in Basic, 30 in
  Structured
• Structured concentrated on problem areas and
  follow-up
• Patrols arrest rate up 4, clearances up 105 -
  however, detective division clearances down 61,
  department as a whole down by 28
• Abandoned after one year.

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Newark Flint Foot Patrol

• No impact on crime in Newark, 9 reduction in
  Flint
• Decreases in fear of crime in both cities
• Significantly improved satisfaction with police
  services in both - 33 of Flint residents knew
  officer by name, 50 of remainder could recognize
  the beat officer
• Newark research beget the Broken Windows
  perspective
• Flint research beget the community oriented
  perspective.

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Minneapolis Recap Experiment

• 3 of 115,000 addresses accounted for 50 of CFS
• 5 of addresses generated 64 of all CFS
• Special unit of 5 officers assigned 125
  residential 125 commercial addresses
• After 6 months, target addresses had 15 fewer
  CFS, but erased after one year.

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Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment

• July 92 to Jan 93 two extra patrol units in Beat
  144 during evening
• Beat 144 is an 8 x 10 block area with homicide
  rate of 177/100,000 - 20 times national average
• Beat is 92 nonwhite, but 66 home ownership
• Gun seizures increased by 65, gun crimes
  declined by 40. No change in Control Beat, no
  displacement
• Drive by shootings homicides dropped
  significantly
• Saturation generated 29 more guns seized, 83
  fewer gun crimes, 55 patrol hours invested per
  gun crime prevented, traffic stops most
  productive - one gun seized for every 28 stops.

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Efficacy of Crime-Specific Approaches

• San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment
• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport News
• Flint Foot Patrol
• Minneapolis Recap
• Kansas City Gun Reduction

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Crime-Specific Policing

• Clearly defined intervention strategies
• Targeted at particular offenses
• Committed by particular offenders
• At specific places
• At specific times.

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A Final Note

• In 25 years we have learned a great deal
• However, we still know relatively little about
  what works in policing.

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TIME FOR THE RECEPTION