Investing in our Nations Readiness

1
Investing in our Nations Readiness Path to
Increased ARNG Readiness
2
ARNG Readiness Then (2005) Now
As of 21NOV08

• 2005 Now
• 1.) Force Structure (FS) Auth. Required 376,105
  349,581
• 2.) End Strength (ES) 329,893 362,261
• 3.) Total MOSQ Ready 292,353 312,634
• (Trained, not DMOSQ)
• ES TPL - NOVAL MOSQ
• 4.) MOSQ Ready/Required 77.7 89.4
• Total MOSQ/FS MOSQ
• July 2005 was the low point for modern ARNG ES

3
The ProblemGhost Soldiers/Conditioned
Cross-Leveling
Now 24.9K Soldiers
ARNG Units New recruits occupy unit spaces
NON-DEPLOYABLE Awaiting IET
Cross-level
Army TTHS
AC Units Fully Manned Deployable
New recruits assigned to TTHS and not against
unit spaces
4
Bringing the ARNG into Balance
Since 1 July 2005 31,239 End Strength
EOM Oct 08 361,551
ARNG Lowest ES 01 JUL 05 330,312
5
Awaiting Training Trending Up (5 year Trend -
Awaiting BT/IET)
New NPS Recruit Model Huge NPS Gains
GRAP
As of 11/24/2008
6
Bringing the ARNG into BalanceContinued
Systemic Un-Readiness
346,207
363,088
376,105
378,720
357,934
349,581
374,803
355,614
FSA
EOM OCT 08 ES 361,551 FSA 346,207 TPL
24,991
ARNG Rebalance
Capability Gap
VCSA MOA
GRAP
GED
RSP
Awaiting Training
Trained End Strength
366,000
352,707
346,288
333,177
342,916
360,351
370,700
348,502
ES
26,481
23,487
23,061
23,494
15,896
16,658
25,295
TPL
19,173
7
Bringing the ARNG into Balance Training Pipeline
As of 14 November 2008
Awaiting Training
At Training
Awaiting Phase II
Total
44,252
8
Path to ARNG Balance
TRADOC Adjusts Efficiencies to Reduce ATP
EOM OCT 08 ES 361,551 FSA 346,207 TPL
24,991
371K 358.2K
RSP-T 12.5K
Potential growth in Trained Strength 23.8K
Awaiting Training
Trained End Strength 334,367
This Ramp indicates Immediate action taken to fix
backlog in 2 years
FSA End Strength Trained End Strength includes
those in training
9
Getting Better Every Day
FY09 TRAINED STRENGTH 89All required
Soldiers All Soldiers trained 100 equipment
available
Recruit Ship for Readiness
Fix Training Pipeline Backlog Problem
Create the TTHS Account for ARNG (12.5K Recruit
Sustainment Prog RSP)
Improved Equipment Fill in Units
Correct Force Structure / End Strength Imbalance
(388K to 358.2K)
Increase End Strength (330K to 350K 360K ) GRAP
new NPS recruiting model
10
Investing in our Nations Readiness Path to
Increased ARNG Readiness
11
Bringing the ARNG into Balance
Backup Slides
12
ARNG to AC Comparison with TTHSTTHS of Strength
ARMY Total Strength 539,264
TTHS
Awaiting Training
Operational Strength
74,824 13.9
Capability Gap
FSA 484.4 K
ARNG Total Strength 370,700
ARNG Total Strength 370,700
12,500 3.4
12,500 3.4
ARNG FY 10 FSA 355.6K
Capability Gap
25,900
358,200
464,400
332,300
13
Quarterly Training Utilization As Of 10/29/2008
Basic Training (BT) Un-fence the Pool

• NOTES
• AC reduced BT Mission by 7.5k (-13), only
  increased inputs 1.3k (2.9)
• NG increased BT Mission by 1.7k (6.7), and
  increased inputs by 2.2k (9.4)
• AC reduced 4th quarter BT by 1.7k, AR reduced by
  744
• ARNG only benefitted 864 of the 2.4k reduction

14
Full-Time Support Update

• FY09
• AGR 2,856 (957 Controlled Grades)
• MILTECH 708
• FY10-15 FTS Growth
• AGR 0 (0 Controlled Grades)
• TECH 1,170
• Completion of RAND Study and AI4 Task Force next
  opportunity to address FTS supporting Operational
  Force

