god, cont'

1
god, cont.

• 6.27.06

2
recall a potential problem

• p1. God does not exist.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  a God.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• then is p1 true?
• rationality may counsel agnosticism
• now is p2 true?

3
recall supernaturalism

• Ss life is meaningful if and only if S has a
  certain relation with some purely spiritual realm
  or being
• pure soul-centered (afterlife) theories
• pure God-centered theories
• PGCT Ss life is meaningful if and only if S has
  a certain relationship with God

4
the details

• PGCT Ss life is meaningful if and only if S
  has a certain relationship with God
• what relationship?
• a meaningful one
• loving God
• worshipping God
• striving to emulate God
• living in fellowship with God
• fulfilling Gods purpose (for you, or humanity,
  or the universe, or whatever)

5
6 args/views for PGCT

• ideal justice arg
• ultimate consequence arg
• grand scheme arg
• regress arg
• purpose theory
• perfection theory
• weve already discussed (1) and (2).
• since all of the same considerations apply when
  the args focus on God (rather than an afterlife),
  we wont go through them again here.

6
grand scheme arg

• p1. our lives can be meaningful only if our lives
  are part of a plan that encompasses the entire
  universe.
• p2. only God can make our lives part of a plan
  that encompasses the entire universe.
• c. so, our lives can be meaningful only through
  God.

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vs. p1

• p1. our lives can be meaningful only if our lives
  are part of a plan that encompasses the entire
  universe.
• a counterexample would be someone who lived a
  meaningful life even if his/her life was not part
  of a plan that encompassed the entire universe.

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vs. p2

• p2. only God can make our lives part of a plan
  that encompasses the entire universe.
• see Metzs Star Trek counterexample.

9
nozicks regress

• About any given thing, however wide, it seems
  we can stand back and ask what its meaning is. To
  find a meaning for it, then, we seem driven to
  find a link with yet another thing beyond its
  boundaries. And so a regress is launched. To stop
  this regress, we seem to needsomething which is
  unlimited, from which we cannot step back, even
  in imagination, to wonder what its meaning is.

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regress arg

• p1. on pain of infinite regress, the only thing
  that can ground lifes meaning is something that
  we cannot stand back from to ask what its meaning
  is.
• p2. a certain relationship with God is the only
  thing that we cannot stand back from to ask what
  its meaning is.
• c. so, on pain of infinite regress, a certain
  relationship with God is the only thing that can
  ground lifes meaning.

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vs. p2

• p2. a certain relationship with God is the only
  thing that we cannot stand back from to ask what
  its meaning is.
• surely we can stand back and ask what a certain
  relationship with Gods meaning is.
• examples
• what is the meaning of this relationship?
• why should I have this relationship with God?
• what is the purpose of this relationship?
• is this relationship worthy of esteem and
  admiration?

12
vs. p1

• p1. on pain of infinite regress, the only thing
  that can ground lifes meaning is something that
  we cannot stand back from to ask what its meaning
  is.
• something could ground lifes meaning even if we
  dont (and couldnt) know it.
• if we dont (and couldnt) know it, were bound
  to ask what its meaning is.
• so, something could ground lifes meaning even if
  was such that we could stand back to ask what its
  meaning is.

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purpose theory

• PURPOSE a life is meaningful if and only if it
  fulfills a purpose assigned by God
• PURPOSE does not entail or require that God
  exists or that God has a purpose it simply
  states the conditions under which a life is
  meaningful.
• if God doesnt exist or fails to assign a
  purpose, PURPOSE entails nihilism.
• PURPOSE claims that whether or not we have a soul
  (afterlife) is entirely irrelevant to the meaning
  of life.
• PURPOSE is consistent with a host of different
  conceptions (a) of God, (b) of Gods purpose, (c)
  of the way God assigns it to us, and (d) of the
  way we are to fulfill it (e.g., freely, happily,
  dutifully, etc.).

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objections to PURPOSE

• morality
• gods omnipotence
• gods eternality
• the uniqueness of god

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vs. PURPOSE morality

• the arg from disrespect assigning us a purpose
  would be immoral because it would degrade our
  autonomy it would be disrespectful.
• the idea is that being assigned an end conflicts
  with the dictum that rational beings ought to
  live by their own choice.
• 4 ways assigning us an end could be
  disrespectful
• coercion
• exploitation
• condescension
• poorly motivated creation

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coercion

• problem 1 God threatens us by making eternal
  damnation the consequence of not realizing his
  purpose.
• solution a threat is not necessarily
  disrespectful
• e.g., states justly make threats to uphold a
  retributive punishment system.
• likewise, if it would be Gods purpose for us to
  be moral, then our failing to fulfill that
  purpose would warrant punishment, and any threats
  God would make incidental to imposing that
  punishment would be respectful (298).
• however, the threat of infinite punishment
  (eternal damnation) for a finite action appears
  to be disrespectful.
• so, purpose theorists can avoid problem 1 by
  simply denying that God would send those who do
  not fulfill her purpose to hell forever, without
  the possibility of parole for good behavior.

