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THE SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION

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Title: THE SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION


1
  • THE SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY SITUATION
  • PAKISTANS PERSPECTIVE
  • Presentation
  • at
  • United Services Institute of ACT
  • by
  • Mr. Jalil Abbas Jilani
  • High Commissioner for Pakistan to Australia
  • on Wednesday 05 November 2008

2
STRATEGIC LOCATION OF PAKISTAN
  • Located at the heart of Asia
  • Gateway to the Central Asian Republics
  • Provide shortest access to Sea to the landlocked
    States of Central Asia, Afghanistan and Western
    China.
  • Immediate neighbour include India (2912 KM)
    Afghanistan (2430 KM), China (623 KM) Iran (1000
    KM).

3
FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
  • Establishment of stable internal and external
    environment for sustainable economic growth,
    promoting collaborative partnership in the region
    and building strategic relationship with major
    powers such as the US, China, Russia, European
    Union and Islamic countries, forging peaceful,
    tension free and cooperative relationship with
    all regional countries and constitute major
    Foreign Policy goals of Pakistan.

4
PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS
  • History of tension due mainly to
  • a) unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir dispute
  • b) Illegal occupation of Siachen Glacier by
    India
  • c) Non-resolution of Land Maritime Boundary in
    Sir Creek area.
  • d) Water issues.
  • e) Terrorism
  • f) Nuclear Conventional issues.

5
PEACE PROCESS
  • Since 2004, Pakistan and India engaged in a Peace
    Process.
  • Three Track Approach
  • 1) Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
  • 2) Composite Dialogue.
  • 3) Back Channel

6
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TOWARDS PEACE PROCESS
  • Realization in India that it could not impose a
    decisive war on Pakistan.
  • Realization that there is no military solution to
    the Kashmir dispute.
  • Conclusion that neither country could achieve its
    economic potential without resolving disputes.
  • Need to manage relations in a nuclearized
    environment.
  • Changing International Environment.

7
STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS
  • After 4 rounds, the status is
  • - Significant progress on CBM track
  • - Slow progress on substantive issues
  • - Back channel has helped sustain the dialogue
    process.

8
HOW TO TAKE THE PROCESS FORWARD
  • Build trust and avoid propaganda.
  • Preservation of agreements and CBMs instituted so
    far.
  • Move forward beyond CBMs.
  • A problem solving approach.
  • The principle of give and take.
  • Play by the rulers
  • Domestic political compulsions should not be
    allowed derail the peace process.

9
INDO-PAKISTAN TENSIONECONOMIC HUMAN COSTS
  • ECONOMIC COSTS
  • Military Cost
  • Bilateral Trade
  • The Foreign Director Investment (for India to
    sustain a growth rate of 8, it needs FDI to the
    tune of 35 of GDP. In other words India needs to
    attract FDI in the order of US 51 billion.
    Pakistan needs FDI of at least US 9 billion.
  • Effect on Intra Regional Trade (present Intra
    Regional Trade is around 5.5 billion dollars,
    whereas potential is US 16 billion. Per Annum
    Loss to the tune of 10 billion dollars).

10
HUMAN COSTS
  • Loss of civilian lives.
  • Loss of Livestock
  • Damage to crop and property
  • Displacement of people in conflict zone.
  • Psychological Trauma on the population in Kashmir
  • Destruction of educational institutions,
    hospitals.
  • Damage to infrastructure.
  • Environment costs (melting of Siachen Glacier due
    to shelling, cutting of trees, disappearance of
    rare species).
  • Toll on tourism

11
  • SECURITY SITUATION
  • IN
  • AFGHANISTAN/FATA
  • ECONOMIC COSTS

12
AFGHANISTAN
  • The present situation in Afghanistan and the
    Frontier Regions of Pakistan is the accumulated
    result of developments since December 1979.
  • The process of radicalization in the region was
    the outcome of a series of strategic mistakes,
    including the use of Islamic extremists in the
    war against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

13
Security Environment
  • Threat to Afghanistan is from five
    elements namely Taliban, drug mafia, warlords,
    tribal and political rivalries
  • Gen. James Jones, NATO Commander

14
Security Situation
  • The Security situation in Afghanistan is
    worsening
  • During 2008, attack on NATO/ISAF Forces/Afghan
    Government installations increased by 40
  • Violence not confined to areas adjacent to
    Pak-Afghan border but in provinces deep inside
    Afghanistan
  • Taliban/Al-Qaeda resistance is turning into a
    mass scale insurgency
  • Taliban have raised thousands of recruits who are
    paid better salaries than are paid to Government
    employees.
  • According to perception in the local population,
    Taliban have reorganized and exercise control
    over large areas of Southern and Eastern
    Afghanistan.
  • 4 Southern provinces Helmand, Kandhar, Zabul
    and Uruzgan are the main base and command center
    of Taliban and also of drugs.

