Comments on Discretion and the Complexity of Simple Incentive Contracts by Felix Hoppe and Frank Moe - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

1 / 5
About This Presentation
Title:

Comments on Discretion and the Complexity of Simple Incentive Contracts by Felix Hoppe and Frank Moe

Description:

Comments on Discretion and the Complexity of Simple Incentive Contracts by Felix Hoppe and Frank Moe – PowerPoint PPT presentation

Number of Views:39
Avg rating:3.0/5.0
Slides: 6
Provided by: chen7
Category:

less

Transcript and Presenter's Notes

Title: Comments on Discretion and the Complexity of Simple Incentive Contracts by Felix Hoppe and Frank Moe


1
Comments onDiscretion and the Complexity of
Simple Incentive Contractsby Felix Hoppe and
Frank Moers
  • Shijun Cheng
  • University of Michigan

2
Discretion in compensation
  • A simple modelC ß0 ß1X1 ß2X2 ?1Z1
    ?2Z2, where Xs are contractible, Zs are
    non-contractible (and unobservable to others).
  • Discretion- General measuring Xs, Zs, setting
    ßs, ?s everywhere.- The paper, roughly for
    annual bonus, (1) setting ß1X 1, when ß20, and
    (2) setting ßs, when both ßs are non-zero.-
    Some questions (1) measuring Xs, Zs, (2) when
    ?1 ?20? (3) discretion in ß1 vs. X1? (4) how to
    distinguish between ?1?0 and ?2?0, and
    discretionarily setting ßs? (5) reduction in risk
    (X1) vs. reduction in noncongruence (ßs)? (6) for
    equity-based compensation? (7) retention
    decisions?

3
Several empirical issues
  • The authors subsamples-earnings (with
    discretion vs. without) (26 vs. 74)-multiple
    (with discretion vs. without) (80 vs. 20)-
    self-selection into the subsamples.
  • Why not all firms (especially given the authors
    classification of discretion is somewhat unclear)
    ?- earnings subsample 46 multiple subsample
    54- four categories together earnings with
    discretion 46 26 12 earnings without
    discretion 46 74 34 multiple with
    discretion 54 80 43 multiple without
    discretion 54 20 11- Also, as the first
    tests with vs. without discretion (55 vs.
    45) earnings vs. multiple (46 vs. 54) ---
    better studied in the literature.

4
Several empirical issues
  • Measurement of variables- Discretion ex ante
    vs. ex post? Actual vs. reported (in the proxys)?
    firm or firm-year classifications?- Noise in
    performance measure variability of industry
    median accounting return- Environmental
    uncertainty the firms stock return
    volatility.- Need theory guidance here.-
    Director knowledge board size, of busy
    outsiders, of busy insiders- How about
    expertise as in audit committee studies?
  • Analyses- Main effects of noise and
    uncertainty ? - Interaction effects in probit
    models- A suggestion Industry vs.
    firm-specific noise/uncertainty in determining
    discretion?

5
Summary
  • Interesting paper
  • Some suggestions- Reconsider the research
    questions- Clarify discretion, noise, and
    uncertainty- Modify the empirical design
Write a Comment
User Comments (0)
About PowerShow.com