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exploitation

• problem 2 God exploits us by getting us to serve
  his purpose by making an offer we cannot
  rationally refuse.
• solutions
• first, purpose theorists can hold that God would
  provide no reward or only a moderate reward for
  serving his purpose.
• second, if Gods intentions are not to degrade or
  harm us in making us the offer, then it is not
  clear how it could be exploitative.

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condescension

• problem 3 God insults us by treating our
  capacity for rational choice solely as a tool to
  be used for the realization of a purpose we do
  not share.
• solution being assigned a purpose could be a
  matter of divine request, rather than divine
  command (300).
• God enter stage left There is something I
  would like you to do with your life, and this is
  the reason that you exist. Specifically, I would
  like you to be a moral person I must ask you to
  pursue the fundamental end of pursuing moral
  ends.
• note that this all sounds very strained for
  one, remember that according to purpose theory,
  God does not merely request that we adopt a
  certain purpose she assigns it.

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poorly motivated creation

• problem 4 God degrades us by creating us for a
  purpose other than setting our own ends.
• solution hold that it is respectful to create a
  rational being for a purpose in addition to the
  purpose that this being pursues its own ends.
• if the creator pursued his end of having the
  created be moral merely by reasoning and
  requesting, then the fact that he made the
  created in order for her to be moral would not
  degrade the created (301).
• note that Metz assumes here and throughout his
  article that Gods purpose is for us to be moral.
  you should think to yourself would Metzs
  points sound as plausible if Gods purpose was
  for us to, say, count the blades of grass in
  Johns lawn?

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(No Transcript)
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vs. PURPOSE gods omnipotence

• if its possible that we not fulfill Gods
  purpose and our purpose is necessary to fulfill
  Gods plan, then God depends on something that is
  entirely up to us in order to fulfill her plan.
  but if God depends on something that is entirely
  up to us in order to fulfill her plan, then she
  is not omnipotent.

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solution

• the fact that God depends on something that is
  entirely up to us in order to fulfill his plan
  does not entail that God is not omnipotent.
• free will is so valuable that its worth it for
  God to freely give up her power to coerce us to
  achieve her purpose.
• nor is it irrational to do so she may have many
  purposes which do not depend on something that is
  entirely up to us.

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vs. PURPOSE gods eternality

• if God is eternal, then she is outside of time.
  but if shes outside of time, then she couldnt
  have a purpose inside of time. at the very least,
  she couldnt assign us a purpose inside of time.
• solution hold that God is eternal in the sense
  that she is everlasting she exists at every
  point in time.
• Metz contends that this solution doesnt work,
  since
• if God is everlasting, then God cant be the
  creator of time
• a merely everlasting God wouldnt be special
  enough to make life meaningful.

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vs. PURPOSE the uniqueness of god

• question why think that the meaning of life
  depends on a certain relationship with God?
• answer because God has special (unique)
  qualities if our lives acquire significance
  just to the extent that we have a proper
  relationship with God, then to explain why God is
  central to lifes meaning we must appeal to
  features which only God can manifest (306).
• these special qualities include immutability,
  atemporality, simplicity, and infinitude.
• but if God has these qualities, then God cannot
  have a purpose. see pp. 309-310.

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some responses

• first, why think that the meaning of life
  requires God because God has certain special
  features?
• second, why think that the meaning of life
  requires God because of Gods immutability,
  atemporality, simplicity, and infinitude? why
  couldnt the fact that she is the creator or
  perfectly perfect do the trick?
• being a creator or being perfectly perfect seems
  consistent with having a purpose so, if the fact
  that God is the creator or perfectly perfect is
  sufficiently special, then Gods purpose could
  ground lifes meaning after all.
• third, Metz admits (in the conclusion) that its
  possible that God could have qualities such as
  immutability, atemporality, simplicity, and
  infinitude, and still have a purpose.

26
gods purpose

• fulfilling a purpose assigned by God can be
  meaningful only if the purpose is meaningful
  i.e., only if the purpose has a certain content.
• but this suggests that its the content of the
  purpose that matters, not the fact that God
  assigned it.
• if this is correct, then the source of lifes
  meaning is not God, but the content of ones
  purpose.

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perfection theory

• PERFECTION a life is meaningful if and only if
  it is oriented towards an entity with certain
  special features.
• God has certain features not found in the
  physical world andthese features have a superior
  value which confers significance on us when we
  orient our lives toward it (Metz, 309).

