Security Force Assistance

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Security Force Assistance
2
Security Force Assistance
HN assumes lead in counterinsurgency
Alleviates a large CF presence Stabilize
the HN for - Larger social equality -
Economic prosperity - A free and democratic
society (self rule)
3
Security Force Assistance
Use of combat arms, combat support, combat
service support arms to protect the civilian
population (and infrastructure) and to physically
and psychologically separate the insurgents from
the population.
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Security Force Assistance
Building a professional military/police will
set a standard for the society and advance the
population to breaking its long and multifaceted
cycles of violence.
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Cycles of Violence

• The police force, to defend themselves, took
  sort of an offensive approach to it. They
  committed atrocities and injustices as well, and
  so it began this cycle oftribal violence which
  further destabilized the city and further
  victimized the people.
• Colonel HR McMaster

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HN Leadership

• What are the traits of a great leader?
• Competent
• Honest
• Selfless
• Trusts his Subordinates
• All are traits we want to pass on to a
• professional HN force

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HN Leadership

• What are the principles of a military leader?
• Know yourself and seek self-improvement
• Technically and tactically proficient
• Know your soldiers and look out for their welfare
• Keep your soldiers informed
• Set the example
• Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and
• accomplished

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HN Leadership

• What are the principles of a military leader?
• Train your soldiers as a team
• Make sound and timely decisions
• Develop a sense of responsibility among your
  subordinates
• Employ your command in accordance with its
  capabilities
• Seek responsibility and take responsibility for
  your
• actions competent

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Security Force Assistance

• You have to prove to them your intentions
  through
• your deeds and through building relationships,
  and we
• were able to do that over a period of a few
  months. So
• lifting the fear off the community is the first
  element.
• The second element then is to be able to follow
  that up
• with the security capability, Iraqi police backed
  up by
• Iraqi Army.
• Colonel HR McMaster

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Overall Advisor Mission

• The most important mission of an advisor is to
  
• enhance the military professionalism of his
  counterpart.
• Influence the HN military to deal with the
  changing
• environment by emphasizing the concept of self
• government
• Use of common sense or common decency is
  so
• basic (to us) it is not discussed much in
  training.

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So You Want to Be an Adviser

• To create an effective Iraqi military, you must
• accomplish three tasks
• 1) Train and equip to a uniform standard
• 2) Partner each Iraqi organization with a
  similar
• coalition formation
• 3) Provide a small team of combat advisers to
  live,
• train, and fight day and night with their Iraqi
  brothers
• BG Bolger

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Security Force Assistance
Are we supporting the Strategic Objective?
1) Political Dominance 2) Unity of Effort 3)
Legitimacy 4) Adaptability 5) Perseverance
Who are we supposed to work with?
Do the people feel we are protecting them?
Do the people provide intel?
Is the effort to ensure the HN can operate when
we leave?
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Campaign Plan
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Campaign Plan
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Campaign Plan
Low Intensity Conflict Political Objective
Unity of Effort Legitimacy
Perseverance Adaptability
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Campaign Plan
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Campaign Plan
SITUATIONAL AWARNESS
CULTURAL AWARENESS
I/O
HUMINT
CF Unit
HN Unit
INTEL
TRAINING
TARGETS
ETHOS
STRONG NCO CORPS
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Campaign Plan
19
Historical Example
The situation the ISF confronts is similar to
the problem Israel faced in Lebanon in the early
1980s Sabra-Shatila Refugee camps in Beirut
where, in 1982, the Lebanese Christian Phalangist
militia conducted an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
authorized operation to search for Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters. The
militia instead massacred up to several thousand
civilians as revenge for the assassination of the
Maronite Christian president and years of
brutality the Lebanese suffered during the PLO
occupation. A truth finding commission later
established the IDF leadership was responsible
for the massacre as they tacitly allowed the
contentious conditions to develop without
intervening.
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Facilitate HN Partner Unit
Relationships

• Combined Commanders Update Briefings (CUB)
• Combined Target Meetings
• Combined Training Meetings
• Commander, S-3 attend back briefs
• HN LNOs
• Attend parallel planning
• Proximity is a consideration

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What the Combat Advisor is not

• Liaison (Just passing information)
• A fire and forget mission
• A supporting effort

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Remember, its a Marathon

• Major causes of an advisors failure
• Inability to maintain a good working relationship
• Fails to understand why his counterparts do not
  feel the sense of urgency that he does
• Unable to realize that his counterpart will
  remain and continue to fight the enemy long after
  his tour is over

