Product Variety and Quality under Monopoly

1
Product Variety and Quality under Monopoly
2
Introduction

• Most firms sell more than one product
• Products are differentiated in different ways
• horizontally
• goods of similar quality targeted at consumers of
  different types
• how is variety determined?
• is there too much variety
• vertically
• consumers agree on quality
• differ on willingness to pay for quality
• how is quality of goods being offered determined?

3
Horizontal product differentiation

• Suppose that consumers differ in their tastes
• firm has to decide how best to serve different
  types of consumer
• offer products with different characteristics but
  similar qualities
• This is horizontal product differentiation
• firm designs products that appeal to different
  types of consumer
• products are of (roughly) similar quality
• Questions
• how many products?
• of what type?
• how do we model this problem?

4
A spatial approach to product variety

• The spatial model (Hotelling) is useful to
  consider
• pricing
• design
• variety
• Has a much richer application as a model of
  product differentiation
• location can be thought of in
• space (geography)
• time (departure times of planes, buses, trains)
• product characteristics (design and variety)
• consumers prefer products that are close to
  their preferred types in space, or time or
  characteristics

5
An geographic example of product variety
McDonalds
Burger King
Wendys
6
A Spatial approach to product variety 2

• Assume N consumers living equally spaced along
  Main Street 1 mile long.
• Monopolist must decide how best to supply these
  consumers
• Consumers buy exactly one unit provided that
  price plus transport costs is less than V.
• Consumers incur there-and-back transport costs of
  t per mile
• The monopolist operates one shop
• reasonable to expect that this is located at the
  center of Main Street

7
The spatial model
Suppose that the monopolist sets a price
of p1
Price
Price
p1 tx
p1 t.x
V
V
All consumers within distance x1 to the left and
right of the shop will by the product
t
t
What determines x1?
p1
z 0
z 1
x1
x1
1/2
Shop 1
p1 tx1 V, so x1 (V p1)/t
8
The spatial model 2
Suppose the firm reduces the price to p2?
Price
Price
p1 t.x
p1 t.x
V
V
Then all consumers within distance x2 of the shop
will buy from the firm
p1
p2
z 0
z 1
x1
x1
x2
x2
1/2
Shop 1
9
The spatial model 3

• Suppose that all consumers are to be served at
  price p.
• The highest price is that charged to the
  consumers at the ends of the market
• Their transport costs are t/2 since they travel
  ½ mile to the shop
• So they pay p t/2 which must be no greater than
  V.
• So p V t/2.
• Suppose that marginal costs are c per unit.
• Suppose also that a shop has set-up costs of F.
• Then profit is p(N, 1) N(V t/2 c) F.

10
Monopoly pricing in the spatial model

• What if there are two shops?
• The monopolist will coordinate prices at the two
  shops
• With identical costs and symmetric locations,
  these prices will be equal p1 p2 p
• Where should they be located?
• What is the optimal price p?

11
Location with two shops
Delivered price to consumers at the market center
equals their reservation price
Suppose that the entire market is to be served
Price
Price
If there are two shops they will be
located symmetrically a distance d from
the end-points of the market
p(d)
The maximum price the firm can charge is
determined by the consumers at the center of the
market
p(d)
What determines p(d)?
Now raise the price at each shop
Start with a low price at each shop
d
1 - d
1/2
z 0
z 1
Shop 1
Shop 2
Suppose that d lt 1/4
The shops should be moved inwards
12
Location with two shops 2
Delivered price to consumers at the end-points
equals their reservation price
The maximum price the firm can charge is now
determined by the consumers at the
end-points of the market
Price
Price
p(d)
p(d)
Now what determines p(d)?
Now raise the price at each shop
Start with a low price at each shop
d
1 - d
1/2
z 0
z 1
Shop 1
Shop 2
Now suppose that d gt 1/4
The shops should be moved outwards
13
Location with two shops 3
It follows that shop 1 should be located at 1/4
and shop 2 at 3/4
Price at each shop is then p V - t/4
Price
Price
V - t/4
V - t/4
Profit at each shop is given by the shaded area
c
c
z 0
1/4
3/4
1/2
z 1
Shop 2
Shop 1
Profit is now p(N, 2) N(V - t/4 - c) 2F
14
Three shops
By the same argument they should be located at
1/6, 1/2 and 5/6
What if there are three shops?
Price
Price
Price at each shop is now V - t/6
V - t/6
V - t/6
z 0
z 1
1/2
1/6
5/6
Shop 1
Shop 2
Shop 3
Profit is now p(N, 3) N(V - t/6 - c) 3F
15
Optimal number of shops

• A consistent pattern is emerging.

