Mind-Body Problem

1
Mind-Body Problem
2
What is the Problem?

• How exactly are the physical states of human
  bodies related to the mental states of human
  minds?
• What is the nature of mind?
• How do minds and bodies interact?

3
Physical Properties

• Bodies have physical properties. Give a list of
  physical properties.
• Bodies are subject to the laws of physics.

4
Mental Properties or States

• Thought experiment Imagine a universe that
  consists only of physical objects and physical
  properties but which lacks minds and mental
  properties. Make a list of those features of the
  world that would vanish if all minds were
  suddenly wiped out.

5
Mental Properties and States

• Minds allow us to
• Perceive, smell, and feel the world
• Feel emotions
• Have self-awareness
• Have dreams, hopes, and fantasies
• Store and retrieve memories
• Reason about the world
• Communicate with others

6
What do all mental states have in common?

• Feel a sharp pain
• Being convinced about winning lotto
• Knowing that 224
• Smelling coffee
• Seeing a lunar eclipse
• Dreaming of traveling to France
• Remembering to buy milk
• Imagining a perfect vacation
• Fearing that the war will go on
• Perceiving a yellow sunflower
• Thinking that the earth is round
• Experiencing frustration

7
Public vs Private Propertiesand States

• Bodies have properties that are public in the
  sense that anyone, in principle, can observe and
  measure them.
• Minds have properties that are private in the
  sense that they can be experienced only from a
  first-person perspective.

8
Possible solutions to themind-body problem

• Metaphysical views of reality
• Materialism only matter exists
• Dualism both mind and matter exists
• Idealism only mind exists
• Possible Solutions
• Physicalism (or Materialism)
• (Substance) Dualism
• Idealism

9
Physicalism

• Mental states can be completely explained in
  terms of physical states. Physical states are
  more fundamental than mental states.
• Mental states are ontologically dependent on
  physical states.

10
Ontological Dependence

• In general, we can say that one entity X
  ontologically depends on another entity Y if X
  cannot exist without Y.

11
Ontological DependenceAre these true or false?

• Tigers are ontologically dependent on lions.
• Rainbows are ontologically dependent on water and
  light.
• Wood is ontologically dependent on trees.
• Oranges are ontologically dependent on apples.
• Children are ontologically dependent on their
  parents.
• Birds are ontologically dependent on dinosaurs.
• Heat is ontologically dependent on the velocity
  of molecules.

12
Physicalism or Materialism

• Physicalist theories
• Behaviorism
• Identity theory
• Functionalism
• Eliminative materialism
• Property dualism (some versions)

13
(Substance) Dualism

• Mental states and physical states are equally
  real and ontologically independent.
• Problem of interaction
• Descartes Dualistic Interactionism
• Parallelism
• Occasionlism
• Preestablished harmony
• Epiphenominalism

14
Idealism

• Mental states are more fundamental than physical
  states.
• Leibnizs metaphysics Monads

15
Descartes

• Purpose He wants to find a certain and
  indubitable (beyond doubt) foundation on which to
  build all knowledge.
• All knowledge must be based on
• Intuition The mind can grasp clear and distinct
  ideas with certainty.
• Deduction Using deduction, one can derive new
  truths from other truths that are known to be
  true by intuition.

16
Descartes Method

• Radical Skepticism
• He will reject any belief that he cannot know to
  be true with absolute certainty. Any possible
  doubt will be reason for rejecting the belief.

17
Descartes

• I was convinced that I must once for all
  seriously undertake to rid myself of all the
  opinions which I had formerly accepted, and
  commence to build anew from the foundation, if I
  wanted to establish any firm and permanent
  structure in the sciences.
• Descartes begins with radical skepticism, radical
  doubt.

18
Descartes

• I have delivered my mind from every care and am
  happily agitated by no passions and since I have
  procured for myself an assured leisure in a
  peaceable retirement, I shall at last seriously
  and freely address myself to the general upheaval
  of all my former opinions.

19
Descartes

• It is not necessary that I should show that all
  of these former opinions are false.
• If I am able to find in each one some reason to
  doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting
  the whole.

20
Descartes

• the destruction of the foundations brings
  with it the downfall of the rest of the edifice.
• I shall only in the first place attack those
  principles upon which all my former opinions
  rested.

