PLANNING%20OF%20SECURITY%20SECTOR%20CAPABILITIES%20FOR%20PROTECTION%20OF%20MARITIME%20SOVEREIGNTY

1
PLANNING OF SECURITY SECTOR CAPABILITIES FOR
PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY

• Capt. (Navy) Ass. Prof. PhD Boyan Mednikarov
• Ass. Prof. PhD Todor Tagarev
• NATO ARW
• SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION MAKING IN
  THE SECURITY SECTOR
• Velingrad, Bulgaria, 21-25 October 2006

2
The main reasons for our interest in the subject

• the dynamic changes of the economic, political,
  and military-strategic environment in the Black
  Sea region after the end of the bi-polar world
• the membership of Bulgaria in NATO
• the forthcoming accession to the EU,
• which brought the need for radical rethinking of
  the views on maritime sovereignty of our country.
• Broader definition of maritime sovereignty - the
  state retains the right to exercise control both
  on the territorial waters and the other parts of
  the Black Sea where it has internationally
  recognized rights.
• The main task of the research - the adequate
  justification of the planning of security sector
  capabilities for protection of maritime
  sovereignty.
• Sub-tasks
• developing a model for planning the national
  capabilities for maritime sovereignty protection
• testing this model and putting it into practise
  within the maritime institutions.

3
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE CAPABILITIES
OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
4
KEY FACTORS

• Objectives in the area of maritime sovereignty,
  including those to be achieved through military
  means
• Strategy for achieving the objectives
• Roles of the institutions, engaged in protecting
  maritime sovereignty
• Scenarios, describing plausible materialization
  risks and threats to the national interests
  related to the maritime space
• Tasks to be performed in neutralizing the
  plausible risks and threats (often structured in
  a Universal Task List, or UTL)
• Capabilities required to perform tasks for
  protection of maritime sovereignty
• Ways to provide these capabilities (coordination
  of the development of the variety of capability
  components within a selected capability model).

5
FRAMEWORK PROCESS FOR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT

• Formulate the policy for protection of maritime
  sovereignty
• Analyse the environment and assess threats to
  maritime sovereignty
• Analyse the status of the system for protecting
  maritime sovereignty
• Define and agree on planning scenarios formulate
  hypotheses for the simultaneous (or near
  simultaneous) occurrence of these planning
  situations
• Create a structured list of tasks for protection
  of maritime sovereignty define the subset of
  tasks that are critical for performing plausible
  missions in the protection of maritime
  sovereignty across scenarios
• Define the full set of capabilities required to
  protect maritime sovereignty
• Test the set against the hypotheses on
  simultaneous occurrence of two or more planning
  scenarios
• Distribute the required capabilities among
  organisations
• Assess planning risks
• Program the development of capabilities.

6
PLANNING THE CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
7
TESTING THE MODEL IN PRACTICE

• 1. Formulating of the national policy for
  protection of maritime sovereignty
• The main problem was identified the lack of
  coordination among the different institutions
  responsible for the protection of the national
  interests in the Black sea region.
• the first step was to define the scope of the
  term maritime sovereignty
• the next step was to formulate the objectives of
  the policy for maritime sovereignty protection,
  which include the protection of all the aspects
  of the national interests, the enforcement of the
  provisions of international and national maritime
  law, the defence of the Black Sea coast, etc.

8
LEVELS OF AMBITION

• To protect the sovereignty and the territorial
  integrity of the country from seaside aggression,
  including neutralisation of terrorist activities
  in the territorial waters
• To protect the outer borders of the European
  Union in the Black Sea
• To prevent acts of violation of international and
  national law, related to the use on the national
  maritime space
• To guarantee security and safety of shipping in
  the territorial sea and the internal waterways
• To react adequately in emergencies in the
  national maritime spaces with primary goal to
  prevent casualties and to minimise material
  losses
• To preserve the ecological balance of the sea and
  safeguard its life resources
• To conduct an active policy for upholding the
  peace and security in the region and to enhance
  the international cooperation on key humanitarian
  and law enforcement issues.

