The hidden reform of the

1
The hidden reform of the unmovable objects
from workers insurance provision to
individualised in-work benefits

• Minna van Gerven
• M.vanGerven_at_uva.nl

2

• Shooting down the theoretical straw man

• workers insurance benefit programmes the least
  obvious subject to policy change ?
• New politics of welfare State (Pierson)
• Institutional rigidities (Esping-Andersen,
  Korpi)
• Reforms only at the margins/within certain regimes

3

• Data

• Qualitative inventory of benefit rules
• In three welfare regimes, UK, NL, FI
• A long time period 1980-2006
• Insurance programmes (against unemployment)
• Both Bismarckian and Beveridgean programmes
• VAN GERVEN, M. (2008a) The Broad Tracks of Path
  Dependent Benefit Reforms. A longitudinal study
  of social benefit reform in three European
  countries, 1980-2006, Helsinki, Social Security
  Institution.

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Table 1 Unemployment benefit programmes and their
institutional characteristics as they existed in
2006
Country Benefit programmes included Benefit type (Beveridgean BE or Bismackian BI) Administration Financing Arena of action
UK Contribution-based JSA Flat-rate insurance (BE) Public Contributions Politics
UK Income-based JSA Flat-rate assistance with a means-test Public Taxes Politics
NL Unemployment Insurance Benefit (Werkloosheidsuitkering, WW) Income-related insurance (BI) Public (since 2002, previously bipartite) Contributions Politics/Labour market
FI Basic Unemployment Benefit Työttömyysturvan Peruspäiväraha Flat-rate insurance (BE) Public Taxes (and some contributions) Politics
FI Earnings-related Unemployment Benefit Työttömyysturvan Ansiopäiväraha Income-related insurance (BI) Bipartite Contribution (employer, employee, state) Politics/Labour market
FI Labour Market Assistance Työmarkkinatuki Flat-rate assistance with a means-test Public Taxes Politicsa
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• Findings 1/ 3

• The hidden reform of the unmovable objects
• Country characteristics relatively stable
• The UK a minimum provision
• The NL smaller group of workers protected
  against loss of income,
• Finland basic security preserved

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• Findings 2/3

• BUT a clear intention of benefit programmes to
  view the eligibility of each claimant
  individually
• Case to case review
• Willingness to co-operate essential
• Defacto individualisation rather than de jure
  individualisation

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• Findings 3/3

• National differences
• FI less, UK and NL more drastic changes
• Programmatic differences
• Basic UB more drastic changes
• Yet, Workers insurances also underwent drastic
  reforms (ref. NL)

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• Conclusion

• Certainly no unmovable objects
• De facto individualisation of benefit rules
  hidden transformation
• Workers insured only if willing to participate
  and do their utmost best to return to
  employmentin-work benefit or benefit in
  between two jobs rather than traditional
  insurance/income replacement benefits

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• Thank you for your interest!
• Weishaupt (2009) Constructive comments very
  welcome ?