15
Leading ChangeEight Stage Process by John Kotter
The Eight Stage Process

• Establishing a Sense of Urgency
• Creating the Guiding Coalition
• Developing a Vision and Strategy
• Communicating the Change Vision
• Empowering Employees for Broad-
• Based Action
• Generating Short-Term Wins
• Consolidating Gains and Producing
• More Change
• Anchoring New Approaches in the
• Culture

16
Eight Common Errors The Consequences

• COMMON ERRORS
• Allowing too much complacency
• Failure to create a sufficiently powerful guiding
  coalition
• Underestimating the power of vision
• Under communicating the vision by a factor of 10
• Permitting obstacles to block the new vision
• Failing to create short-term wins
• Declaring victory to soon
• Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the
  corporate culture

CONSEQUENCES

• New strategies arent implemented well
• Acquisitions dont achieve expected synergies
• Reengineering takes too long and costs too much
• Downsizing doesnt get cost under control
• Quality programs dont deliver hoped for results

17
Management vs. Leadership

• MANAGEMENT
• Planning and Budgeting
• establish steps to achieve results allocate
  necessary resources
• Organizing and Staffing
• establish structure staff that structure and
  delegate responsibility provide guidance,
  policies and procedures
• Controlling and Problem Solving
• monitor results and identify deviations plan
  organize to solve
• Produces a degree of predictability
  orderPotential to consistently produce expected
  short-term results

• LEADERSHIP
• Establishing Direction
• develop future vision strategies for producing
  change
• Aligning People
• communicating via words deeds to foster
  cooperation, influence creation of teams that
  understand vision strategies
• Motivating and Inspiringenergize people to
  overcome major political, bureaucratic
  resources barriers
• Produces change, often to dramatic degree
• Potential to produce extremely innovative
  useful change that help make organization more
  competitive

18
Bringing the ARNG into Balance Answering the
Mail
Our goal is to achieve full spectrum readiness
for ARNG units and full deployment readiness on
mobilization. I would like you to outline the
systemic policy changes needed to enable Guard
units to achieve and maintain P1 personnel
readiness standards during pre-mobilization,.
19
Bringing the ARNG into Balance Systemic
Un-Readiness (1 JULY 2005 )
376,726 FSA
Systemic Un-Readiness - 63,575 or 83 of
personnel fill when considering Force Structure
Imbalance and Awaiting Training Pipeline
330,312 ES
313,151 (ES-TPL)
Strength
20
Bringing the ARNG into Balance Systemic
Un-Readiness (1 JULY 2005 )
376,726 FSA
Negative ES vs. FSA Deviation
63,575 Capability Gap
330,312 ES
Awaiting Training
313,151 ES - TPL
Trained Strength
ARNG Lowest ES 01 JUL 05 330,312
21
Force Structure - End Strength Deviation
Since 1 July 2005 31,239 End Strength Since
2005 - 29,207 Force Structure Allowance
378,720
EOM Oct 08 361,551
376,105
374,803
Recruit Sustainment Program
ARNG Rebalance
363,088
357,934
Negative ES vs. FSA Deviation

GRAP
GED
RSP
Positive ES vs. FSA
346,207
ARNG Lowest ES 01 JUL 05 330,312
VCSA MOA
352,707
342,918
346,288
333,177
348,502
22
FULLY MANNED UNREADY THE FUTURE WITH NO SUPPORT
Cross-Leveling stays Conditioned
EOM JUL 08 ES 361,151 FSA 346,207 AWT TNG
26,784
361K 358.2K
Awaiting Training 26.7K
In RSP
Awaiting Training
Trained End Strength 334,367
FSA End Strength
23
MANNED COA 1 FIX PART 1 Positioned For
ReadinessProvide ARNG only a T in TTHS (the
RSP-T)
EOM JUL 08 ES 361,151 FSA 346,207 AWT TNG
26,784
371K 358.2K
RSP-T 12.5K
Awaiting Training 23.8K
Awaiting Training
Trained End Strength 334,367
FSA End Strength
24
Assumptions

• Army will reduce ARNG Soldiers Awaiting IET
  pipeline to 12,500 and provide adequate and
  timely training seats to the ARNG
• The RSP size will equate to those Soldiers
  Awaiting IET of 12,500
• Soldiers in IMT will be able to complete their
  training and will deploy with their units
• The ARNG will not grow additional Force Structure
  without an equivalent increase to End Strength
  and the RSP.