21
Descartes

• it is sometimes proved to me that the senses are
  deceptive.
• although the senses sometimes deceive us there
  are yet many things known through the senses
  that we cannot reasonably doubt.
• For example, there is the fact that I am here,
  seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown,
  having this paper in my hands and other similar
  matters.

22
Descartes The Dream Argument

• I must remember that I am a man, and that
  consequently I am in the habit of sleeping.
• how often has it happened to me that in the
  night I dreamt that I found myself in this
  particular place, that I was dressed and seated
  near the fire, while in reality I was lying
  undressed in bed!
• there are no certain indications by which we may
  clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep.

23
Descartes the truths of mathematics and geometry

• Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that
  kind contain some measure of certainty and an
  element of the indubitable
• For whether I am awake or asleep, 2 3 5, and
  the square can never have more than 4 sides, and
  it does not seem possible that truths so clear
  and apparent can be suspected of any falsity or
  uncertainty.

24
Descartes The Evil Genius Argument

• I shall then suppose some evil God-like genius
  has employed his whole energies in deceiving
  me.
• how do I know that Im not deceived every time
  that I add two and three, or count the sides of a
  square .
• I shall consider that the heavens, the earth,
  colors, figures, sound, and all other external
  things are naught but the illusions and dreams of
  which this genius has availed himself in order to
  lay traps for my credulity.

25
Descartes Cogito Ergo Sum

• I shall ever follow in this road until I have
  met with something which is certain.
• I myself, am I not at least something?
• I myself exist merely because I thought of
  something
• Let the evil genius deceive me as much as he
  will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long
  as I think that I am something.
• We must come to the definite conclusion that
  this proposition I am, I exist, is necessarily
  true each time that I pronounce it, or that I
  mentally conceive it.

26
Descartes The Wax Experiment

• The famous wax thought experiment of the Second
  Meditation illustrates a procedure for uncovering
  what is innate to the mind.
• The idea of body (extension in space) is not
  learned through the senses.
• Melt a block of wax and all of its sensory
  qualities change. Is it the same wax? Yes. How do
  we know this? The idea of the wax body does not
  seem to come from sense experience..
• The idea of body itself is an intuition of the
  mind. I know the mind better than anything else.

27
Arguments for Substance Dualism

• The Conceivability Arguments
• The Divisibility Argument
• Near-Death Experiences

28
Conceivability Argument

• Descartes argues for these points.
• Having a body is not essential to him.
• Having a mind is essential to him.
• Mind and body are two distinct kinds of
  substances.

29
Conceivability ArgumentSee pages 86-88

• It is conceivable for me to exist without a body.
• Whatever is conceivable is possible.
• Therefore, it is possible for me to exist without
  a body.
• If body is essential to me, then it is impossible
  for me to exist without it.
• So body is not essential to me.

30
Objection to theConceivability Argument

• It does not seem possible to conceive of existing
  without a body. Try it. (See thought probe on
  page 90)
• So Descartes cannot conclude that it is possible
  for him to exist without a body nor conclude that
  body is not essential to him.

31
Conceivability ArgumentThis part seems to be
sound?

1. I cannot conceive of existing without a mind.
2. Whatever is inconceivable is impossible.
3. Therefore, it is impossible for me to exist
   without having a mind.
4. Whatever is impossible for me not to have is
   essential to me.
5. So having a mind is essential to me. (It is part
   of my nature, what I am.)

32
Conceivability Argument B

1. Its conceivable for me to exist without having a
   body.
2. I cannot conceive that I exist without a mind.
3. Hence, body and mind have different properties.
4. Leibnizs law If X and Y are identical, then
   they have all the same properties in common.
5. Therefore, my mind is not identical to my body.
6. Therefore, mind and body are two distinct kinds
   of substances.

33
Objection to Conceivability Argument B

• We cannot always apply Leibnizs law
  (indiscernibility of identicals) to properties
  that are a result of our beliefs. Saying I can
  conceive that my car is red is different from
  saying My car is red. The first can be true
  even if the car is blue. (See example on next
  slide.)

34
Objection to Conceivability Argument B

• I can conceive that Clark Kent is an ordinary
  human being.
• I cannot conceive that Superman is an ordinary
  human being.
• So, Clark Kent has a property that Superman
  lacks.
• Therefore, by Leibnizs law, Clark Kent is not
  the same person as Superman.

