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New York State Smallpox Preparedness Planning

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Title: New York State Smallpox Preparedness Planning


1
New York State Smallpox Preparedness Planning
Guthrie Birkhead, MD, MPH New York State
Department of Health
2
Last Smallpox Outbreak in NYC - 1947
3
Spectrum of Vaccination Options
  • No change
  • Limited recommendation for vaccination of
    pre-designated public health and health care
    staff who will care for smallpox patients
  • Wider recommendation for vaccination of first
    responders
  • Permissive vaccination policy
  • Universal vaccination recommendation.

4
Context for Smallpox Vaccine Discussion
  • Post 9/11 and Anthrax preparedness planning
  • Intensive State and Local preparedness planning
    efforts
  • gt1 billion in supplemental Federal funds for
    public health and hospitals for bioterrorism
    preparedness
  • Large populations of immunocompromised persons
    (HIV, transplant, cancer therapy, elderly).

5
New York State Public Health Health Care System
  • 57 county health departments NYC
  • 72,000 physicians
  • 260,000 RNs
  • 55,000 EMTs
  • 13,000 medical residents
  • 260 acute hospitals
  • 66,200 hospital beds
  • 2,200 isolation rooms
  • 680 nursing homes
  • 36 trauma centers

6
Federal Bioterrorism Funding
CDC Public Health NYS 29 Million
NYC 23 Million HRSA Hospital NYS 4.4
Million NYC 3.3 Million CDC/Assn of
Schools of Public Health Albany SPH 1
Million
7
CDC Bioterrorism Grant Focus Areas
A Preparedness, Planning and Readiness
Assessment B Surveillance and Epidemiology
Capacity C Laboratory Capacity - Biologic
Agents D Laboratory Capacity - Chemical
Agents E Health Alert Network/Comp Information
Technology F Communicating Health Risks Health
Info. Dissemination G Education and Training
8
Examples of CDC Grant Funded Activities
  • Focus A Incident command structure review of
    state statutes, state/local smallpox plan, mass
    vaccination plan
  • Focus B 24/7 real time syndromic disease
    surveillance from all emergency rooms
  • Focus C Strengthen state laboratory, establish
    two regional Level 3 labs, train 200 Level A
    clinical labs.
  • Focus E Triple redundant, internet/ISDN
    communication with local health departments,
    hospitals over secure, encrypted network.

9
HRSA Hospital Grant Activities
  • Joint State/NY City process to award funding
  • Base grant to all hospitals
  • Establish a few regional centers with enhanced
    capability
  • Needs assessment
  • Develop and drill hospital BT response plans
    including smallpox care plan for each region of
    the state.

10
State and Local Smallpox Preparedness Plans
  • Pre-event surveillance and case investigation
    protocols
  • Search, containment, ring vaccination procedures
  • Smallpox vaccination operational plan
  • Plan for clinical care for smallpox patients
  • Where? -- Who?
  • Isolation, quarantine, decontamination plans
  • Communications, training, security plans

11
Type C Facility (Contagious)
  • Infectious individuals (confirmed, probable, and
    suspected smallpox cases)
  • Examples of potential Type C facilities include
    any empty facility (e.g. motel, hospital,
    separate building of hospital, college dormitory,
    etc.).
  • All persons entering or admitted to Type C
    facility, including cases, must be vaccinated.

Source CDC. Smallpox Response Plan and
Guidelines, Draft 2.0,11/21/01.
12
Suggested Pre-Event Activities Associated with
Isolation/Quarantine
  • Identify appropriate personnel (medical,
    maintenance, etc.) to maintain/staff facilities
  • Establish procedures for monitoring access to
    facility
  • Establish procedures for appropriate disposal of
    medical waste from facility
  • Establish laundry service arrangements (on-site
    if possible) and appropriate disposal of medical
    waste
  • Arrange for food service support for facility
    occupants
  • Establish procedures for monitoring health status
    of facility staff.

Source CDC. Smallpox Response Plan and
Guidelines, Draft 2.0,11/21/01.
13
CDC Field Teams (Pre-vaccinated)
  • Senior level physician/medical epidemiologist
  • Senior public health advisors
  • Medical epidemiologists surveillance, epi
    investigation and infection control
  • Medical epidemiologists vaccine safety
  • Laboratory scientist or technician(s)
  • Communications specialist
  • EISO/PMR/PHAs

Source CDC. Smallpox Response Plan and
Guidelines, Draft 2.0,11/21/01.
14
NY Hospital Preparation - 1
  • Set up smallpox emergency planning process
  • Pre-hospital telephone triage system
  • transport
  • Effective ER triage to immediately isolate all
    febrile/rash patients
  • Identify smallpox medical care and support team
  • Smallpox vaccination history
  • History of military service in 1980s/early 90s.

15
NY Hospital Preparation - 2
  • Provide/fit test HEPA masks all ER/care team
  • Test integrity of negative pressure isolation
    rooms on regular basis
  • Review airborne and contact isolation precautions
    with all staff on a regular basis
  • Identify isolation ward/building with staffing
  • separate air supply exhausted through HEPA
    filter,
  • 100 yards from other buildings.

16
Vaccination Issues Identified in Smallpox
Response Planning
  • Designated public health and clinical staff may
    not care for or work with smallpox patients
    unless pre-vaccinated
  • Pre-vaccination
  • Allows for planned vaccination
  • Avoid worksite disruption from workers furloughed
    or experiencing fever following vaccination
  • Avoids breakthrough smallpox cases in staff.

17
Limited Vaccination ProgramPre-designated
PH/Clinical Staff
  • 10,000 or fewer vaccinees nationwide
  • eg in NYS 20 facilities, 50/facility 1000
  • Provides for initial staffing needs in an
    outbreak a larger campaign would occur after
    identification of an outbreak
  • Avoids wide spread vaccination campaign, with
    attendant vaccine adverse events.

18
Concerns About Wider Vaccination Efforts
  • No clear threat
  • Immunocompromised populations who already have a
    lot of contact with first responders
  • 130-170,000 HIV, 1/3 not aware of their status
  • Transplant and chemotherapy patients.
  • Logistics and cost of delivery through the public
    health system (eg polio and Swine Flu).
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