Wolfgang Renzsch European Integration 5

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Wolfgang RenzschEuropean Integration 5

• The Awkward Partner
• British Integration Policy EFTA instead of EEC

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• Process leading to ECSC and EEC based essentially
  on an understanding of France and Germany
• In GB, however, other convictions prevailed which
  led to a competing process of integration, the
  European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
• The most important difference between the
  continental and the British concept rested in the
  vital question of federal or intergovernmental
  integration.

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• British position independent of parties was clear
  for a long time (and is even today) no federal
  solution!
• Even during the negotiations of the Maastricht
  Treaty (1990/91) the British government rejected
  the wording federal, instead as objective ever
  closer union
• Also the draft for a constitutional treaty of
  July 2003 avoided this issue carefully.
• Political language in GB discriminates between
  union and unity union is compatible with
  intergovernmental structures, not so unity.
• Therefore, European Union is accepted, not
  European unity (German unification gt unity!)

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• Basic conceptual differences
• Since WWII GB did not accept the objective of a
  political integration, therefore GB abstained in
  the 1950s and 60s from the European integration
  process
• Clement Attlee, Labour PM 1945-51 cannot
  surrender our freedom of decision and action to
  any supranational authority
• GB did not expect that a political union would
  work, and that the Continental European would
  accept British proposals

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• Only exception West European Union (WEU)
  European NATO branch
• After failure of European Defence Community GB
  proposed WEU in order to influence defence
  policies on the continent EDC as supranational
  institution was not acceptable to GB
• September 1954 GB declared her readiness to
  station more military in the framework of the
  British Army on the Rhine under the command of
  NATO.

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• This step of the British government opened the
  door to signing the WEU contract which solved the
  problem of West German rearmament by integrating
  Germany into NATO.
• gt GB strengthened the Atlantic alliance which GB
  anyway preferred.

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• Central issue for GB Sovereignty of Parliament.
• According to British constitutional doctrine,
  sovereignty rests with the Parliament (both
  Houses, King/Queen in Parliament, Law Lords as
  part of the House of Lords)
• Parliament is not bound by a constitution or a
  constitutional courts any decision is
  constitutional, revision by Parliament itself
  only.

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• Parliamentary sovereignty is incompatible with a
  supranational authority which might supersede the
  powers of Parliament.
• After GBs accession to EU 1972 the doctrine of
  parliamentary sovereignty has been reconciled
  with EU by the theory that Parliament has
  accepted EU but is always in the position to
  leave the EU.

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• Further aspects of GBs opposition to European
  integration
• Priority of Atlantic alliance, special
  relations to USA
• Commonwealth common tariffs for nations outside
  the EU were not acceptable Australian butter,
  New Zealand sheep gt inexpensive food in GB gt
  also agrarian policy (immediately after accession
  1973 food price in GB rose considerably)
• Faced with the progress of European integration
  GB had to react

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• After the Suez crisis PM Harold Macmillan
  proposed an industrial free trade area (excluding
  agriculture) instead of economic community
• Objective economic association, not a community.
• After the decision of the Six for EEC, GB
  organized the European Free Trade Association
  (EFTA) together with Sweden, Switzerland,
  Austria, Norway, Denmark and Portugal.
• EFTA Treaty signed on 4 January 1960
• Finland joined as associated member in 1961, 1986
  full membership. Iceland joined 1970,
  Liechtenstein 1991.
• EFTA had in distinction to EEC never
  political intentions

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• EEC based on common security and defence
  interests (ECSC), all member were human rights
  respecting democracies and also members of NATO,
  part of Western alliance.
• EFTA three NATO members, four neutral nations,
  one dictatorship (Portugal). Hardly possible for
  community based on common political values and
  interests, but only for a loose tariff union.
• No infringements on national sovereignty, no
  political union, just economic alliance.

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• EFTA allowed members to abstain from political
  integration but could at the same time profit
  from international economic co-operation.
• EFTA avoided institutionalization, instead
  informal relation and a small secretariat located
  at Stockholm
• EFTA economically rather heterogeneous
  (Switzerland Portugal), dependent on
  international trade (0.7 pc of world population,
  5.5 pc of all imports and exports), below average
  unemployment
• Until 1966 all tariffs inside EFTA abolished,
  1972/73 free trade agreement with EC (to ease
  GBs and DKs switch from EFTA to EC, same 1986
  with Portugal.

