Value and Normativity

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Value and Normativity

• Antti Kauppinen

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Time and Place

• Lecture Monday 11-1 in School V
• Discussion sections Tuesday 12-1 and Tuesday 4-5
  in room G01 at the Philosophy Department
  (Edgecliffe), Tuesday 2-3 in room 104 at the
  Philosophy Department

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I Introduction
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Question 1

• Suppose that the following scenario is actual
• The latitude of St Andrews is 5620' and the
  latitude of London is 51 30.
• Is St Andrews to the north of London?
• Is it possible for someone who knows the same
  facts to disagree with you without being at
  fault, rationally speaking?
• Is it true that St Andrews is to the north of
  London?
• On a scale of 1 (least objective) to 5 (most
  objective), how objective do you think your
  judgment is?

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Question 2

• Suppose that the following scenario is actual
• President Robert Mugabe's government has set up
  secret camps across the country in which
  thousands of youths are taught how to torture and
  kill. In accounts gathered by BBC Panorama from
  dozens of youths, it appears that for many of
  them the training in the camps begins with rape.
  One girl, Debbie, said she was raped three times
  on the first night. She claims she used to share
  a blanket with an 11-year-old girl. The little
  girl was also raped night after night. Food is
  often scarce. Youths are beaten until they
  succumb to orders. They are taught that their
  mission is to keep President Mugabe in power.
• Are the actions of the Zimbabwean government
  morally wrong?
• Is it possible for someone who knows the same
  facts to disagree with you without being at
  fault, rationally speaking?
• Is it true that the actions of the Zimbabwean
  government are (not) morally wrong?
• On a scale of 1 (least objective) to 7 (most
  objective), how objective do you think your
  judgment is?

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Question 3

• Suppose that the following scenario is actual
• Ann is a sexually promiscuous young woman. One
  day she realizes that she is pregnant, but has no
  idea of who the father is. Distraught, she
  decides to have an abortion, and goes ahead with
  her plan.
• Is Anns decision morally wrong?
• Is it possible for someone who knows the same
  facts to disagree with you without being at
  fault, rationally speaking?
• Is it true that Anns decision is (not) morally
  wrong?
• On a scale of 1 (least objective) to 5 (most
  objective), how objective do you think your
  judgment is?

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Question 4

• Suppose that the following scenario is actual
• Dave thinks that coconut raspberry milkshakes are
  better than banana chocolate milkshakes. They are
  equally (un)healthy, but one just tastes better.
• Is Dave right?
• Is it possible for someone who knows the same
  facts to disagree with you without being at
  fault, rationally speaking?
• Is it true that coconut raspberry milkshakes are
  better than banana chocolate milkshakes, or vice
  versa?
• On a scale of 1 (least objective) to 5 (most
  objective), how objective do you think your
  judgment is?

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Question 5

• Suppose that the following scenario is actual
• Siobhans teenage little brother has a rock band
  in their garage. They have tried to play The
  Killers When You Were Young many times, but
  have trouble with tuning and rhythm. They do
  manage to make a loud noise, though.
  Nevertheless, Siobhan thinks that the original is
  aesthetically much better.
• Is Siobhan right?
• Is it possible for someone who knows the same
  facts to disagree with you without being at
  fault, rationally speaking?
• Is it true that the original version of When You
  Were Young is better than the noise that
  Siobhans brothers band is making, or vice
  versa?
• On a scale of 1 (least objective) to 5 (most
  objective), how objective do you think your
  judgment is?

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Metaethics

• If we look at the preceding questions, we can see
  that they fall into two classes
• First-order questions Is X right/wrong/good/beaut
  iful?
• Second-order questions Can statements about
  right/wrong/value/beauty be true/objective? Are
  they rationally defensible? If there are facts
  about value, what sort of facts are they? What is
  it to think that something is right/wrong? How,
  if at all, can we know that something is
  good/bad?
• Metaethics is the branch of philosophy that
  studies second-order questions about ethics (and
  value in general)
• First-order questions are the provenance of
  normative ethics and applied ethics

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Metaethics and Normative Ethics

• What is the relationship between metaethics and
  normative ethics?
• Moore, Stevenson metaethics is normatively
  neutral any second-order view is compatible
  with any second-order view
• But if you come to be convinced, say, that there
  are no moral truths or that they are unknowable
  or relative to pre-existing desires, will your
  first-order beliefs stay the same? Will your
  attitude to moral debate remain the same, if you
  think it is (always) a matter of people venting
  their feelings?