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Key Points

• Recognize institutional and cultural differences
• between the HN and US Army
• Rapport, credibility, and legitimacy can only be
• established through time, proximity, and
  interaction
• Mentor HN leadership at every opportunity
• Combat advisor (Must leave the wire)
• Partner units must always be engaged in every
• aspect of the HNs development

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Negative Practices

• Lack of support
• Partner units dont conduct dismounted patrols
• Making promises to host nation units
• Not participating in operations
• Not sharing the danger
• Not eating and sleeping with host nation
• Partnering units not involving host nation and
  Combat Advisors
• Not conducting mission analysis and estimate of
  situation with host nation

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Positive Practices

• Building rapport (sharing hardships)
• Participation in operations
• Prevent/document abuses by host nation
• Gather info from detainees during tactical
  questioning
• Assist in building targets and follow-on
  missions
• Coordinate between host nation and partner units
  
• Combat advising
• Continue to assess training
• Provide long-term sustainment

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Imperatives
Understand the Operational Environment
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Imperatives
Recognize Political Implications
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Imperatives
Facilitate Interagency Activities
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Imperatives
Engage the Threat Discriminately
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Imperatives
Consider Long-Term Effects
Identify and fix the problem at its root cause
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Imperatives
Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Combat
Advisors and Partner Units
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Imperatives
Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects
Sunni groups demonstrate to demand the release of
top Sunni religious leader in Tikrit
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Imperatives
Apply Capabilities Indirectly
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Imperatives
Develop Multiple Options
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Imperatives
Ensure Long-Term Sustainment
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Imperatives
Provide Sufficient Intelligence
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Imperatives
Balance Security and Synchronization
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Challenges for the Combat Advisor
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The Weight of History

• It is necessary to empower HN junior leaders.
  Through
• out Arab history officers have led down to the
  lowest
• level. The development of a strong NCO and
  Warrant
• Officer base is the road to a highly successful
  military.
• How do we build an NCO Corps?

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Cultural Obstacles

• A Professional Culture that values
• Who you know
• Denial in the interest of saving face
• Entitlements
• Micro-management

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The Warehouse

• Many IA soldiers were short Individual equipment
  to include
• body armor, helmets, and NVDs. Paperwork showed
  that all
• the equipment in sufficient quantities had been
  delivered to
• the BDE. MiTTs began to inspect the base
  warehouses. All
• the equipment was in the warehouses, the supply
  officer
• hadnt issued it out.

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The Number 2 Man

• An American unit trained an IA Strike element
  for Direct
• Action missions. The unit was proficient in small
  unit tactics
• and CQB. Each individual team and squad was able
  to
• flow through a building. However, each time the
  unit
• prepared to breach a structure, the Platoon
  Leader was
• always in the initial stack.

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Culture of Change

• The HN security forces are the model and best
  hope to break cycles of violence.
• When we do make a change in the attitudes and
  habits of HN leadership, the effectiveness of the
  unit increase exponentially.

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Building Teams

• Cohesive US units are not created overnight
• Effective junior leaders are not born, they are
  built
• Good leaders and good units eat, sleep, sweat
• and bleed TOGETHER.

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Challenges for U.S. Units

• Take Charge attitude
• Dignity and Respect
• Cultural sensitivity
• Is perfection the enemy of good enough?
• Over-coaching desensitizes the unit in training
• Patience

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Chow Plan for Combat Advisors

• An American Bn S-3 decided to send a
• transition team an MKT (mobile kitchen) and crew
  due to the
• following situation
• - Combat Advisors was constantly sick from HN
  mess hall.
• - US and HN unit were geographically separated
  enough to make daily resupply unrealistic

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The Military as a Reflection

• How do we change a people?
• Build Rapport
• HN must believe you care for him and his people.
• Establish Credibility
• As a professional and a soldier
• Legitimacy
• Do you practice what you preach?

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You must have a plan

• Part of infiltration plan
• Rapport Plan
• Language
• Culture
• History
• Credibility
• Technically and tactically proficient
• WHAT can you do and HOW can you do it?