25
ARNG Balanced Issues

• Timing of training capacity inadequate
• Grow-back of Force Structure Allowance
• Operating Strength Deviation totally embedded in
  ARNG Force Structure
• Current system does not allow ARNG Units to
  achieve P1 without significant cross-leveling

26
ARNG Balanced Solutions

• Increase End Strength
• Increase throughput for the training pipeline
• Reduce Force Structure
• Combination of the above

27
MANNED at 406K COA 2 Adds full TP Top-line of
FSANo Training Base Efficiencies / 7-9 years to
be Ready
406K
EOM JUL 08 ES 361,151 FSA 346,207 TPL
45,580
Training Pipeline 46K
358.2K
23.8K
Awaiting Training
This space represents potential only if no
changes are made, this may never be realized.
Trained End Strength 334,367
FSA End Strength
28
ARNG Balanced Increased ES TNG Throughput
TTHS 370,700
346,207
363,088
376,105
378,720
357,934
349,581
374,803
355,614
FSA
EOM AUG 08 ES 362,014 FSA 346,207 TPL
26,282
ES 370,700
ARNG Rebalance
TTHS
Capability Gap
VCSA MOA
GRAP
GED
RSP
Awaiting Training
Trained End Strength
370,700
352,707
346,288
333,177
342,916
358,200
370,700
348,502
ES
25,052
25,252
23,061
23,494
15,896
16,658
25,295
TPL
19,173
29
Bringing the ARNG into Balance Total AC Program
Model
Total AC Program using May 08 Data. The
Operating Strength Deviation in FY12 shows that
acquiring 547.4K strength does not fill all of
the force structure requirements of the Army.
Furthermore, it suggests that 547.4 K end
strength is not high enough to support a 484.4K
force structure with current TTHS projections.
(Source DA G1 M2PR)
30
ARNG Sands of Time
TAPDB EOM 200810 MOB 20081104
112,405 24,052 104,799 51,630 24,232
44,433
31
(No Transcript)
32
Bringing the ARNG into Balance P1 Readiness
Policies

• IRR-G A must to man the future force. ARNG will
  be the laboratory to develop what right looks
  like within the RC to have an operational and
  strategic IRR. Variable participation in order to
  meet the needs of the Soldier while augmenting
  the force with individuals will not encumber unit
  spaces in the future.
• Early notification of Sourcing two years at a
  minimum.
• Synchronization/Connection of VIEP and Dent/Med
  coverage
• 18 months Prior - extend early Dental /
  Medical ( Local contract or TRICARE)
• 12 months Post - extend TAMP 12 months to
  cover Reintegration activities
• For the Soldier and Family. This stabilizes
  the force, covers Reunion/Reintegration
  requirements, and will allow us to work the
  warriors in transition, PDHRA follow ups, and
  other the Family concerns.
• Reset Imperatives - Reverse SRP
• We must direct a complete reverse SRP - to ensure
  our Soldiers are returned to Family/Employers in
  a 10/20 Standards.
• This must include all Soldiers to have a
  Psychological consult. Need to remove stigma for
  receiving Psychiatric care. Can't attend OCS,
  fear of career being ruined, Suicides have been
  on an increase, Homeless Vets increased. May be
  missing the M-TBI/Future.

33
Bringing the ARNG into Balance P1 Readiness
Policies

• Need authority to transfer MGIB to Family. This
  will help Recruiting / Retention and show the
  wounded Soldier they are still valued to the Army
  Family. This will help us with making the
  survivor/spouse the "bread winner" and set the
  Family up for the future.
• Rapid delivery of RC forces onto Active Duty
  need to look at the business processes we
  currently have in place. ARNG has reviewed and
  believe we can remove unnecessary steps and
  deliver capabilities. Air Force has a much
  simpler model, same law different steps. With
  OSD changeover this is the opportunity to
  reinvent the process. Huge cost and manpower
  savings.
• Stop Loss Unit stabilization is critical,
  understand the political pressure to remove but
  this is a critical stabilization policy and
  should not be jettisoned until all other
  stabilization initiatives are in place and have
  proven effective. Lack of effective
  stabilization programs places follow-on unit
  readiness at risk due to replacement requirements.

