36x48 vertical poster template

1
- Machine Consciousness - Is intentionality a
precondition of self awareness Tino Schmidt
Hagen Lehmann University of Bath, Artificial
models of natural Intelligence Technische
Universität Dresden, Institut für Allgemeine
Psychologie
by courtesy of mr - vorarlberg
INTRODUCTION
Intentionality is the precondition of self
awareness, because it enables the differentiation
between effects caused by self or by others. This
is the connection between the base of
phenomenological conciousness and social
behavior, based on agents with a theory of mind.
Models in neuropsychology are usually too
complicated or too abstract to be useful for an
integration into artificial cognitive systems.
The main problem with these models is the lack of
exact information about the time distribution
mechanism between the different cognitive
components. This is one reason why it is
difficult to implement such models into programs.
Examples for some of the most influencial
cognitive models are Shallice (1988), Rosenthal
(1997) and Wolpert (1995). Wolpert (1995)
describes how actions are initiated and
controlled by the human brain. But he gives, like
in most of the other models, no further
information about the distribution of time
between actions and can therefore be called
static model. Based on this static model we
will integrate results from neurological research
in order to create a model which includes both,
the components of cognitive actions and the time
distribution. We therefore refer to our model as
dynamic. These dynamic enables binding between
present and past state of the system. This kind
of system information enables memory and the
differentiation of new information. This is basic
process of consciousness (Pasemann 1996, Port
1996) and describes the phenomenon of
psychological representation. We differentiate
between three levels of consciousness with
different complexity 1. Phenomenological
consciousness 2. Intentionality 3. Self
awareness Since human cognitive abilities evolved
to be adaptive in dynamic environments and
cognitive processes are dynamic by themselves we
hope our model will help us to understand these
processes better and with this understanding to
create artificial cognitive systems.
Figure 3 Taxonomy between the complexity of 3
levels of consciousness and their functions. As
references for this taxonomy we show the related
neurophysiological disorders 1.
Phenomenological consciousness Visual agnosia
is classified as inability to recognize familiar
objects or faces. In general patients are able to
describe objects in their visual field in detail,
but are unable to recognize them. Therefore the
memory is not affected by this disorder (Riddoch
Humphreys 2003). 2. Intentionality as shown
before Ataxia Anarchic Hand Syndrome 3. Self
awareness Autism is classified as a disorder
what manifests itself in abnormal social
behavior, limited ability to communicate, and
reduced interests (Frith, Morton Leslie, 1999).
DYNAMIC MODEL
The model describes the progress of activation of
several activity patterns, representing goals,
sequences of single actions, recognition patterns
etc., during initiation and monitoring a motor
action.
STATIC MODEL
Wolperts model describes forward internal models
of motor action. This kind of model predicts the
consequences of actions and can be used to
overcome time delays associated with feedback
control (Wolpert 1995). It is suggested, that
impairments of the components of this model might
underlie a broad variety of neuropsychiatric
symptoms, like the anarchic hand syndrome,
phantom limb pain and delusions of control
(Blakesmore et al 2002). Our model is based on
this assumptions as we will show in the neuro
- physiological background.
The model describes the progress of activation of
several activity patterns, representing goals,
sequences of single actions, recognition patterns
etc., during initiation and monitoring a motoric
action. In the state called proto activation,
all possibilities of these patterns are
represented by the frequency characteristics of
these patterns. This enables the neuronal network
as a emergent system to generate own desires by
the reinforcement of the dominant frequencies,
and to stay flexible when new affordances are
arising from the environment. Action selection is
done by pattern matching between the pattern in
the network, representing the desired state and
the most similar pattern of a predicted state of
all possibilities to act in this situation. At
the same time, there are a lot of external
stimuli and changes in the environment.
Therefore, the network should copy each of its
own states and orders into another functional
part of the system for 40-80 ms. This causes the
problem of time delay in reaction or, when the
action is initiated before, the problem of
loosing control over its own actions. There is
the dilemma between the necessity to react as
quick as possible and to stay flexible. In this
model we facilitate a mechanism of a feed-forward
and a feedback-loop. Green lines are
representing feedback loops that backdate the
actual perceived states of the environment as
perceived in present, even though this effect has
already happened. But to get the feeling of
control to an organism, some form of working
memory is required, which includes the activation
of the predicted state of an action. Blue lines
are representing feed-forward loops to initiate
conscious control as a information filter when
the regulation of the action fails. Therefore
information is filtered, but all conscious events
seems to be present.
Figure 1 Forward internal model of motor action
described by Blakesmore et
al 2002 The actual state of the system is not
directly available to the
central nervous system. Instead, an estimated
actual state of the system is
inferred on the basis of the stream of motor
commands, predictions based on
the motor commands and sensory feedback.
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
REFERENCES
Intentionality can be described as based in the
dynamic construction in the limbic system of
directed motor patterns, that are delivered
through the amygdala and septum into the lateral
and medial forebrain bundles to the subthalamus
and hypothalamus, then into the autonomic, and
neuroendocrine effector systems. Functions of
intentionality are disturbed in the case of
ataxia and the anarchic hand syndrome Ataxia
is the failure of muscle control in arms and
legs, resulting in a lack of balance and
coordination. This is due to injuries in the
cerebellum. Anarchic Hand Syndrome is
characterized by uncontrolled behavior or the
feeling of strangeness of one extremity, most
commonly the left hand and an intermanual
conflict. (Kritikos, Breen Mattingley 2005)

• Blakesmore Wolpert Frith (2002) Abnormalities
  in the awareness of action. Trends in
• Cognitive Sciences, 6 (6), p.
  237-242.
• - Frith U., Morton J. Leslie A.M. (1991). The
  cognitive basis of a biological disorder
  autism. Trends Neuroscience., 14(10), p. 433-8.
• - Kritikos A., Breen N. Mattingley J.B. (2005).
  Anarchic hand syndrome bimanual coordination
  and sensitivity to irrelevant information in
  unimanual reaches. Cognitive Brain Research,
  24(3), p. 634-47.
• Pasemann, F. (1996), Repräsentation ohne
  Repräsentation Überlegungen zu einer
  Neurodynamik modularer kognitiver Systeme. In
  G. Rusch, S.J. Schmidt O. Breidbach (Hg.),
  Interne Repräsentationen, Frankfurt am Main.
•  Port, R.F. van Gelder, T. (1996), Mind as
  Motion Explorations in the Dynamics of
  Cognition, Cambridge.
• Riddoch M.J. Humphreys G.W. (2003). Visual
  agnosia. Neurologic Clinics of North America,
  21, p. 501-520.
• Rosenthal, D.M. (1997), A theory of
  consciousness. In Ned Block, Flanagan
  Güzeldere (Hg.), The Nature of Consciousness,
  Cambridge.
• Qiu F.T. von der Heydt R. (2005). Figure and
  ground in the visual cortex V2 combines
  stereoscopic cues with gestalt rules. Neuron,
  47(1), p. 155-66
• Shallice, T. (1988), Information-processing
  models of consciousness possibilities and
  problems. In A. Marcel E. Bisiach (Hg.),
  Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford. 
• Wolpert, D.M. et al. (1995) An internal model for
  sensorimotor integration. Science 269, 18801882

Figure 2Integration into the model
Lesion at position A leads to
ataxia. Lesions at position B
leads to anarchic hand syndrom
Based on this model, intentionality is a key
function of humans and animals as they are
continuously generating hypotheses about the
external world, testing their hypotheses by
acting upon the environment and perceiving
sensory information about the consequences of
their action.