Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

1
Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

• Dennett on Qualia

2
Dennett on Qualia

• Some keys ideas that we will try to outline
  today
• Dennetts denial of the existence of qualia
• Heterophenomenology
• (Briefly) the Self as Centre of Narrative Gravity

3
What does Dennett accept?

• Dan Dennett, Sue Blackmore, Inman Harvey (and
  many others, who all deny the existence of
  qualia) accept that the following type of
  experience really does occur for them
• Green-golden sunlight was streaming through the
  window that early spring day, and thousands of
  branches and twigs of the maple tree in the yard
  were still clearly visible through a mist of
  green buds My conscious thinking, and
  especially the enjoyment I felt in the
  combination of sunny light, sunny Vivaldi
  violins, rippling branches plus the pleasure I
  took in just thinking about it all how could
  all that be just something physical happening in
  my brain?

4
What more might we want?

• Dennetts passage seems to admit just the sort of
  thing that you would want to explain if you were
  a fan of qualia
• But as we look at Dennetts explanation of what
  he can possibly mean by the passage we will,
  perhaps, see why many feel that he has denied the
  existence of exactly what they wanted explained!

5
Quining Qualia

• Dennett has two contentions about qualia
• The sophisticated philosophical notions that have
  been developed to capture what the word is
  supposed to refer to are meaningless they define
  nothing that could be real
• Even our pre-theoretic notions, that led us to
  the philosophical term, are so confused that we
  should accept that they are simply false
• Despite what seems obvious at first blush, there
  really are no qualia at all. (Quining Qualia,
  1988)

6
The traditional approach

• The approach to qualia which Dennett rejects
  which he thinks all traditional approaches are
  really wedded to is an approach in which
• Mental representations are painted in figment,
  for a homunculus in our brains to look at!
• Certainly the traditional philosophical approach
  assumes that experience is built up out of
  qualities (Latin qualia) which
• We cannot describe to others
• We cannot break-down into simpler parts
• By which we distinguish one experience from
  another
• We can only point to and say like this!

7
Know thine enemy

• Here are Dennetts enemies
• Qualia defined as
• Ineffable
• Intrinsic
• Private
• Directly or immediately apprehensible in
  consciousness
• Access to our own experience which is in some
  sense either
• Infallible or
• Incorrigible

8
Ineffability

• Is meant to capture
• The idea that we simply cannot describe our
  experience to others
• We cannot get to the bottom of what is special
  about the qualities of our experience, they just
  are the way they are
• A mystery necessarily too deep to ponder

9
Intrinsicness

• Ineffability is supposed to be at least partly
  because qualia are intrinsic properties of
  experience
• They are
• Non-relational
• Atomic
• Unanalyzable
• Simple
• Homogeneous
• Available as a given, by which we tell one
  experience from another

10
Privacy

• It is also supposed that
• All interpersonal comparisons are, in the end,
  systematically impossible
• Qualia are
• Known only to us
• Not capturable from any objective point of view
  at all (e.g. Nagel, 1974,1986 Jackson, 1982)

11
Directly accessibility in consciousness

• Qualia are
• Properties one is directly acquainted with
• Immediate phenomenological qualities
• The very properties by which we identify our
  conscious states
• Therefore, it seems (but not to Dennett!), our
  own descriptions of our conscious states must
  possess

12
Infallibility

• We could not be wrong
• By definition if we feel a pain or see red or
  smell a rose, that simply is the quality that our
  experience has
• Or at the very least, even if neuroscience could
  tell us that we are mistaken about what we are
  sensing, qualia at least possess

13
Incorrigibility

• We cant be wrong about what we think we are
  sensing, can we?
• Does it even make sense to ask?
• Dennett thinks it does make sense to ask.
• In fact, he thinks there are no such things as
  infallible, incorrigible qualities of experience
  that they are a mistaken theoretical construct,
  born of a tangle of confused intuitions, that we
  should get a new kite string!

14
Chase and Sanborn

• Heres just one example from the many in Quining
  Qualia
• Chase Sanborn, two out of several tasters for
  Maxwell House, who are all charged with ensuring
  that the taste of the brand goes on unchanged
• One day, after several years in the job, they sit
  down to have a chat...