• Assume that there are n shops.

• They will be symmetrically located distance 1/n
  apart.

How many shops should there be?

• We have already considered n 2 and n 3.

• When n 2 we have p(N, 2) V - t/4

• When n 3 we have p(N, 3) V - t/6

• It follows that p(N, n) V - t/2n

• Aggregate profit is then p(N, n) N(V - t/2n -
  c) nF

16
Optimal number of shops 2
Profit from n shops is p(N, n) (V - t/2n - c)N
- nF
and the profit from having n 1 shops
is p(N, n1) (V - t/2(n 1)-c)N - (n 1)F
Adding the (n 1)th shop is profitable if
p(N,n1) - p(N,n) gt 0
This requires tN/2n - tN/2(n 1) gt F
which requires that n(n 1) lt tN/2F.
17
An example
Suppose that F 50,000 , N 5 million and t
1
Then tN/2F 50
For an additional shop to be profitable we need
n(n 1) lt 50.
This is true for n lt 6
There should be no more than seven shops in this
case if n 6 then adding one more shop is
profitable.
But if n 7 then adding another shop is
unprofitable.
18
Some intuition

• What does the condition on n tell us?
• Simply, we should expect to find greater product
  variety when
• there are many consumers.
• set-up costs of increasing product variety are
  low.
• consumers have strong preferences over product
  characteristics and differ in these
• consumers are unwilling to buy a product if it is
  not very close to their most preferred product

19
How much of the market to supply

• Should the whole market be served?
• Suppose not. Then each shop has a local monopoly
• Each shop sells to consumers within distance r
• How is r determined?
• it must be that p tr V so r (V p)/t
• so total demand is 2N(V p)/t
• profit to each shop is then p 2N(p c)(V
  p)/t F
• differentiate with respect to p and set to zero
• dp/dp 2N(V 2p c)/t 0
• So the optimal price at each shop is p (V
  c)/2
• If all consumers are served price is p(N,n) V
  t/2n
• Only part of the market should be served if
  p(N,n)lt p
• This implies that V lt c t/n.

20
Partial market supply

• If c t/n gt V supply only part of the market and
  set price p (V c)/2
• If c t/n lt V supply the whole market and set
  price p(N,n) V t/2n
• Supply only part of the market
• if the consumer reservation price is low relative
  to marginal production costs and transport costs
• if there are very few outlets

21
Social optimum
Are there too many shops or too few?
What number of shops maximizes total surplus?
Total surplus is consumer surplus plus profit
Consumer surplus is total willingness to pay
minus total revenue
Profit is total revenue minus total cost
Total surplus is then total willingness to pay
minus total costs
Total willingness to pay by consumers is N.V
Total surplus is therefore NV - Total Cost
So what is Total Cost?
22
Social optimum 2
Assume that there are n shops
Price
Price
Transport cost for each shop is the area of these
two triangles multiplied by consumer density
Consider shop i
Total cost is total transport cost plus
set-up costs
t/2n
t/2n
z 1
1/2n
1/2n
z 0
Shop i
This area is t/4n2
23
Social optimum 3
Total cost with n shops is, therefore C(N,n)
n(t/4n2)N nF
tN/4n nF
If t 1, F 50,000, N 5 million then
this condition tells us that n(n1) lt 25
Total cost with n 1 shops is C(N,n1)
tN/4(n1) (n1)F
There should be five shops with n 4 adding
another shop is efficient
Adding another shop is socially efficient if
C(N,n 1) lt C(N,n)
This requires that tN/4n - tN/4(n1) gt F
which implies that n(n 1) lt tN/4F
The monopolist operates too many shops and, more
generally, provides too much product variety
24
Product variety and price discrimination

• Suppose that the monopolist delivers the product.
• then it is possible to price discriminate
• What pricing policy to adopt?
• charge every consumer his reservation price V
• the firm pays the transport costs
• this is uniform delivered pricing
• it is discriminatory because price does not
  reflect costs

25
Product variety and price discrimination

• Suppose that the monopolist delivers the product.
• then it is possible to price discriminate
• What pricing policy to adopt?
• charge every consumer his reservation price V
• the firm pays the transport costs
• this is uniform delivered pricing
• it is discriminatory because price does not
  reflect costs

26
Product variety and price discrimination 2

• Should every consumer be supplied?
• suppose that there are n shops evenly spaced on
  Main Street
• cost to the most distant consumer is c t/2n
• supply this consumer so long as V (revenue) gt c
  t/2n
• This is a weaker condition than without price
  discrimination.
• Price discrimination allows more consumers to be
  served.