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• EFTA was much more in accordance with traditional
  British convictions (free trade, sovereignty)
  than EEC
• However as early as in 1960 Brit. government
  rethought EEC accession. Ministry of Finance in
  favour of EEC because of Trans-Atlantic
  relations USA considered EEC as more important
  than EFTA
• July 1960, Edward Heath (pro-European) became
  Lord Chancellor gt he became the leading in the
  process of approximation of the Conservative
  Party towards the EEC
• The first British application to join EEC of 1961
  was a results of Heaths endeavours.

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• May 1961 GB applied for membership. However GB
  had conditions concerning agriculture, other EFTA
  member and Commonwealth
• After a(nother) crisis of Pound Sterling, GB
  applied formally on 9 August 1961. Head of
  British delegation was Heath, meanwhile Minister
  of European Affairs
• What had changed?
• Changed role in the world demanded a change of
  policies Commonwealth had lost economic
  importance, EEC gained importance special
  relations with US had deteriorated nuclear
  cooperation with France seemed to be more
  attractive than with US Cuba Crisis proved again
  GB was no longer a world power

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• Additionally
• Nations on the Continent which had suffered more
  than GB had become more successful than GB
  lost in value, old inefficient industries, class
  society, old working methods British industry
  had lost its former position
• Because of industrial and economic decay joining
  EEC seemed to a good alternative
• In favour CBI (Industry) and TUC (Unions) better
  conditions for Brit. Industry and labour.
• Political support from (small) Liberal Party,
  majority of Conservative Party and right wing of
  Labour Party
• Opposition left-wing Labour and right-wing Cons.

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• Labour left wing opposed because of objective
  socialisation of industries and higher food
  prices sovereignty and against capitalist bloc
  of West Europe
• Cons right wing opposed because sovereignty,
  Commonwealth and special relations to US British
  free entrepreneurial spirit would be hampered by
  Germany, France and Brussels bureaucrats!
• PM remained successful, however the large parties
  articulated their conditions
• TUC and Labour restrictions for imports and free
  movement of labour into GB, Labour socialisation
  and planed economy must remain possible
• Cons relations with Commonwealth must not be
  restricted

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• Both parties demanded the accession of further
  EFTA members and protection of interest of
  British agriculture
• They wanted to eat the cake and to keep it at the
  same time.
• Negotiations (started 8 Nov 1961) quickly proved
  French resistance. French guiding role would be
  encroached.
• de Gaulle and Adenauer had given French-German
  understanding priority.
• France insisted on British acceptance of Roman
  Treaties, no concession. Adenauer was more
  flexible, but definitely not in favour of British
  accession. Only Benelux supported GB.

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• Fall 1962 negotiations close to failure
• Jan 1963 de Gaulle not agréable
• First British application failed because of
  French no and British conditions
• Second application by PM Harold Wilson (Lab) 1966
• Situation in principle similar to five years
  before but worse
• Among EEC member rising support for British
  membership all except France in favour because
  French politics of the empty chair
• France boycotted decision by not taking part
  (July 1965 Feb 1966) because of disputes over
  wheat prices

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• France returned to the negotiation table after
  the introduction of a veto in cases of vital
  national interests.
• March 1966 France left NATO military integration
• However
• 1 July 1967 Fusion Treaty ECSC, EEC and EAC
  became a single common institutional structure gt
  EC.
• other five encouraged GB to apply again
• After first talks PM Wilson applied officially on
  11 May 1967 gt supported by British public, also
  by the left (Vietnam war, French Eastern
  policies Russia, China, France outside NATO
  military integration gt illusion of Third Way)
• However, de Gaulle NON (27 Nov 1967) gt
  association, rejected by GB (gt Turkey 2003/04!!)