35
Objection to Conceivability Argument B

• Conceiving of objects X and Y does not make them
  different objects.
• One and the same object can be described in two
  different ways. The names Evening Star and
  Morning Star refer to the planet venus. I might
  believe that they are different objects because I
  see them in different ways.

36
Divisibility Argument (p. 90)

• Minds are indivisible, but bodies are divisible.
• Leibnizs law
• So minds are not identical to bodies.
• Objection 1 Minds seem to be divisible. Cerebral
  Commissurotomy People who undergo this split
  brain operation seem to be left with split minds.
• Objection 2 Minds may still depend
  (ontologically) on the body. Vocal cords can be
  divided, but the voice cannot be. But we cannot
  conclude that the voice can exist independently
  of the vocal cords.

37
Argument from Near-death experience

• If substance dualism is false, then minds cannot
  exist independently from bodies.
• But minds can exist independently from bodies.
  (See argument for this on the next slide.)
• Therefore, substance dualism is true.
• Note This is a deductively valid argument Modus
  Tollens (see page 31)

38
Argument from near-death experiences

• Argument for the second premise in previous
  argument.
• Hundreds of people report having experiences
  while being outside their bodies.
• The best explanation for these reports is that
  minds can exist independently from bodies.
• Therefore, minds can exist independently from
  bodies.

39
Near-death experiences

• Is this the best explanation?
• Oxygen deprivation or medical drugs can cause
  hallucinations.
• When studying one person who had out of body
  experiences, they found that the persons angular
  gyrus was very active during these experiences.
• Perhaps they are caused by other neurological
  processes in the brain.
• These are simpler and more conservative
  explanations.

40
Objection The Biblical conception of the person

• See page 87 for the Biblical conception of the
  person. There is unanimity among Biblical
  scholars that the Biblical picture of the person
  is non-dualist. The whole person dies, not just
  the body. Christ was resurrected body and soul.
  His body wasnt reunited with his soul.

41
Problem of Interactionism

• How do minds and bodies interact?
• There is no such thing as a nonphysical cause,
  but there would have to be if nonphysical minds
  interact with bodies. (Or is there evidence of
  this? Is telekinesis possible?)
• Mind-body interaction would violate a fundamental
  law of physics the law of the conservation of
  mass-energy. If a mind interacted with a body,
  then energy would enter the physical world out of
  nowhere violating this law of conservation.

42
Objection to DualismThe problem of Interaction

• Answers to the problem of interaction
• Descartes Dualistic Interactionism
• Parallelism
• Occasionlism
• Pre-established harmony
• Epiphenominalism

43
Descartes Interactionism

• The mind affects the brain at the pineal gland in
  the brain. (See page 94.)
• But this does not overcome the objection that
  mental causation violates the law of the
  conservation of mass-energy.

44
Epiphenominalism

• To overcome the objection that minds cannot
  causally interact with bodies (because that would
  violate the law of conservation of mass-energy),
  some have denied that minds have any causal
  power. But bodies have causal power on minds.
  Mind is an ineffective by-product of physical
  processes. The mind is to the body as smoke is to
  a fire.

45
Objections to epiphenomenalism

• How does body cause mental processes?
• It seems like the law of the conservation of
  mass-energy is violated again. Energy must be
  lost to the mental world if the physical world
  produces the nonphysical mental world.
• Thoughts and feelings have no effect on the world
  or our behavior. But it the mental states do
  affect our behavior. (I pull my hand away from a
  hot pan that causes me pain.)
• Creatures with minds are no better off than
  creatures without minds. Mind has no survival
  value.

46
Parallelism

• The doctrine that the mind and body are two
  separate things and do not causally interact with
  each other. Mental processes and physical
  processes run parallel to each other. This solves
  the problem of interaction.

47
Occasionalism

• The parallelist theory of the mind that claims
  the correlation between mental processes and
  physical processes are caused on each occasion by
  God.

48
Pre-established Harmony

• The parallelist theory of mind that claims that
  the correlation between mental and physical
  events was established by God at the beginning of
  the universe when God created it. This was
  Leibniz view. God placed each monad in a
  pre-established harmony.

