The Knowledge Argument

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The Knowledge Argument
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1st Paper

• Ready to return
• Same marking scheme as before
• 25 of grade
• Youve now received 50 of your overall grade.
• Notes on the 1st paper
• 1) Introduction
• 2) Conclusion
• 3) References

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2nd Paper

• Paper length 1500-2000 words
• Due date December 13, 2007, 3 p.m.
• Penalty for late submission 10 of your essay
  grade per late day, including weekends
• Submit hard copy to Philosophy Office and soft
  copy to turnitin.com

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• Paper topics
• Is the mind modular? If so, is it massively
  modular, or is central processing non-modular?
  Please argue your case with reference to
  particular modules that have been proposed, e.g.
  a language learning module, cheater-detection
  module or folk psychology module.
• 2) Does the language of thought hypothesis or
  connectionism provide a more promising model of
  the mind?
• 3) Is there a universal, innate mentalese?
• 4) Is folk psychology an accurate theory of human
  behavior? Why or why not? If not, should folk
  psychology be eliminated?
• 5) Could physical science allow an alien to learn
  what it is like to be a human? If so, how? If
  not, why not and does this prove that physicalism
  is false?

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Paper topics (cont.)

• 6) Are A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness
  distinct types of consciousness? Discuss in
  relation to cases such as sleep-walking, change
  blindness, blindsight, etc.
• 7) Does Mary learn anything when she sees red for
  the first time? If not, why not? If so, what does
  she learn and does this prove that physicalism is
  false?
• 8) Is all thinking unconscious?
• 9) What is the role of consciousness in thinking?
• 10) If decisions are made unconsciously, is free
  will possible?

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Advice for 2nd Paper

• Say something new!
• Dont rely only on what has been covered in
  class. I want to read some new ideas, so either
• 1) Do some research. You are advised to read
  optional readings that I have posted that are
  relevant to your subject. You are also welcome to
  find other sources. You must acknowledge other
  peoples ideas through references, and, you must
  not only report other peoples ideas, but also
  use your own philosophy skills to analyse and
  evaluate their arguments.
• OR
• 2) Formulate your own new ideas and arguments.
• In either case, be sure to consider possible
  counter-arguments.
• Dont forget introduction, conclusion,
  references.

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A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness (cont.)

• Review
• Access Consciousness a state wherein
  informational mental content is available to
  reasoning and rational control of action
• Phenomenal Consciousness qualia, raw feels,
  what it is like

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Possible relationship between A- and
P-Consciousness

• They are distinct in concept and separable in
  reality
• There are actual cases of P- without
  A-Consciousness or A- without P-Consciousness,
  e.g. blindsight, background noise
• 2) They are conceptually distinct but empirically
  inseparable
• In humans, P and A consciousness always go
  together, but we can imagine in other creatures
  they could come apart, e.g. zombies
• 3) They are not even conceptually distinct
• P-consciousness is a necessary component of
  A-consciousness. A-consciousness necessarily
  feels the way it does. Zombies are inconceivable.

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Other Characterizations of Consciousness

• Self-Consciousness
• Sometimes consciousness is defined as
  self-consciousness.
• In other words, it is claimed that consciousness
  is an awareness of the world in relationship to
  ones self, so that a concept of self is
  necessary for consciousness.
• Perhaps consciousness arises when the brains
  simulation of the world becomes so complete that
  it has to include a model of itself (Dawkins
  1981)

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• Self-consciousness a higher-order consciousness
• Self-Concept
• self vs. environment
• self vs. others
• A kind of Access Consciousness
• Can a creature have P-consciousness without
  self-consciousness?
• Block says, obviously yes.
• Most people say yes. Some rare philosophers say
  no.

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• Mirror test for self-consciousness
• Meant to show if animal/person is
  self-conscious.
• Spot put on forehead of dog/chimp/baby and
  dog/chimp/baby put in front of mirror.
• If they react to mirror appropriately, e.g.
  touch their own forehead, they are said to be
  self-conscious.
• Dogs, cats, birds fail.
• Chimps, elephants, dolphins pass.
• Babies pass after 1½ years old.
• Are dogs nevertheless conscious?

