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A source of danger to the stock of this
country The Pirbright laboratory and the
history of foot and mouth disease research in
Britain

• Dr Abigail Woods
• Centre for the History of Science, Technology and
  Medicine
• Imperial College London

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FMD, 2007

• 8 outbreaks in Surrey, August-September

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• Origins the Pirbright site

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• Defective drains contractors vehicles blamed
• Criticism of Defras dual role as regulator and
  customer

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• Led to media questioning of the risks and
  benefits of work at Pirbright

• Vaccines may prevent an epidemic.
• They may also have caused this outbreak
  (Economist 9/8/07)
• How safe is biosafe? (Telegraph, 14/8/07)
• Science proved to be a threat as well as a
  protection (Guardian, 13/0/07)

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Whats new?

• This risk / benefit discourse has a long history.
• Since the 19th century, fears about virus escape
  have structured attitudes to and the practice of
  FMD research in Britain.
• FMD escaped before, in 1960.
• What lessons can history provide?

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Origins

• 1839 FMD appeared in Britain, became endemic.
• 1869 / 1878 acts passed to control it.

• 1878-1883 experiments at the Brown Institution
  and the RVC, sponsored by Royal Agricultural
  Society

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Interest fades

• 1886 endemic FMD eliminated only occasional
  invasions for the next 25 yrs.
• No further research
• Vets not interested job done!
• But many advances in Germany and France

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The 1910s

• 1911 25 outbreaks
• Worst situation for 25 yrs
• Committee appointed to enquire
• Witnesses asked about research extremely
  cautious
• Committee recommends research abroad.

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• 1914 Research committee heads to India, no
  progress
• 1920 Departmental Committee directs work by JA
  Arkwright on HMS Dahlia no progress

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Epidemics, 1922-24

• 2 devastating epidemics
• 7 months / 9 months
• 1,140 / 2,691 outbreaks
• 56,000 / 300,000 culls
• Cheshire particularly hard hit

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The battle for research

• Mounting criticisms of the slaughter policy
• Calls for research into an alternative control
  method
• Campaign led by members of the medical profession

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• Stockman furious!

• Argued that research was
• Dangerous
• virus might escape from lab
• Harmful to trade
• threatened Britains FMD-free status
• Irrelevant
• already know how to control FMD
• experiments are going on before our eyes, in
  nature.

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• Stockman was overruled.
• Minister of Agriculture appointed the FMD
  Research Committee (FMDRC), 2/24.
• Research began at various sites.
• Pirbright field station opened 1925.

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FMD research the early years

• Stockman lost the battlebut his (MAFs) views of
  research shaped the way it was pursued.
• No independent FMD research allowed
• MAF to oversee the FMDRC
• All research (from 1933) at Pirbright
• MAF vet stationed at Pirbright to monitor
  biosecurity

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Disease security at Pirbright

• Ongoing upgrading of facilities, including
• Enclosed animal accommodation, bathing, lab,
  hostel for workers (1927)
• Laundry (1930s)

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• Isolation unit (c1950, 1970, 1998)

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• Sewage / effluent treatment plant (mid-1950s).
• Air filtration (c1960)

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Breaches

• Much accidental (mechanical) transfer of virus
  within the compound
• 1946 and 1958 outbreaks within 3 miles of
  Pirbright.
• 1958 internal leaks raises awareness of aerosol
  route.
• 1960 2 internal leaks 1 external leak

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• 1960 escape to infect farm near Guildford
• Cover-up considered and rejected.
• Press comment, not criticism

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• Who was responsible?
• MAFs close control had slipped in previous
  decade
• ARC in charge from 51 (though CVO still on
  governing body)
• MAF vet withdrawn 53.
• Significant expansion of Institute
• Claimed governing body / ARC responsible. ARC
  denied
• Ultimately agreed
• ARC responsible for internal leaks
• MAFF responsible for external leaks

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• Internal investigation
• Couldnt discover route
• In view of the many hazards and the high
  infective power of the virus, it will never be
  possible to guarantee absolute security at all
  times

• 2 firms of auctioneers sued (unsuccessfully) for
  damages

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• Action
• Biosecurity improved (though internal virus leaks
  in 67 and 70)
• Vaccine RD handed to industry, 1961.
• Conditions of work shaped by biosecurity demands

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Post-1960

• Rothschild report (1971)
• Funds shifted from ARC to MAFF
• Customer-contractor principle of research
• 1980s Pirbright threatened but survived.
  Control passed to AFRC (1984) and BBSRC (1993)
• Wellcome sold out to Rhone Merieux (1990) which
  became Merial (1997)
• Responsibility for biosecurity passed from MAFF
  to Defra (2001)

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Lessons from history

• Why the Pirbright facility exists
• What Merial is doing there
• Defras dual role as customer and regulator
• The ongoing fight to contain the virus
• And how that priority has shaped the governance
  and practice of research
• How reactions to viral escape have changed

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