34
Training Pipeline Trend
35
Building Ready Forces in a Sustained Force
Structure

• Eliminates unique RC process that inhibits the
  National Guards ability to execute readiness
• Over 25K non prior service recruits are awaiting
  Initial Entry Training (14 of all E1-E4
  positions)
• New recruits for the ARNG occupy slots in
  deployable unitsnew recruits in AC are held in
  the TTHS account
• Since recruits occupy unit slots, commanders have
  limited ability to increase personnel readiness
• New recruits are not deployable so cross-leveling
  is required when unit deploys
• Alert for cross-leveled soldiers are much later
  than the gaining unit limiting training time,
  individual readiness time (medical and dental),
  building unit cohesion and exacerbates distances
  from gaining unit
• Cross-leveling negatively impacts the readiness
  of the losing unit

36
Building Ready Forces in a Sustained Force
Structure cont

• Will allow the ARNG to reach 90 MOSQ for
  assigned ES
• Improves ARNG readiness to generate 55K of DMOSQ
  Soldiers to warfight in each ARFORGEN available
  year
• Improves ARNG readiness to generate 55K of DMOSQ
  Soldiers to war fight in each ARFORGEN available
  year
• Grows ARNG End Strength by 12.5K above programmed
  Force Structure Allowance
• Enhances ARNG operating force capability in
  support of Combatant Commanders and domestic
  missions
• No force structure bill to ARNG operating force
  in Total Army Analysis 10-15
• Does not increase ARNG equipping costs in POM
  10-15 or PBR 11-15
• ARNG already executes an RSP increases the
  chances of recruits successfully completing IET

37
Elements of a Healthy Awaiting Training Pipeline

• NPS Accessions
• Split-Training
• Thru-Ticket Training
• Accessions currently in high school
• Enlist to Ship period
• Training Seat Availability
• Total training seats to support NPS enlistments
• Training seats spread by month conducive to the
  break-out listed above
• Attrition
• NPS Accessions that fail to ship need to be
  renegotiated for another training seat, or
  expeditiously discharged from SIDPERS

38
ARNG MILCON Update

• Increase of 47M to FY09 BRAC funding (538M)
• 10 AFRCs in 9 States
• 1 Regional Maintenance and Training Complex
• 1 HQ Building addition
• No change to FY09 base MILCON funding (539M)
• 16 new Readiness Centers and AFRCs in 11 States
  housing over 3,355 Soldiers
• 7 new ranges in 7 States
• 2 Maintenance facilities in 1 State
• 2 Aviation facilities to support the
  transformation of the Army in 2 States
• 2 training institutes in 2 states
• Results of POM 10-15
• Funded BRAC UFR in FY09 FY10 (98M
  construction and 64M non-construction)
• Funded GTA UFR in FY12 (92M)
• Funded ORTCs railheads at ARNG Mobilization
  Centers in FY12 (79M)
• Increased FY10-13 base funding by 213.5M
• Army MILCON funding constrained in FY14 FY15

39
Capitalizing on ARNG Reclass Training Capacity

• AC has about 6,300 Reclass Training
  requirements
• ARNG can train approximately 5,000
• 56 MOSs trained in ARNG Schools
• Total Annual Savings to the Army
• 2.6M annually (estimate from Institutional
  Training Resource Model - ITRM)
• Saves 97 training days per Soldier (average)

Opens up 5,000 AIT Seats
40
Efficiencies

• Reduces AC costs when RTI is co-located
• Frees up classroom and billet space for AIT
  requirements
• Enhances ability for Grow the Army
• Reduces out year base expansion costs (new
  facilities)
• 900 seats available at ARNG Schools this FY
• no additional costs for AC/RC
• Shorter duration training
• makes the Soldier available to the unit for
  collective training
• allows attendance at more than 1 course
• Similar gains to Army for NCOES training

41
ARNG Reclass Training for AC

• ARNG has a Medical Battalion Training Site at
  Camp Shelby, MS
• Ready to load AC Soldiers into ATRRS for 68W10
  (Health Care Specialist) training
• AMEDD proponent leadership recently visited ARNG
  site and observed our instructors
• They are impressed with our facilities and staff
  and want us to train 200-300 AC Soldiers in FY09
• ARNG has 1,400 AC Soldiers programmed to train
  Warrior Leader Course (WLC) at Camp Ashland, NE
  Regional Training Site
• Will end up training approximately 700 AC
  Soldiers in FY08

42
OVERALL QUALIFIED STATUS OF ARNG
43
Leading ChangeARNG Strategy for an Ready Force
Equipped
Predictable
Trained
Operational Ready Force
Strategic Reserve
Bridging Strategy
Accessible
Organized
Strong
44
READY 371K
14.3B Base2.3B Sup
2010
346K FS361K ES
2008
8 DIV34 BCT
388K FS333K ES
OJS
2005
ARNG Strategic Environment1989-2010
GWOTEra of Persistent Conflict
OIF 193,308
388K FS351.8K ES
OEF 58,621
2001
ONE 35,718
405K FS357K ES
5.69B Base
KOSOVO 12,944
1999
420K FS374.9K ES
1995
BOSNIA 14,879
426K FS409.9K ES
9 DIV22 BDE
1993
HAITI
SOMALIA
464K FS446K ES
62,411
472K FS444K ES
1990
1989
COLD WAR ENDS
HOLLOW
45
DARNG CCMRF GUIDANCE