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• de Gaulle caused crisis among the Six.
• In Feb 1968, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign
  Minister Brandt succeeded in convincing de Gaulle
  to accept enlargement in principle
• No official rejection of British application, but
  no start of official negotiations, postponed
  until the resignation of de Gaulle
• New French President Pompidou (April 1969) was
  open to British application
• The Hague summit (Dec 1969) all six in favour of
  an enlargement of EC
• New French interest balancing Fed. Rep. Germany
  which had gained political strength by Brandts
  Ostpolitik.

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• June 1970 EC offered to start official
  negotiations gt Wilson called for general
  elections and lost. New PM Heath.
• Heath immediately accepted EC offer (general
  conditions for GB has deteriorated further)
• Domestic climate in GB, however, had changes
  sceptics got stronger. Labour and TUC against EC
  gt increase of food prices, industry had lost
  optimism in EC

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• EC expected by British accession
• New power relations in EC, especially balancing
  the French-German axis
• Redefinition of global role of EC
• Faster decision making due to British pragmatism
• Push forward for political union
• Access to new markets in Commonwealth and other
  British dominated areas
• Rising investments in GB and export to GB

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• July 1971 publication of conditions of
  accession. Labour opposition in Parliament
  unacceptable gt times for adjustment of
  agriculture too short, preferential for
  Commonwealth (butter and sheep from New Zealand,
  cane sugar from the Caribbean) not sufficiently
  protected, British financial contribution too
  large, and future role of unclear (problems of
  fishery became known later gt Norway twice 1971
  and 1994)
• 29 Oct 1971 House of Commons accepted accession
  by 365 to 244 votes
• 22 Jan 1972 signing of treaties, accepted by
  House of Common 13 July 1972 (small majority, 16
  votes), in force 1 Jan 1973

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• GB, Denmark and Ireland joined, Norway remained
  outside because of a referendum which rejected
  accession gt issue fishery.
• Accession to EC did not improve economic
  situation in GB. On the contrary strike wave,
  decreasing value of , productivity of British
  industry fell by 40 pc, trade deficit with EC
  rose from 150 million to 2.2 billion . Despite
  North Sea oil detected in the 1970s GB was
  severely hit by the oil crisis of the mid-70s.
  The old EC-members were better prepared.
• Economic competition became tougher, British
  industries (CBI) agreed with the fears of TUC
  that British industry were not competitive.

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• Consumer prices and unemployment rose steadily in
  the first months of membership. For the
  parliamentary opposition it was quite easy to
  construct a relation between EC membership and
  deteriorating economic situation.
• In spring 1974, a long lasting strike of mine
  workers caused general elections, lost by PM
  Heath.
• A minority government lead by PM Wilson (Lab)
  asked for renegotiations of the accession
  terms. Wilson proposed corrections of the terms
  accepted by a referendum or to cease membership.

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• Because Wilson had no majority in the House of
  Commons he called another general election in Oct
  1974, gaining a three votes majority.
• Renegotiation took place in Brussels and
  Luxembourg, the European Council accepted some
  marginal demands in March 1975 (Dublin summit) gt
  f.e. access of third countries to EC markets, no
  approximations of VAT rates
• British cabinet accepted Dublin negotiations
  which, however, did not imply any relevant
  changes. gt window dressing gt opened British
  government a face saving way to remain in EC

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• Next step the promised referendum (In 1970
  Heath rejected a referendum because in
  contradiction to parliamentary sovereignty)
• Referenda in Denmark, Ireland, Norway and France
  eased the argument in favour (of the opponent of
  a membership).
• After House of Commons accepted Dublin summit in
  April 1975, 67.2 pc of British voters voted in
  favour of EC membership. Participation of 64.5 pc
  was quite high.
• Now British membership was accepted.

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• Critical organisations like Labour Party or TUC
  now started to cooperate with EC institutions.
• However, GB remained an awkward partner until
  1993 the term EEC or common market (instead of
  EC) was used in the British public
• GB remained ambivalent until today gt
• GB wanted economic integration (free trade
  tradition), but no encroachment on national
  sovereignty and independence gt doctrine of
  sovereignty of parliament gt guaranty of freedom!
• gt Further British politics within the framework
  of EC/EU.