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A Rough Division of Metaethical Views

• According to moral realism, there are moral facts
  and true moral propositions, and their truth is
  independent of our judgments and desires. Also,
  some of our moral beliefs are true and justified,
  so moral knowledge is possible.
• According to moral non-cognitivism (or
  expressivism), moralizing is a matter of adopting
  stances toward things, not forming beliefs about
  them. Accordingly, questions about truth or
  knowledge do not arise, at least not in the same
  way as for ordinary beliefs and statements.
• According moral constructivism, there are moral
  facts and truths, but they are constitutively
  tied to our best beliefs about them. So, moral
  demands depend on what we would think they are
  under suitable conditions.
• According to moral error theory, our moral
  thought and talk represent the world are having
  mind-independent moral properties, but there are
  no such things. All positive moral claims are
  false.

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The Realist Presumption

• Several things suggest that pre-theoretically,
  our ordinary moral practices involve realist
  presuppositions
• Moral discourse is often declarative in form
  Abortion is wrong resembles on surface
  Abortion is expensive
• We talk of moral knowledge, as in It is unfair
  to punish someone who did not know that what he
  was doing was wrong
• We do not think that murder is wrong for Hitler,
  for example, but that it is wrong, period (in
  contrast to Insulin is good for diabetics)
• We often deliberate about whether an action would
  be right, which does not make sense if there is
  no right or wrong answer to the question, or the
  possibility of being mistaken
• We think that moral learning is possible, which
  implies that there is a standard of correctness
  that is independent of our current attitudes

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Forms of Moral Realism

• Moral realism comes in three main varieties
  distinguished by their views on the nature of
  moral facts and our epistemic access to them
• Non-naturalism moral facts are sui generis (of
  their own kind), and consequently our knowledge
  of them is of a special sort, for example based
  on intuition
• Naturalism moral facts are natural facts that
  may or may not be reducible to other, more basic
  natural facts, and consequently can be known more
  or less like other natural facts
• Supernaturalism moral facts have a supernatural
  source, such as the will of God

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Supernaturalism

• The simplest and most common form of
  supernaturalism is divine command theory
• According to it, x is morally wrong if and only
  if x is commanded by God
• For example, the Great Inquisitor in Dostoevskys
  Brothers Karamazov famously claims If God is
  dead, everything is permitted.
• Moral knowledge is based on revelation for
  example, the Bible tells what God commands
• On many theological views, people also have a
  voice of conscience that borrows its authority
  from God

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The Euthyphro Argument

• The basic problem with divine command theory was
  articulated by Plato in his dialogue Euthyphro.
  The eponymous protagonist defends a version of
  divine command theory, and is challenged by
  Socrates
• Socrates What then do we say about holiness,
  Euthyphro? Surely that it is loved by all the
  gods, by your account?
• Euthypro Yes.
• Socrates Is it loved because it is holy, or is
  there some other reason?
• Euthypro There is no other reason.
• Socrates It is loved then because it is holy,
  but it is not holy because it is loved?
• Euthypro So it seems.
• Socrates And because the gods love it, it
  becomes loved by the gods and god-beloved?
• Euthypro Of course.
• Socrates What is loved by the gods is not, then,
  identical to what is holy, Euthyphro nor does
  holy mean god-beloved, as you maintain these are
  distinct things.

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What Euthyphro Shows

• Euthyphro is at bottom a modal argument
• Torturing little children is wrong.
• God commands us not to torture little children.
• Were God to command us to torture little
  children, it would still be wrong.
• Therefore, torturing little children is wrong
  regardless of Gods commands.
• The best explanation for why God commands us not
  to torture little children is that She recognizes
  it to be independently wrong
• After all, why else would God command us not to
  torture little children? She must have some
  reason, and it would be circular to say because
  she commands so
• God wouldnt command us to do something bad
  why?
• Ockham adultery and theft would be obligatory is
  God said so

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II Non-Naturalism About Value
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Moral Non-Naturalism

• According to non-naturalism, moral properties
  like goodness are real properties that are not
  reducible to natural ones
• Metaphysical questions What are natural
  properties, and why should we think that moral
  properties are not such? What is the relationship
  between moral and natural properties, if theyre
  distinct?
• Epistemological questions How can we come to
  know that non-natural properties are
  instantiated, given that usual empirical methods
  are evidently ruled out?

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Natural Properties

• In his 1903 Principia Ethica, G. E. Moore defined
  the natural as the subject matter of natural
  sciences, and also of psychology
• Later writers generally speak of natural
  properties as those that play an explanatory role
  in true natural and social scientific theories
• Another, and related, criterion is involvement in
  causal relations
• Sometimes natural properties are taken to be (in
  principle) observable
• Moore we can know about them by empirical
  observation and induction

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Non-Natural Properties

• What makes a property non-natural but
  nevertheless not supernatural?
• Shafer-Landau analogy with philosophy of mind
• Substance dualism mental properties are realized
  in a different, causally unrelated substance than
  physical ones
• Property dualism mental properties are realized
  by physical ones, but are not reducible to them
• Corresponding to substance and property dualism,
  we can speak of strong and weak non-naturalism
• In the case of weak non-naturalism, the most
  important distinctive mark of non-naturalism
  becomes a priori epistemic access