9
NEXT STEPS

• Analysis of the participation of the Republic of
  Bulgaria in a variety of international
  initiatives in the Black sea region this
  analysis proved the fact that the increased
  number of activities enhances the security within
  the region.
• Evaluation of the ways and the level of providing
  resources for the maritime institutions - this
  showed that the situation was not very optimistic
  although it can be improved by actively utilising
  the funds provided by the EU.
• Analysis of the environment where the protection
  of maritime sovereignty is realised. As a result,
  the main threats for the sea-related national
  interests of the Republic of Bulgaria were
  identified.

10
MAIN THREATS

• Armed aggression
• Violation of the safety of shipping and other
  regulations
• Trafficking in human beings and illegal
  emigration by sea
• Trafficking in narcotics
• Smuggling
• Trafficking in weapons and military technology,
  including WMD components
• Illegal or indiscriminate use of the
  bio-resources of the sea
• Maritime terrorism
• Piracy
• Maritime pollution
• Information security threats
• Incident on a vessel or aircraft endangering the
  life of the crew/passengers
• Geology-, hydro-geology-, or weather-induced
  contingency

11
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SYSTEM FOR
PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY

• Bulgarian Navy and Air Force
• Border Police
• Maritime and Port Administration Executive
  Agencies
• Other organisations
• We can sum up that their capabilities leave a lot
  to be desired.

12
DEFINITION OF THE PLANNING SCENARIOS, RELATED TO
THE PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
12 hypotheses for the simultaneous occurrence of
the scenarios were formulated.
13
FORMULATION OF STRUCTURED LIST OF THE TASKS OF
THE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY

• Two existing approaches to this were analysed
• developing a universal task list (the approach
  used by the Armed Forces of the US, United
  Kingdom and Canada)
• the approach used by the Department of Homeland
  Security of the US
• In result, we agreed on the following structure
  of the tasks of the maritime institutions

14
1. Management of the Maritime Security
Organisations as part of the security sector

• 1.1. Management of the Maritime Security
  Organisations (MSO)
• 1.1.1. Planning the development of the Maritime
  Security Organisations (MSO)
• 1.1.2. Resource Management
• 1.1.2.1. Human Resource Management education,
  qualification, certification
• 1.1.2.2. Acquisition Management
• 1.1.2.3. Finance Management
• 1.1.2.4. Crisis Resource Management
• 1.1.3. Training and exercises of the Maritime
  Security Organisations (MSO)
• 1.1.4. Lessons Learned
• 1.2. Coordination, Command and Control of the
  Maritime Security Organisations
• 1.2.1. National and international planning for
  protection of the maritime security
• 1.2.2. Operations planning
• 1.2.3. Command and control of forces
• 1.2.4. Coordinate and integrate joint,
  multinational and interagency support and
  interaction with public organisations
• 1.2.5. Conduct information operations
• 1.2.6. Deploy the command and control system
• 1.3. Support to the Maritime Security
  Organisations
• 1.3.1. Provide material means
• 1.3.2. Recover/maintain systems and equipment

15
2. Prevention

• 2.1. Identify threats
• 2.1.1. Manage intelligence activities
• 2.1.2. Collect intelligence information
• 2.1.3. Process intelligence information
• 2.1.4. Analyse intelligence information
• 2.1.5. Disseminate information on threats
• 2.1.6. Identify, inform, and report
• 2.2. Control access
• 2.2.1. Inspect vessels and cargo
• 2.2.2. Monitor zones and areas
• 2.2.3. Inspect people
• 2.3. Eliminate threats
• 2.3.1. Investigate and detain terrorist suspects
• 2.3.2. Seize dangerous materials
• 2.3.3. Explosive ordnance disposal
• 2.3.4. Detect and eliminate information incursion

