ENGR 107: Engineering Fundamentals

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ENGR 107 Engineering Fundamentals

• Lecture 3
• Engineering Ethics
• C. Schaefer
• September 9, 2002

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Reference(s)

• Ethics in Engineering 2nd Edition, Mike W.
  Martin and Roland Schinzinger, McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
  1989.
• Engineering Ethics Concepts and Cases, 2nd
  Edition, C. Harris, M. Pritchard, and M. Rabins,
  Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2000.

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Engineering Ethics

• Technology can have no legitimacy unless it
  inflicts no harm, Adm H.G. Rickover, father of
  the US nuclear navy.
• What does Adm. Rickover mean by this?
• Should engineers avoid technology that has the
  potential for ______ inflicting harm on a
  society or its members? Possibly? likely?
• Engineers have an ethical and social
  responsibility to themselves, their clients, and
  to society.
• Practically (although there is much debate about
  this), engineering ethics is about balancing
  cost, schedule, and risk.

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Engineering Ethics

• Engineering ethics is
• the study of moral issues and decisions
  confronting individuals and organizations
  involved in engineering,
• the study of related questions about moral
  conduct, character, ideals, and relationships of
  people and organizations involved in
  technological development.

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General Terms

• Ethics critical reflection on what one does and
  why one does it.
• Morality social conventions about right and
  wrong conduct.
• Descriptive ethics (non-normative) factual
  investigation of moral behavior and beliefs,
  i.e., the study not of what people ought to do
  but how they reason and how they act.

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General Terms

• Normative ethics (general) Which action
  guides are worthy of moral acceptance and for
  what reasons? Action guides include theories,
  principles, rules, and maxims.
• Normative ethics (applied) Professional codes
  of ethics that specify role norms or obligations
  that professions attempt to enforce.
• Tacit ethic unsaid, unspoken rule of practice.

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Ethics Nomenclature

• Meta-ethics theories about ethics.
• Normative ethics recommendations of standards
  and guidelines for morally right or good
  behavior
• engineering ethics (and professional ethics, in
  general) are normative in nature.
• Ethical relativism ethics relative to specific
  culture or society.
• Ethical absolutism same ethical standards apply
  to all societies and cultures.

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Training in Preventive Ethics

• Stimulating the moral imagination
• Recognizing ethical issues
• Developing analytical skills
• Eliciting a sense of responsibility
• Tolerating disagreement and ambiguity

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Questions

• Should we judge what is ethical by a relative or
  absolute standard? Why or why not?
• But which (whose) moral standard do we use to
  judge these things?
• Is the Engineering Code of Ethics relativistic or
  absolute?

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Organizing Principles to Resolving Ethical Issues

• Utilitarian thinking a standard that promotes
  those individual actions or rules that produce
  the greatest total amount of utility to those
  affected.
• A code that enjoins engineers to promote the
  safety, health, and welfare of the public.
• What is utility, though? Happiness?
• Preference utilitarianism promote those
  conditions that allow each individual to pursue
  happiness as he or she conceives it.
• Two conditions necessary for this freedom and
  well-being.
• Practically, for engineers, this advocates
  cost/benefit analyses.

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Problems with Utilitarianism

• Difficult to quantify benefits for ALL those
  affected.
• Greatest good difficult to apply to an
  all-inclusive population.
• Someone gets shafted approach justifies
  perpetrating injustice on individuals, i.e.,
  someone gets left out.
• Three approaches
• Cost/benefit quantifiable approach. Maximize
  positive utilities (benefits) against negative
  utilities (costs).
• Act utilitarian will the course of action
  produce more good than any alternative course of
  action that I could take?
• Rule utilitarian would utility be maximized if
  everyone did the same thing in the same
  circumstances? Adoption of commonly accepted
  rules.

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The Ethics of Respect for Persons

• Those actions or rules are right that, if
  followed, would accord equal respect to each
  person as a moral agent.
• One well-known Respect for Persons Approach
• The Golden Rule universalizability
• Treat others a you would like them to treat you
  (Christian).
• Hurt not others with that which pains you,
  (Buddhist)
• What is hateful to yourself do not do to your
  fellow man, (Judaism)
• No man is a true believe unless he desires for
  his brother that which he desires for himself,
  (Islam)
• Two others not discussed
• The self-defeating criterion
• Rights

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Impediments to Responsibility

• Self-interest.
• Fear.
• Self-deception.
• Ignorance.
• Egocentric tendencies.
• Microscopic vision.
• Uncritical acceptance of authority.
• Groupthink.

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Questionable Engineering Practices

• Trimming smoothing of irregularities to make
  data look extremely accurate and precise
• Cooking retaining only those results that fit
  the theory and discarding others.
• Forging inventing some or all of the research
  data
• Plagiarism misappropriating intellectual
  property.
• Conflicts of interest (such as accepting gifts.)
• actual
• potential
• apparent

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Clearly Wrong Engineering Practices

• Lying
• Deliberate deception
• Withholding information
• Failing to adequately promote the dissemination
  of information
• Failure to seek out the truth
• Revealing confidential or proprietary information
• Allowing ones judgment to be corrupted.

