Veto Power II

1
Veto Power II

• Last time introduction to Veto power
• Today bargaining before an audience

2
2nd Essay assignment

• Write no more than 3 double-spaced pages
  (exclusive of title/abstract page and references
  page) on the following
• Where are the presidents persuasive powers
  greatest in the legislative process and why?
  Discuss presidential use of positive agenda
  powers vis-à-vis different kinds of issues in the
  legislative process, illustrating your
  conclusions with some details from a specific
  legislative initiative from the last four years.
• Include a one-paragraph (short!) abstract on a
  separate title page, summarizing your answer
• 3-paragraph introduction hook, thesis, roadmap
• Due in class Nov. 15

3
Last time asymmetric veto power

• Negative agenda power is the ability to reject
  policy changes. Key questions
• what is reversionary policy?
• what do legislators and executives know about
  each others interests?
• Model 1 single-shot, take-it or leave-it offers.
• the setter model
• if prez threats are cheap talk, should anyone pay
  attention?
• prez should veto bills that make him worse off
  than reversionary policy, Congress should try to
  anticipate and optimize
• veto power should be asymmetric

4
Odysseus and the Sirens

• Model 2 presidential commitment
• Hypothesis that president can credibly pre-commit
  to vetoing a bill, even if signing makes him
  better off
• reduces asymmetry, but not subgame perfect in
  single-shot games
• in equilibrium, Congress overrides all vetoes
• suppose president and Congress can send signals
  to the audience the Going Public variant
  (president has asymmetric ability to prime/frame
  issues for the public, thereby affecting
  legislators induced preferences)

5
More veto models

• Veto bargaining and incomplete info MCs have to
  guess what prez would accept
• vetoes happen and are not overridden in eq.
• but MCs never intend to be vetoed
• Blame Game bargaining before a moderate
  audience
• assume president wishes to appear more moderate
  than his true preferences MCs want him to appear
  extreme actions entail audience costs
• Cong Prez know each others prefs, but voters
  dont
• Groseclose and McCarty model prez approval
• prez taste for voter approval gives Congress
  leverage to do better than in the standard setter
  model when reversionary policy is bad, but
  favors the prez