Collective Action And then what

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Collective Action -And then what?

• Winnifred R. Louis
• School of Psychlogy,
• The University of Queensland

2
Acknowledgements

• This research was supported under the Australian
  Research Council's Discovery funding scheme
  (project number DP0663937).
• Thanks to Debby Terry, Angela Nickerson, Allison
  Sullivan, Carla Barnett, Leda Blackwood

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Jargon

• collective action
• intentional action of individuals to benefit a
  group.
• does not require physical and temporal proximity,
  explicit political aims, or prior planning.
• social change
• both formal policy change to benefit a group, and
  informal changes in their social value, status or
  power.
• Outcomes of collective action
• social change, identities, norms,
  socio-structural beliefs, and intergroup
  attitudes.

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How do you motivate collective action?

• individual instrumental incentives and social
  rewards (e.g., Klandermans, 1997)
• social identities, or ones sense of oneself as
  part of a group (Tajfel Turner, 1979 also,
  Deaux, Reid, Martin, Bikmen, 2006 Simon
  Klandermans, 2001 van Zomeren et al., 2004)
• collective effectiveness, or success in achieving
  group goals (e.g., Klandermans, 1997 Tajfel
  Turner, 1979 Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,
  Wetherell, 1987)
• collective emotions such as anger (e.g., Iyer,
  Shmader, Lickel, 2007 van Zomeren et al.,
  2004).

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How do you use collective action to achieve
social change?

• Given collective action event x, what determines
  whether the event
• Leads to policy change vs status quo vs provoking
  a backlash?
• Consolidating or erodes participants
  identification, norm perceptions, perceptions of
  intergroup relations?
• Changes identities, beliefs, attitudes and
  actions of political opponents and bystanders?
• Collective action as the IV?

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A learning model of collective action Does it

• Benefit individuals and groups?
• Assuage aversive emotions such as anger, guilt,
  and outrage?
• Convey to protagonists, bystanders, and opponents
  the distinctive positive value of a group?
• Or the illegitimacy, instability, or
  impermeability of intergroup relations?

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A virtuous spiral?

• Successful collective action (Drury Reicher,
  2008 see also, Drury et al., 2005 Drury
  Reicher, 2000, 2005)
• increases in identification,
• collective empowerment and collective
  self-objectification
• But unsuccessful collective action (e.g.,
  Blackwood Louis, 2009)
• Leads to defensive discounting of failure to
  mobilise by high identifiers
• Alternative motives or rationalisation?

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A commitment/dissonance model of collective
action

• Does it harm individuals and groups?
• Does it reinforce emotions such as anger, guilt,
  and outrage?
• Are irrational beliefs about the effectiveness of
  action sustained (or replaced) by social
  creativity?
• When will collective action by one group alter vs
  reinforce anothers socio-structural beliefs and
  norms?

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The interaction of injunctive and descriptive
norms
who act
E1 Either one is enough
Smith, J. R., Louis, W. R. (2008). Do as we
say and as we do The interplay of descriptive
and injunctive group norms in the
attitude-behaviour relationship. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 47, 647-666.
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The Sociology of Ineffectiveness

• Environmental, anti-nuclear, and peace movements
  in the USA, Switzerland, and Italy had no impact
  on national policy (Giugni, 2004 see also, e.g.,
  McAdam Su, 2002 Soule Olzak, 2004).
• Burstein (2006 Burstein, Bauldry, Froese,
  2005) social movement action has little role in
  policy change, as both are shaped by public
  opinion.

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Making change happen
Bills proposed in a sitting of Congress
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Public opinion???

• Increasing public doubt that politicians care
  what public opinion is (e.g., Pharr, Putnam, and
  Dalton, 2000, pp. 9-10)
• Predominant analysis strategy is regression model
  (Louis, Mavor Terry, 2003)
• Regression models in intergroup often overlook
  meaningful inter-correlations among IVSs
• underestimate distal predictor (mediation) (see
  also Louis, Taylor Neil, 2004 Louis, Taylor
  Douglas, 2005)
• Luders (2006) depends on leverage
• vulnerability of the target to disruption costs
  (e.g., lost profits from disruptive collective
  action)
• vulnerability to concession costs (e.g., lost
  profits from counter-mobilisation by opponents)
• Both of these relationships in turn moderated by
  the targets ability to meet the movements
  demands.