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Code of Ethics of EngineersFundamental Canons

• Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of
  the public in the performance of their
  professional duties,
• Perform services only in areas of their
  competence,
• Issue public statements only in an objective and
  truthful manner,
• Act in professional matters for each employer or
  client as faithful agents or trustees,
• Avoid deceptive acts in the solicitation of
  professional employment.
• National Society of Professional Engineers

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Code of Ethics of EngineersProfessional
Obligations

• Engineers shall be guided in all their
  professional relations by the highest standards
  of integrity,
• Engineers shall at all times strive to serve the
  public interest,
• Engineers shall avoid all conduct or practice
  which is likely to discredit the profession or
  deceive the public,
• Engineers shall not disclose confidential
  information concerning the business affairs or
  technical processes of any present or former
  client or employer without his/her consent,
• Engineers shall not be influenced in their
  professional duties by conflicting interests,
• Engineers shall uphold the principle of
  appropriate and adequate compensation for those
  engaged in engineering work,
• Engineers shall not attempt to obtain employment
  or advancement or professional engagements by
  untruthfully criticizing other engineers, or by
  other improper or questionable methods.

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Code of Ethics of EngineersProfessional
Obligations

• Engineers shall not attempt to injure,
  maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly,
  the professional reputation, prospects, practice
  or employment of other engineers, nor
  untruthfully criticize other engineers work.
• Engineers shall accept responsibility for their
  professional activities provided, however, that
  Engineers may seek indemnification for
  professional services arising out of their
  practice for other than gross negligence, where
  the Engineers interests cannot otherwise be
  protected.
• Engineers shall give credit for engineering work
  to those to whom credit is due, and will
  recognize the proprietary interests of others.
• Engineers shall cooperate in extending the
  effectiveness of the profession by interchanging
  information and experience with other engineers
  and students, and will endeavor to provide the
  opportunity for the professional development and
  advancement of engineers under their supervision.

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Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway Collapse
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The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway
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The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway
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The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway
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The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Walkway
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Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster
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Case Background

• Morton Thiokol developer of Space Shuttle solid
  rocket boosters (SRBs)
• Roger M. Boisjoly senior engineer for SRB and SRB
  joint design.
• Inspection of previous flights (STS-51C)
  indicated hot gas blow-by in primary seals in two
  field joints.
• Seal leaks could weaken joint and cause
  catastrophic failure of SRB and loss of Shuttle
  and its crew.
• Seal leaks attributed to cold weather effect on
  O-ring resiliency. O-rings lost resiliency below
  about 50 F.

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Case Background

• If O-rings were cold, they would not flex.
• During hot gas blow-by, seals (O-rings) would
  erode (be eaten away).
• Earlier launch (STS-51B) also indicated some
  blow-by and seal erosion.
• Earlier seal failures prompted Thiokol to conduct
  seal tests on resiliency
• First indication of failure mode.
• Test results kept secret from NASA until Flight
  Readiness Review immediately preceding decision
  to launch STS-51L (Challenger).

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Solid Rocket Booster Design
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Solid Rocket Booster Design
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SRB Joint Design
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Events Leading to Flight Readiness Review

• Following seal test results, a memo was
  circulated to technical and management personnel
  at Thiokol outlining problem.
• Memo indicated potential for catastrophic failure
  of SRB joints, loss of shuttle vehicle, and loss
  of crew.
• NASA asked Thiokol to present a summary of all
  booster seal problems. (NASA later denies this).
• A task team was formed to solve the problem.

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Events Leading to Flight Readiness Review

• Task team denied adequate resources by Thiokol
  management manpower and materiel.
• NASA and Thiokol significantly pressured to keep
  launch schedule.
• Thiokol or NASA management never acknowledged
  Boisjolys status reports.

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Flight Readiness Review

• Telcon between Thiokol, Marshall Space Flight
  Center, and Kennedy Space Center to discuss
  whether to launch STS-51L next day.
• Temperature predicted at launch 18F.
• Seal erosion problems and concerns discussed.
• Task force problems presented to NASA Thiokol
  management NOT happy with Boisjoly.

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Flight Readiness Review

• NASA asked Thiokol middle management for launch
  decision. Thiokol does not recommend launch.
• NASA clearly disappointed.
• Thiokol requests private caucus.
• During caucus, Thiokol General Manager pushes for
  middle management to launch he apparently does
  not want to disappoint his client, NASA.

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Flight Readiness Review

• Engineers NOT encouraged to talk during Thiokol
  management caucus.
• Thiokol management felt that all facts were on
  table.
• Thiokol recommends launch to NASA.
• According to Boisjoly, the launch decision
  resulted from intense customer intimidation.

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The Explosion
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Hot Gas Leak from SRB(prior to explosion)
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Post Disaster

• Seven astronauts, including one teacher, lost
  their lives in the explosion.
• Cost of disaster is in the billions
• 1.7 billion to replace Challenger with Endeavor
• 450 million launch costs
• Payload hardware and development costs
• Congressional hearings
• Process changes and oversight

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Post Disaster

• Space shuttle program put on hold for several
  years of investigation and hardware redesign.
• During Rogers Commission proceedings, Thiokol
  and NASA management begin to cover up missteps.
• Cover up exposed.

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Post Disaster

• Boisjoly leaves Thiokol following efforts of
  management to punish him. Some fellow
  employees hold grudge against Boisjolys
  testimony to Congress.
• Thiokol or NASA never really held accountable for
  disaster.
• 10 million fine to Thiokol reportedly not paid.
• Chance of another catastrophic Shuttle disaster
  is 1 in 131 flights even after redesign!

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The Crew of Flight STS-51L