Battle of Marston Moor

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Battle of Marston Moor

• 2 July 1644

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• Situation before the battle
• Marquis of Newcastles army was sandwiched
  between a Scottish army twice its size and the
  Eastern Association
• Newcastles army were besieged in York
• Rupert mounted a relief expedition but was
  concerned with the deteriorating military
  situation in the Thames valley
• How might the concern over the situation in the
  south affect Ruperts strategic thinking?
• Arrival of Manchesters Eastern Association made
  relieving the York from the south extremely
  difficult ? solution approach from the west

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• Charless orders were to relieve York as quickly
  as possible, to destroy the enemy armies that had
  been besieging it, and then to return south
  without delay.
• Intelligence York was about to surrender!
• Rupert reunited with northern cavalry under
  George Goring at Skipton
• Rupert approached York from the north-east
  wrong-footing the allies who were guarding the
  approach to the city from the west
• 1 July York was liberated
• Instead of resting and awaiting reinforcements
  Rupert carried out the kings orders and sought
  to do battle as soon as possible

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Problems with the evidence

• Inconsistencies between the Parliamentary and
  Scottish accounts ? controversy over
  contributions of Scots and English Troops
• E.g. Thomas Harrison claimed that the Eastern
  Association had done it all their own alone
• Royalist accounts biased reflecting division
• E.g. Sir Hugh Cholmneys account depicts the
  Marquis of Newcastles troops fighting bravely,
  while of Prince Rupert underperformed.

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Royalist division events leading to up the
battle

• Marquis of Newcastle opposed an immediate attack
• Preferred to await reinforcements encouraged by
  intelligence about increasing differences between
  the Allied army officers
• Rupert ignored these arguments followed the
  kings orders despite being heavily outnumbered
  (mostly in infantry)
• Newcastle slow to move his Northern infantry onto
  the battlefield (why? Due to disagreement with
  Rupert? Refusing to leave the city until paid
  owing wages? Result of alcohol consumed
  celebrating the end of the siege?)

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• About Midday Rupert abandoned idea of attacking
  that day due to failure of the Northern infantry
  to arrive

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Royalist cavalry

• Rupert deployed his forces in a defensive
  formation
• Small bodies of musketeers placed between the
  cavalry squadrons
• Two infantry regiment placed on right-wing
  musketeers would be able to fire into the flank
  of the enemy force as they charged
• Cavalry reserve placed at back of the field,
  making it easier for Rupert to move it wherever
  it was most needed as the battle progressed
• How much can you remember how does this
  formation differ to the offensive formation used
  by Charles at Edgehill?

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• About 3000 horse (drawn up in two lines)
• About 2000 horse (drawn up in two lines)
• About 1000 horse

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Parliamentarian cavalry

• Eastern Association cavalry (drawn up in two
  lines), supported by a reserve of three regiments
  of Scottish cavalry
• This was an attack formation where the lines of
  cavalry were to punch a hole in the enemy
  formation needed the reserve to be in close
  support!
• Scots ideal for skirmishing/ rapid movement
  light armoured horses

Looking south from the moor ditch where it
crossed Moor Lane, towards the hilltop, with the
small group of trees known as Cromwell's Clump,
where the parliamentarian army deployed.
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• Fairfaxs wing also drawn up in three lines
  (including three Scottish cavalry regiments led
  by Lord Eglinton)
• Both wings flanked by dragoons with a combined
  strength of about 8000 horse

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Comparative strength of the infantry

• The Royalist infantry was drawn up in two and a
  half lines
• About 11,000 strong approx. 4,000 in each of
  the first two lines, 2,000 in the third and
  another 1,200 supporting the cavalry
• The Allied army numbered between 15,000 and
  20,000 men.
• It was drawn up in three full lines with the
  beginning of a fourth. This befitted its greater
  size and the constricting nature of the ridge.

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Events of the Battle

• Marston Moor biggest battle in the entire war
• Unusual in being fought during the evening
• Royalist generals were settling down for the
  night convinced nothing would happen until the
  following day
• 7pm the whole Allied army moved down the slope
  with the Eastern Association horse in the lead.

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• It was alleged Lord Byron disobeyed orders and
  charged the enemy
• Wanklyn defends Byron suggesting that he may have
  been sacrificing two regiments of horse to gain
  time and allow the rest of his command the chance
  to remount, as well as gain infantry support.
• Byron killed in the battle an easy scapegoat?
  On the other hand, narrative after narrative of
  the battle criticises him for disobeying orders.

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• Because of the rabbit-warren in this area the
  cavalry had to proceed more cautiously and thus
  had less momentum. As a consequence the fighting
  on this wing tended to be brutal hand to hand
  sword fighting
• After about half an hour the Royalist right wing
  was routed
• Allied forces were able to regain their formation
• (possibly thanks to their training or because the
  enemy broke suddenly all along the line rather
  than dispersing randomly)

Looking south from the Tockwith/Marston road at
the edge of Tockwith village up onto Bilton
Bream. This was the rabbit warren within which
most of Cromwell's cavalry were deployed.
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• During this time the Eastern Association brigades
  under Major General Crawford were pushing back
  the enemy in front of them.

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• Their opposing infantry were routed at about the
  same time as the cavalry
• Fairfaxs regiments fled suddenly like Ruperts
  horse on the other wing.
• Due to the combined effort of the royalist
  infantry and one of the reserve cavalry brigades
  many of the infantry formations in the centre and
  right of the parliamentarian army were fleeing
  the battlefield (over half the Allied infantry)
• The panic in the second and third lines of
  infantry was made worse by Fairfaxs fleeing
  cavalry riding over them in their eagerness to
  flee.

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• By nightfall the victorious Allied left wing
  (Cromwell Leslies cavalry Crawfords infantry
  brigades) had destroyed the remaining royalist
  formations and taken thousands of prisoners, as
  well as the whole of Newcastles and Ruperts
  artillery and baggage.
• Gorings troops were plundering the Allied
  baggage train on Braham Hill

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Looking north from Church Field on the hilltop to
the south west of Marston village towards the
moor in the distance beyond the village. This
hilltop, close by the Wetherby to York road and
almost a mile from where the armies first
clashed, is probably the site there the
parliamentarian baggage train was attacked by
Goring's cavalry
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