49
More Objections to Dualism

• Brain problems affect our ability to think.
• The problem of other minds
• Solipsism
• Ryle and the category mistake

50
Objection Brain problems

• According to Cartesian dualism, we think with our
  minds and not our brains. If we think with our
  minds and not our brains, then when we lose brain
  functions (because of diseases like Alzheimers
  or accidents that cause brain damage), that
  should have no effect on our ability to think.
  But these diseases and brain problems seem to
  have serious effects on our ability to think. So
  it is false that we think with our minds and not
  our brains.

51
Problem of Other Minds

• There is no way to tell if anyone (besides
  yourself) has a mind. Minds are nonphysical and
  cannot be seen or detected in any way. They are
  private to each individual.

52
Solipsism

• How can Descartes know anything but his own mind?
  The only thing he knows for certain is that he
  has a mind. Unless he can prove that there is an
  external world and that other people have minds,
  the only thing he can know is the contents of his
  own mind. (He tried to prove that the external
  world exists and that he can know other things
  besides the contents of his own mind.)

53
Ryle and the category mistake

• See page 106.
• According to Ryle, dualists make a category
  mistake when they talk of minds being mental
  substances. A category mistake occurs when you
  talk about something in a way that treats it as
  something that it is not. For instance, suppose
  that you introduce your friends to the college,
  and you show them all the different buildings
  there. At the end of the tour they ask, But
  where is the college? You friends are making a
  category mistake. The college is not something
  else besides all the buildings that make it up.
  The same goes with the concept of mind. The mind
  is not something in addition to what is physical.
  To think so is to make a category mistake.

54
New arguments for dualismIntentionality

• The best arguments for dualism rest on the
  attempt to find properties that distinguish minds
  from bodies.
• Intentionality is one such property.
  Intentionality refers to a property of mental
  states. Some mental stateslike the thought of
  buying my mother a presentare ABOUT something
  else. In this case, my thought is about my
  mother. But it does not seem that objects can be
  about other things in the same way that mental
  states can be about things. To say that mental
  states have intentionality is to say that they
  represent something else. But physical objects
  are what they are and are not about other things.

55
Questions

• Descartes identifies the mind with the soul. Is
  that correct? If not, how does the soul differ
  from the mind?

56
Questions

• Some people also talk about spirits. Is that
  something different?

57
Questions

• Suppose someone claimed to have a device that
  destroyed peoples souls. When it was used, it
  prevented a persons soul from going to heaven
  but otherwise had no discernible effect on that
  person. How would you evaluate such a claim?
• Is the claim that people have souls any more
  plausible? Why or why not?

58
Questions

• Is it possible to build a machine that has our
  linguistic and problem solving abilities?
• If a machine had these abilities, would it have a
  mind?

59
Questions

• Descartes did not think that animals have minds
  because they do not behave in ways that cannot be
  accounted for in purely mechanical terms. Do
  animals have minds?
• If they do, then can we justify killing and
  eating them or using them for experimentation?

60
Questions

• Thomas Jefferson said that to talk about
  immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. Do
  you agree or not? Why or why not?

61
Basis of PhysicalismEmpiricism

• Empiricism The only source of knowledge about
  the external world is sense experience. The mind
  is a blank slate waiting to be filled.
• British empiricists
• John Locke
• David Hume
• Bishop Berkeley

62
PhysicalismTwo Corollaries of Empiricism

• An idea corresponds to a real object only if it
  is derived from or reducible to sense
  impressions.
• A term is meaningful (has meaning) only if it
  stands for a real object.

63
PhysicalismEmpiricism

• An example of how an empiricist thinks about
  mind Hume rejects the idea of the soul (an
  immaterial substance) because there is no sense
  impression that can be connected to it. The word
  soul stands for nothing and is meaningless.

64
PhysicalismLogical Positivism

• The Vienna Circle
• A group of 20th Century philosophically minded
  scientists and philosophers.
• Philosophy makes sense of science
• Eliminate meaningless metaphysical speculation.

65
Logical Positivism

• The Verifiability Theory of Meaning
• The meaning of a sentence is its method of
  verification through sense experience.
• To know the meaning of a sentence is to know what
  observable differences in the world it would make
  if it were true (or false).

66
Logical Positivism

• According to the Logical Positivist view, here
  are some meaningless statements
• The nothing nothings. (Heidegger)
• The absolute is infinite. (Hegel)
• Being is eternal. (Parmenides)
• The strings of string theory exist. (This would
  be meaningless if string theory cannot be
  connected to experimental tests.)

