Peace by Cooperation

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Peace by Cooperation ?

• The Stability Pact for S.E. Europe
• -
• Premisses, Problems, Consequences

Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Meyers Institut für
Politikwissenschaft - Westfälische Wilhelms-
Universität Münster
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Useful Reading

• Mejlina Modanu The European Union and Conflict
  Prevention in the Balkans Regional Integration
  and the impact of the enlargement process, in
  New Balkan Politics Issue 7/8 to be found under
  www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk
• or on the seminar CD under Zusatzinfos
  Nützliche Websites
• SP website www.stabilitypact.org
• The new book by Prof.Dr.Rafael Biermann on the
  Stability Pact is to appear with Schöningh
  publishers in Paderborn at the end of April. Dr.
  Biermann is the author of the ZEI discussion
  paper on The Stability Pact for South Eastern
  Europe potential, problems, and perspectives C
  56/1999, downloadable under www.zei.de

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EU Ostpolitik Aims

• Support of socioeconomic
• modernisation

regional security
contribution to/ precondition of stability for
the whole of Europe
Security
international implementation of the rules of
peaceful coexistence and of a regime of conflict
prevention/ conflict resolution between the
nations of Europe
domestic conservation of social peace as
precondition of a successful transformation to a
market economy and a liberal democracy
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Problem how to break into the vicious circle ?

• The vicious circle of Balkan politics

domestic/ international security
precondition of
precondition of
conservation of social peace
regionalstability
successful modernisation/ transformation
precondition of
precondition of
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How to break into the vicious circle ?

• Develop a strategy of regime change using
  non-military instruments transforming SE Europe
  into a region of
• sustainable stability
• growing prosperity
• firmly established peace
• Regional cooperation as the main instrument of
  problem solving

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Regional Cooperation Instruments

• Matchmaking bringing together donors,
  implementing agencies, and recipient countries
  for joint priority setting
• Peer review peer pressure as methods to
  advance the reform process
• Honest brokerage good offices as
  instruments to bring together institutions that
  do not normally cooperate
• Object to stabilize the S.E.European region
  after the conflicts of the 1990s enhancing
  regional cooperation and supporting ever closer
  integration into European and Euro-Atlantic
  structures

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Stability Pact for S.E.Europe How it started

• Problem During the Kosovo crisis,
  decision-makers realised that there had never
  been a coherent, longterm policy of conflict
  prevention in S.E.Europe.
• Rather, the international approach to the Balkans
  had been piecemeal and country-oriented,
  following the geographical direction Milosevics
  policies chose to take.
• The transnational character of many regional
• problems was hardly admitted a predominantly
• reactive, fire-brigade policy concentrated on
• managing crisis after crisis, from Slovenia to
  the
• Kosovo.

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Stability Pact for S.E. Europe How it started
(2)

• The previous policy of the international
  community vis-a-vis former Yugoslavia had two
  severe deficits It concentrated on the
  consequences instead of on the sources of
  conflict, and it tackled the problems of the
  region individually and separately from the ones
  in other parts of Europe.
• Joschka Fischer, Cologne, June 1o, 1999

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Stability Pact for S. E. Europe Precursors

• a) EU Regional Approach adopted on February 27,
  1996, as part of the Royaumont process following
  the Dayton Agreement
• cooperation agreements with Albania
  Macedoniatrade preferences for
  Bosnia/Hercegovina Croatia more than 7 bn.
  expenditure since 1991 on strict, regularly
  monitored conditions
• b) EU Common Strategy for the Western Balkans,
  commissioned by the Vienna European Council in
  December 1998
• The Unions Regional Aproach of 1996 encouraged
  closer political and economic ties among the
  Balkan countries, but appeared late, with vague
  goals, and little incentives for the countries to
  actually carry out the proposed objectives.
  Differential bilateral EU approaches to
  individual countries undermined much of the
  Regional Approach in the second half of the 90s.

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Stability Pact for S.E.Europe Precursors (2)

• Problems
• Main focus on bilateral relations
• Not enough attention paid to the Eastern Balkans,
  i.e. neglecting the stabilisation potential of
  Romania and Bulgaria for the region
• No coordination of competing numerous initiatives
• Main actors lacked political will and resolve to
  make a real difference
• From todays point of view, all Balkan
  initiatives prior to the Stability Pact are
  perceived as ill-conceived and unsufficient

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On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was
adopted in Cologne. Its main aim is to strengthen
the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their
efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for
human rights and economic prosperity in order to
achieve stability in the whole region". The
Stability Pact is a political declaration of
commitment and a framework agreement on
international co-operation to develop a shared
strategy among all partners for stability and
growth in South Eastern Europe. It is not a new
international organisation nor does it have any
independent financial resources or implementing
structures. It is a co-ordinating mechanism which
matches requests from the region with offers from
participating nations and organisations and
co-ordinates political and economic reforms and
reconstruction in the region. It seeks to provide
a forum to stimulate change in the region.
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The Stability Pact Partners are