15
  • The Afghan Governments writ mainly confined to
    Kabul and its adjoining areas
  • Excessive use of force breeding resentment
    amongst the Afghan people
  • Strong Pushtoon tradition of blood for blood
  • Killing one innocent Afghan can turn the whole
    village against the Coalition and the Afghan
    Government
  • Afghan resistance does not distinguish between
    American, British or Australian soldiers. For
    them all white skinned soldiers are American
    soldiers

16
Factors contributing instability
  • Ineffective security apparatus
  • (Poor discipline, low salaries, high rate of
    desertions, corruption)
  • Nexus between Taliban/Al-Qaeda, drug barons and
    warlords
  • There is an awful evil mix of Taliban
    hardliners, drug barons, warlords, black
    marketers and corrupt officials who are funding
    insurgency that Canadian troops are battling in
    Panjwai and Zhari Districts of Southern
    Afghanistan
  • Col. Fred Lewis, Deputy Commander,
  • Canadian Task Force.

17
  • Drug Money is dragging the rest of Afghanistan
    into a bottom line pit of destruction and
    despair
  • Antonio Mario Costa
  • Executive Director UNODC
  • According to UNODC Report 2007, drug production
    and trade has reached alarming proportions

18
  • Taliban and warlords are being funded with
    billions of dollars from massive local opium
    trade. Much of the money is used to buy
    sophisticated weapons for the Taliban and
    warlords, salaries of the fighters and to bribe
    Pak-Afghan border officials and to secure the
    allegiance and support of local population
  • Ilena Ros-Lehtinen
  • Member US House Foreign Affairs Committee
    Feb 2007

19
  • Ethnic Imbalance in the Government.
  • - Ethnic imbalance is yet another factor
    contributing to instability. Pashtuns have
    been sidelined in almost all important spheres

20
  • Cross Border Movement
  • - 2560 km Pak-Afghan border remains mostly
    undemarcated, ill- defined and porous.
  • - There are 362 crossing points out of which 20
    crossing points are frequented and 340
    unfrequented
  • - Most crossings take place from unfrequented
    routes
  • - 10,000 to 30,000 people cross Torkham/Chaman
    border every day. (Businessmen, tribals, NGOs,
    international agencies, illegal immigrants)

21
  • Excessive use of force
  • - Excessive use of force is breeding
    discontentment

22
  • Slow pace of reconstruction activity.
  • - Many of the Afghans feel that a lot of
    promises, agreements and pledges were made by
    the international community for reconstruction
    but never fulfilled
  • - Afghan Pact 2006 London is being perceived as
    an admission of failure of Bonn and Japan Process

23
  • Too few Western Troops.
  • Lack of coherent strategy on the part of ISAF
    Forces
  • - National restrictions on respective forces (71
    restrictions on how forces can be used).

24
  • (i) Foreign Interference
  • - Various countries have started to go beyond
    their brief in Afghanistan.

25
Pakistans Dilemma
  • The situation in tribal areas of Pakistan will
    remain volatile due to instability in Afghanistan
  • Three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan for the
    last 30 years a major economic drain, some of
    the Afghan refugee camps also provide save havens
    to Afghan insurgents
  • Lack of resources to enforce border control
  • The legacy of 30 years have established strong
    linkages between extremist elements in Pakistan
    with Taliban and Al-Qaeda
  • External interference in NWFP and Baluchistan.

26
Pakistans Role in bringing about stability in
Afghanistan and Tribal Areas
  • Deployment of 1,20,000 troops along Pak-Afghan
    border and establishment of 900 border posts
  • Pakistan still hosting more than 3 million Afghan
    refugees
  • In our fight against Al-Qaeda and Taliban more
    than 1000 of Pakistan troops have lost lives
  • Pakistan has captured more than 700 Al-Qaeda and
    Taliban elements and handed over to the US and
    Afghan Government
  • Stable Afghanistan is Pakistans interest to
    ensure stability in Pakistan and for economic
    development of Pakistan and the region
  • Pakistan is providing 300 million assistance to
    Afghanistan
  • Pakistan provides training to Afghan Customs and
    Diplomats
  • Registration of Afghan refugees
  • Introduction of biometrics system

27
What is Required
  • A comprehensive strategy would be required to
    break the vicious circle involving simultaneous
    action to defeat Al-Qaeda/Taliban, eliminate drug
    barrens and warlords, removal of ethnic
    imbalance, initiation of visible developmental
    work
  • The international community need to assure the
    Afghans that their presence is meant to help
    reconstruction and no occupation
  • Outside countries should confine themselves to
    reconstruction only. Any political agenda on the
    part of any country or temptation to extend the
    mandate will initiate a chain reaction
  • Ethnic imbalance must be removed
  • Carefully planned strategy to win over Taliban
    sympathisers should be evolved
  • In order to discourage drug production a crop
    substitution programme should be initiated
  • Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan , some of which
    who have developed sympathies with Taliban have
    to be closed down and refugees encouraged to go
    back to Afghanistan
  • Do not impose any thing that clashes with Afghan
    culture and traditions

28
  • PAKISTAN SHOULD DO MORE?