67
PhysicalismLogical Behaviorism

• Can sentences about mental states be meaningful?
  (e.g., Joe is in pain.) We have to connect these
  sentences with sense experiences.
• We can tell what mental state a person is in by
  observing his or her behavior.
• Mental States behavioral dispositions
• Behavioral Disposition The tendency to respond
  in certain ways to certain stimuli.

68
PhysicalismLogical Behaviorism

• Having a mental state Having a disposition to
  behave in certain ways given certain stimuli
• The mental state IS the disposition
• B.F. Skinner To make talk of mental states fit
  scientific discourse, replace all mental terms
  with terms referring to descriptions of behavior.
  There is no mind existing behind the behavior,
  and no need to talk of belief, pain, etc.

69
Logical Behaviorism

• How would a behaviorist transform the following
  sentences?
• Henry is angry with Maud.
• Thor believes that he is ugly.
• Niki wants to become rich.
• Aronian has learned Spanish well.
• Kenny thinks the Colbert Report is funny.

70
Logical Behaviorism seems more adequate than
Cartesian Dualism

• Simpler Reductive, materialist theory. No need
  to assume any immaterial minds
• More Conservative Fits our beliefs about the
  conservation of energy, and the causal closure of
  the physical
• More Fruitful Solves problem of other minds.
  Minds are observable. There is no trouble
  admitting intelligent robots. They will have
  mental states, too.

71
Logical BehaviorismBenefits of Behaviorism

• Behaviorism has implications for how we treat
  mental illness. If we want to alter a persons
  mind, then all we have to do is change the
  persons behavior.
• Behaviorism helped psychologists overcome the
  problem that people are poor reporters of their
  own subjective mental states. For instance, to
  find out which hurts more, piercing ones navel
  or ones nose, it is better to measure behavior
  than ask subjects to compare their pains. We can
  understand people in terms of stimuli, responses,
  and conditioning.

72
Logical BehaviorismTest Its Definition of
Mental States

• Mental state X if and only if behavioral
  disposition Y.
• If mental state X, then disposition Y
• If disposition Y, then mental state X
• Can we refute one of these? Is it possible to
  have one side but not the other?

73
Test Logical Behaviorism

• The Perfect Pretender, p. 108 (Qualitative
  Content The felt quality of certain mental
  states)
• Putnams Super-Spartans, p. 108
• Mental states seem to be causes of behavior, not
  identical with behavior
• Noam Chomsky If LB were true, then it would be
  possible to predict our future behavior from our
  past behavior. But people display completely
  novel verbal (linguistic) behavior.

74
Logical Behaviorism

• The verifiability criterion of meaning is itself
  unverifiable. It cannot be verified by any
  possible observations. So it must be a
  meaningless statement, too.
• So talk using traditional mental state terms is
  not necessarily meaningless.

75
PhysicalismIdentity Theory

• Phineas Cage Damage to brain caused change in
  personality and mental functioning.
• Other evidence that brain states (a pattern of
  neurons firing) are connected to mental states.
• Mental states are identical to brain states.
• Strong Identity Theory
• One type of brain state is identical to one type
  of mental state.

76
Identity Theory andLogical Behaviorism

• Suppose that you are going through a difficult
  time in your life. When you go to bed, you start
  thinking that your life is empty and meaningless.
  You are tired of these thoughts and you want to
  change your mind. You want to get rid of these
  depressing late-night thoughts.
• If behaviorism is true, how would you go about
  changing your mind?
• If identity theory is true, how would you go
  about changing your mind?

77
Identity Theory

• Simple Reductive, no need for immaterial
  substance.
• Fruitful makes predictions. For instance,
  doctors can stimulate the brain and cause smells,
  sights, and sounds. It also explains mental
  causation, how mental states can cause behavior.

78
Test Identity Theory

• Identity and Indiscernibility
• Conscious experience brain states are knowable
  by empirical investigation, but mental states are
  not. (see Nagels, What is it like to be a bat?,
  p. 115)
• John Lorber (p. 115). Radically different brain
  states can give the same mental state. So
  identity theorists cannot say what it is to be in
  a particular mental state. No one type of brain
  state can be correlated to one type of mental
  state.