27
Product variety price discrimination 3

• How many shops should the monopolist operate now?
• Suppose that the monopolist has n shops and is
  supplying the entire market.
• Total revenue minus production costs is NV Nc
• Total transport costs plus set-up costs is C(N,
  n)tN/4n nF
• So profit is p(N,n) NV Nc C(N,n)
• But then maximizing profit means minimizing C(N,
  n)
• The discriminating monopolist operates the
  socially optimal number of shops.

28
Monopoly and product quality

• Firms can, and do, produce goods of different
  qualities
• Quality then is an important strategic variable
• The choice of product quality determined by its
  ability to generate profit attitude of consumers
  to q uality
• Consider a monopolist producing a single good
• what quality should it have?
• determined by consumer attitudes to quality
• prefer high to low quality
• willing to pay more for high quality
• but this requires that the consumer recognizes
  quality
• also some are willing to pay more than others for
  quality

29
Demand and quality

• We might think of individual demand as being of
  the form
• Qi 1 if Pi lt Ri(Z) and 0 otherwise for each
  consumer i
• Each consumer buys exactly one unit so long as
  price is less than her reservation price
• the reservation price is affected by product
  quality Z
• Assume that consumers vary in their reservation
  prices
• Then aggregate demand is of the form P P(Q, Z)
• An increase in product quality increases demand

30
Demand and quality 2
Begin with a particular demand curve for a good
of quality Z1
Price
Suppose that an increase in quality increases
the willingness to pay of inframarginal
consumers more than that of the marginal consumer
Then an increase in product quality from Z1 to Z2
rotates the demand curve around the quantity axis
as follows
R1(Z2)
P(Q, Z2)
If the price is P1 and the product quality is Z1
then all consumers with reservation prices
greater than P1 will buy the good
P2
R1(Z1)
Quantity Q1 can now be sold for the higher price
P2
This is the marginal consumer
These are the inframarginal consumers
P1
P(Q, Z1)
Quantity
Q1
31
Demand and quality 3
Suppose instead that an increase in quality
increases the willingness to pay of
marginal consumers more than that of the
inframarginal consumers
Price
Then an increase in product quality from Z1 to Z2
rotates the demand curve around the price axis as
follows
R1(Z1)
Once again quantity Q1 can now be sold for a
higher price P2
P2
P1
P(Q, Z2)
P(Q, Z1)
Quantity
Q1
32
Demand and quality 4

• The monopolist must choose both
• price (or quantity)
• quality
• Two profit-maximizing rules
• marginal revenue equals marginal cost on the last
  unit sold for a given quality
• marginal revenue from increased quality equals
  marginal cost of increased quality for a given
  quantity
• This can be illustrated with a simple example

P Z(? - Q) where Z is an index of quality
33
Demand and quality 5
P Z(q - Q)
Assume that marginal cost of output is zero
MC(Q) 0
Cost of quality is C(Z) aZ2
Marginal cost of quality dC(Z)/d(Z)
This means that quality is costly and
becomes increasingly costly
2aZ
The firms profit is
p(Q, Z) PQ - C(Z)
Z(q - Q)Q - aZ2
34
Demand and quality 6
Again, profit is
p(Q, Z) PQ - C(Z)
Z(q - Q)Q - aZ2
The firm chooses Q and Z to maximize profit.
Take the choice of quantity first this is
easiest.
Marginal revenue MR
Zq - 2ZQ
MR MC ?
Zq - 2ZQ 0 ?
Q q/2
? P Zq/2
35
Demand and quality 7
Total revenue PQ
(Zq/2)x(q/2)
Zq2/4
So marginal revenue from increased quality is
MR(Z) q2/4
Marginal cost of quality is
MC(Z) 2aZ
Equating MR(Z) MC(Z) then gives
Z q2/8a
Does the monopolist produce too high or too low
quality?
36
Demand and quality multiple products

