Approach to the

1
Approach to the IW Environment
2
Understanding the Environment
Approach the problem from the perspective of the
insurgent and population to help define
priorities and the balance of efforts. What is a
counterinsurgency? - What are we
countering? - What is Counterinsurgency vs.
Counterguerrilla warfare
Counterguerrilla
Counterinsurgency
3
Mindset and the Full Spectrum of COIN
Counterguerrilla
Counterinsurgency
Countering Insurgents (e.g. Counter IED)
Counterguerrilla
- Short term - Reactive -
Tactical - Military
Versus
Counterinsurgency
Eliminating Root Causes (e.g. denying
insurgents passive/active support of the
population to lay in IEDs.
- Medium and long term - Proactive - Tactical
(with cumulative) - Military and political
4
Mindset and the Full Spectrum of COIN
What is a counterinsurgency? - Countering
Insurgents - Countering the Root Causes
of the insurgency
Counterinsurgency
Counterguerrilla
Balanced Development
Balanced Development - Political Reform -
Economic Reform - Social Refrom Mobilization -
Manpower - Material Neutralization - Physical
Interdiction - Psychological Interdiction Securit
y - Population - Infrastructure Advising HN
(Combat Advisor) - Leadership - Training -
Equip/Admin/Logistics - Ethos/Professionalization
Balanced Development
Mobilization
Neutralization
Security
Mobilization
Advising HN (Combat Advisor)
The Full Spectrum of Counterinsurgency
Counterguerrilla
5
How do we bridge the gap from DOCTRINE to
APPLICATION?
Versus
Know It
Know It
Get It
Size and Experience of the Force
6
3
Mindset / Perspective
2
1
7
IPB in Counterinsurgency Overview
8
Approaching the Problem COIN IPB

• Part I Operational Environment
• - AO/AI Study ASCOPEs (overlays)
• Part II Environment's Effects
• - Determine Root Causes of the Insurgency
• Part III Evaluate the Threat
• - 7 Dynamics (Leadership, Ideology, Objectives,
  External Support, Environment and Geography,
  Phases and Timing, Organization and Pattern
• - Determine Strategy
• Part IV Threat Courses of Action Analysis
• - Determine and analyze insurgent MPCOA/MDCOA
  (AKA COIN Center of Influence Analysis)