• ARNG AVS and EN assets will not be sourced or
  contingency sourced
• Source from ARFORGEN Year 2 // Train in
  ARFORGEN Year 1
• ARNG will not accept mission without full
  additional funding
• Concurrent (dual) mission status within
  ARFORGEN model
• - If SECDEF directs Title 10 employment of an
  ARNG CCMRF, then a later decision
• will determine whether such an employment
  constitutes single mission status against GWOT
  requirements
• Apportionment (AC term) at TPFDD Level 4 not
  to exceed 24 months
• ARNG assets remain in a T-32 status, available
  to Governors, until SECDEF directs T-10
  employment
• Adjutants General will retain Training
  Readiness Oversight authority
• No Derivative Unit Identification Codes will be
  implemented for sourcing

46
CNGB CCMRF GUIDANCE

• 25 FTE against UIC authorized strength
• NG will not accept mission without full
  additional funding
• No more than 20 of the capabilities will come
  from one state
• NG assets remain in T-32 status, available to
  Governors, until SECDEF directs T-10 employment
• Adjutants General retain Training Readiness
  Oversight authority
• No Derivative Unit Identification Codes
  implemented for sourcing
• CST, CERFP, and NGRFs, are not sourced against
  CCMRF requirements
• Inclusion of NG 1-Star C2 element for
  synchronization of readiness issues
• NC will coordinate with JFCOM and NGB for the
  use of T-32 forces for exercises ISO national
  exercise program

47
CCMRF

• Lack of appropriate T10 authority exists for RC
  CCMRFs, resulting in an authority gap between
  allocated (RC) and assigned (AC) forces for
  NORTHCOM
• No mobilization authority exists for a T10
  response
• Reluctance at the ARNORTH/NORTHCOM level to
  accept units in T32 502(f) status
• CCMRF should function in a T32 502(f) status
  during initial response
• Planning should reflect most likely employment of
  ARNG forces in support of a domestic/CBRNE event
• ARNG should plan for follow-on conversion to T10
  status or appointment of dual-status command

48
CCMRF
FP III Support
FP II Response
FP I Assessment
STRATEGY IS TO PROVIDE FUNDING TO ACCOMPLISH
CCMRF REQUIRED TRAINING IN THE FORM OF - 25
FTE - 6 DAYS ADT - 7 IDT PERIODS ARFORGEN
SYCRONIZATION - UNITS TO BE AVAILABLE FOR CCMRF
TRAINING IN YEAR 1 (RESET PHASE) - UNITS TO BE
AVAILABLE TO SERVE AS CCMRF IN YEARS 2 (READY)
AND 3 (TRAIN) - UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO TRAIN
ON METL TASKS DURING TRAIN AND READY PHASES OF
ARFORGEN
355 PAX
2004 PAX
2012 PAX

• 2 x MED CO (-)
• Chem Recon Plt
• Chem Decon CO
• BDE MED HQs C2
• BN SPT HQs (-)
• 2X Sec Forces COs
• Commo CO (-)
• PA Det
• Exp MED SPT Unit
• Topo SPT Sys Unit
• Chem / Bio Tech Expert Det
• Bio DETECTION Plt
• AEROMED EVAC LNO Tm
• 5 x SMART
• (Health/Svc/NBC)
• (Stress/EmerMed/Pastoral)
• AF Radiological AT
• 2 x Hammer Air Commo Ele

• CBIRF IRF
• SMART (BURN)
• SMART C3
• DTRA CM Advisory Tm
• JTF HQ ADVON
• BDE HQS ADVON
• BDE AVN ADVON
• 1 x HAMMER ACE
• SPT BN HQs ADVON
• MCT
• Personnel Spt UNIT
• CBRNE Tech Aug Cell

• AVN BN
• (Med /Lift Co)
• AIR Maint Contact Tm
• JTF HQ (-)
• BN MED HQs
• BDE Spt BN (-)
• BN Sec Force HQs
• BN Commo HQs
• 3 X Maint Tms
• Med SANI CO
• Med LOG CO
• Fwd Spt CO
• Sec Force CO (-)
• Quartermaster Co
• 2 x Commo COs
• Trans CO
• EN Construction Co
• CBRNE Detection Co
• Mortuary Affairs Plt