• The European Union Member States and the European
  Commission
• The countries of the region and their neighbours
  Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
  Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia,
  Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
  Yugoslavia (Serbia Montenegro), Turkey and
  Moldova
• Non EU-members of the G8 USA, Canada, Japan and
  Russia
• Other countries Norway and Switzerland
• International organisations UN, OSCE, Council of
  Europe, UNHCR, NATO and OECD
• International financial institutions World Bank,
  International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Bank
  for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
  European Investment Bank (EIB) and Council of
  Europe Development Bank (CEB)
• Regional initiatives Black Sea Economic
  Co-operation (BSEC), Central European Initiative
  (CEI), South East European Co-operative
  Initiative (SECI) and South East Europe
  Co-operation Process (SEECP).

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Stability Pact for S.E.EuropeCharacteristics

• SP an example for a general trend in
  international politics regionalization replacing
  bipolarity
• SP based on lessons from international crisis
  management and conflict prevention, stressing the
  need for
• a secure environment
• promotion of sustainable democratic
  systems
• economic and social well-being
• reconstruction of intra- and
  intersocietal relations based on agreed rules,
  legitimacy and public authority
• as preconditions for successful conflict
  prevention and sustainable peace.
• SP also incorporates the CSCE process experiences
  trust in the power of confidence-building
  measures, coherence of approach to problems in a
  number of baskets, insistence on peaceful change,
  compromise, and package deals as means of
  inter-national (re)conciliation, emphasis on
  local ownership of policies

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Stability Pact for S.E.Europe Working Mechanism

• Premiss CSCE concept of conflict
  transformation through an open-ended process of
  increasing cooperation that will unfold over time
• Mechanism
• 
  S.E.Europe Regional Table
  meets on Foreign
• 
  Steering Body acting as Clearing
  Minister
  level
• 
  House for all matters of
• 
  Principle
• 
  Chair Special Coordinator
  appointed by
• 
  Coordinates all activities of and among
  the European
• 
  the working tables, meets regularly with
  Union
• 
  the chairs of the working tables, and re-
• 
  ports periodically to the OSCE
• Working Table
  Working Table
  Working Table
• on democratisation on economic
  reconstruction, on security
  issues
• and human rights development,
  and cooperation

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Regional TableChair Erhard Busek
Working Table I DEMOCRACYChair Goran
Svilanovic
Working Table II ECONOMYChair Fabrizio
Saccomanni
Working Table III SECURITYChair Janez
Premoze
Sub TableSecurity Defence
Sub TableJustice Home Affairs
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• The Stability Pact was launched in a manner which
  raised exaggerated expectations of what it might
  achieve. Since then, it has been viewed mostly
  with indifference if not scepticism. It could,
  and should, have been better explained at the
  start that it was not a new international funding
  organisation with financial resources of its own
  and an operational mandate. It is a forum
  bringing together 35 countries and 16
  international organisations, financial
  institutions and regional initiatives committed
  to working within a common framework to promote
  stability and growth in the region. In that role
  it has sought with some modest success to promote
  regional co-operation and intra-Balkan trade to
  focus non-EU donors on the needs of the region
  and to achieve better co-ordination amongst the
  plethora of donors. We welcome the consensus
  which emerged at the Bucharest Regional
  Conference that the Stability Pact's role and
  activities should be given a focus more clearly
  in line with its status as a generator of
  international political commitment to the region
  and a catalyst for greater co-operation within
  it.
• House of Lords, Select Cttee.on the EU, 20th
  report,para.154

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Stability Pact Achievements

• Through the Stability Pact for South Eastern
  Europe the EU, for the first time in history,
  undertook to draw South Eastern Europe closer to
  the perspective of full integration into its
  structures. All Southeast European countries have
  been recognised as potential candidates for EU
  membership

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Stability Pact Achievements (2)

• The European perspective has proved to be
  the most powerful incentive for reconciliation,
  co-operation and internal reforms in the region.
  Countries in the region view the Pact as the
  primary instrument of political and institutional
  support for the EU integration of SEE countries.
  More important The Stability Pact has succeeded
  in giving life to regional co-operation. For the
  first time in history, SEE countries perceive
  such co-operation as a building block, not a
  stumbling block for European integration.

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How could the Stability Pact make a difference ?

• First, the Pact has made it clear that
  regional co-operation is an indispensable
  component and a precondition for Euro-Atlantic
  integration. It is the fast track to full EU
  membership. The EU, on its part, has recognised
  that it should not reward a race towards
  membership. If countries want to join the
  European Union, they have to demonstrate that
  they can develop regional co-operation and can
  solve their problems in co-operation with their
  neighbours, Commissioner Verheugen once stated.
  People in the region should have by now
  understood that such co-operation is one of the
  founding principles of the European Union itself.
  