9
IPB 1
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
10
IPB 2
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
11
IPB 3
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
3
Assess the insurgents strategy and forecast his
MD/MP COA (add to IPB I-II overlay to visualize
and the enemys campaign plan and how he gains
passive/active support of the population)
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
12
The enemys Strategy and capabilities (IPB III)
to use Root Causes (IPB II) to specifically
target and leverage the human and physical
terrain (IPB I) to accomplish MD/MP COAs. In
short this is the enemys campaign plan.
IPB 4
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
4
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
3
Assess the insurgents strategy and forecast his
MD/MP COA (add to IPB I-II overlay to visualize
and the enemys campaign plan and how he gains
passive/active support of the population)
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
13
IPB
4
1
4
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
How ENEMY uses ISSUES to get PEOPLE
The PEOPLE
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
Their ISSUES
The ENEMY
2
3
2
3
14
IPB 4
4
1
4
1
How ENEMY uses ISSUES to get PEOPLE
The PEOPLE
Their ISSUES
The ENEMY
2
3
2
3
15
Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Assess Strategy Forecast Operational OBJs
across
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government
Military
Political
COAs
COAs
16
What
w/ Who
How
Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Assess Strategy Forecast Operational OBJs
across
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government
17
What
w/ Who
How
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
MDMP
MDMP
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government
18
What
w/ Who
How
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government
19
COIN IPB/Overlay helps with
Site selection of Combat Outposts
COP
Standardizes method to assist units, HN
security forces, coalition members, local
leaders, government agencies, PRTs, etc in
focusing on - Political Objective - Unity of
Effort - Legitimacy - Adaptability -
Perseverance
COP
COP
Overlapping sectors based on Operational
Environment
COP
I/O message and delivery method based on
Operational Environment, and Effects
COP
COP
COP
Greatly assists in cultural and situational
awareness (key to Mission success and Force
Protection).
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Addresses Effects (Root Causes) by the
Environment to forecast and deny Threat from
gaining active / passive support.
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Ineffective Government
Support med/long term plans and continuity to
insure sustainment from tour to tour and during
handoff to HN
20
Questions?
21
Demo Animation
KNOWING IT vs. GETTING IT
Task Using the Insurgency Dynamics the
animation demonstrates the insurgency shifting
strategy and phases following an election.
Forecast insurgent MP/MD COAs after the election.
Background Insurgents convinced aspect of the
population not to vote on the national elections.
Situation backfires since opposing groups voted
in great numbers and therefore received a greater
proportion of the power within the newly formed
government. The demo will show what this
insurgent group does following their setback.
Forecast some of the additional operational
goals you might see in your BCT/BN/ or Co area.
22
Organization
Phases and Timing
External Support
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
External Support
Phases and Timing
A list of some of the Insurgency Dynamics
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
AIF
AIF
Unity of Effort
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Unity of Effort
Political Objective
Perseverance
The demo uses the 5-imperatives of the Low
Intensity Environment as a standard measurement
of effectiveness to demonstrate improvement.
Adaptability
Note Although SASO superseded the LIC FM, these
tenets exist for the enemy
23
LIC Imperatives
Unity of Effort Legitimacy Political
Objective Perseverance Adaptability
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
24
LIC Imperatives
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
25
Organization
Phases and Timing
External Support
Restructuring Guerrillas Auxiliary Cells Pol.
wing denounces Mil. Wing
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
External Support
Phases and Timing
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
AIF
AIF
Unity of Effort
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
26
Organization
External Support
Insurgent Political Wing receives External
Support boosts legitimacy
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
Phases and Timing
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
AIF
AIF
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
27
Organization
External Support
Transition to Subversive strategy to
undermined democratic process from within
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
Phases and Timing
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
AIF
AIF
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
28
Organization
External Support
Political Mobilization e.g. - Vote against
Referendum
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
Phases and Timing
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
AIF
Insurgents
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Perseverance
Adaptability
29
Organization
External Support
Phases I stressed to reorganize and allow for
Political Wing to Negotiate
Doctrinal Strategies
Operational Objectives
Phases and Timing
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Insurgents
Insurgents
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
Adaptability
30
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
31
Political Process Elections
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
32
Political Process Elections
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
33
Political Process Elections
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
34
Political Process Elections
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
35
Political Elections
Process
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
36
Political Process Elections
Improved Post-Election
Insurgents
Pre-Election
Unity of Effort
Legitimacy
Political Objective
Perseverance
Adaptability
37
Forecast
Overall Assessment Insurgency is shifting from
Protracted to the Subversive strategy and from
Phase II to Phase I Note Although the
Protracted and Subversive strategies are both
advanced and stable they are vulnerable while
they shift. Additionally insurgencies are
vulnerable while they shift Phases. The
strategy and phase shift represents a fracture
point and overall weakness. During which its
members are exposed and at risk and their actions
are more predictable during the shift.
38
Forecast
Political Build/strengthen political wing -
Meet local wealthy and educated ex-Baathist
leaders and Generals - Assassinate local
leaders - Make comms with facilitators from
Syria - Increase I/O campaign designed to rally
civilian leaders to meet with insurgent political
wing Military Drop to Phase I to consolidate
and reorganize - Assassinate local leaders -
Increase effort to infiltrate police and military
39
Forecast
Socially - Reduce terrorism - Increase
pressure on local tribal and religious
leaders Economically - Increase attacks on key
infrastructure 1. Pressures friendly forces
to meet and therefore recognize insurgent
political wing 2. Give guerrillas something to
do to insure they dont split due to tactical
pause
40
Concept
Issue There are three basic steps to
institutionalize conventional forces to
successfully conduct unconventional type
operations against an irregular enemy in
cooperation with a HN government and population.
1) Education of doctrine, theories,
principles, terms, etc 2) Indoctrination of
the counterinsurgency mindset 3) Implementing
tools that bridge the gap between doctrine (step
1) to application in the context of (step 2).
41
Step 1
Doctrine, principles, theories Provided advice
and assisted on FM 3-24 Writing the USA/USMC
COIN Small Unit Leaders Handbook Professional
Reading Military Review Joint
FMs Experiences CALL Lessons
learned Interoperability Training COIN Master
course Professional Military Education
42
Step 2
Indoctrination of the counterinsurgency
mindset Focusing the COIN mindset needs a
holistic though orchestrated methodology. This
mindset is broken down to Key Themes / Maxims
that make up this warfighting philosophy. These
Key Themes are purposely woven into the
workshops, Combat Advisor training, leadership
courses, LTPs and their CTCs, Officer/NCO
education centers, interagency conferences, COIN
seminars etc. This is accomplished by repeatedly
reintroducing the themes from a full range of
perspectives and topics which in-turn inculcates
and reinforces the mindset.
43
Key Themes
44
Key Themes

