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Martin D. Eakes

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Title: Martin D. Eakes


1

Martin D. Eakes Subprime Mortgage
Loans Foreclosures and Policy Reversing the
Retreat on Civil Rights Conference October 19,
2007
2
About CRL
  • Nonprofit, nonpartisan research and policy
    organization dedicated to protecting
    homeownership and family wealth by working to
    eliminate abusive financial practices.
  • Affiliated with Self-Help, one of the nations
    largest community development financial
    institutions.

3
Overview
  • Subprime and Foreclosure Data
  • Existing Subprime Borrower Problem
  • Federal Regulations and Legislation
  • North Carolina legislation 1999 and 2007

4
Subprime Growth
Source IMF Publications
5
Subprime Share of All Mortgages (by origination
year)
Source IMF Publications
6
Key Subprime Facts
  • 7.5 million borrowers 1.4 trillion loans
    outstanding
  • 3 million subprime loans each year in 2005 and
    2006
  • 1 in 5 subprime loans from 2005 and 2006 will end
    in lost home.
  • 57 of 2005 subprime loans not bank-affiliated
  • 72 of subprime as exploding ARMs (Lehman,2004)
  • Rates jump from 8 to 12
  • Monthly payments up 30 or more in 3rd year
  • 600 billion rate reset in next two years
  • 70 lack escrows, which leads to flipping
  • 70 of subprime have prepay penalties only 2 in
    prime
  • 50 utilize stated income for ability to repay
  • 50 of 2006 subprime were 80/20 LTV with
    piggyback 2nd liens

7
Neighborhood Loss Direct Loan Loss
  • 1.5 lost value for neighborhood spillover effect
    within 1/8 mile of foreclosed home.
  • 3,000 loss per neighbor x 50 neighbors 150k
    of lost neighborhood value.
  • 3,000 lost property tax revenues per year for
    schools at 2 rate.
  • For 2 million lost homes, 300B neighborhood
    wealth 6B local taxes lost.

8
Higher cost 1st lien total loans2005 HMDA
  • Higher cost of total
  • African American 388,471 52
  • Latino 375,889 40
  • White 1,214,003 19

9
(No Transcript)
10
Cumulative Final Foreclosures for Subprime Loans
Made in 2000
Cumulative Foreclosures (as of May 2005)
11
Final Foreclosures by Annual Loan Cohort (May
2005)
12
Subprime Foreclosure Starts Now Drive MBA Overall
Foreclosure Starts
Source MBA
13
Subprime Proportion of MBA Conventional
Foreclosure Starts
Source MBA
14
State Housing Prices vs. Foreclosures
15
Helping Borrowers Keep Their Homes
  • 40 Refinance existing loans to prime,
    fixed-rate loans (GSEs, FHA).
  • 20 Loan modifications by extending initial
    rate.
  • 20 Loan modifications by reducing rate or
    balance by up to 50, the est. liquidation loss.
  • 10 Speculative or investor loans.
  • 10 Borrowers where feasible assistance will not
    be enough.

16
Solved Legal Issues for Loan Mods
  • Pooling and servicing agreements (PSA) generally
    permit loan modifications.
  • REMIC rules for pass-through tax treatment permit
    modifications of loans in default or where
    default is reasonably foreseeable.
  • FAS 140 for QSPE treatment permits loan
    modification for home loans that are delinquent
    or where default is reasonably foreseeable.

17
Remaining Legal Issue 2nd liens
  • 20 LTV second mortgage for 50 of 2006 loans
  • 50 serviced by different servicer.
  • Borrowers cant handle negotiations with two
    different servicers.
  • 1st lender will not modify loan if substantial
    benefit flows to 2nd.
  • 2nd lender will not modify if 100 loss.
  • Foreclosure cuts off 2nd, but borrower loses
    home.
  • Need federal amendment to modify home loan in
    bankruptcy

18
Remaining Legal Issue Servicer Liability
  • Servicer liability for conflicting investor
    demands
  • Example Mod deferring loss favors residual
    holder if excess yield account released, but
    hurts senior bondholders.
  • New PSAs include safe-harbor language that loan
    servicers serve the best interests of boldholders
    as a group.
  • Will be greater problem in 2008 when
    modifications could reach 30 of outstanding
    securitization pools.
  • Discrimination liability possible if servicer
    modification guidelines are discretionary, and
    non-objective.
  • Foreclosure is legally the easiest servicer
    action.

