Current Trends in Iranian Foreign Policy toward Iraq

1
Current Trends in Iranian Foreign Policy toward
Iraq

• Gauging Irans Involvement and Influence in the
  Post-Saddam Era
• By Jason Blake

2
Research Questions

• What is the current state of Iranian activity and
  influence among the Shiite population of Iraq
  and its new government?
• What are the underlying factors dictating Iranian
  actions towards Iraq?
• What are the implications of Iran and Iraqs
  relationship within the Shiite community and
  greater Muslim world?

3
IranPolitical and Religious Foundations

• Islamic Republic formed on April 1, 1979
• Extreme form of Islamism, which merges the
  traditional separation between mosque and state
  into a hybrid system where Islamic principles
  guide the government and all aspects of daily
  life in order to combat encroaching Western
  secularism.
• We believe in governance that the Prophet,
  Gods prayers be upon him, appointed a successor
  on the orders of God that we believe in the need
  for forming governmentPledge to apply an Islamic
  rule, rely on yourselves, and be confident of
  victory.
• Sharia (Islamic Law) and velayat-e-faqih
  (rule of the Islamic jurisprudent)
• Effects on the Shiite community

4
Shiite Islam

• Constitutes 13 of worlds 1.3 billion Muslims
• 60-65 of Iraqs population is Shiite 89 of
  Irans population is Shiite
• Movement founded after the death of Muhammad in
  632 C.E.
• Shiites were those who felt that Muhammads
  familial descendants should lead the Muslim
  community, which set them apart from their Sunni
  brethren, who felt that appointed caliphs, or
  leaders of the ummah (Islamic community), were
  the ones to carry on Muhammads legacy.
• Imams - religious leaders who, as Muhammads
  descendants, are seen as sources of authority
  next to God and the Prophet. They speak on behalf
  of the deceased at the time of death.
• 18th-19th century Usuli School of jurisprudence
  spread by missionaries. Said all lay believers
  must implement teachings of marja al-taqlid
  (object of emulation), or a Shiite
  jurisprudent with extensive training.
• Gave Shiite religious leaders much more
  centralized power than their Sunni counterparts
• Religious centers Najaf and Karbala - Shrines of
  Imam Ali (Muhammads Son-in-Law) and Hussein
  (Alis nephew).

5
Iran and Iraq Common Threads and Recent Conflict

• Two major events have shaped modern Iran-Iraq
  relations in the past century the 1979
  revolution in Iran and 1980 Iran-Iraq war.
• Iran Revolution Khomeini seen as unpredictable
  figure as opposed to the Shah, Saddam saw
  opportunity to be seen as a regional power and
  take control of Iranian oil. Other points of
  dispute Shatt al-Arab waterway and islands in
  Persian Gulf.
• Contrasting nature of two regimes Arab Secular
  Nationalist Govt. vs. Islamic Republic.
• Stalemate cost Iran 1.5 million lives and 350
  billion in debt
• Socioeconomic effects - Welfare network created
  for families of war victims. Led constituents to
  blame Iraq for economic woes, affects Iranian
  foreign policy
• Security Military establishment wary of a
  strong Iraq on its borders

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Fated Allies? The Shiite Factor - Religion

• Some analysts would argue that Iran and a
  Shia-controlled Iraq are destined to either be
  friendly towards one another, if not similarly
  governed.
• Not necessarily true although the Shiites from
  both countries share similar beliefs and
  doctrines, there are divergent differences.
• Ayatollah Sistani seen as closest candidate to be
  the Marja-e taqlid-e motlaq (object of ultimate
  emulation). This position would make him the
  foremost authority on Shiite doctrine in the
  world.
• Impact of Najaf and Karbala Saddam feared
  Shiite instability, restricted access to
  pilgrimage to the shrines.
• There has since been a religious revival in the
  holy cities, with increased visitors coming from
  all parts of the Shiite world.
• Seminary establishment in Najaf steadily
  increasing, student population numbered in the
  low hundreds during the 1990s

His Eminence Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
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The Shiite Factor - Politics

• Despite much media emphasis on the Islamist
  activism present in Iraq (with leaders such as
  Muqtada al-Sadr), there are no shortages of
  moderate Shiite groups.
• Basra, which is Iraqs second largest city and
  home to more than 1.3 million Shia, is largely
  seen as a cosmopolitan and secular city.
• Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Dawa Party) -
  Founded in the 1950s by Shiite leaders such as
  Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, the uncle of Muqtada
  al-Sadr, al-Dawa led a brief armed campaign
  against the Iraqi government and supported the
  Iranian Revolution when it occurred. However,
  Baqr al-Sadrs vision of the state differed from
  Khomeinis in that he supported a government
  ruled by the ummah, or Muslim community, rather
  than the ulema, or clerical establishment.
• Note There is no precedent of separation between
  religion and government in the Middle East, and
  so the debate now focuses as to how much sharia
  should be strictly applied.
• Not all Iraqis are Muslim. Not all Muslims are
  Shia. Not all Shia are Islamic. We have to have
  a system that is open to all components of
  society.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari
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• Do not allow them to say to Iraqis, to Arabs, to
  Muslims, that we have only two models of
  governments, brutal dictatorship and religious
  extremism. This is wrong. Like Americans, we
  Iraqis want to enjoy the fruits of liberty.
  Ayad Allawi before a joint session of Congress,
  September 23, 2004
• Iraqis are mostly Muslims, but this is not an
  Islamic republic and will never be. The people
  wont accept it. - Qassem Dawoud, National
  Security Advisor to Mr. Allawi