• Everything by, with, and through the HN
• Dismount, dismount, dismount!
• In COIN civilians are not Obstacles but Key
  Terrain
• "Mission first Men always." In COIN that
  translates to "Protecting Civilians first Force
  Protection always." Safeguarding the people is
  always an essential task in counterinsurgency.
• If the local population perceives the coalition
  is there to protect them, they will provide
  intelligence, information and deny insurgents
  active/passive support.
• Cultural awareness Situational awareness
  Force Protection and Mission accomplishment
  Depends on level of interoperability and
  interaction with civilians
• Countering insurgents and counter IED is
  counterguerrilla (kinetic) operations and only
  one aspect of COIN. Counterinsurgency is
  eliminating the root causes of the insurgency and
  therefore denying the enemy the passive/active
  support to emplace IEDs.

45
Key Themes

• The three Root Causes are the same for all
  insurgencies the specifics are always unique.
  To conduct COIN we must learn what they are
  through the HN. (e.g. El Salvador - Land reform,
  American Revolution Political voice, liberty,
  religious freedom, Sadrs Shite Theocracy
  (opposite of religious freedom)
• The enemy uses strategies and apply sources of
  power differently. Learning insurgent strategies
  and perspective as key to entering their decision
  cycle.
• Understanding insurgents operational goals
  leads to assessment. Enemy TTPs should be used
  to confirm assessments not used to build them
• No operation without I/O.
• Enemy I/O is intelligence.
• By applying COIN doctrine once we see the root
  causes can prevent the growth of an armed
  insurgency
• Use lines of operation as a metric our
  initiatives should be based on eliminating the
  root causes and forecasted enemy initiatives by
  understanding nature of the people and strategy
  of the enemy.

46
Key Themes

• Clear, Hold, Build is the most successful
  method of eliminating the root causes of an
  insurgency
• Full-spectrum COIN fundamentals must be done
  simultaneously for the short, medium, and
  long-term
• Enable and train the HN to take the lead
• FID is the main effort and adds a great deal to
  combat power
• Refine staff procedures for FID/COIN
• Combat Advisors are among the main efforts.
  Man, equip, and support them with your best. (If
  it doesnt hurt you didnt give them the right
  people and assets).
• Combat Advisors are not LNOs partnering units
  must train, plan, fight, and socialize together.
• Half of your unit are experts in language,
  culture, religion, history, I/O, HUMINT, and the
  people. They are your soldiers take care of
  them (ref HN partner unit).
• US Forces are masters at evaluating Performance
  HN are masters at evaluating Effects

47
Key Themes

• Push assets down to the lowest level
• Your interpreter/cultural advisor is a weapon
  system and an extension of you. Involve him in
  everything you do to learn. (eat, sleep,
  socialize, rehearsals, meetings, etc).
  Miscommunication is common between different
  languages/cultures and the cause of many
  conflicts (large and small).
• Make the HN your brother-in-arms in everyway.
  When he calls you his brother and means it then
  training, retention, morale, and performance all
  improve while infiltration and OPSEC are
  minimized
• Hearts and Minds does not mean liking us, but
  instead it is when the people are buying into
  their new system of government, legitimacy of HN
  security forces and authorities, embracing
  economic reform, rule of law, etc. Mind is the
  short term Heart is the long term.
• Conventional wisdom seldom works in an
  unconventional environment. Counterinsurgency
  operations are paradoxical. Confirm with HN,
  interpreters, doctrine and doctrinal tools.

