Chapter 4: Structural Realism By John J' Mearsheimer

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Chapter 4 Structural RealismBy John J.
Mearsheimer
International Relations Theories Discipline and
Diversity
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Learning outcomes

• After this lecture you should be able to
• Know the defining features of structural
  realism, especially the role of power
• Understand the key differences between offensive
  and defensive realism
• Debate how various structural realists read the
  rise of China
• Know why proponents believe structural realism
  to be a better explanation of the dynamics of the
  contemporary system

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Realism and Power

• Realists believe that power is the currency of
  international politics. It is based on the
  material capabilities that a state controls
• States compete for power, and do all they can to
  shift the balance of power in their favour
• Classical realists believed conflict was
  hardwired into human nature
• Structural realists believe the international
  system forces states to pursue power politics

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Five Assumptions.

• Great powers are the main actors and they operate
  in an anarchic international system
• All states possess offensive military capability
  this varies over time
• States can never be certain about other states
  intentions. A defensive military doctrine
  espoused by one state can look like offensive
  threat to another
• The main goal of states is survival
• States are rational actors operating with
  imperfect information they sometimes make
  serious mistakes

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Offensive vs. Defensive Realism

• Offensive realists argue that states should
  always be looking for opportunities to gain more
  power, with the ultimate prize being hegemony
• Defensive realists argue that unrelenting
  expansion is imprudent conquest is often costly
  and troublesome
• Defensive realists such as Kenneth Waltz, argue
  that states should seek an appropriate amount of
  power (1989 40)

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Which is less war-proneBipolarity or
Multipolarity?

• Bipolarity
• there is less opportunity for great powers to
  fight each other in a bipolar world
• equality between great powers tends to be more
  even, and balancing behaviour is easier
• there is greater potential for miscalculation in
  multipolarity

• Multipolarity
• More great powers is better in part because
  deterrence is easier
• In multipolarity, more states can join together
  to confront an aggressive state
• There is less hostility among the great powers as
  their attention is more diffused

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Is Unipolarity less war prone?

• With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of
  the Soviet Union, many realists argue that
  unipolarity has arrived
• Such a world is likely to be more stable than
  either bipolarity or multipolarity
• Logically, there can be no war or security
  competition among great powers minor powers will
  not cause any trouble for fear of offending the
  unipolar power
• The dangers of a unipolar world is that the
  absence of security competition encourages the
  great power to withdraw from outer regions
• Or a hegemon uses its overwhelming power to
  engage in ideological engineering

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Case study discussion

• Can China Rise Peacefully?
• How Should the US Respond?

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Offensive realist answer

• Predict that China and the USA will engage in
  security competition
• A rising China will imitate the USA to become a
  regional hegemon in Asia
• This means removing all local threats to its
  security and pushing American military forces out
  of Asia
• This will be resisted by the USA as it does not
  tolerate peer competitors

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Defensive Realist Answer

• Defensive realists argue that it would be smarter
  for China to consolidate its power rather than
  have a run at establishing regional hegemony
• Nuclear weapons in the hands of rivals such as
  India ought to restrain China
• The costs of a highly interventionist foreign
  policy are exorbitantly high

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9/11 and Realisms Return

• After 9/11, realism has made a stunning comeback.
  
• Liberal optimism of the 1990s now deflated
• Giddy predictions of globalizers about the end of
  the state have proved to be premature
• War again appears to be a regular feature of the
  international system
• Structural realists were right to predict that
  the 2003 Iraq War was a significant strategic
  error on the part of the US and its partners
• Security competition in West, South and East Asia
  reminds us that the world remains a dangerous
  place