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Integrating Access Control with Intentional Naming

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DNS. Intentional Naming. root. service. location. printer. camera ... Name-Lookup algorithms will eliminate resources based on membership in intermediate ACLs ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Integrating Access Control with Intentional Naming


1
Integrating Access Control with Intentional Naming
  • Sanjay Raman
  • MIT Laboratory for Computer Science
  • sraman_at_mit.edu
  • January 8, 2002

With help from Dwaine Clarke

2
Main Goal
  • Create an infrastructure to provide
    access-controlled resource discovery in dynamic
    networks that is scalable yet efficient

3
Overview
  • Problem Description
  • Intentional Naming Introduction
  • Security extensions
  • Integration of Access Control
  • Security Advantages
  • Status
  • Questions

4
Motivation
  • Consider a dynamic environment with many users
    and resources
  • Resources should be given the ability to restrict
    specific users / applications
  • Automatic discovery of accessible resources

5

Usage Scenario
Directors Office
TA
TA
6
Access Control
  • Security Model
  • Useful mechanism in guarding access to resources
  • Suitable for dynamic environments
  • Each resource maintains a list referencing a set
    of valid keys
  • Granting, delegating, revoking access
  • user/application does not know accessibility of
    resource without explicitly attempting access

Resource
7
Intentional Naming
  • Resource discovery and service location system
    for dynamic networks
  • Uses a simple language based on attributes and
    values to identify resources
  • Language used to describe the desired resource
  • Applications describe what they are looking for,
    not where to find it

INS
DNS
building lcs floor 2 service
printer load 4
pulp.lcs.mit.edu
8
Intentional Naming
9
Security Extensions of INS
  • INS is a naming service designed to be a layer
    below security
  • No built-in mechanism to implement access control
  • Cannot explicitly reject requests from
    unauthorized users
  • Extend INS to provide access control decisions
  • Application should find best resource to which it
    has access
  • Increases scalability and performance
  • Costly to perform full authentication check

10
The Naïve Solution
User B
K21 Proxy
11
A Scalable Solution

Cricket Beacon
K21 Proxy
K21 Proxy
K21 Proxy
K21
Proxy-to-proxy security
request
print to closest, least-loaded printer
Printer Proxy
pulp.lcs.mit.edu
12
Integration of Access ControlKEY IDEAS
  • Store ACL as attribute-value pair on each
    resource proxy
  • INS routers maintain dynamic name-trees
  • Propagate ACLs up the tree when they are modified
  • OR (?) ACLs at each parent node
  • Access Control decisions made during traversal
  • Name-Lookup algorithms will eliminate resources
    based on membership in intermediate ACLs
  • K21 Proxy performs transitive closure of its
    certificates and sends appropriate rules to INS
    with request

13
Integration of Access Control
Constructed ACL
Periodic Updates
Resource-level ACLs
Name record resolution
14
Integration of Access Control
  • INS processes request by pruning name-tree and
    making access decisions
  • INS returns best accessible address
  • Proxies perform Proxy-to-Proxy protocol with full
    authentication

15
System Architecture Revisited

Cricket Beacon
K21 Proxy
K21 Proxy
K21 Proxy
K21
Proxy-to-proxy security
request
print to closest, least-loaded printer
Printer Proxy
K21s Certificates
K1 students ? K2 students
K2 students ? Kc
Transitive Closure of K21s Certificates
K1 students ? K2 students
192.168.0.45
() K2 students ? Kc
() K1 students ? Kc
16
Scalable Solution
Intentional Naming Service
NAME-TREE
root
service
location
User B
ACL1 ? ACL2 ? ACL3
K21 Proxy
printer 1 ACL1
printer 2 ACL2
lcs
ai-lab
printer 3 ACL3
mit
17
Proxy-to-Proxy Security
  • SPKI/SDSI Model
  • Protocol does not have to be repeated in order to
    determine access privileges
  • ACL check should succeed the first time (2
    boundary cases)
  • Protocol can be used with very little change to
    INS architecture
  • Protocol follows end-to-end argument
  • Enhances scalability of automation system
  • Previous model would be unusable

18
Proxy-to-Router Updates
  • Resource status updates
  • Periodic Event
  • Flooding concerns
  • Update messages must be secure and authentic
  • DoS attacks

revoke user B
Resource Proxy
INS Router
Triggered Update
Periodic Update
increase in load
Revocation of User B
19
Status
  • Implementation of system is underway
  • Performance evaluation
  • Tradeoff overhead in creating ORed versus ACL
    checks
  • State inconsistency in boundary cases
  • Goal integrate with existing automation system
  • Scale system to a large number of nodes

20
Questions?
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