Overview%20of%20Today - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Overview%20of%20Today

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Documentation style: signing, anonymous, encryption and reference digest ... An asserting actor may receive proxy certificates from other actors ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Overview%20of%20Today


1
Overview of Todays Talks
  • Provenance Data Structures
  • Recording and Querying Provenance
  • Break (30 minutes)
  • Distribution and Scalability
  • Security
  • Methodology

2
Security in a Provenance System
  • Victor Tan vhkt_at_ecs.soton.ac.uk

3
Security Where does it fit in ?
  • All data processing related activities in
    industrial environments will incorporate security
    concerns
  • Recording and querying are two main activities in
    the provenance system for which a security
    architecture needs to be developed
  • Scalability and distribution requires further
    extensions to a basic security architecture

4
Primary security issues
  • Integrity and non-repudiation of p-assertions
  • Access control to provenance store
  • Delegation of identity / access control
  • Federated security

5
Integrity and non-repudiation of p-assertions
  • P-assertion is a subjective view of actor
  • Need to establish accountability for the creation
    of an assertion (non-repudiation)
  • Ensure that p-assertions are not altered after
    being created (integrity)
  • Directly implemented by signing p-assertions

6
Signed actor state p-assertion
7
Signed relationship p-assertion
8
Signed interaction p-assertion
9
Access control to provenance store
  • Mutual authentication between actors and
    provenance store
  • Secured communication link (encryption,
    signatures)
  • Appropriate authorisation scheme expressed in
    suitable authorisation policy language

10
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11
PS
12
Remote security domain
Security architecture of hosting system
13
Delegation of identity / access control
  • Various components interact with each other in
    the logical architecture during a workflow run
  • Need to be authenticated or authorised to perform
    an action or access a resource on behalf of
    another component
  • Requires delegation of identity / access control

14
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15
Hospital Actors
User Interface
Donor Data Collector
Brain Death Manager
16
Delegation of identity / access control
Presentation UI
Provenance store
17
Federated security
  • Provenance stores can be distributed for
    scalability reasons
  • Stores may be located in different security
    domains
  • Federation of identity may be required for actors
    in a given domain to interact securely with
    stores in separate domains.

18
Remote security domain
Security architecture of hosting system
19
Provenance Store Distribution
- Bandwidth - Access Control - Storage
PS
PS
PS
20
Federated security / Single sign on Approach 1
Provenance store Security domain 1
Provenance store Security domain 2
21
Federated security / Single sign on approach 2
Provenance store Security domain 1
Provenance store Security domain 2
22
Secondary security issues
  • Checking asserter identity
  • Documentation style signing, anonymous,
    encryption and reference digest
  • Integrity of referenced data
  • Setting authorization assertions for p-assertions

23
Checking asserter identity
  • Asserter identity is given in view of a
    p-structure
  • This should match with identity on verified
    signature on associated p-assertions

24
P-structure view
25
Signed actor state p-assertion
26
Documentation style
  • In the simplest case, creation of a p-assertion
    from original message exchanged involves copying
    the message content verbatim
  • Creation of a p-assertion from original message
    can also involve transformation of contents of
    original message for various reasons

27
Documentation style Security relevant
transformations
  • Encryption
  • Uses a secret key to encrypt parts of message
    that becomes the content of the created
    p-assertion
  • Querying actors with access to the secret key can
    retrieve the p-assertion and decrypt the
    encrypted portion
  • Anonymous
  • Some parts of the message are replaced by
    anonymous identifiers
  • Particularly relevant in environments where
    privacy is critical (e.g. patientID in hospital
    records)

28
Documentation style Security relevant
transformations
  • Signing
  • An asserting actor may receive proxy certificates
    from other actors
  • The keys in these proxy certificates can be used
    to sign parts of p-assertion by the asserting
    actor
  • Referenced-digest
  • P-assertions may contain references to data
    rather than the actual data
  • To ensure that the data that the reference is
    eventually resolved to was the original data, a
    digest of the original data is included along
    with the reference in p-assertion

29
Interaction in the Organ Transplant Process
Request healthcare record for patient PID1
Donor Data Collector
Electronic Healthcare Management System
30
Request Message Contents
  • ltsoapenvelopegt
  • ltsoapheadergtlt/soapheadergt
  • ltsoapbodygt
  • ltechrsrequestgt
  • ltechrspatientgt PID1 lt/echrspatientgt
  • lt/echrsrequestgt
  • lt/soapbodygt
  • lt/soapenvelopegt

31
Documentation style Anonymous
  • ltpsinteractionPAssertiongt
  • ltpslocalPAssertionIdgt1lt/pslocalPAssertionIdgt
  • ltpsdocumentationStylegt
  • http//www.pasoa.org/.../stylesAnonymisedPa
    tient
  • lt/psdocumentationStylegt
  • ltpscontentgt
  • ltsoapenvelopegt
  • ltsoapheadergtlt/soapheadergt
  • ltsoapbodygt
  • ltechrsrequestgt
  • ltechrsanoymisedPatientgtx78df2 lt/
    echrsanoymisedPatientgt
  • lt/echrsrequestgt
  • lt/soapbodygt
  • lt/soapenvelopegt
  • lt/pscontentgt
  • lt/psinteractionPAssertiongt

32
Setting authorisation statements
  • Newly created p-assertions must have
    authorisation statements associated with them
  • These can be
  • set statically by provenance store system
    administrator
  • provided by the recording actor submitting the
    p-assertion
  • The appropriate use depends on application
    dependent requirements

33
Summary
  • Primary security issues
  • Integrity and non-repudiation of p-assertions
  • Access control to provenance store
  • Delegation of identity / access control
  • Federated security
  • Secondary security issues
  • Checking asserter identity
  • Documentation style
  • Integrity of referenced data
  • Setting authorisation assertions for p-assertions

34
Questions ?
Victor Tan vhkt_at_ecs.soton.ac.uk
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