Harvard University

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Knowledge for Development Seminar, Center for
International Development Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, November 6, 2003
Seminar on Knowledge Systems for Development A
Survey of Core Questions and Answers "Science,
Salt Water and Submarines Doing RD with the
Navy"
Harvard University Kennedy School of Government
Presentation by RADM Richard F. Pittenger, USN
(Ret.) Vice President for Marine Operations Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution October/November
2003
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ASW as a Cumulative Conditional Probability
Equation
Probability of success is controlled by lowest
probability.
ASW Campaign is a game of small numbers i.e.
attrition (small individual encounter success
rates add up to overall success).
October/November 2003
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ASW and Submarine WarfareForce Level Builder in
Cold War

• SSBN Ballistic Missile Sub
• The survivable leg of the triad (second strike)
• New mission
• SSN Nuclear Attack Submarines
• No longer an anti-commerce mission
• Now focused on ASW
• Fixed Wing Aircraft Maritime Air (VP)
• Key to winning World War II ASW Campaign
• No mission without Soviet Submarine Threat
• Surface Reluctant Players (Gun Club)
• Shore
• Jobs for Navy Labs, Academia, Industry

October/November 2003
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Threat Perception

• Soviet Submarine Construction Effort
• Recollection of Second Battle of the Atlantic
• Missiles Close to U. S.
• Short / No warning (This one gets Congresss
  attention.)
• SOSUS Primary Task - I W
• Submarines Threaten Allied Sea Control and
• thus U.S. National Security

October/November 2003
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Secrets to Success in PPBS Process
President Brickbat DOD Navy Pentagon and
Fleet Congress

• Priority at all levels
• Funding (ASW TOA FY 86 14B)

October/November 2003
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Good RDTE

• Involves Both
• Technology / Knowledge Push and
• Requirement Pull (6.3 ? 6.5)
• The state of knowledge and the availability of
• knowledgeable scientists, engineers,
  operators and
• managers are key ingredients to developing
• weapons systems.

October/November 2003
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Examples
Technology/Knowledge (Push) Nuclear Powered
Sub Ballistic Missile Deep Sound
Channel Hydrophone and Cable Technology
(ATT) Acoustic Processing Oceanography
Requirement (Pull) Survivable Strategic
Missile Capability SOSUS
October/November 2003
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Examples (continued)

• Technology/Knowledge
• (Push)
• Long Range Acoustic Path
• CZ, BB
• Platform Quieting
• Sonar and Sonobuoy Design
• Transducer
• Processing
• Transmission
• Oceanography

Requirement (Pull) ASW Sensors Sonars
Sonobuoys Towed Arrays
October/November 2003
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Detection

• Problem
• U. S. faced with another
• large submarine threat
• Soviets gt 300 subs
• Combination of nuclear power and ballistic
  missile tilts Cold War balance.
• Subs, in general, threaten national security.

• Solution
• Need
• Large area-basin scale sensors
• as well as tactical sensors
• Enabled by
• Discovery of long-range acoustic
• propagation paths Ewing
• Approach
• SOSUS fixed arrays
• Follow-up forces
• MPA
• SSN
• Surface and air sensors
• exploiting CZ and BB

October/November 2003
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The Shadow Zone Below a 200-Foot Isothermal Layer
Probing the Ocean for Submarines A History of
the AN/SQS-26 Long-Range, Echo-Ranging Sonar, A
Memoir by Thaddeus G. Bell. Page 12.
Distribution authorized to the Depart. Of Defense
and U.S. DoD contractors only Administrative or
Operational Use 28 March 2003. Other requests
for this document shall be referred to the Naval
Sea Systems Command (PMS-411).
October/November 2003
11
Deep-Ocean Sound Paths Exploitable by the SQS-26
Long-Range, Echo-Ranging Sonar
Probing the Ocean for Submarines A History of
the AN/SQS-26 Long-Range, Echo-Ranging Sonar, A
Memoir by Thaddeus G. Bell. Page 2.
Distribution authorized to the Depart. Of Defense
and U.S. DoD contractors only Administrative or
Operational Use 28 March 2003. Other requests
for this document shall be referred to the Naval
Sea Systems Command (PMS-411).
October/November 2003
12
Echo Versus Frequency Plots at Two Ranges
Probing the Ocean for Submarines A History of
the AN/SQS-26 Long-Range, Echo-Ranging Sonar, A
Memoir by Thaddeus G. Bell. Page 22.
Distribution authorized to the Depart. Of Defense
and U.S. DoD contractors only Administrative or
Operational Use 28 March 2003. Other requests
for this document shall be referred to the Naval
Sea Systems Command (PMS-411). Page 22.
October/November 2003
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The U. S. started World Wars I and II with
torpedoes that did not work. (So did the U. K.
and Germany.)
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Engagement

• Problem
• Soviet submarines
• Anechoic coatings
• Double hull construction
• Countermeasures
• Fleet Performance
• Weapon delivery accuracy (CEP)
• Torpedo sonar range
• Warhead lethality

• Solution
• NEARTIP Near-Term Torpedo
• Improvement Program
• Improve MK46 Torpedo
• Slow down
• Better processing, CCM
• Better explosive warhead
• Advanced Lightweight Torpedo
• Major RD program 4B
• Push sonar, propulsion,
• guidance control, warhead
• to state-of-the-art and beyond
• Better Fleet Tactics
• Presidential Priority

October/November 2003
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Torpedo Propulsion System
SCEPS
HYDROX CONCEPT
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The U. S. started World Wars I and II with
torpedoes that did not work. (So did the U. K.
and Germany.)
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