Title: Digital Signature
1Digital Signature
(e public key , d secret key ) of a
signer Sd signing function, Ve verification
function, m Ve(Sd(m))
2Attack models
- Total Breaking Attack
- - The attacker knows the public key and tries
to recover the corresponding secret key. - Forgery Attack
- - The attacker knows the public key. He
tries to find the signature - for a given message.
- Existential Forgery Attack
- - The attacker knows the public key. He
tries to find a pair of - a message and its signature.
- Chosen Message Attack (CMA)
- - The attacker is able to sign messages
but does not know the key used. He tries to
perform the (existential) forgery or to obtain
the secret key.
3Forgery Attack
The attacker tries to find the signature s from
a given message m and the public key.
signature s of m
Forgery attacker
message m public key
(d secret key )
4Existential Forgery Attack
The attacker tries to find a pair of a message
and its signature from the public key.
(m,s) pair of message and signature.
Existential Forgery Attacker
public key
(d secret key )
The message of the pair may have no meanings.
5Chosen Message Attack
The attacker tries to find a pair (m,s) from
several pairs of signature (mi,si) and the
public key.
(m,s) pair of message and signature.
Chosen Message Attacker
public key
(d secret key )
messages m
Sd(m) signatures
Signing Oracle
If the attacker can choose new messages dependent
to obtained signatures, it is called the
adaptive chosen message attack.
6Definitions of Digital Signature
Digital signature is a triple of algorithms (G,
SIG, VER) such that (1)G is a probabilistic key
generating algorithm which returns public key
pk and secret key sk depending on the security
parameter k. (2)SIG is a signing algorithm,
which on input pk, sk, a message m in 0,1k,
and a random number r in 0,1k (kltn), returns a
signature s. (3)VER is a verification
algorithm, which on input pk and m, and s,
checks if s is valid. We require VER(pk,m,s)1
if s SIG(m,pk,sk).
7Strongest Security Definition
A signature scheme (G,SIG,VER) is existentially
unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message
attack if Pr (pk,sk) G(1k)
for A chooses mi and gets si SIG(mi,pk,sk)
for i1,2,..,n (m,s) A(pk, m1, s1,
, mn sn) m mi for i1,,n, and
VER(m,pk,s)1 is negligible in k for every
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A.
8RSA Signature
p, q primes, n pq, ed 1 mod (n),
e, n public key, d secret key, (factoring,
n 1024 bits) M message, M in 0,1,.. , n-1.
Signing S Md mod n
Verification M Se mod n
Key generation p 3, q 5, n 15, e 3 gt d
3 Signing M 13, S 13d mod n,
gt S 7 Verification Checking M Se mod
n
9Existential Forgery of RSA
Let (S1, S2) be the signatures of the messages
(M1,M2), namely S1 M1d mod n, S2 M2d mod n.
Then S S1S2 mod n is the signature of M
M1M2 mod n, because S S1S2 M1d M2d
(M1M2)d mod n.
The message M must be randomized before signing.
The message M is usually signed by S h(M)d mod
n, where h is the hash function h 0,1 -gt
Z/nZ. (h(M) h(M1)h(M2) mod n does not
hold)