Y5-AVAILABLE

DARNG REDLINES -NO AVIATION ASSETS -NO ENGINEER
ASSETS -NO ARNG UNITS SOURCED AGAINST FP IV
49
Full Time Support

• NDAA FY09
• Accelerates AGR ramp from FY13 to FY09 2,856
  AGR inc this year
• Maintains Miltech ramp through FY13 708
  Miltechs inc this year
• ARNG Control Grades increase of 957 (O4-O6,
  E8-E9)
• Readiness Transformation Focus FY09 FTS Voucher
• MTOE Unit level FTS Fill
• RSP cadre
• Medical/Dental Per-readiness
• Education Initiatives
• Way Ahead
• Strategic Reserve FTS model toward Operational
  Force FTS Req.
• AI4 Operationalize the RC Rand FTS Study

50
DIMHRS

• Delay in fielding Systems Acceptance Test not
  complete
• Concerns memo
• ARNG position verified functionality equals
  progress
• Orders transition
• Positive funds control
• Daily data for RCMS
• Transition plan
• ARNG must be ready
• Data Cleansing
• Command Emphasis
• State DIGs (DIMHRS Implementation Groups)

51
Joint Cargo Aircraft

• ARNG JCA Equities
• ARNG will establish a dual-use light FW Cargo
  capability with 6 Companies
• ARNG is Armys FUE in late FY10
• Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report validated
  intra-theater movement of Time Sensitive Mission
  Critical supplies and key personnel as Army DS
  role
• JCA allows ARNG to retire legacy C-23 Cargo FW
  and some C-12 Utility FW
• Army JCA requirements
• Army analysis showed need for 145 JCA for low
  risk and 75 for medium risk
• Army is committed to buy 75 JCA (48 ARNG, 16
  USAR, 11 Training/Float)
• 54 funded in FY08-13 POM and remaining 21 funded
  in FY10-15 POM
• ARNG gets 40 of the first 54 and 8 of the last 21
  for total of 6 companies
• At current OPTEMPO Army deploys 1½ to 2 Cos per
  rotation with another 1½ or 2 Cos preparing to
  deploy leaves ARNG 2-3 Cos for Homeland support
  
• Possible Friction Points
• Army expects ARNG to fielded its 48 JCAs in
  standard Army FW Cargo companies with 2.0 crew
  manning

52
JFHQ-State

• ARNG and Joint Staff Will Publish Updated
  Manning Documents NLT 1 September 09
• Joint and Army staff conducting concurrent
  redesign effort
• Army Redesign During This Phase Accomplishes the
  Following
• Converts Army portion to a G-Staff Configuration
• Updates structure and manning to reflect current
  operational realities
• Provides states and territories an updated
  menu against which to allocate authorizations
• Result Updated TDA with an E-date of 1 Sep 09
• Current Redesign Efforts Will Not Alter Current
  Manpower Authorization Levels
• Next Phase Examine Authorization Levels and
  Develop Proposed Adjustments
• Data developed concurrently as initial redesign
  is finalized
• Key data will come from ongoing G1 manpower
  surveys
• Manpower surveys substantially complete by FY10
• Result Updated TDA 1 Sep 10

53
NOVAL 10 YEAR HISTORY
5.0
4.5
3.7
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.5
1.4
54
Bringing the ARNG into Balance
Backup WHATs LEFT?
55
Whats Left In The ARNG
Current ARNG Strength 361,551 (as of 31 Oct 2008)
Mobilized SOLDIERS MONTHS
Previously Mobilized MONTHS SOLDIERS
NON-DEP
Future Missions
Note 1 Includes temporary non-deployable
(medical both temporary and processing for
final determination), Officer Transition, Other
Training, Lautenberg and Other Non-Deployables.
56
Whats Left in the ARNG
TAPDB EOM 200810 MOB 20081104
Available112,590

Currently/Previous Mobilized in End Strength
181,817 Soldiers Mobilized Since 9-11 no longer
in End Strength 106,992 Total Soldiers Mobilized
ARNG since 9-11 288,809 Total Mobilization Tours
conducted since 9-11 366,234
57
Whats Left Balance Sheet
Mobilized
361,551
Current Strength
Previously Mobilized
12,888
Available
TAPDB EOM 200810 MOB 20081104
58
Whats Left Army Definitions
TAPDB EOM 200810 MOB 20081104