Title: GPTC Distribution Integrity Management Guidance
1GPTC Distribution Integrity Management Guidance
- Lee Reynolds
- Leader Gas Standards
- NiSource Distribution Operations
- OGA Technical Seminar
- March 28, 2008
2Presentation Overview
- DIMP Background
- DIMP Elements
- Who is GPTC?
- GPTC DIMP Guidance
- Timelines
3DIMP BackgroundRelevant Reports
- American Gas Foundation Safety Performance and
Integrity of the Natural Gas Distribution
Infrastructure - Sponsored by Industry with participation with
Government - Allegro Report - Safety Incidents on Natural Gas
Distribution Systems Understanding the Hazards - PHMSA Sponsored Report
4DIMP BackgroundPHMSA Public Meeting
- Public Meeting - December 16, 2004
- DOT Inspector General recommended Distribution
Integrity should include the following operator
requirements - Understand the Infrastructure
- Identify and Characterize the Threats
- Determine How Best to Manage the Known Risks
(Prevention, Detection, and Mitigation)
5Transmission
6Distribution
7DIMP BackgroundDistribution Vs Transmission
- There are significant differences in the design
of gas distribution pipeline systems compared to
the pipelines subject to current integrity
management regulations (i.e., liquids and gas
transmission). These include - pipe size,
- operating pressure,
- materials, and
- the large number of branches and connections in
distribution systems. - These design differences significantly limit the
applicability of the inspection techniques
currently in use for transmission pipelines to
distribution pipeline systems.
8DIMP Background
Report of Phase 1 Investigations
Published December 2005
9DIMP Background Report of Phase 1 Investigations
This effort concluded, as did the American Gas
Foundation Study before it, that distribution
pipelines are safe. Incidents continue to
occur, but their frequency has been reduced.
There is room for improvement. Implementing
integrity management, consistent with the
findings and conclusions of the work/study
groups, should help achieve additional
improvement.
10GPTC Discussion
- The following information developed by the GPTC
DIMP Ad-Hoc Task Group.
11Who is the GPTC?
- Gas Piping Technology Committee
- Providing guidance for compliance with federal
pipeline safety regulations since 1970 - Began as an ASME committee
- An ANSI Accredited Standards Committee - Z380 -
since 1992 - Large, well balanced, consensus oriented committee
12Who is the GPTC?
- Regulators
- Federal
- State
- NTSB
- Gas Industry
- Distribution
- Manufacturing
- Transmission
Primary mission Write and publish guide material
(The GUIDE) for 49 CFR Parts 191 and 192
13What is The GUIDE?
- An ANSI standard Z380.1
- Provides how-to guidance for compliance
activities - Based on sound engineering and operating
principles - Advisory in nature does not restrict other
methods of compliance
14What is in The GUIDE?
- Already covers most technical aspects of
distribution system integrity - Leak detection, grading and control
- Cast iron pipe maintenance
- Continuing surveillance
- Excess flow valves
- Recognizes distribution system and operator
diversity
15Why DIMP Guidance?
- Needed for implementation of high level, flexible
regulation - Will help assure the flexibility needed for the
wide variations of the gas distribution industry - Assist operators in preparation of DIMP programs
- Aide in compliance with DIMP
16GPTC Appendix on DIMP (Draft)
17DIMP 7 Elements
- 1 Know the Distribution System How Its
Operated Maintained - 2 ID Threats (existing potential)
- 3 Evaluate and Rank groups based on risk
- 4 ID and Implement appropriate measures to
manage risks - 5 Measure performance and monitor results
- 6 Periodically evaluate improve program
- 7 Make periodic reports to government agencies
181 - Know the Distribution System
- Location
- Material Composition
- Pipe Size
- Construction Methods
- Date of Installation
- Pressures
- Condition
- Pressures
- Other
192 - Identify Threats (Existing Potential)
- The primary threats to a natural gas
distribution system are as follows and are
described under the instructions for the DOT
Annual Report, PHMSA Form F7100-1.1. - Corrosion
- Natural Forces
- Excavation
- Other Outside Forces
- Material or Welds
- Equipment
- Operations
- Other
202 ID Threats (Continued)
- Determine if one or more threats causes a problem
- Answer appropriate questions to help determine
whether the threat - Exists throughout the system (General), or
- Is limited to a certain geographic region or
material (Local). - Alternatively, some risk models perform threat
identification - Some threats may be insignificant, non-existent,
or not applicable (NA).