79
Test Identity TheoryMultiple Realizability
Problem

• Lewiss Pained Martian(p. 116) If IT were true,
  then only creatures with brains could have mental
  states. But it seems logically possible that
  creatures without brains could have mental
  states.
• If it is logically possible to have thinking
  machines made of silicon chips, then identity
  theory is false. (John Searles thought
  experiment imagine replacing your brain slowly,
  piece by piece, with silicon chips. Page 119.)
• See page 121 on Neural Chips.

80
Functionalism

• Mental states Functional states
• A functional state is defined in terms of what it
  does, not what it is made of.
• Example, clocks can be made of many different
  kinds of materials, but they all have the same
  function.
• So functionalism solves the multiple
  realizability problem, the problem that it is
  possible for things other than brains to have
  minds.

81
Functionalism vs. Behaviorism

• Mental states are defined by their causal role.
• Behaviorism Defines m-states in terms of
• Physical stimulus ? behavior output response
• Functionalism Defines m-states in terms of
• Physical stimulus and mental state ? behavior
  output and mental state change
• (1) So mental states can be causes of behavior
• (2) Mental states are related causally to other
  mental states

82
Functional States of Coke Machine
State 1 State 2
50 Cents input No output Go to State 2 Dispense 1 Coke Go to State 1
1 Dollar input Dispense 1 Coke Stay in State 1 Dispense 1 Coke Return 50 cents Go to State 1
83
Functional State TableMachine Table
State 3 State 1 State 7 State 4 State 5 State n
Input 1 State 4 Output 2 State 4 Output 9 State 5 Output 3 State 4 Output 4 State 1 Output 2 State x Output y
Input 4 State 5 Output 2 State 7 Output 1 State 2 Output 2 State 3 Output 8 State 7 Output 6 State x Output y
Input 5 State 2 Output 5 State 1 Output 8 State 2 Output 4 State 6 Output 3 State 4 Output 2 State x Output y

Input n State x Output y State x Output y State x Output y State x Output y State x Output y State x Output y
84
FunctionalismMind as Software Version

• To have a mind is to have the ability to perform
  certain functions
• Programs determine how computers function.
• Strong AI There is nothing more to having a mind
  than running the right kind of software. (pp.
  126-127)

85
Evaluating Functionalism

• Lewis Pained Madman (p. 128) it seems possible
  that a person could be in a mental state, like
  pain, but this pain state could have an entirely
  different function than it normally has.
• So being in a certain functional state is not a
  necessary condition for being in a certain mental
  state. To be in pain, you do not have to be in
  any particular functional state.

86
Evaluating Functionalism

• Ned Blocks Chinese Nation (p. 129) Having the
  right sort of functional organization is not
  sufficient for having a mind.
• Absent Qualia Objection It is possible to have
  something that is functionally equivalent to a
  human being but not have conscious experience
  (qualia, raw feels, felt quality)

87
Evaluating Functionalism

• Putnams Inverted Spectrum (p. 130) Something
  that is functionally equivalent to a human being
  could have the wrong kind of conscious
  experience. So having a certain functional state
  is not sufficient for being in a certain mental
  state.
• There must be something more to being in a mental
  state than being in a certain functional state.
• Example of Synesthesia (p. 132)

88
Functionalism

• Paul Churchlands Response to Objections the
  qualitative experience associated with a mental
  state is irrelevant to it.
• But are qualia irrelevant?

89
Functionalism

• The Turing Test (pp. 133-134). There is nothing
  more to being intelligent than being able to use
  language as we do.
• See the Loebner Prize (p. 138)

90
Evaluating Functionalism

• Searles Chinese Room (p. 136) It is possible to
  pass the Turing Test (have the correct functional
  state) and yet not have any understanding of the
  language used (not have the corresponding mental
  state). A machine can manipulate symbols but not
  assign any meaning to the symbols.
• Computers make sentences by combining symbols
  according to their physical features or form
  (syntax), but people manipulate symbols on the
  basis of their meaning or content (semantics).

91
Evaluating Functionalism

• Searles Chinese Gym (p. 140) A thought
  experiment to show that connection machines
  (parallel processing) will fare no better than
  sequential processing machines.

92
Evaluating Functionalism

• See Blocks Conversational Jukebox (p. 142). This
  is like the Chinese Room objection. A machine
  could produce answers to questions like a human,
  but not have a mind or intelligence.

93
Evaluating Functionalism

• The Total Turing Test (p. 140)
• Would passing this test be necessary or
  sufficient for having intelligence and a mind?