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How could the Stability Pact make a difference ?
(2)

• Secondly, the Stability Pact has given
  evidence that co-operation serves the mutual
  interests of all participating countries.
  Against this background, the Pact has been
  engaged in facilitating the resolution of
  transnational issues, using the tool of regional
  co-operation as a catalyst for reconciliation,
  good-neighbourliness and improved political
  relations.

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Stability Pact Criticisms Problems

• As the prospect of full integration has proven to
  be a powerful incentive for reconciliation,
  cooperation and internal reforms in SEE, the EU
  needs to live up to its full commitment that SEE
  countries will be welcomed as full and equal
  members once the necessary conditions are
  fulfilled. Yet, the engagement of major donors in
  the Balkans has fallen dramatically. The
  Stability Pact community, including the EU, does
  not have appropriate instruments to promote
  social cohesion, private investment and
  sustainable growth in the region. Complicated
  bureaucratic procedures create difficulties to
  spend the money available efficiently and create
  disappointment among recipient countries. Thus,
  the credibility of donors is at stake. The SP has
  been given the difficult task to coordinate
  partners who sometimes resist to such
  coordination. For greater efficiency, SEE
  partners should be granted greater ownership in
  the design and management of external assistance.
  (Bodo Hombach, 2004)

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Stability Pact Criticisms Problems (2)

• The Stability Pact for SEE is not as efficient as
  it could be. The economic development in the
  region is still unsatisfactory, the population is
  unaware of the existence of the pact and its
  extensive programmes. The main problem is the
  lack of coordination. The single donor states
  even do not know which projects are funded by
  other countries. (Rainer Stinner, 2004)
• The record of the international involvement and
  that of the Stability Pact in particular is
  mixed. This is partly due to the fact that the
  Stability Pact has mainly a coordinating
  function, while much more active involvement is
  necessary because the regional will is weak.
  (Vladimir Gligorov, 2004)
• Note the Special Coordinator only has about 30
  staff !!

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Stability Pact Criticisms Problems (3)

• Main problem
• Inconsistencies perhaps even competition
  between Stability Pact and Stabilization and
  Association Process
• SP emphasizes regional cooperation and judges
  progress made by SEE states on this basis.
• SAP establishes competition among the candidates
  for a Stabilization and Accession agreement, as
  their chances to enter the EU later on are judged
  on the basis of their individual progress towards
  the goals and qualifications agreed on. In this
  context, achievements in regional cooperation are
  regarded as marginal.

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Future Prospects

• The Stability Pact provides a superstructural
  framework between Romania Bulgaria as accession
  countries, the SEE states as potential accession
  countries, and Moldowa. Thus, it will be needed
  at least until the SEE accession process is
  successfully resolved.
• The Stability Pact also binds Kosovo into
  regional cooperation via UNMIK. Thus, it will be
  needed as long as the Kosovo status problem is
  not resolved.
• The development of regional cooperation is an
  open-ended continuing process. This means that at
  last in the immediate and medium term future the
  Stability Pact will have enough work to do. Any
  obituaries therefore are decidedly premature.

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Thank you for your attention !
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The Stabilisation and Association Process for
South-Eastern Europe

• Recipients
• Albania, Bosnia Hercegovina, Croatia, Federal
  Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic
  of Macedonia
• Size
• 4,5 bn Euro 1991 1999 on part of EU
• 17 bn Euro including humanitarian assistance
  contributions of member states

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The Stabilisation and Association Process for
South-Eastern Europe

• Definition
• EUs main contribution to the stability pact
• Enhancement of the Regional Approach
• Stronger incentives for the region, but also an
  element of conditionality regarding political and
  economic development and regional cooperation
• Tailor-made approach taking into account the
  needs of each country
• Goal
• bring peace, stability, and economic development
  to the region and open the long-term perspective
  of EU membership

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151. We heard from many of our witnesses that the
Stability Pact, in particular the Quick Start
Package, was announced with a great deal of
fanfare which led to high expectations of it.
Stephen Wordsworth from the FCO told us that
these expectations were overblown (Q 34). Clare
Short went one step further and indicated that
the grandiose promises made at its inception were
a cause for concern because they were seen by
many as too ambitious (Q 252). Chris Patten
believed that "the expectations were less
than coherently explained or analysed and that
it is unfair to blame those who run the Pact
for the gap between the initial rhetoric and what
the Pact has usefully been able to do." (Q
65) 152. Gary Titley MEP made a similar point
when he explained that the Pact had been
established as a reaction to the problem of a
perceived lack of co-ordination of aid efforts in
the Balkan region. He thought that the Pact
itself needed to be more streamlined and focused
and given specific yearly tasks to achieve (Q
177).