16
3. Protection

• 3.1. Assess critical infrastructure and key
  resources and sites
• 3.1.1. Identify key resources and sites
• 3.1.2. Assess vulnerability
• 3.1.3. Coordinate and exchange information among
  institutions, non-governmental organisations, and
  businesses on key resources and sites
• 3.1.4. Assess the situation
• 3.2. Protect forces and sites
• 3.2.1. Adopt measures to lower/mitigate threats
  against sites
• 3.2.2. Prepare/ develop the types of defence and
  protection of mobile and stationary assets
• 3.2.3. Disseminate key resources and objects
• 3.2.4. Detect and destroy mines
• 3.2.5. Detect and seize illegal fishing devices
• 3.3. Lower the risks to society
• 3.3.1. Safeguard public health
• 3.3.2. Provide public safety
• 3.3.3. Prepare the public

17
4. Response

• 4.1. Assess incidents
• 4.1.1. Investigate incidents
• 4.1.2. Assess threats and consequences
• 4.1.3. Maintain internal communication and
  disseminate information on incidents
• 4.2. Limit incident consequences
• 4.2.1. Manage incidents
• 4.2.2. Respond to threats
• 4.2.3. Target hardening
• 4.2.4. Search and rescue
• 4.2.5. Fire fighting
• 4.3. Impact by opponents
• 4.3.1. Track detected ships and submarines
• 4.3.2. Destroy ships and submarines
• 4.3.3. Establish defensive mine barrages
• 4.3.4. Detain ships
• 4.3.5. Antiterrorist activities

18
5. Recovery

• 5.1. Assist the public
• 5.1.1. Provide pre-hospital care/ support and
  evacuation
• 5.1.2. Provide humanitarian assistance
• 5.1.3. Provide social services
• 5.2. Restore environment
• 5.2.1. Clean up contaminated sites and areas
• 5.2.2. Dispose of materials
• 5.2.3. Conduct site remediation
• 5.2.4. Restore natural resources
• 5.3. Restore infrastructure
• 5.3.1. Restore Civil Services
• 5.3.2 Rebuild property
• 5.3.3 Restore lifelines
• 5.3.4. Restore economic institutions

19
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY

• General (for each mission)
• Management of the maritime sovereignty forces
  managing force development
• Coordination, Command and Control of the Maritime
  Sovereignty Forces
• C2 communications and information support
• Logistics support
• Force deployment

20
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY

• Prevent
• Surveillance and detection of surface,
  sub-surface and aerial targets
• Fusion and analysis of intelligence information
• Exchange of information and cooperation
• Target identification, dissemination and
  reporting
• Inspection of vessels and their cargo
• Control the traffic of vessels, cargo, passengers
  and personnel in harbour areas
• Investigate and detain intruders, including
  terrorists, in national maritime spaces
• Detect chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear,
  and ecological threats and effects
• Detect information incursion

21
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY

• Protect
• Defend and protect forces and areas
• Protect sites and critical infrastructure in the
  coastal area
• Detect and destroy mines
• Detect and seize illegal fishing gear
• Protect databases and computer networks

22
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY

• Respond
• Track detected surface and subsurface vessels and
  aircraft
• Destroy surface and subsurface vessels and
  aircraft
• Set defensive mine barrages
• React to a terrorist attack against a vessel and
  a harbour facility
• Rescue hostages
• Search and rescue at sea
• Fight fires at sea
• Evacuate and provide pre-hospital care

23
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY

• Recover
• Limit a pollution source/spill
• Decontamination of sea areas
• Assist a ship/aircraft in emergency
• Provide humanitarian assistance

24
NEXT STEPS

• to suggest distribution of the capabilities among
  security sector organizations taking into account
  their traditions, experience, and current roles,
  with a focus on cost effectiveness.
• to assess the risk.

25
CONCLUSIONS

• The problem with the lack of interagency
  cooperation is very serious and it must be made
  central for the maritime policy of the country.
• The wide array of tasks related to the protection
  of maritime sovereignty requires that that the
  activities should be systematized and specified.
• The defining of the maritime sovereignty
  protection capabilities must be based on the
  particular tasks carried out within the
  particular scenarios.
• The suggested distribution of the capabilities
  reflects their current state in the maritime
  institutions.
• The main purpose of risk assessment is to
  evaluate the extent to which the planned
  capabilities will be adequate to the possible
  future requirements for the maritime
  institutions.