9
Post-Saddam Regional and International Effects
on Iran

• 2002 President Bush declares Iran to be part of
  an axis of evil.
• Iranian Reaction President Khatami says it is
  bellicose and insulting, saying that as long as
  the U.S. was threatening, insulting, and
  humiliating us, neither myself nor the nation is
  ready to accept any relations.
• Direct impact Iran unwilling to offer aid to
  U.S. forces in the 2003 invasion, even though it
  accomplished one of Irans original aims in the
  1980 war
• We are looking forward to the day when the
  criminal Saddam Hussein will be judged by a
  revolutionary tribunal in Iraq, to the day when
  he will be punished for his deeds. We are looking
  forward to the day when the people of Iraq will
  rid themselves of him. Ali Rajai, Prime
  Minister of Iran before the Security Council,
  1980
• The result? A nuanced policy towards post-Saddam
  Iraq neutral but not indifferent.
• Two-front foreign policy concerns
  chaotic/aggressive Iraq and the U.S. enforcing
  its WoT policies

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The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SCIRI)

• Should Iran attempt to influence Iraqs Shia, it
  would do so through its main organ, the Supreme
  Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
  (SCIRI).
• Founded in 1982 as an offshoot of the brutally
  repressed al-Dawa Party (in the aftermath of a
  failed attempt on Saddam Husseins life), SCIRI
  has consistently maintained ties with the Iranian
  regime and has received funding for its movements
  from Tehran.
• Ideology closest of Shiite groups to Khomeinis,
  but rhetoric has been toned down in order to
  assimilate into Iraqi politics. Ex. Its previous
  leader, Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim,
  a powerful religious leader in the Shiite
  community, preached opposition to the occupation
  but was strictly against doing so in a violent
  manner.
• Core constituency is in religious cities, marsh
  areas, and poor slums in Baghdad.
• Has resisted against issuing fatwas calling on
  Iraqis to use force against the occupation
• Limited by ties to Iran Used by Saddam as
  pretext for oppressing Shia

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The Sunni-Shiite Ideological Conflict

• In the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution,
  Shiite Islam became more associated with
  anti-Western violence and terrorism.
• Sunni Islam and its branches deemed less of a
  threat, especially being endorsed by allies such
  as Saudi Arabia.
• Sunni Islam has ruled the Arab regional
  governments since the Ottomans conquered the
  region, and has established itself as the
  dominant denomination of Islam through the Muslim
  world. Anti-Shia violence, however, is a more
  recent phenomenon, with tacit and even vocal
  support coming from some clerical circles.
• Khomeinis challenges to Saudi religious
  authority were depicted as a Shia challenge
  against Sunni authority, evoking the legacy of
  Shia rebellions against the Umayyad and Abbasid
  caliphates in early Islamic history.

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The Sunni-Shiite Ideological Conflict (Cont.)

• The rhetoric of Shite rebellion is often now
  invoked by militant Sunni Islamists, who feel
  they are not only participating in an insurgency
  against the United States, but also against the
  possibility of Shiites establishing control in a
  historically Sunni region.
• Grand subjugation of the faith by Americans and
  Shiites
• Michael Scott Doran wrote in Foreign Affairs that
  Saudi Wahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia often
  portray the Shia as a fifth column for the
  enemies of true Islam. The danger of the
  Shia heretics to the regionis not less than
  the danger of the Jews and Christians.

13
Conclusions

• It is reasonable to presume that Irans current
  foreign policy trends towards Iraq will remain
  neutral in the immediate future and is
  overshadowed by fears that it will be the next
  country to be unilaterally attacked by the U.S.
• Iran could act to ensure the U.S. stays tied up
  in Iraq, but this problematic for three reasons
• Any activity that Iran partakes in will be
  scrutinized by the United States, and would
  subject Iran to further U.S. pressure should
  there be evidence found that impugns Iran.
• Iraqi Shiites are Arabs, which could lead to
  further resistance to perceived Persian regional
  ambitions.
• Iraqi Shiites may well resist and openly
  denounce any attempts by Iran to dictate how
  their newly found independence should be used.
• Najaf vs. Qom
• Shiites in Iraq follow a different type of
  clerical leadership in Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,
  a member of the more traditionalist approach of
  Islam that dictates the separation of Islam from
  political affairs.

14
Final Thoughts

• Iraqs current Shiite political revolution will
  have long-term effects on domestic Iranian
  politics.
• The contrast could not be starker between a
  hypothetically open and democratic Iraqi society,
  led by Shiites, where free speech is encouraged,
  and an increasingly defunct Islamic republic
  ruled by elites who stifle reforms at the
  parliamentary level. Interfering with this
  process and provoking an Iraqi Shiite backlash
  because of Irans regional/religious ambitions
  would further enflame the frustration in Iran at
  the lack of genuine reform, stagnant economy, and
  relatively low standards of living.
• It has chosen to walk a fine line between flexing
  its religious, political, and financial muscle
  and maintaining a neutral stance towards its
  neighbor to the west.
• Security concerns Rejuvenated Iraq and United
  States forces on both borders.
• These pressures on Iran limit its ability to
  maintain its religious authority and legitimacy
  in the eyes of the Shiite nation.
• Presently, it remains unclear as to how the new
  Iraqi regime will interact with Iran, leading
  some moderates and reformers in Iran to urge the
  leadership that it is better to drink from the
  poisoned chalice of the new Iraq rather than
  the alternative.