INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE

1
INSTITUTIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT JOINT VENTURE

• Richard C. Feiock
• Augustus B. Turnbull Professor of Public
  Administration
• Askew School of Public Administration and Policy
• Florida State University
• Hyung Jun Park
• Research Fellow,
• Korea Public Administration Institute (KIPA)
• Annette Steinacker,
• Associate Professor
• School of Politics and Economic, Claremont
  Graduate University

2
Introduction

• Institutional Collective Action and Economic
  Development
• Characteristics of Economic Development Policy
• Competition vs. Consolidation Debate
• Interlocal Cooperation and Interlocal Service
  Provision as Collaborative Approach among Local
  Governments
• Research Questions?
• Why do some local governments engage in
  cooperative agreements while others do not?

3
Transaction Costs and Cooperation in Economic
Development

• Coasian bargains to be achieved, transaction
  costs from the following five sources need to be
  minimized (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997 2000)
• Bargaining Costs - there can be at most small
  resource costs associated with the process of
  negotiating a deal
• Information Costs - information on the
  preferences of all participants over possible
  outcomes and on their resources must be common
  knowledge
• Agency Costs - bargaining agents must perfectly
  represent the interests of their constituents
• Division Costs - the parties must agree to a
  division of the bargaining surplus
• Enforcement Costs there can be at most low
  costs associated with monitoring and enforcing
  the agreement.

4
Three factors important to lowering each
transaction costs of interlocal cooperation or
agreements

• Characteristics of Communities
• Political, economic, and demographic contexts
• Geographic location.
• Regional Characteristics.
• Characteristics of Political Institutions
• Forms of Government (incentive structures)
• Forms of Council Government (Election
  institutions)
• Interaction between both of institutions.

5
Three factors important to lowering transaction
costs of interlocal agreement (Cont)

• Structure of Policy Networks
• Linked to governance problems
• Allocative inefficiencies
• Extensive networks with weak-tie relationships
• Distributional disparities or spillovers network
  closure strong-tie relationships
• Two layers of relationships
• Resource (informal) Network.
• Contract (formal) Network

6
Research Design

• Unit of Analysis City Governments
• Analytical Method Probit Analysis
• Data Survey Data
• Sample of 555 cities. (Over 50K)
• To date 254 responses (45.76).

7
Result

• Table2

8
Conclusions