Title: Electronic Evidence and the Constitution
1Electronic Evidence and the Constitution
- March 4, 2008
- Jonah Morningstar and Brian Bernel
2- Fourth Amendment
- Background
3Amendment IV, U.S. Constitution
- The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
- Narrow / Literal Interpretation based on
trespass. - The amendment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things the person, the house,
his papers, or his effects. - The amendment does not forbid what was done
here. There was no searching. There was no
seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of
the sense of hearing and that only. There was no
entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants. - Here those who intercepted the projected voices
were not in the house of either party to the
conversation.
5Goldman v. U.S., 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
- Detectaphone?
- A fly on the (other side of the) wall.
- No trespass, no problem.
Is this a Detectaphone?
6Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
- A slight expansion.
- Technical trespass no longer required.
- Actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area
7Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
- Formally overruled the trespass doctrine
enunciated by Olmstead and Goldman. - The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places. - Katz justifiably relied on the privacy of a
phonebooth.
8Justice Harlans Two-Part Katz Test
- Whether the individuals conduct reflects an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy and - Whether the individuals subjective expectation
of privacy is reasonable.
9Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
10Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
- We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area constitutes a
search at least where (as here) the technology
is not in general public use.
11Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?
- Two elements
- SUBJECTIVE Whether an individual has an actual
expectation of privacy - OBJECTIVE Whether that expectation of privacy is
one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable
12 13Computer Closed Container
- Courts generally recognize that and individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents stored in closed containers. - Therefore. . .your computer is Tupperware in the
eyes of the law. Ok, thats a little too glib. .
. - What about files as containers?
- Courts are split on this one.
14Exceptions?
- When a computer has been made openly available.
- When the screen is in view of others, an
expectation of privacy in the contents of the
screen display is not reasonable. - When the computer you have is one you have stolen
- In certain cases, when you relinquish control of
a computer or disks to third parties
15Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
- Direct Third-Party Consent
- Spouses / Domestic Partners
- Parents
- System Administrators
- Implied Consent
- Exigent circumstances
- Plain View
- Search incident to lawful arrest
- Border searches
16Privacy and New Technology
- Kyllo Applying the Katz Rule to New
Technology - As technology improves, narrowing of areas
considered private.
17Non-Governmental Searches
- Private Party Exception and its limits US v.
Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984) - Computer Repair Issue
18Terrorism Warrantless Wiretapping
- Homeland Security The Terrorism Exception?
19Consent to Search
- Objectively private, but consent shows no
subjective privacy - Shared computers, password-protected areas. US
v. Matlock, 415 US 164 (1974)
20Undercover Agents, Entrapment,
- Defendant cannot be entrapped. Jacobson v. US,
503 US 540 (1992) different case than US v.
Jacobsen - Inducement and Predisposition
21Borders and Cyber Defense
- Cyber intrusions at the Border
- National Cyber Security Information Warfare