Title: anonymity
1Anonymity on the Internet
2Types of Anonymity
- Pseudonymity
- Susceptible to subpoenas
- Sender
- Receiver / observer cant identify sender
- Receiver
- Observer cant identify receiver
- Sender-receiver
- Observer cant identify that communication has
been sent
3Uses of Anonymity
- Positive
- Free speech for political claims as well as
non-political comments - engage in whistle-blowing
- conduct commercial transactions
- freedom from detection, retribution, and
embarrassment - New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 1964
- "an author's decision to remain anonymous...is
an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment"
4Uses of Anonymity
- Negative
- Spam
- DoS -
- Illegal activity anonymous bribery, copyright
infringement, harassment, financial scams,
disclosure of trade secrets
5Assumptions
- Weak attacker
- Eavesdrops on first and last hop
- Can introduce messages here
- Strong attacker
- Eavesdrops on all links
- Can introduce messages anywhere
- Attacker has finite time, computing power
- Multiple users
6Types of Attackers
- Local eavesdropper
- Observes inbound and outbound messages on users
computer - Administrator
- Operator or group of operators of anonymizing
systems attempting to foil their own system - Remote attack
- Observation at the remote end by eavesdropper or
attack by the remote host
7Attacks
- Timing Attack, Volume Attack
- Watches shape of traffic instead of content
- Flooding Attack
- With batch size n, attacker sends n-1 messages
- Usage Pattern Attack
- Consistent usage patterns leads to predictability
8Levels of Anonymity
Absolute Privacy
Beyond Suspicion
Probable Innocence
Possible Innocence
Exposed
Provably Exposed
- Beyond Suspicion
- Attacker can see evidence of a sent message, but
the sender appears no more likely to be the
originator than any other potential sender in the
system - Probable Innocence
- The sender is more likely the originator than any
other potential sender, but there is equal
likelihood the sender is not the originator - Possible Innocence
- The sender appears more likely to be the
originator than to not be the originator, but
theres still a non-trivial probability that the
originator is someone else
9Capabilities
- Latency, Bandwidth, Anonymity
- Pick 2
- Human element
- Repetitive usage patterns make attacks easier
- Pizza effect
10Proxy Anonymizers
- Use trusted centralized servers
- Anonymous remailers - Helsingius
- Anonymizer.com
- Hides IP address - NAT
- Users not anonymous to proxy server
- Susceptible to traffic analysis
11Mixes
- Source routing chosen by user
- Shuffles order of packets
- Mix cascade consists of several mixes under
separate operators - Encrypted for each mix in the path
- Processes packets in batches
- Used to counter traffic analysis
12Mixes
Ai Next Hop Address
Ci Message encrypted with public key of Mix i
S Destination Host address
M Original message
4.
Mix 1
Mix 2
1.
3.
2.
Mix 4
Mix 3
A1, C1(A3, C3(A2, C2(S, M, r2), r3), r1)
A2, C2(S, M, r2)
1.
3.
A3, C3(A2, C2(S, M, r2), r3)
S, M
2.
4.
13Mixes
- Fine for non real-time (email)
- Not sufficient for VoIP, video, web
- Mix waits to accumulate inputs to process as a
batch (especially slow for low traffic)
14Enhancements
- Messages all the same length
- Buffers messages until several can be sent at
once - Dummy messages inserted
- Between mixes
- Between mixes and user
- Balance end to end throughput with anonymity
- Duration to wait for mixes to accumulate traffic
- Percentage of dummy traffic
15P5
- Decentralized
- Harder to attack
- Allows choice of tradeoff between anonymity /
throughput - Encrypted with public key of each node in route
- Nodes change packet order
- Fixed message size
- Users have broadcast map and route map
- Noise packets counter statistical traffic analysis
16User A
User B
Hash of Users public key provides choice of
groups.
User A can send an anonymous message to User B
via group /0, 1/1, 111/3, etc
01/2 is a subset of /0 more efficient but less
anonymous
User A can route messages between 00/2 and 01/2
Broadcast hierarchy independent of network
topology
17P5
- Within a channel, P5 functions as a mix cascade
- Between channels, P5 provides greater anonymity
per bandwidth - For 8192 users, 1.5 Mbps provides 200Kbps with
40 loss - Resistant to Timing/Volume and DoS attacks
- Susceptible to Flood Attack (Mob Attack)
- Users channel is flooded, prompting him to
reveal more of his mask to gain efficiency,
thereby reducing his anonymity
18Conclusion
- Costly to be anonymous (Use Anonymous VPN
Service) - Tradeoff with throughput
- Can not be completely anonymous anyway
- No protection from monitoring usage patterns
- Aside from this, practical anonymity can be
achieved