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vs. PERFECTION

• the theory is not fully developed, so its
  difficult to assess
• first, we need a story explaining what it is to
  orient ones life towards this entity in the
  right sort of way.
• the right orientation cant be fulfilling the
  entitys purpose (if it were, perfection theory
  would be no different than purpose theory)
• the right orientation cant be living morally
  (metz concedes that an entity, such as God, may
  not be necessary for morality)
• second, we need a story explaining how a being X
  could confer significance on the life of another
  being Y when (i.e., simply because) Y orients its
  life towards X (in the right way).
• first, its not obvious that it makes sense can
  something increase in significance simply because
  of its orientation towards another thing?
• second, how would the conferral (transfer) of
  such significance take place? (this is especially
  difficult if one thinks that the entity is God,
  and that God is outside of time, simple,
  unchanging, etc.)

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3 args against PGCT

• justification arg
• great Argentinian arg
• Euthyphros dilemma

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justification arg

• p1. we have a substantial degree of justification
  for thinking that at least some lives are
  meaningful.
• p2. we have a low degree of justification for
  thinking that God exists.
• p3. if we have more justification for thinking
  that at least some lives are meaningful than we
  have for thinking that God exists, then we have
  reason to doubt PGCT.
• c. so, we have reason to doubt PGCT.

31
great Argentinian arg

• suppose that there is a very great man in
  Argentina. the presence of this Argentianian is
  neither necessary nor sufficient for your life to
  be meaningful.
• p1. the great Argentinian is irrelevant to the
  meaning of your life.
• p2. if the great Argentinian is irrelevant to
  the meaning of your life, then God is irrelevant
  to the meaning of your life.
• c. so, God is irrelevant to the meaning of your
  life.

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vs. p2

• p2. if the great Argentinian is irrelevant to
  the meaning of your life, then God is irrelevant
  to the meaning of your life.
• God is different than the great Argentinian.
• to reject p2, then, one must identify some
  feature or set of features which
• God alone possesses, and
• can make sense of why God would and could be
  necessary and sufficient to the meaning of your
  life.
• if no such feature can be found, then God is not
  relevantly different than the great Argentinian.
• in such a case, the great Argentinian arg would
  succeed.
• so, we must ask is there a feature (or set of
  features) which satisfy (1) and (2)?

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divine command theory

• Divine Command Theory (DCT) is the ethical theory
  that says that what God wills or commands
  determines the moral status of a given action
• an act is right iff God wills or commands it.
• an act is wrong iff God forbids it.
• although DCT is attractive to most theists, and
  commonly assumed in pop culture, it faces a
  significant objection Euthyphros dilemma.
• the problem is that DCT cant give a good answer
  to this question
• is an act right because God commands it, or does
  God command it because its right?

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euthyphros dilemma (rachels)

• p1. if God commands us to do what is right, then
  either the right actions are right because God
  commands them OR God commands them because they
  are right.
• p2. if the right actions are right because God
  commands them, then Gods commands are arbitrary,
  and the doctrine of Gods goodness is
  meaningless.
• p3. if God commands them because they are right,
  then there is a standard of right and wrong that
  is independent of Gods commands (in which case
  DCT is false).
• p4. it is not the case that Gods commands are
  arbitrary, and that the doctrine of Gods
  goodness is meaningless.
• c. so, there is a standard of right and wrong
  that is independent of Gods commands (in which
  case DCT is false).

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euthyphros dilemma, revised

• p1. if Gods assigning us a purpose is the
  source of lifes meaning, then either the purpose
  is the source of lifes meaning because God
  assigns it OR God assigns it because its the
  source of lifes meaning.
• p2. if the purpose is the source of lifes
  meaning because God assigns it, then Gods
  assignments are arbitrary, and the doctrine of
  Gods goodness is meaningless.
• p3. if God assigns it because its the source of
  lifes meaning, then there is a standard of
  meaning that is independent of Gods assignments
  (in which case PURPOSE is false).
• p4. it is not the case that Gods assignments
  are arbitrary, and that the doctrine of Gods
  goodness is meaningless.
• c. so, there is a standard of meaning that is
  independent of Gods assignments (in which case
  PURPOSE is false).

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today

• PGCT Ss life is meaningful if and only if S
  has a certain relationship with God
• for PGCT
• grand scheme arg
• regress arg
• purpose theory
• perfection theory
• against PGCT
• justification arg
• great Argentinian arg
• Euthyphros dilemma

37
recall a potential problem

• p1. God does not exist.
• p2. our lives can be meaningful only if there is
  a God.
• c. so, our lives cannot be meaningful.
• then p1 is up in the air.
• now p2 is up in the air.