An%20Economic%20Perspective%20on%20Software%20Licenses%20 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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An%20Economic%20Perspective%20on%20Software%20Licenses%20

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Title: An%20Economic%20Perspective%20on%20Software%20Licenses%20


1
An Economic Perspective on Software Licenses
Incentives in Open Source Software
  • Kasper Edwards
  • Department of Manufacturing Engineering and
    Management
  • Technical University of Denmark

2
Outline
  • Point of Departure
  • Properties of Software
  • Three Licenses
  • Two Types of Agents
  • Roles and Desired Use-Products
  • A Model

3
Point of Departure
  • Motivation
  • Why is open source software being developed?
  • Raymond
  • Geeks bearing gifts
  • Ego, social status and reputation
  • Lerner Tirole
  • Leadership
  • Reputation effects and spillover
  • Problems
  • Explained incentives for individuals - not
    mechanisms and dynamics
  • Too much emphasis on social status

4
Point of Departure
  • Interest
  • The development process
  • Economics
  • There is special dynamic within the development
    process
  • Hypothesis
  • Properties of software Type of agent gt A
    certain behaviour (incentives and mechanisms)
  • Goal
  • To develop a model of software development and
    consumption

5
Properties of Software
  • Two properties
  • Technical properties
  • License properties
  • Technical Properties
  • Software can be reproduced without loss of
    quality
  • The cost of copying is non-prohibitive
  • The cost distribution is non-prohibitive
  • License Properties
  • The license set boundaries for possible behaviour
  • Focus on the economic issues rather than the
    political

6
Three Licenses
  • Three extremes
  • Microsoft EULA
  • GNU GPL
  • BSD
  • Microsoft End User License Agreement
  • The licensee may use in the intended way
  • The licensee may sell the program once
  • The license may NOT copy, distribute, modify, use
    on more than one computer etc. etc.
  • It the program eats your data the program may be
    refunded
  • - - - A capitalists dream come true

7
Three Licenses
  • GNU General Public License (GPL)
  • The Licensee may copy, distribute and modify
  • Source code for modifications distributed must be
    available
  • Distributed copies carry same license
  • The viral effect
  • - - - Protect the users
  • BSD License
  • The Licensee may copy, distribute and modify
  • Modifications and derived works may be
    distributed as closed source
  • - - - The liberal alternative

8
Two Types of Agents
  • Firms
  • Command resources
  • Pay salaries
  • Profit maximizing
  • Individuals
  • Only command personal time
  • Also driven by leisure
  • Utility maximizing

9
Roles and Desired Use-Products
  • Two Roles
  • Developers
  • User-developers
  • Use-Products
  • An agents particular use of a combination of
    features in a program

10
A Model Microsoft EULA License
Private use
Agents who use
U-U assistance
Maintainer
User- developer
Program is developed
Distribute
11
Dynamics Microsoft EULA License
  • Basic market situation
  • Profit incentive for developing
  • Main dynamic is outside the model
  • Competition between maintainers
  • User-maintainer
  • Feedback if desired use-product is not present
  • User-to-user assistance
  • Cost effective way of obtaining information
  • Infoproviders derive a personal benefit i.e.
    reputation effect

12
A Model GPL License
Private use
Keep modifications
Agents who use
U-U assistance
Maintainer
User- developer
Program is developed
Modify the program
Distribute
Discuss modifications
Agents who modify
Distribute modifications
13
Dynamics GPL License
  • Why GPL?
  • Personal beliefs
  • Evolutionary perspective In beginning profit
    prospects are low
  • Why Make modifications?
  • Desired use-product missing
  • Maintenance costs
  • Maintaining a separate patch is costly
  • Lack of information
  • User-developers cannot know if other
    user-developer are creating a similar use-product
  • The cost of being too late
  • No reputation effect
  • Maintenance costs

14
A Model BSD License
Private use
Keep modifications
Agents who use
U-U assistance
Maintainer
User- developer
Program is developed
Modify the program
Closed source distribution
Distribute
Discuss modifications
Agents who modify
Distribute modifications
15
A Model BSD License
16
Dynamics BSD License
  • Identical to GPL
  • But
  • Firms have a greater incentive to adopt BSD
  • Greater chance that modifications are kept
    private
  • Free riding becomes a significant problem
  • Effect limited at this level of focus
  • Standards and compatibility issues are missing

17
Conclusion
  • A model based in economics
  • Seems to offer a reasonable explanation for the
    phenomenon
  • The license shapes possible behaviour
  • The three licenses exemplify different types of
    behavior
  • Licenses not only restrict behavior but also
    create incentives
  • Limitations
  • Project as object of analysis
  • Consequences from standards and compatibility not
    included
  • Obvious implications for policy
  • P-makers must consider which license is best for
    the economy

18
The End
19
Incentives and Costs
  • Incentives for individuals
  • Ego LOOK What I have created!
  • Peer reputation
  • Signaling effects may spill into the real world
  • A desired use-product can be obtained at little
    cost
  • Incentives for firms
  • A desired use-product can be obtained at little
    cost
  • Homemade modifications
  • Possible to create services without maintaining
    the software
  • Costs
  • Time (adoption, programming, integration, etc.)
  • Firms Wages
  • Individuals Opportunity cost

20
Dynamics
  • Uncertainty
  • Difficult to predict development path gt Lowered
    free riding
  • The Keep Private Penalty
  • Keep private gt High maintenance costs
  • Always a work in progress
  • Low initial commercial value gt license lock-in
    (GPL)
  • The cost of being too late
  • Development becomes a sunk cost
  • Risk of the Keep Private penalty
  • Aggregated benefit
  • One agents small contribution result in large
    aggregated benefits

21
Does the Model Hold Up?
  • Henrik
  • Individual, limited spare time
  • High opportunity cost
  • The modification was a one time investment
  • Paul
  • Consultant, working for a firm
  • Obvious incentive for keeping private
  • Small firm, Paul charged extra for keeping
    private
  • No in-house programmers no wish for extra
    maintenance
  • Number 1 to market the new product more important

22
The Model
Private use
Keep modifications
Agents who use
U-U assistance
Maintainer
User- developer
Program is developed
Modify the program
Closed source distribution
Distribute
Discuss modifications
Agents who modify
Distribute modifications
BSD License
23
Two examples of OSS development
  • Henrik Need feature
  • Programmer and Linux enthusiast
  • Interested in kernel development
  • Had to use windows for work
  • Linux was unable to read Windows file system
  • Gordon had a patch, which he maintained ?
  • The patch was troublesome to obtain ?
  • In frustration Henrik decides to fix the patch
    for integration
  • The patch is integrated and future versions of
    Linux can now read Windows file system

24
Two examples of OSS development
  • Poul Paid modifications
  • FreeBSD core developer, consulent
  • Small American ISP wanted to market a new
    product
  • The product Individual hosting
  • Each customer was to obtain full control
  • The ISP already used FreeBSD, however
    functionality was needed
  • Poul was hired for the job
  • To prices 1) Private 2) Open source
  • Added benefit General increase in FreeBSD
    security
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