• What if the firm chooses to offer more than one
  product?
• what qualities should be offered?
• how should they be priced?
• Determined by costs and consumer demand

37
Demand and quality multiple products 2

• An example
• two types of consumer
• each buys exactly one unit provided that consumer
  surplus is nonnegative
• if there is a choice, buy the product offering
  the larger consumer surplus
• types of consumer distinguished by willingness to
  pay for quality
• This is vertical product differentiation

38
Vertical differentiation

• Indirect utility to a consumer of type i from
  consuming a product of quality z at price p is Vi
  qi(z zi) p
• where qi measures willingness to pay for quality
• zi is the lower bound on quality below which
  consumer type i will not buy
• assume q1 gt q2 type 1 consumers value quality
  more than type 2
• assume z1 gt z2 0 type 1 consumers only buy if
  quality is greater than z1
• never fly in coach
• never shop in Wal-Mart
• only eat in good restaurants
• type 2 consumers will buy any quality so long as
  consumer surplus is nonnegative

39
Vertical differentiation 2

• Firm cannot distinguish consumer types
• Must implement a strategy that causes consumers
  to self-select
• persuade type 1 consumers to buy a high quality
  product z1 at a high price
• and type 2 consumers to buy a low quality product
  z2 at a lower price, which equals their maximum
  willingness to pay

z, z

• Firm can produce any product in the range

• MC 0 for either quality type

40
Vertical differentiation 3
Suppose that the firm offers two products with
qualities z1 gt z2
For type 2 consumers charge maximum willingness
to pay for the low quality product p2 q2z2
Type 1 consumers prefer the high quality to the
low quality good
Now consider type 1 consumers firm faces an
incentive compatibility constraint
Type 1 consumers have nonnegative consumer
surplus from the high quality good
q1(z1 z1) p1 gt q1(z2 z1) p2
q1(z1 z1) p1 gt 0
These imply that p1 lt q1z1 (q1 - q2)z2
There is an upper limit on the price that can be
charged for the high quality good
41
Vertical differentiation 4

• Take the equation p1 q1z1 (q1 q2)z2
• this is increasing in quality valuations
• increasing in the difference between z1 and z2
• quality can be prices highly when it is valued
  highly
• firm has an incentive to differentiate the two
  products qualities to soften competition between
  them
• monopolist is competing with itself
• What about quality choice?
• prices p1 q1z1 (q1 q2)z2 p2 q2z2
• check the incentive compatibility constraints
• suppose that there are N1 type 1 and N2 type 2
  consumers

42
Vertical differentiation 5
Profit is
P N1p1 N2p2
N1q1z1 (N1q1 (N1 N2)q2)z2
This is increasing in z1 so set z1 as high as
possible z1
z
For z2 the decision is more complex
(N1q1 (N1 N2)q2) may be positive or negative
43
Vertical differentiation 6
Case 1 Suppose that (N1q1 (N1 N2)q2) is
positive
Then z2 should be set low but this is subject
to a constraint
Recall that p1 q1z1 (q1 - q2)z2
So reducing z2 increases p1
But we also require that q1(z1 z1) p1 gt 0
Putting these together gives
The equilibrium prices are then
44
Vertical differentiation 7

• Offer type 1 consumers the highest possible
  quality and charge their full willingness to pay
• Offer type 2 consumers as low a quality as is
  consistent with incentive compatibility
  constraints
• Charge type 2 consumers their maximum willingness
  to pay for this quality
• maximum differentiation subject to incentive
  compatibility constraints