212 ID Threats (Continued)
- The guidance provides sample questions (not
all-inclusive) - Sample Questions for the Corrosion Threat
- Sub-category External corrosion bare steel
pipe - Does bare steel exist in the system?
- Is the pipe cathodically protected?
- Have corrosion leaks occurred?
- Do exposed pipe inspections indicate external
corrosion?
222 ID Threats (Continued)
- Information evaluation may be done by any means
suitable to the operator. Methods may include - Simple stand-alone approach
- One or more subject matter experts review
available data - Periodic inter-departmental meetings
- Periodic meetings with subject matter experts
- More sophisticated approach
- Electronic database or work management system
- Risk evaluation software that compiles relevant
information
233 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on Risk
- Implementing this element should result in a
relative risk ranking of facilities or groups of
facilities based on comparison to other
facilities or groups of facilities. - Risk Evaluation Methods
- Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Determine where problems have occurred and if
problems will likely occur in the future. - Assign relative risk ranking to each group or
groups of facilities experiencing problems - Use of mathematical methods
- Software that performs risk evaluation
243 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on RiskEvaluate
Risks and Rank Facilities
- Risk Likelihood x Consequences
- Facilities not experiencing problems may be
removed from the risk evaluation and no further
action taken (except excavation threats). - Stable or improving problem trends may require no
further action. - Frequency may be an indicator of Likelihood
253 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on RiskSample
Frequency Factors for Excavation Damage
- Low Few problems, excavators generally
responsive, good map and locating records. - Medium Moderate number of problems, excavators
not very responsive, moderate map and locating
records. - High High number of problems, excavators
non-responsive, poor or no map and locating
records.
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263 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on RiskSample
Consequence Factors for Excavation Damage
- Low Rural location, small diameter pipe, low
operating pressure. - Medium Residential location, medium diameter
pipe, medium operating pressure. - High Predominantly multi story buildings, large
diameter pipe, high operating pressure.
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27- 3 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on Risk
- Sample Relative Risk Calculation
Determined by Operator
27
283 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on Risk Relative
Risk Calculations
- A high score is not an absolute measure of risk.
- Scores can help determine a relative risk between
several groups for prioritizing. - Can enhance the matrix by adding more detail
- Example A small diameter pipeline, operating at
medium pressure and located in an urban area. - Small diameter Low risk 1
- Medium pressure Med risk 2
- Urban area High risk 3
- Total consequence factor 6
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293 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on
RiskValidation
- Validate the risk ranking
- Do the results and OM records focus on the same
facilities or groups of facilities? - Do the results agree with the SME experiences?
- If either answer is no, the differences need to
be understood. Consider - Review / revise evaluation process
- Gather more data
- Reevaluate the SME perspective
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303 - Evaluate Rank Groups Based on RiskRisk
Management
- Risk can be managed
- By eliminating or reducing the likelihood of a
problem occurring - By lessening the consequences of a potential
problem. - DIMP expects you to be pro-active in one or both
30
314 - ID and Implement Appropriate Measures to
Manage Risks
- Accelerated actions/techniques operators may
perform over and above the requirements of
existing pipeline safety regulations to manage
risks - Operator may implement one or more accelerated
actions when addressing one or more of the risks
324 - ID and Implement Appropriate Measures to
Manage Risks Additional or Accelerated Actions
(A/A)
- The guidance gives examples of activities that
are performed in addition to the requirements of
the Code to manage risk. - Determine which risk management techniques and
practices are most appropriate. - May implement one or more A/A, or other action
determined by the operator, when addressing one
or more of the risks.