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Good and the good

• Moore emphasizes that we must distinguish between
  the property of being good and the things that
  are good
• When we say things like A hot cup of chai is
  good or Pleasure is good, we are not asserting
  that a hot cup of chai or pleasure are identical
  with the property of being good, but rather
  saying that these things have the property of
  being good (that is, we are using the is of
  predication, not the is of identity)
• The interesting property is that is intrinsic
  goodness or value, not instrumental goodness
• Moore thinks that identifying goodness with any
  natural property is a mistake that deserves the
  name naturalistic fallacy

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The Open Question Argument (OQA), Definitional
Version

• Two properties are the same if one can be defined
  in terms of the other
• If a definition D of X is correct, it is not an
  open question whether D is X
• But in the case of good, whatever definition
  be offered, it may always be asked, of the
  complex so defined, whether it is itself good
  (Moore 1903, MDP 57)
• Suppose our definition is good that which we
  desire to desire it still makes sense to ask Is
  it good to desire to desire A?
• Hence, good cannot be defined (2, 3)
• Hence, being good is not identical with any other
  property

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The Open Question Argument, Synonymy Version

• Two properties are identical only if the
  predicates that ascribe them are synonymous (the
  semantic test of property identity)
• For example, the property of being a vixen is the
  same as the property of being a female fox,
  because vixen and female fox are synonymous
  (or it is analytically true that vixens are
  female foxes)
• So, goodness is identical with a natural property
  N only if good and N are synonymous
• If two terms are synonymous, substituting one for
  the other does not change the meaning of a
  sentence (the substitutional test for synonymy)
• Vixens run fast means the same as Female foxes
  run fast
• Substituting any N for good changes the
  meaning of any sentence
• For example, Pleasure is good says more than
  Pleasure is pleasure asking Is pleasure
  good? is not just asking Is pleasure pleasure?
• By contrast, Bachelors are unmarried men is not
  saying more than Bachelors are bachelors
• So, good is not synonymous with any
  naturalistic term N (3, 4)
• So, being good is not identical with any natural
  property N (1, 5)

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What Goodness Is

• Goodness is a simple, undefinable property
• Definitions are a matter of analysing a complex
  into its more basic constituents, and the OQA
  shows that this is not possible in the case of
  goodness
• Compare yellow
• Moore is here eliding the distinction between
  metaphysical simples and conceptual simples you
  cant define yellow in more basic terms, but
  what does that tell us about the property it
  picks out?

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Problems with the OQA, 1

• Frankena the argument is begging the question,
  since if analytic naturalists are right, good
  does mean the same as, for example, that which
  we desire to desire, and asking Is that which
  we desire to desire good? does not make sense,
  after all
• Reply surely this is not just begging the
  question, since our finding the question open is
  independent from embracing non-naturalism
  perhaps we are wrong, but at least OQA counts
  prima facie against analytic naturalism
• Darwall, Gibbard, Railton there is a principled,
  independent reason why we feel that the question
  is open someone can think that X has any
  naturalistic property N without seeing any reason
  to pursue X, but it is not possible to think that
  X is good without seeing any reason to pursue it
• It is conceptually possible to think that X would
  be pleasurable and not care about bringing about
  X, but not conceptually possible to think that X
  would be good and not give a damn about bringing
  it about

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Problems with OQA, 2

• The OQA overgeneralizes if we accept its
  assumptions, we must reject all interesting and
  informative conceptual analyses
• The whole point of giving an analysis of a
  concept C in terms of another concept (or set of
  concepts) C that is better known or more basic
  is to say something that is not obvious at first
  sight
• For example, doing x intentionally desiring to
  y, believing that x-ing is a way to y, and x-ing
  as a result of the belief/desire pair
• When we possess a concept, we have what is
  sometimes called knowledge-how of how to apply
  it, a practical skill, but not necessarily
  knowledge-that, explicit propositional knowledge
  that we can put in words

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Problems with OQA, 3

• There is a difference between the sense of an
  expression and its reference the OQA shows at
  best that the sense of moral expressions is not
  identical with any
• For example, water does not mean H2O people
  prior to the 18th century were perfectly
  competent with the concept of water but it is
  still true, as we have discovered a posteriori,
  that water is H2O
• Synthetic naturalists argue that the same is true
  of ethical properties we can discover a
  posteriori that they are identical with natural
  properties, even if the concept of good is
  different from any concept of a natural property

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Problems with the OQA, 4

• Sturgeon even if we accept all of Moores
  criteria, all that the argument shows is that
  goodness is a simple property
• But there are simple properties that are natural,
  such as being yellow so it seems Moore is
  simply begging the question
• Moore could reply by drawing on the
  epistemological criterion of naturalness we
  come to know that something is yellow by
  observation, but knowledge of the good is a
  priori
• Sturgeon would reply that moral knowledge, too,
  is a posteriori, as well see later