94
Functionalismand Intentionality

• Intentionality (p. 141) Thoughts can be about
  things. Any adequate theory of mind must explain
  how mental states can be about something else.

95
Functionalism

• Nevertheless, a machines passing the Turing test
  is evidence for its being intelligent and having
  a mind. How far should we go to recognize this
  possible intelligence? Should we ever give
  machines rights or equal moral consideration?
• What about animals? They seem to have minds that
  are similar to ours in certain respects. Should
  we give them equal moral consideration or rights?
  Why or why not?

96
Should We Ban Artificial Intelligence Research?

• Some scientists are so concerned that intelligent
  machines may threaten our existence that they
  want to ban all research into artificial
  intelligence.

97
Functionalism

• Check out Chatterbots or chatbots.

98
Eliminative Materialism

• The Hard Problem How can we explain the fact of
  conscious experience? How is it possible to
  explain how physical processes give rise to
  experience?
• Reductive materialism has failed.
• Eliminative materialist answer Reductive
  theories fail, so there are no mental states.
  They do not exist.

99
Eliminative Materialism

• Arguments for
• Richard Rortys Demons (146)
• Folk Psychology is weak (148, quote)
• Arguments against
• Searles Chevrolet Station Wagon (149)
• Jacksons Color-Challenged Scientist (150 and in
  the news 151)
• Chalmers Zombies (152)

100
Eliminative Materialism

• Rortys Demons (p. 146). The absurdity of
  saying Nobody has ever felt a pain is no
  greater than that of saying Nobody has ever seen
  a demon.
• All references to mental states will someday be
  eliminated from our psychology textbooks.

101
Eliminative Materialism

• Folk Psychology This is our common sense theory
  of the mind. It is our talk about beliefs, pains,
  desires, hopes, fears, etc. But this theory
  doesnt explain much. (See Churchland quote on
  page 148) So it will be replaced by a better
  theory that does not rely on beliefs, desires,
  etc.

102
EvaluatingEliminative Materialism

• Jacksons Color-Challenged Scientist (p. 150).
  Read about Seeing Color for the First Time (p.
  151). Subjective experience (its qualitative
  content) cannot be eliminated. A complete account
  of the world cannot be given in purely physical
  terms. Physicalism must be false.

103
Eliminative Materialism

• If Zombies are logically possible, then
  consciousness is nonphysical, or it is not
  identical to or reducible to physical states.

104
Property Dualism

• There can be no complete description of the world
  in purely physical terms.
• Mental states have (a) qualitative content and
  (b) intentional content that are neither physical
  nor functional properties.
• These are primitive properties cant be
  explained in terms of anything more fundamental.

105
Property Dualism

• Arguments For
• Jacquettes Intentionality Test Intentionality
  is primitive.
• Nonreductive explanations of basic properties
  (158) EMC2 Fma
• Panpsychism (159) Everything has mental
  properties from the beginning.
• Emergentism (160) mental properties emerge from
  things lacking those properties. (link)

106
Emergentism

• Consciousness is an emergent property. Our
  neurons are not conscious but once they become
  related to one another in the right sorts of
  ways, consciousness emerges.
• Downward Causation The mind has causal effect on
  the body. Link

107
Downward Causation

• Emergent properties can have causal influence on
  the physical elements that bring them into being.
• Evidence
• Biofeedback (162) control neuron firing rates
• Placebo/Nocebo effects (163)
• Cognitive behavior theory (163)

108
Emergent God

• See page 165

109
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110
First Consider your answers to these questions
true or false?

• It is possible for my mind to survive the death
  of my body.
• It will be possible to build machines that have
  minds like people.
• The best way to treat depression is to change the
  chemical reactions inside my brain.
• Sometime in the future, it might be possible for
  a crazy scientist to create false memories in my
  mind by simply injecting certain chemicals into
  my brain.
• Scientists can understand the nature of clouds,
  planets, black holes, and other objects, they
  will never understand the true nature of emotions
  like anger, love, or hate.

111
Continued true or false?

• Dogs and cat have beliefs and hopes just like
  humans do.
• My thoughts and ideas are the product of my
  environment and upbringing.
• There might exist conscious beings on other
  planets who do have beliefs and self-awareness
  but who do not have brains like ours.
• It is impossible for machines to be creative or
  funny. One could never be a stand-up comedian.