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Critical moderators, contd (Burstein and
Linton, 2002)

• Policy change is more likely with non-party
  actors than political party actors b/c depends on
  proportion of swing voters mobilised
• Its not frequency of events, organisational
  membership, budget need change variables
• Routine vs novel, disruptive, in time of change
• collective actions were linked to policy outcomes
  20 of the time for activities not directed at
  electoral politics (e.g., strikes), 60 for
  routine electoral activities, and 100 of the
  time (!) for novel electorally-oriented
  activities.

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Distinguishing the types of action

• Piven and Cloward (1977, 1991) ritualized,
  normative conflict acknowledges and procedurally
  reinforces the power of advantaged groups. Vs
  disruptive
• Breaks up the advantaged group by inducing
  polarisation on their responses
• moderate faction disempowered because of
  defections to more conservative factions.
• moderates motivated by their need for alliances
  to make concessions to the disadvantaged group.
• Disruptive conflict overlooked in aggregate
  measure
• Normative and disruptive collective actors can be
  rivals (vs. allies)

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Plausible hypotheses for social psychology

• Collective action might work if it
• Increases the salience of a superordinate
  identity
• Decreases legitimacy perceptions increases moral
  outrage and reparatory intentions
• Increases instability perceptions increases
  perceptions of the costs of the status quo
• Increases impermeability perceptions (thereby
  decreasing legitimacy and defusing threat)?
• Makes salient injunctive and descriptive norms
  against discrimination in the advantaged group
• But as commonly practiced, many collective
  actions should worsen intergroup relations via
  backlash effects

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Brisbane Activists Survey 08-09

• 58 volunteers
• Mean age approximately 43 years (18 - 75)
• Predominately female (74)
• 42 different organisations represented with group
  membership ranging from less than 1 year to over
  20 years
• approx. 20 are members of other organisations
• Sampled three times (2-4 weeks apart)

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At T2, introduced power and opponent
counter-mobilisation prime

• When power was low people reported more
  determination (M 5.81) compared to high power
  (M 4.64)
• Opponents no effect

This is a highly functional reaction, but
intentions didnt change nor did identity,
cost-benefit analyses, anger. And what about less
experienced activists?
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Introduction of a Carbon Pollution Reduction
Scheme in Australia

• 113 Queenslanders self-categorised as
• Supporter of the governments scheme (36), of a
  stronger scheme (34), or opponent of CPRS (20)
• 56 women
• Aged 21-76
• power prime
• Supporters are running a campaign
• Opponents are running a campaign

Many political commentators argue that supporters
of the governments proposed 5 carbon pollution
reduction scheme are winning the debate. It
appears to be unlikely that higher emission
reduction targets will be introduced in the short
term. It also appears to be unlikely that those
who oppose carbon pollution reduction schemes
altogether will be able to block the start of any
scheme in the next two years. What do you think?
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The effects of campaigns on intentions

• Again, power had no impact
• Three-way interaction
• Opponents campaign motivated counter-mobilisation
  by supporters of stronger scheme if govt was not
  campaigning (!)
• But neither of the other groups intentions
  affected
• In TPB, perceived control seemed to carry part of
  this interaction

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The effects of collective action

• Descriptive norm research
• Depends on moral context (injunctive norm) as
  well as political context (issue relevance)?
• Expt 1 Brisbane activists
• Experimental primes show low power elicited
  increased determination
• Expt 2 Community sample
• Evidence of counter-mobilisation
• Fascinating three-group context such that govts
  political opponents fought each other if govt was
  silent
• Correlational analyses pending

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Where next

• Bystanders / Public Opinion
• Laboratory studies using ostensible news stories
  and student samples
• Descriptive and injunctive norms
• Collective action is a fascinating IV with
  complex moderators and important outcomes
• Changing protagonists identity, norm
  perceptions, attitudes, action
• And bystanders
• And opponents / policy change

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Thank you!

• w.louis_at_psy.uq.edu.au