Priming and Framing in the Public Agenda

1
Priming and Framing in the Public Agenda

• Last time more Veto power models
• Today priming, framing and the public agenda

2
Odysseus and the Sirens

• Model 2 presidential commitment
• Hypothesis that president can credibly pre-commit
  to vetoing a bill, even if signing makes him
  better off
• reduces asymmetry, but not subgame perfect in
  single-shot games
• in equilibrium, Congress overrides all vetoes
• suppose president and Congress can send signals
  to the audience the Going Public variant
  (president has asymmetric ability to prime/frame
  issues for the public, thereby affecting
  legislators induced preferences)

3
More veto models

• Prez commitment model reduces asymmetry Cong.
  compelled to give prez more of what he wants,
  even when he is structurally disadvantaged how
  plausible?
• Incomplete info models MCs have to guess what
  prez would accept
• vetoes sometimes happen, and are never overridden
  in eq.
• but MCs never intend to be vetoed
• Blame Game bargaining before a moderate
  audience
• assume president wishes to appear more moderate
  than his true preferences MCs want him to appear
  extreme actions entail audience costs
• Cong Prez know each others prefs, but voters
  dont
• Groseclose and McCarty model prez approval
• prez taste for voter approval gives Congress
  leverage to do better than in the standard setter
  model when reversionary policy is bad, but
  favors the prez

4
Positive agenda power

• can the president set the legislative table
  directly or indirectly?
• Where does the president have unilateral ability
  to initiate policy change?
• What shapes legislators policy agendas? I.e.,
  how are issues primed? Can the president affect
  the set of salient issues?
• How do specific proposals get considered? I.e.,
  how are issues framed? Can the president affect
  the set of alternatives considered?

5
Constitutional authorities

• Negotiate treaties (needs advise and consent of
  2/3 of senate)
• Receive ambassadors
• Commander in chief
• Nominate judges, ministers, ambassadors,
  officers, high officials (needs majority of
  senate to appoint) and all other officials not
  otherwise provided for by law Fill vacancies
  during Senate recesses (temporary appointments)
• Other action-forcing authorities
• Require written opinions from principal officers
  of executive departments
• Call Special Sessions of Congress Adjourn
  Congress when H and S cant agree on an
  adjournment date
• Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the
  U.S. not involving impeachment
• Other constitutional authorities
• Give periodic reports to Congress on State of
  Union
• Take care that the laws are faithfully executed

6
Delegated authorities

• Contingency funds
• Reporting requirements (other than State o
  Union), e.g., the budget
• Trade agreement authorities
• Reorganization authorities
• Impoundments recission authorities

7
What do legislators want? How can they get what
they want?

• Goals
• reelection
• good public policy
• career advancement
• cost minimization
• Strategies
• advertising
• position-taking
• credit-claiming

8
When can the president set the legislative table
directly?

• Legislators face a collective dilemma of who will
  do the hard work of writing policy proposals and
  trying to pull together a support coalition
• Legislators face a further collective dilemma in
  how to solve distributive problems
• Presidents have incentives to try to solve these
  dilemmas by offering entrepreneurial services
• first-mover advantages when entrepreneurship and
  amendments are costly prez may get policy closer
  to what he most wants
• credit-claiming and position-taking
  opportunities audience effects

9
Bicameral bargaining and presidents

• Bicameral legislatures create the possibility of
  bargaining failures
• 2-player bargaining games
• relative bargaining strengths?
• are there obvious solutions (Schelling focal
  point solutions)?

10
Presidential persuasion

• Going public (external lobbying)
• priming
• framing
• Insider lobbying
• patronage campaigning support
• persuasion

11
Can the president prime issues?

• Jeffery Cohen article on State of the Union
  addresses
• presidential mentions of an issue area are
  related to increased mentions of those issues by
  survey respondents (a priming effect)
• prez popularity seems unrelated
• leadership effects decay faster in domestic than
  in foreign policy arenas
• no evidence of framing effects