19
Foreclosure Solutions
  • Need federal bankruptcy amendment to allow
    judicial mod of home loans, as for all other
    personal assets, including 2nd homes, farms,
    land, commercial real estate, boats, and
    furniture.
  • Automated, standardized loan modifications by
    loan servicers. 1 currently is pathetic.
    (Moodys)
  • Funding for legal representation of borrowers.
  • Lease-purchase program to redeploy REOs.

20
Bankruptcy Tweak
  • section 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code should be
    amended as follows
  • 1322 Contents of plan
  • . . . .
  • (b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this
    section, the plan may
  • (2) modify the rights of holders of secured
    claims, other than a claim secured only by a
    security interest in real property that is the
    debtors principal residence, or of holders of
    unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights
    of holders of any class of claims

21
Three Different Policy Problems
  • 1. Future subprime borrowers and loans
  • Joint banking guidance for Nontraditional
    Mortgage loans October 2006
  • Joint banking guidance for Subprime mortgage
    loans July 2007.
  • Federal Reserve rules under HOEPA Fall 2007.
  • Federal legislation (Watt-Miller-Frank, Bachus,
    Schumer)
  • 2. Foreclosure of existing subprime borrowers.
  • 3. Liquidity and investor markets melt-down.

22
FRB Authority since 1994
  • 15 USC 1639(l)(2)
  • (l) DISCRETIONARY REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF
    BOARD.--
  • (2) PROHIBITIONS.--The Board, by regulation or
    order, shall prohibit acts or practices in
    connection with--
  • mortgage loans that the Board finds to be unfair,
    deceptive, or designed to evade the provisions of
    this section and
  • refinancing of mortgage loans that the Board
    finds to be associated with abusive lending
    practices, or that are otherwise not in the
    interest of the borrower.

23
FRB Action Needed for Subprime
  • Prohibit prepayment penalties
  • Prohibit yield spread premiums to brokers
  • Require escrows for taxes and insurance
  • Require ability to repay at fully indexed rate
  • Prohibit stated income loans
  • Require lender due diligence of brokers such that
    lender responsible for broker acts or
    misrepresentations for loans delivered to lender

24
North Carolina 1999 Legislation
  • For all home loans
  • Prohibited single-premium credit insurance
  • Prohibited prepay penalties for loans up to 150k
  • Prohibited flipping where net tangible benefit
    of refinancing less than fees charged
  • High cost loan defined as 5 points and fees
  • Prohibits financing of up-front fees
  • Counseling required

25
North Carolina 2007 Legislation
  • Definition of Subprime as rate spread loans
  • Consensus by Banks, credit unions, mortgage
    banks, finance companies, consumer and civil
    rights groups
  • HMDA trigger of Treasury 300 bps for 1st liens
    OR
  • Freddie survey rate 175 bps (fixes flight to
    quality problem and inverted yield curve ARM
    problem)
  • Prohibits subprime prepay penalties
  • Prohibits subprime stated income loans
  • Requires ability to repay at fully indexed rate
  • Includes yield spreads in 5 high cost
    definition as in Georgia, New Jersey, New Mexico,
    Mass, and other states

26
Addendum Slides
27
Subprime Foreclosure Over Time(20 Cohort FC
Rate 70 SP Refi Rate)
28
Sensitivity to Refi Rate to Another Subprime Loan
29
Loan Features Carry Risk
  • Among subprime loans originated in 2000, after
    controlling for credit score
  • ARMs had 72 greater risk of foreclosure than
    FRM.
  • Balloons had 36 greater risk than FRM.
  • Prepayment penalties associated with 52 greater
    risk.
  • Low/no doc loans with 29 greater risk.
  • Purchase money with 29 greater risk than
    refinance.

30
Example of 2-28, 200,000 ARM, No Change in Rates
Source CRL Calculations
31
Ever Foreclosed, by Annual Loan Cohort
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