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Combinatorial Auctions Bidding and Allocation

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{TV, VCR}:8 XOR {Book}:3. OR-of-XORs example 2. Downward ... red, and odd ones blue. Bidder wants to stick to one color, and values each item of that color ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Combinatorial Auctions Bidding and Allocation


1
Combinatorial Auctions(Bidding and Allocation)
  • Adapted from Noam Nisan

2
The Setting
  • Set of Products
  • Each customer can bid 700 for AND
    1200 for OR 8 for
    6 for XOR 30 for 3
    for ANY 3

3
Examples
  • Classic
  • (take-off right) AND (landing right)
  • (frequency A) XOR (frequency B)
  • E-commerce
  • chair AND sofa -- of matching colors
  • (machine A for 2 hours) AND (machine B for 1
    hour)
  • XOR XOR

4
Model
  • We assumeEach bidder c has a valuation function
    ?c(S), for any set of products S, describing
    precisely the price c is willing to pay for S

No externalities?c depends solely on S
  • ?c satisfies
  • Free disposal S ? T ? ?c (S) ? ?c (T)
  • May satisfy additionally
  • Complementarity ?c (S?T) ? ?c (S) ?c (T)
  • Substitutability ?c (S?T) ? ?c (S) ?c (T)

5
Issues
  • Consider only Sealed Bid Auctions
  • Bidding languages and their expressiveness
  • Allocation algorithms (maximizing total
    efficiency)
  • Not deal with payment rules and bidders
    strategies

6
How Does c Communicates ?c
  • c sends his valuation ?c to auctioneer as
  • a vector of numbers Problem Exponential size
  • a computer program (applet) Problem requires
    exponential number of accesses by any auctioneer
    algorithm
  • Using an Expressive, Efficient Bidding language

7
Bidding LanguageRequirements
  • Expressiveness
  • Must be expressive enough to represent every
    possible valuation.
  • Representation should not be too long
  • Simplicity
  • Easy for humans to understand
  • Easy for auctioneer algorithms to handle

8
AND, OR, and XOR bids
  • left-sock, right-sock10
  • blue-shirt8 XOR red-shirt7
  • stamp-A6 OR stamp-B8

9
General OR bids and XOR bids
  • a,b7 OR d,e8 OR a,c4
  • a0, a, b7, a, c4, a, b, c7, a, b,
    d, e15
  • Can only express valuations with no
    substitutabilities.
  • a,b7 XOR d,e8 XOR a,c4
  • a0, a, b7, a, c4, a, b, c7, a, b,
    d, e8
  • Can express any valuation
  • Requires exponential size to represent
  • a1 OR b1 OR OR z1

10
OR of XORs example
  • couch7 XOR chair5
  • OR
  • TV, VCR8 XOR Book3

11
OR-of-XORs example 2
  • Downward sloping symmetric valuationAny first
    item is valued at 9, the second at 7, and the
    third at 5.
  • a9 XOR b9 XOR c9 XOR d9
  • OR
  • a7 XOR b7 XOR c7 XOR d7
  • OR
  • a5 XOR b5 XOR c5 XOR d5

12
XOR of ORs example
  • The Monochromatic valuationEven numbered items
    are red, and odd ones blue. Bidder wants to
    stick to one color, and values each item of that
    color at 1.
  • a1 OR c1 OR e1 OR g1
  • XOR
  • b1 OR d1 OR f1 OR h1

13
Bidding LanguageLimitations
  • Theorem The downward sloping symmetric valuation
    with n items requires exponential size XOR-of-OR
    bids.
  • Theorem The monochromatic valuation with n items
    requires exponential size OR-of-XOR bids.

14
OR Bidding Language (Fujishima et al)
  • Allow each bidder to introduce phantom items, and
    incorporate them in an OR bid.
  • Example a,z7 OR b,z8 (z phantom)
  • equivalent to (7 for a) XOR (8 for b)
  • Lemma OR can simulate OR-of-XORs
  • Lemma OR can simulate XOR-of-ORs

15
Allocation
  • A computational problem
  • Input bids
  • Outputs allocation of items to bidders
  • Difficult computational problem (NP-complete)
  • Existing approaches
  • Very restricted bidding languages (Rothkopf
    et al)
  • Search over allocation space (Fujishima etal,
    Sandholm)
  • Fast heuristics (Fujishima
    etal, Lehman et al)

16
Integer-Programming Formalization
Relaxation produces fractional allocations xj
specifies fraction of bid j obtained If were
lucky, the solution is 0,1
  • n items m atomic bids
  • Goal
  • Maximize social efficiency
  • subject to constraints

?0
17
The Dual Linear Problem
  • n items m atomic bids
  • Goal
  • Minimize Implicit Prices
  • subject to constraints

18
The meaning of the dual
  • Intuition yi is the implicit price for item i
  • Definition Allocation xj is supported by
    prices yi if
  • Theorem There exists an allocation that is
    supported by prices iff the LP solution is 0,1

19
When do we get 0,1 solutions?
  • Theorem in each one of the cases below, the LP
    will produce optimal 0,1 results
  • Hierarchical valuations
  • 1-dimensional valuations
  • Downward sloping symmetric valuation
  • OR of XORs of singletons
  • independent problems with 0,1 solutions
  • problem with 0,1 solution low bids
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