15
Chase

• I used to think Maxwell House was lovely, but I
  just dont like it any more. It still tastes the
  same to me, but Im a more sophisticated coffee
  drinker now, and I just dont care for it any
  more. Im no longer cut out for this job.

16
Sanborn

• I dont care for it any more either. But my
  tastes havent changed, I think my tastebuds
  have! Id still like the old taste if it tasted
  that way, but something in me has changed (the
  rest of you say it tastes the same way, so I
  guess it must). Im not cut out for this job any
  more either.

17
Whats the problem?

• Can we really tell the difference?
• Dennett thinks not
• How can Chase be so sure that his experience of
  the tastes really is the same? Couldnt it be
  just his memory of what it used to taste like (to
  him) that has changed? Maybe Maxwell House really
  does taste different to him now, even though he
  thinks it tastes the same?
• How can Sanborn be so sure that it really tastes
  different? Maybe it is just his memory that has
  changed?
• How can you tell the two cases apart?

18
Dennetts conclusion

• You really cant tell what has happened to the
  tastes experienced by Chase and Sanborn apart,
  objectively.
• All that you can say is that the relation between
  their memories and their current discriminative
  abilities has changed! There is no fact of the
  matter about whether the taste of coffee, to each
  of them, has really changed even though they
  think so.

19
Even neuroscience wont help

• Dennett points out that even neuroscience wont
  help
• You can certainly tell whether C or Ss low-level
  discriminations have changed, or their high level
  memories and comparisons.
• But so what? Where do the qualia come in? Surely
  they are just a matter of the complex
  relationship between C Ss discrimination and
  memory systems?

20
Centre of Narrative Gravity

• Note that Chase and Sanborn have each told a
  story about themselves
• Dennett thinks that that is all that conscious
  experience is a theoretical fiction in a story
  that would be told about itself by any complex
  enough being

21
Holmes London

• We can compare this idea with the theory of
  comprehension of fictional narrative (as Dennett
  does, in Consciousness Explained)
• Take the case of Sherlock Holmes London
• Were there jet planes?
• Were there piano-tuners?
• Did Holmes and Watson get the 1110 to Berkshire
  on a Wednesday?

22
Feenoman

• Heres another example
• Imagine some anthropologists, studying a tribe of
  forest people, who talk of a blue-eyed god,
  Feenoman, who flies through the forest
• What is the correct approach for these scientists
  to take?
• They should be objective
• They should compile as consistent a story as they
  can from the sincerely held beliefs of the
  Feenomanologists
• Then they should look and see what (if anything)
  there is that caused the Feenomanologists
  beliefs
• But they dont have to in fact they mustnt
  assume that what the Feenomanologists say is true!

23
Heterophenomenology

• And we should do the same for our own stories,
  told about ourselves, if we want to be scientific
• We can certainly build up a story of what is
  claimed to be the case (by the us as
  Phenomenologists) that is an important part of
  our data
• But we dont have to believe the
  Phenomenologists, we just have to explain their
  beliefs
• (And maybe the sophisticated Phenomenologists can
  join the scientists, as sophisticated
  Feenomanists could)

24
Two Outcomes

• We could find things that roughly verify the
  Phenomenology
• Or we could completely discredit it as an account
  of something real
• (Or possible intermediate cases perhaps there is
  a brown-eyed Tarzan-type man in the Feenomanists
  forest, but without any god-like powers)

25
A Centre of Narrative Gravity

• Dennett draws a comparison with the physicists
  centre of gravity
• Whats it made of? Nothing!
• Can I see it? Touch it? No!
• But it is still a theoretical construct in (very)
  good standing
• Dennett thinks that if you have a complex enough
  agent, which is creating theories about itself,
  then one such theoretical construct which it will
  come up with will be
• the experiencing self, as centre of narrative
  gravity

26
Consciousness Explained

• This idea is the central thesis of Consciousness
  Explained (1991)
• If you want to know more, read the rest of the
  book!
• There are lots more interesting ideas there,
  including a discussion of Stalinesque vs.
  Orwellian models of memory, and the multiple
  drafts theory of the stories we tell about our
  consciousness
• In this weeks seminar, and the readings, we will
  discuss mainly Dennetts rejection of the notion
  of qualia, and his positive account
  heterphenomenology