48
Key Themes

• Successful unity of effort means approaching all
  non US military as foreign (HN security forces,
  local leaders, State Dept, Coalition, etc). To
  understand them use rapport building and
  cross-cultural communication skills. e.g. Learn
  to speak State Department.
• Scholarship, professional development, and
  experience is a necessary step in developing COIN
  warriors
• While building HN leaders Officers/NCO Corps
• 1)Train NCOs to be capable leaders and take
  charge.
• 2) Convince unit leaders to insist junior
  officers give NCOs responsibility without
  repercussions (no zero defect).
• COIN experts can only master doctrine,
  historical lessons, tools, and mindset. Every
  situation has specifics that are unique that
  requires us to become students again.
• Keep an open mind

49
Themes Integration Matrix
Theme / Class
50
Step 3
Implementation of tools that bridge doctrine
(step 1) to application in the context of step 2.
The provide methodology, direction, and
structure to apply doctrine. Tools are built
into training programs, scenarios/role playing
PEs, COIN Small Unit Leaders Guide, published
papers, COIN Master and Leadership Workshops,
etc.
51
Step 3
These include - Operational Environment (Tool
AO/AI COIN Overlay, ASCOPEs worksheet and
overlays) - Battlefield Effects (Tool - Root
Cause (of the insurgency) Study) - Threat
Analysis (Tool - Insurgent Dynamics/Strategy
Analysis) - Determine Threat COA (Tool - COIN
Center of Influence Analysis) - Clear, Hold,
Build Planning and Assessment tool - Negotiations
Worksheet - I/O Worksheet - Combined (US/HN) MDMP
Guide - Transition Team Roles and
Responsibilities - Tactical Questioning Guide -
COIN Fundamentals Metrics - Formatted Target
Package
52
IPB 1
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
53
IPB 2
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
54
IPB 3
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
3
Assess the insurgents strategy and forecast his
MD/MP COA (add to IPB I-II overlay to visualize
and the enemys campaign plan and how he gains
passive/active support of the population)
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
55
The enemys Strategy and capabilities (IPB III)
to use Root Causes (IPB II) to specifically
target and leverage the human and physical
terrain (IPB I) to accomplish MD/MP COAs. In
short this is the enemys campaign plan.
IPB 4
Visualize the specific groups that defines the
limits of the AO/AI by looking at the physical
and human terrain using ASCOPE (overlay).
Identify each specific community or group.
4
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
2
3
Assess the insurgents strategy and forecast his
MD/MP COA (add to IPB I-II overlay to visualize
and the enemys campaign plan and how he gains
passive/active support of the population)
Visualize the 3 x Root Causes by community or
specific group depicted in the Overlay from IPB I
56
IPB 4
4
1
4
1
Determine Threat Courses of Action
Define the Operational Environment
How ENEMY uses ISSUES to get PEOPLE
The PEOPLE
Describe the Environment's Effects
Evaluate the Threat
Their ISSUES
The ENEMY
2
3
2
3
57
IPB 4
4
1
4
1
How ENEMY uses ISSUES to get PEOPLE
The PEOPLE
Their ISSUES
The ENEMY
2
3
2
3
58
Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Assess Strategy Forecast Operational OBJs
across
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control
Military
Political
COAs
COAs
59
What
w/ Who
How
Begin to Develop Insurgent Campaign Plan
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Assess Strategy Forecast Operational OBJs
across
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control
60
What
w/ Who
How
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
MDMP
MDMP
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control
61
What
w/ Who
How
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
MDMP
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control
62
COIN IPB/Overlay helps with
Site selection of Combat Outposts
JSS
Standardizes method to assist units, HN
security forces, coalition members, local
leaders, government agencies, PRTs, etc in
focusing on - Political Objective - Unity of
Effort - Legitimacy - Adaptability -
Perseverance
JSS
JSS
Overlapping sectors based on Operational
Environment
JSS
I/O message and delivery method based on
Operational Environment, and Effects
JSS
JSS
JSS
Greatly assists in cultural and situational
awareness (key to Mission success and Force
Protection).
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Addresses Effects (Root Causes) by the
Environment to forecast and deny Threat from
gaining active / passive support.
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control
Support med/long term plans and continuity to
insure sustainment from tour to tour and during
handoff to HN
63
COIN IPB/Overlay helps with
JSS
Uses standard conventional framework (4 x steps
IPB) but in a COIN environment. Consistency
and standardizing basic tools and mindset within
the framework of Doctrine outweighs each
centers, seminar, units, or schools individual
method If we all use these tools greatly
facilitates long-term sustainment which is vital
in a protracted struggle
JSS
JSS
JSS
JSS
JSS
JSS
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
3 x Root Causes
Root Causes 1. Vulnerable Population 2.
Lack of Leadership 3. Lack Government Control