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• 2) Monitoring Consciousness
• Consciousness is internal monitoring (proposed by
  Lycan)
• Consciousness consists of a scanning of internal
  mechanisms that monitor perception, psychological
  states, etc. and integrating the information
  received
• What about laptop computer that contains internal
  monitoring program?
• Lycan consciousness is a spectrum. Laptop
  computers are a little bit conscious.
• Block This is only A-consciousness, not
  P-consciousness

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Thought Experiments about Color Consciousness

• Philosophers of consciousness love to talk about
  color.
• Experience of color perception is
• a prime example of qualia.
• The experience of color is
• P-consciousness, but the ability
• to discriminate color is a function
• of A-consciousness
• But, these thought experiments are really about
  consciousness -- color is just an example.
• These thought experiments could be reformulated
  to be about tastes, smells, sensations or sound.

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1) The Inverted Spectrum

• A precursor to the knowledge argument.
• First proposed by John Locke in 17th century
• Imagine that you see colors in exactly the
  opposite way as I do.
• Where I see green, you see red, where I see
  yellow, you see blue, etc.

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You and I still use color words in exactly the
same way we agree that the sky blue, even
though we experience the color of the sky
differently. Color discrimination functions the
same in both of us. Argument against
functionalism Since color perception in both of
us is the functionally same, but our qualia is
different, functionalism about qualia must be
wrong. Argument against physicalism If no
physical investigation can show that our color
experience is different, physicalism must be
wrong.
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• Objection to the inverted spectrum scenario
• Is it really possible for color experience to be
  inverted with no behavioral (functional)
  differences?
• Consider The sky appears orange (as you see
  orange) to me, but I say that the color of the
  sky is cool, soothing and peaceful, and it
  reminds me of refreshing water, bluebells and
  bluebirds.
• Can I really see orange and have this response?
• What is it like for me to see orange for blue?
  Is it like seeing orange is for you, or is it
  like seeing blue is for you?
• Dennett qualia is no more than the combination
  of physiological responses, associations and
  reactive dispositions caused by a stimulus.

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• 2) The Knowledge Argument
• Frank Jackson
• Epiphenomenal Qualia
• 1982
• Qualia freak
• Argues that physicalism is false, and qualia is
  epiphenomenal.

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• What physicalism means
• Everything is physical
• All (correct) information is physical
  information.
• All facts are physical facts.
• Remember supervenience
• The mental supervenes on the physical.
• Thoughts, feelings, ideas, qualia all supervene
  on the physical.

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• What physicalism is false means
• There are non-physical facts.
• OR
• There are non-physical properties.
• Jacksons claim
• Qualia is non-physical.
• Anything non-physical can have no effect on the
  physical world (because of causal closure)
• Hence, qualia is epiphenomenal

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Fred

• The knowledge argument has two parts
• Fred
• Mary
• Fred is the lesser known.
• Fred can distinguish two completely distinct
  colors in objects that we call red. He calls
  them red1 and red2.
• For Fred, these colors are as distinct as blue
  and yellow are for us.
• He can use this ability to sort (e.g.) tomatoes
  reliably into two categories. The categories look
  the same to us (i.e. red), but he can always tell
  them apart.

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• We are colorblind with regard to red1 and red2.
• We can never know (except by direct experience,
  i.e. a partial brain transplant) what red1 and
  red2 are like.
• Physical investigation cannot tell us what red1
  and red2 are like, so these concepts are
  non-physical.
• Is this the same as we cannot tell what it is
  like to be a bat?
• No. We share most types of subjective experience
  with Fred, but we cannot know what this
  particular subjective property is like to
  experience. We cannot even know what it would be
  like for us to see red1 or red2.

