Title: MGT 459 Negotiation
1MGT 459 - Negotiation
2Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
3Two Major Types of Negotiation Situations
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
4Factors Increasing Non-cooperative Negotiation in
Business
- Decentralization within Company
- Conflicts of interest
- Sub-optimization
- Strategic Alliances, Mergers, Acquisitions
- 55 of alliances and 78 of MAs fail
- Only 23 recover costs
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
5Non-cooperative Negotiation in Business
- Specialization
- Dependence on other firms for inputs
- Competition
- Can also create opportunities for cooperation
(e.g., generic advertising)
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
6Myths about Interdependent Decision Making
- Myth 1 Its a game of wits
- I can outsmart them
- Other party is just as smart
- Myth 2 Its a game of strength
- Show em youre tough!
- Escalates conflict
- Myth 3 Its a game of chance
- Hope for the best
- Many outcomes are predictable
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
7Forms of Social Dilemmas
- A two-party dilemma is called a prisoners
dilemma - A multi-party dilemma is called a social
dilemma - Also known as Mixed-Motive Situations
- Simultaneous incentives to cooperate and compete
- Mutual cooperation is best for both parties,
combined - Competition is best for each party, individually
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
8Prisoners Dilemma
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
9Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
- Type 1 One-shot decision
- Dominance detection Party As outcome is better
by defecting regardless of Party Bs decision - Equilibrium outcome results, neither party can
unilaterally improve his or her outcome by making
a different choice
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
10Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
- Type 2 Repeated interaction over a fixed number
of trials - Purpose of cooperation is to influence the
behavior of other party - Backward induction Start by predicting outcomes
in final trial - Final trial is essentially a one-shot decision
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
11Types of Prisoners Dilemmas
- Type 3 Repeated interaction for an infinite or
indefinite amount of time - Final trial not expected, or point in time not
predictable - Cooperation may influence other persons behavior
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
12Examples of Mixed Motive Situations
- Airlines
- Auto manufacturers dealers
- Arms race
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
13Winning (i.e. losing) Strategy for Prisoners
Dilemmas
- Tit-for tat strategy
- Always cooperate on first trial
- On subsequent trials, do what opponent did on the
previous trial - Tit-for-tat can never do better than its
opponents - Tit-for-tat has the potential to induce
cooperation
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
14Illustration of Tit-for-tat
15Why is Tit-for-tat Effective?
- Its nice
- Competition elicits competition
- Its tough
- Solid cooperation would be exploited
- Its forgiving
- Commensurate response
- Its not too clever
- Other party can figure it out
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
16How to make TIT-FOR-TAT work
- Dont be envious
- Dont be the first to defect
- Reciprocate both cooperation and defection
- Dont be too clever
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005
17Recovering from Defection
- Try to see the other partys response as rational
(i.e., one we would make) - Dont expect trust to be rebuilt immediately
- Consider letting the other party catch up
- Make your decisions at the same time
Source Adapted from Thompson, The Mind and Heart
of the Negotiator, 2005