45
Vertical differentiation 8
Case 1 Now suppose that (N1q1 (N1 N2)q2) is
negative
Then z2 should be set as high as possible
The firm should supply only one product, of the
highest possible quality
What does this require?
From the inequality offer only one product if
Offer only one product
if there are not many type 1 consumers
if the difference in willingness to pay for
quality is small
Should the firm price to sell to both types in
this case? YES!
46
Empirical Application Price Discrimination and
Imperfect Competition
Although we have presented price discrimination
and product design (versioning) issues in the
context of a monopoly, these same tactics also
play a role in more competitive settings of
imperfect competition
Imagine a two-store setting again
Assume N customers distributed evenly between the
two stores, each with maximum willingness to pay
of V .
No transport costHalf of the consumers always
buys at nearest store. Other half always buys at
cheapest store.
47
Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition 2
If both stores operated by a monopolist, set
price V.
Cannot set it higher of there will be no
customers.
Setting it lower though gains nothing.
What if stores operated by separate firms?
Imagine P1 P2 V. Store 1 serves N/4
price-sensitive customers and N/4
price-insensitive ones. The same is true for
Store 2.
If Store 1 cuts its price ? below V.
It loses N?/2 from all current customers
It gains N(V - ?)/4 by stealing all
price-sensitive customers from Store 2
48
Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition 3
MORAL 1 Both firms have a real incentive to cut
price.
This ultimately proves self-defeating
In equilibrium, both still serve N/2 customers
but now do so at a price closer to cost.
This is especially frustrating in light of the
brand-loyal or price-insensitive customers
Cutting their price does not increase their
likelihood of shopping at a particular place.
It just loses revenue.
MORAL 2 Unlike the monopolist who sets the same
price to everyone, these firms have an incentive
to discriminate and so continue to charge a high
price to loyal consumers while pricing low to
others.
49
Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition 4
The intuition then is that price discrimination
may be associated with imperfect competition and
become more prominent as markets get more
competitive (but still less than perfectly
competitive).
This idea is tested by Stavins (2001) with
airline prices.
Restrictions such as a required Saturday night
stay-over or an advanced purchase serve as
screening mechanism for price-sensitive
customers. Hence, restrictions lead to lower
ticket price.
Stavins (2001) idea is that price reduction
associated with flight restrictions will be small
in markets that are not very competitive.
50
Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition 6
Stavins (2001) looks at nearly 6,000 tickets
covering 12 different city-pair routes in
September, 1995.
She finds strong support for the dual hypothesis
that
a) passengers flying on a ticket with
restrictions pay less
b) price reduction shrinks as concentration rises
In highly competitive (low HHI) markets, a
Saturday night restriction leads to a 253 price
reduction but only a 165 reduction in less
competitive ones.
In highly competitive (low HHI) markets, an
Advance Purchase restriction leads to a 111
price reduction but only a 41 reduction in less
competitive ones.
51
Price Discrimination and Imperfect Competition 5
Variable Coefficient
t-Statistic Coefficient
t-Statistic Saturday Night Stay
0.408 4.05 -----
----- Required Saturday Night Stay
0.792 3.39
----- ----- RequiredxHHI Advance
Purchase ----- -----
0.023 5.53 Required Advance
Purchase ----- -----
0.098 8.38RequiredxHHI
NOTE HHI is the Herfindahl Index. A Saturday
Night Stay or an Advance Purchase lowers the
price significantly. But the HHI terms show that
this effect weakens as market concentration
increases.
52
Demand and quality A1
Price
Z2q
P(Q, Z2)
When quality is Z2 price is Z2q/2
How does increased quality affect demand?
MR(Z2)
When quality is Z1 price is Z1q/2
Z1q
P2 Z2q/2
P1 Z1q/2
MR(Z1)
P(Q,Z1)
q
q/2
Quantity
Q
53
Demand and quality A2
Price
So an increase is quality from Z1 to Z2
increases surplus by this area minus the increase
in quality costs
Z2q
The increase in total surplus is greater than
the increase in profit. The monopolist
produces too little quality
An increase in quality from Z1 to Z2
increases revenue by this area
Z1q
P2 Z2q/2
P1 Z1q/2
q
q/2
Quantity
Q
54
Demand and quality
Derivation of aggregate demand
Order consumers by their reservation prices
Aggregate individual demand horizontally
Price
Quantity
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
55
Location choice 1
d lt 1/4
We know that p(d) satisfies the following
constraint
p(d) t(1/2 - d) V
This gives
p(d) V - t/2 td
? p(d) V - t/2 td
Aggregate profit is then p(d) (p(d) - c)N
(V - t/2 td - c)N
This is increasing in d so if d lt 1/4 then d
should be increased.
56
Location choice 2
d gt 1/4
We now know that p(d) satisfies the following
constraint
p(d) td V
This gives
p(d) V - td
Aggregate profit is then p(d) (p(d) - c)N
(V - td - c)N
This is decreasing in d so if d gt 1/4 then d
should be decreased.