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Dynamic Adversarial Conflict with Restricted Information

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Title: Dynamic Adversarial Conflict with Restricted Information


1
Dynamic Adversarial Conflict with Restricted
Information
  • Jason L. Speyer
  • Research Asst. Ashitosh Swarup
  • Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering
    DepartmentUCLA
  • MURI , Review
  • June 4 2002

2
Cooperative and Adversarial Static Strategies
with Restricted Information
  • Static Stochastic Teams Radner
  • Each team members strategy is a function of only
    its local noisy measurement of the state of the
    world.
  • Minimize the expected value of a convex function
    of the team strategies and the state of the
    world.
  • All a priori statistics and functions are known.
  • Solution
  • Stationary conditions for general convex cost
    Radner.
  • Locally finiteness condition relaxed Krainak,
    Speyer, Marcus
  • Solutions available for the LQG and LEG.
  • Static Stochastic Nonzero-sum Games Basar
  • Solutions available for LQG.

3
Dynamic Team and Game Strategies with Nonclasical
Information Patterns
  • LQG and LEG team strategies with one-step
    delayed-information pattern available.
  • All information except for the current
    measurement is shared.
  • Solution constructed by dynamic programming where
    a static game is solved at each step in the
    backward recursion.
  • Since information can not be shared, few results
    are available for game strategies Willman.
  • Formal (possible) solution to LQG games of
    conflict.
  • We interpret his results and discuss new
    directions.

4
Formulation of the Dynamic LQG Game With
Restricted Information
  • Consider the quadratic cost criterion
  • The discrete-time system dynamics are
  • The measurements are

5
Strategies for Games with Restricted Information
  • Define the measurement history of the pursuer and
    evader as
  • Define the strategies as general linear functions
  • Since these strategies are adversarial, there is
    no cooperation and therefore, no possibility of
    cheating.
  • Consider the Saddle Point Inequality as
  • where ( ) denotes the saddle point strategies.
  • If one player uses a linear strategy, then the
    resulting LQG problem produces the other linear
    optimal strategy.

6
Construction of the Linear Strategies
  • The cost can be formed through the following
    nesting
  • Assume the pursuer knows the functional form of
    the evaders strategy as
  • Substitute evaders strategy into the dynamic
    system
  • where is a ((i1)nie)(in(i-1)e)
    growing matrix.

7
Construction (Continued)
  • Knowing the evaders strategy, solve the LQG
    problem of minimizing
  • where is the
    conditional mean propagated as
  • The pursuers strategy given the evaders strategy
    is
  • This strategy, known to the evader, must be
    reduced to the form

8
Convergence to Saddle Point Strategies
  • Strategies are a complex function of the
    opponents gains.
  • Strategy gains are determined by an iterative
    procedure.
  • Begin by assuming an adversaries strategy.
  • Solve for the opponents strategy given an
    adversaries strategy.
  • A sequence of LQG minimization and maximizations
    oscillate about the saddle point.
  • This sequence may converge to the saddle point
    strategies.
  • Require conditions for the existence of a saddle
    point of pure strategies.
  • Require conditions for convergence to the saddle
    point.

9
Special Cases
  • Consider the full state information LQR
    differential game.
  • If there exits a solution to the saddle point
    Riccati eq.,
  • then the Riccati eqs. associated with sequential
    min and
  • max operations converge to the saddle point
    Riccati eq.
  • Convergence has been proved.
  • Consider a scalar three stage dynamic game with
    restricted
  • information.
  • Cost criterion converges to a fixed point for
    some parameters.
  • Saddle point strategies converge to a fixed
    point.
  • Results indicate a hedging policy by the
    adversaries
  • over their full state strategies.

10
Application to SEAD
  • Requires generalization of LQG strategies for
    adversarial conflict.
  • Apply to suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)
  • UCAVs allocate resources based on their
    distributed sensor information.
  • SAM site allocates resources based on its sensor
    information.

11
Coordinated Flight
  • Aerodynamically Coupled Formation Flight of
    Aircraft
  • Chichka, Wolfe, Speyer
  • Applications
  • Autonomous Aerial Refueling.
  • Autonomous Formation Flight for Drag Reduction.
  • UCAV Clusters.
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