29
Characteristics of Pak-Afghan Border
Pakistan shares 2560 kms long border with
Afghanistan, out of which 1360 kms border is with
NWFP while the remaining 1200 kms is shared with
Balochistan
BADAKSHAN
MINTAKA
CHITRAL
NURISTAN
1360 km
KUNAR
NWFP
NANGARHAR
AFGHANISTAN
PESHAWAR
PAKTIA
KHYBER
KHOWST
2560 km
PAKTIKA
NWA
BANNU
ZABUL
SWA
KANDAHAR
ZHOB
BALOCHISTAN
CHAMAN
NIMROZ
QUETTA
HELMAND
29
1200 km
NAUSHKI
ROBAT
NOK KUNDI
30
BAJAUR
Characteristics of Pak-Afghan Border
MOMAND
PARACHINAR
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
FATA comprises 4200 sq kms of the Pak Afghan
border belt, which was considered No Go Area
before these operations
SWA
31
Characteristics of Pak-Afghan Border
Pak - Afghan Border belt consists of mountainous
inhospitable terrain with heights ranging from
6000 to 15000 feet
31
32
North Waziristan
Characteristics of Pak-Afghan Border
The area on both sides of the border lacks basic
infrastructure, due to which it is mostly under
developed and quite inaccessible. This makes
logistic support and sustenance of forces
extremely difficult
32
33
MINTAKA PASS
Characteristics of Pak-Afghan Border
BROGHIL PASS
BADAKSHAN
DORA PASS
GILGIT
CHITRAL
NURISTAN
ARANDU PASS
Bari Kot
KUNAR
DIR
BAJAUR
NAWA PASS
Nawa Pass
NANGARHAR
KABUL
MOHAMAND
Torkham
KHYBER PASS
KABUL
The tribal border belt has split families and
tribes with property on both sides therefore,
cross border movement has been an accepted
practice since long
PESHAWAR
KHYBER
KURRAM
PAKTIA
GHAZNI
Chamkani
KHOWST
Lawara
ALWARA
NWA
INDUS
PAKTIKA
ANGOOR ADDA
SWA
GOMAL
33
34
Strategy being Followed
  • Application of military and para military forces
    to destroy hard core elements and establish the
    writ of the government, coupled with extensive
    deployment along the border to control cross
    border movement
  • Engagement at the political level to secure the
    desired objectives Cont

34
35
Strategy being Followed
  • Revitalisation of the civil administration to
    improve governance
  • Development of civic infrastructure of the
    region. For this purpose, Pakistan has allocated
    US 80 million while United States has promised
    US 150 million every year

35
36
Operations Conducted by Pakistan Armed Forces
Pakistan Army has established 821 posts along the
border, as against approximately 120 that have
been established by Afghan National Army and NATO
36
37
Operations Conducted by Pakistan Armed Forces
Approximately 1,12,000 regular and para military
forces are presently employed on our Western
Border
BADAKSHAN
MINTAKA
CHITRAL
NURISTAN
KUNAR
NWFP
NANGARHAR
AFGHANISTAN
PESHAWAR
PAKTIA
KHYBER
KHOWST
PAKTIKA
NWA
BANNU
ZABUL
SWA
KANDAHAR
ZHOB
BALOCHISTAN
CHAMAN
NIMROZ
QUETTA
HELMAND
37
NAUSHKI
ROBAT
NOK KUNDI
38
Operations Conducted by Pakistan Armed Forces
  • 110 major operations by Pakistani Forces
  • 13 joint operations with Coalition Forces

BADAKSHAN
MINTAKA
CHITRAL
NURISTAN
KUNAR
NWFP
NANGARHAR
AFGHANISTAN
PESHAWAR
PAKTIA
KHYBER
KHOWST
PAKTIKA
NWA
BANNU
ZABUL
SWA
KANDAHAR
ZHOB
BALOCHISTAN
CHAMAN
NIMROZ
QUETTA
HELMAND
38
NAUSHKI
ROBAT
NOK KUNDI
39
Casualty Figures
  • Pakistan Armed Forces
  • Martyred (Killed) Injured
  • 1500 3746

39
40
Casualty Figures
  • Casualty Figures Al-Qaeda/Taliban
  • Killed Injured Apprehended
  • Foreigners 534 311 326
  • Locals 911 984 2045
  • Total 1445 1295 2371

40
41
  • A NEW STRATEGY
  • Objectives
  • 1) To end Suicide Bombings
  • 2) Pacify FATA
  • 3) Halt the spread of Taliban and militant
    influence
  • 4) Support the stabilization of Afghanistan

42
  • ELEMENTS OF THE NEW
  • STRATEGY
  • 1) POLITICAL (Dialogue with Tribal elders, those
    willing to lay down Arms).
  • 2) ECONOMIC (Reconstruction activity. ROZs,
    employment).
  • 3) MILITARY (Military action against those
    unwilling to surrender).

43
  • ECONOMIC COSTS
  • Absence of economic development (ROZs)
  • Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
    Project
  • Negative effect on Education, Health in
    Afghanistan and Tribal Areas of Pakistan.
  • Foreign Direct Investment.
  • Transit and Access to sea of land locked States
    of Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan.
  • Destruction of infrastructure.
  • Environmental costs.

44
  • THANKYOU
  • Q A
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