32
334 - ID and Implement Appropriate Measures to
Manage Risks Additional or Accelerated Actions
(A/A)
33
344 - ID and Implement Appropriate Measures to
Manage Risks Additional or Accelerated Actions
(A/A)
- Leak management is an important risk management
technique used by natural gas distribution
operators to maintain the integrity of their
distribution systems. - Operators consider many factors specific to
their geographical location and their specific
distribution system to evaluate the severity of
the leaks and determine the appropriate actions
to mitigate the risk associated with the leaks.
34
354 - ID and Implement Appropriate Measures to
Manage Risks Additional or Accelerated Actions
(A/A)
- An effective leak management program has the
following basic elements. - Locate the leaks in the distribution system
- Evaluate the actual or potential hazards
associated with these leaks - Act appropriately to mitigate these hazards
- Keep records and
- Self-assess to determine if additional actions
are necessary to keep people and property safe.
35
365 - Measure Performance Monitor Results
- Determine if a risk management technique or
practice is effective - Develop performance measures that match the risk
management techniques or practice spelled out in
your program - Measures may be gathered and tracked for an
entire system, specific geographic areas,
material type, each facility or group of
facilities or other reasonable category
375 - Measure Performance Monitor
Results Performance Measures
- Address your specific risk management practices
- Should be something that can be counted, tracked,
monitored and supported - Select a critical few measurements
- Select performance measures that use data
collected currently or in the past - Where practical, use numeric performance
measures, but - Dont ignore non-numeric methods
37
385 - Measure Performance Monitor Results Example
Performance Measures
- Corrosion
- Leaks due to external or internal corrosion
- Exposed pipe condition reports that found
corrosion or coating damage - Repairs required due to non-leaking pitting or
coating damage (above/below ground) - CP zones found with low protection levels
38
395 - Measure Performance Monitor Results Example
Performance Measures
- Excavation
- Excavation caused damages (1st/2nd/3rd party)
- Damages per 1,000 tickets (normalized damages)
- Ratio of ticket no-show to total tickets received
- Failure by notification center to accurately
transmit tickets to the operator - Damages by cause, facility type (mains, services)
and responsible party
39
406 - Periodically Evaluate Improve Program
- Review content of written DIMP to ensure it is
appropriate and accurate - Analyze the effectiveness and success of risk
management techniques, practices or accelerated
actions adopted to respond to specific threats
417 - Periodic Reporting
- Federal regulations, and in some cases state
regulations, require periodic reports of
information related to distribution integrity
management programs. - The operator should ensure that the information
needed to complete those reports is being
collected and is available when needed. - Waiting on Rulemaking to determine specific
reporting requirements.
42GPTC Guidance Availability
- GPTC will verify guidance is consistent with the
NPRM after it is issued - Anticipate only editorial changes since PHMSA has
monitored the development process - If no substantive changes, guidance will be
available to the public - Within weeks of the NPRM
- Through ANSI public review procedures
- Concurrently, it will be letter balloted for
approval by the GPTC main body
43GPTC Guidance Summary
- DI guidance provides examples of
- How to identify threats
- A simple risk assessment method
- Risk management actions
- Performance measures
- Guidance will be available to the public
- Through ANSI public review procedures
- Within weeks of the NPRM if no substantive
changes - by end of July if revisions are needed
44Small OperatorsSimple, Handy Risk-based
Integrity Management Plan (SHRIMP)
- Being developed by the American Public Gas
Association (APGA). - SHRIMP is to be a decision management software
system designed to assist the operators of
natural gas utility systems to develop plans to
manage the integrity of their distribution
piping. -
- This program is meant to assist utilities to
comply with new Federal pipeline safety
regulations requiring utilities to develop and
implement integrity management plans. - The basic purpose of the software is to generate
a written integrity management plan that is
appropriate for the unique circumstances of each
utility. - It is geared toward the needs of small utilities
that lack in-house engineering and/or risk
management expertise.
45Timelines
- Based on Latest Information
- Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) June 2008
- 90 day comment period follows
- Final Rule
- December 2008
- Operator Plan Development
- 10/2009
46Questions??
46
47GPTC Distribution Integrity Management Guidance
- Lee Reynolds
- Leader Gas Standards
- NiSource Distribution Operations
- lreynolds_at_nisource.com
- 614-460-2261
OGA Technical Seminar March 28, 2008