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Mary

• Mary is the second and more famous part of the
  Knowledge Argument.
• Mary Imprisioned
• Mary is imprisoned in a black-and-white room
• with a black and white TV
• Marys skin, blood, etc. dyed grey?
• lets just say Mary is colorblind

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• Mary is a brilliant scientist.
• She learns all the physical facts
• about colors and the neurophysiology
• of vision (how we see color), including
• which wavelength combinations from the sky
  stimulate the retina (Jacksons example)
• how the stimulation of our eyes causes the brain
  state changes that result in the speech act the
  sky is blue (Jacksons example)
• what changes in brain states occur when we see or
  imagine color and how these changes affect all
  other brain states (my elaboration)

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Mary freed

• When Mary comes out of the room (or has surgery
  to give her color vision), she sees colors for
  the first time.
• Is she surprised?
• Oh, thats what blue looks like!
• Does she learn something?
• Jackson Yes, obviously she learns something!

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The Argument

• P1 Mary knew all the physical facts about color
  vision
• P2 Mary learned something new about color vision
• Conclusion What she learned was not a physical
  fact.
• Hence, there are non-physical facts.
• Facts about qualia are non-physical facts.

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Responses

• Mary doesnt learn anything new
• Jackson is begging the question.
• Jackson says Mary knew all the physical facts,
  and yet learned something new. Obviously, this
  presupposes that all physical facts do not cover
  all possible facts.
• You can object that P1 is impossible. It is
  impossible for us to learn all the facts about
  human visual processing
• Or, if you accept P1 and you dont beg the
  question and you assume that there are only
  physical facts, then you conclude that Mary
  doesnt learn anything new.

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• If Mary doesnt learn anything new, why does it
  seem like she would learn something new?
• It is very hard to understand what it would be
  like to know all the physical facts about the
  perception of color in human beings.
• Because we cannot imagine what it is like to know
  all the physical facts, our intuition lets us
  down.
• We cannot now imagine what complete physical
  knowledge of visual processing will allow us to
  understand in the future.

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• 2) The ability response
• Mary does learn something new, but what she
  learns is not a fact.
• Mary learns know-how.
• Not all knowledge is factual knowledge. Some
  knowledge is know-how, e.g. how to ride a
  bicycle.
• Mary learns how to recognize colors, how to
  imagine and remember them.

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• 3) Mary doesnt learn any new facts, but she
  learns old facts under a new presentation.
• Mary learns no new facts about color.
• She learns to experience old facts in a new way.
• Knowing from a subjective point-of-view and
  knowing from an objective point-of-view are two
  different ways of knowing, but can both be
  knowledge of the same facts.
• Related argument subjective facts are also
  physical facts, but can only be known
  subjectively. So, she does learn new facts, but
  physicalism is not false.

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Jacksons change of heart

• In 1982, Jackson thought that the knowledge
  argument proved that qualia was non-physical and
  supported epiphenomenalism.
• Later, he changed his mind. He decided that
  physicalism is most likely correct, and the
  knowledge argument is misleading, but still
  interesting as a challenge to be answered how
  can it be wrong and yet seem so right?
• In 2002, he wrote
• Most contemporary philosophers given a choice
  between going with science and going with
  intuitions, go with science. Although I once
  dissented from the majority, I have capitulated
  and now see the interesting issue as being where
  the arguments from the intuitions against
  physicalismthe arguments that seem so
  compellinggo wrong.

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Readings for next week

• Required
• Daniel Wegner (2003), The mind's best trick How
  we experience conscious will, at
• http//web.gc.cuny.edu/cogsci/private/wegner-trick
  .pdf
• Zelazo Thompson, Is Thought Unconscious?, in
  The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, p.
  357-359 at
• http//books.google.com/books
• Optional
• Levy, Neil, (2005), Are Zombies Responsible? The
  Role of Consciousness in Moral Responsibility
  at
• http//au.geocities.com/neil_levy/Documents/articl
  es/consciousness_MR.pdf