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Time, Proximity, and Interaction

• How do you (Combat Advisor and Partner Unit)
  build rapport, credibility, and legitimacy?
• You must be there.
• A cohesive, effective US unit is built as a Team
• Why would we expect to create an effective HN
  unit, if we are not willing to be part of the
  team?
• Only then will you be able to teach, coach, and
  mentor. (Shape the HN Security Forces)

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Mutual Respect

• Only after rapport, credibility and legitimacy
  are
• established can you effect change.
• Imparting the Good Boss on a fellow
  professional

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Pick and Choose Your Battles

• You cannot change culture
• They want to emulate you
• They want to be successful
• Make your opinion valuable
• A professional Army
• Promotion based on merit
• Professional NCO corps
• Military must support political process
• Defend the rights of citizens

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Being There

• Trends that can not be addressed if advisors
• are not there
• CQB didnt communicate/mark rooms clears, no
  one cleared or communicated moving to stairwell
  and roof
• Didnt utilize NCOs
• Actions on contact
• Hand and arm signals
• Finger in trigger well
• Fire control measures
• Cant call for assets
• Assessment

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Combat Advisor Duties and Responsibilities
Advisor in COIN
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Mission Planning

• MiTT Chief ensures the HN Commander
• Issues planning guidance
• Provides C2
• Devises time plan
• COA development
• Ensures OPLAN are IAW higher OPORD
• MiTT Staff ensures the HN Staff
• Prepares estimates of COA for identified task
• Prepare tentative plan of COA
• Coordinate execution of tasks

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Mission Planning

• MiTT XO ensures HN Executive Officer
• Chief of Staff
• Performs analysis
• Directs development
• Coordinates and prepares plans
• Reviews tentative plans with S3
• MiTT S-1 ensures HN S1
• Prepares HN personnel status estimate
• Prepares personnel support of the IAs OPLAN
• Proper coordinations

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Mission Planning

• MiTT Intelligence Officer ensures HN S-2
• Prepares intelligence estimate and annex for
  OPLAN
• Prepares IPB and intelligence collection plans
• Updates PIRs and IRs from higher
• Prepares Target Package
• MiTT Operations and Training Officer ensures HN
  S3
• Prepares IAs operation estimate
• Supervises updating CCIR
• Task organizes the HN unit
• Responsible for advising HN on PSYOP activities
• Issues planning guidance from partner unit
  commanders guidance
• Prepares training plans
• Advises on paragraph 2 ,3 and 5

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Mission Planning

• MiTT Logistics Officer ensures HN S4
• Advises on paragraph 4
• Prepares logistic support
• Train HN on logistic support
• MiTT Electronics Staff (Communications) ensures
  HN Staff
• Prepares communications estimate
• Prepares paragraph 5
• Develop military and nonmilitary communications
• Develop training on communications equipment

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Mission Planning

• MiTT Medical staff ensures HN Staff
• - Prepares medical estimate
• - Input for paragraph 4
• - Prepares the health services portion of the
  OPLAN
• - Develop medical training

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Conduct of Operations

• The MiTT commander
• - Advises and assists the HN unit commander
• - Recommends improvements or additions
• - Helps the HN unit commander understand and
  executes the partner unit commanders intent
• - Keeps the command communications channels open
  between HN and partner unit

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Conduct of Operations

• MiTT XO
• - Monitors all HN staff sections
• - Helps his counterpart
• - Monitors the liaison and coordination with
  higher HN units
• MiTT S1
• - Monitors maintenance
• - Monitors processing of wounded
• - Monitors the processing of detainees/Records HR
  violations
• - Monitors the HN unit morale

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Conduct of Operations

• MiTT S2
• - Monitors OPSEC
• - Monitors the updating of the situation map
• - Monitors the collection, evaluation,
  interpretation, and dissemination of information
• - Assists HN in examining captured insurgent
  documents, material, and personnel .
• - Recommends and assists in requesting
  intelligence reports
• - Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to
  the HN commander
• - Assists in the briefing and debriefing of
  patrols
• - Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart,
  in developing reconnaissance and surveillance,
  I/O

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Conduct of Operations

• MiTT S3
• Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN
  S2 using estimates, predictions, and information.
• Monitors command and communications net
• Assists in supervising training and preparing for
  operations.
• Monitors and makes recommendations
• MiTT S4
• Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness,
• Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its
  subunits, and attachments.
• He recommends improvements as necessary.
• Assists in supervising the use of transportation
  assets.
• MiTT Fire Direction NCO
• Assists the HN unit in planning for,
  coordinating, requesting, and using fire support.
• Recommends using fire support based on firepower
  restrictions and the principle of
  minimum-essential force.

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Terminal Learning Objective

• Advisors understand the institutional and
  cultural
• differences between HN and American units.
• Advisors understan how their actions facilitate
  the
• creation of a successful, professional HN Army.

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Advisor in COIN
Questions?