HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN FRANCE

1
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGYINFRANCE

• Christian NADAL
• President
• EDF INA
• cnadal_at_edfina.com

2
Nuclear Energy in France Today

• 19 plants - 58 Units
• Installed capacity
• Total 110 GW
• Nuclear 63 GW (57)
• Net Electric generation
• Total 549 TWh
• Nuclear 429 TWh (78)

Sources EIA, 2004 - IAEA,2006 - EDF
3
Nuclear Energy in France Today

• Around 40 of total primary energy supply in
  2006 (117 Mtep)
• Low Carbon Intensity 0.26 Metric ton/Thousand
  2000 (US 0.55) and less than 80 Metric tons of
  CO2 per GWh of electricity in 2004

Source International Energy Agency, 2004
4
THE PIONEERS
THE TRANSITION PHASE
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
1945
1973
1990
1985
1960
1974
5
ENERGY

• France has no Natural Resources
• Independence is key issue for French Politicians
  since WW I
• e.g. Oil Sector Reorganization Act 1928
• Stability of Supply
• Nuclear is no exception

6
Nuclear Energy
Pre WW II
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Nuclear Energy

• Pre WW II (Contd)
• Patents describe main Features of a Nuclear
  Reactor
• Young scientists hired for designing/building a
  nuclear reactor (F. Perrin 1940)
• Secure Heavy Water supply

8
THE PIONEERS
THE PIONEERS

• BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE
• 1945 - 1973

9
KEY DECISIONS

• End of WW II sees French economy left in shambles
• Priority is rebuilding French Infrastructure
• Crediting French Historical Tradition
• Strong Government involvement
• Centralized decisions
• Create two Government-owned entities
• CEA (Commissariat a lEnergie Atomique 10/18
  1945)
• EDF (Electricite de France 03/29 1946)

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CEA and EDF
CEA
EDF

RD Science Industry
Defense Radiation Protection Standards Raw
Material Supply Prospection
Mining Design, Build industrial Scale Nuclear
Units Advise French Government for
International Agreements
Monopolies Generation Transmission Distribu
tion Imports Exports Design Build
Generating Units Operate
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POLICY

• Need Long-Term Vision
• Dictated by French Situation
• Uranium Enrichment not Practicable
• Industrial Capability not adequate
• Funding unreasonable
• ? Natural Uranium is the only solution
• Confirmed by International Environment
• Mc Mahon Act (08/01 1946)

12
POLICY

• Consequence is Plutonium
• Defense
• Civilian use
• Evaluate consequences of Strategic Orientations
• Fuel Reprocessing
• Interest for LMFBRs

13
POLICY

• Practical Implemention
• Quinquennial Planning
• General Trend constant
• Natural Uranium
• Plutonium Separation as an objective
• LMFBRs contemplated as early as 1953
• Periodic Reassessment

14
POLICY

• Practical Implementation
• Quinquennial Planning
• Marginal modifications tolerated
• Scheduling
• Technical
• Moderator type (Heavy Water EL or Graphite G)
• Output
• ? No Standardization

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The Chinon site (mid 60s)
The Gravelines site (early 80s)
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EDFs APPROACH

• Long-term priority is cost-effectiveness

CONTROL PROCESS
LEAD CONTRACTOR A.I. (1954)
ENGINEERING CAPABILITY

• General orientations

MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT (PRICE PERMITTING) 1955
PAY OVERHEADS FOR FIRST UNITS
BASELOAD ENTIRELY WITH NUCLEAR UNITS
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INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

• The 50s open new perspectives
• Atoms for Peace
• Geneva Conferences
• 1953
• 1958
• EURATOM Treaty (03/25 1957)
• Open door for evaluating US technologies

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KEY MILESTONES

• G1 (2 MWe GG) 1956-1968
• G2 (40 MWe GG) 1959-1980
• G3 (40 MWe GG) 1960-1984
• Chinon 1 (70e MW - GG) 1963-1973
• Chinon 2 (180 MWe - GG) 1965-1985
• Chinon 3 (360 MWe - GG) 1967-1990
• SL1 (390 MWe GG) 1969-1990
• SL2 (450 MWe GG) 1971-1992
• Bugey 1 (540 MWe GG) 1972-1994
• Brennilis (70 MWe HW) 1967-1985

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THE TRANSITION PHASE
THE PIONEERS
THE TRANSITION PHASE

• TIME FOR DIFFICULT DECISIONS
• 1960 - 1974

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THE NEW CONTEXT

• The 60s confirm need for change
• Development of Uranium Enrichment techniques is
  first step for contemplating LWRs (1967)
• EURATOM treaty gives opportunity for testing US
  LWRs
• CHOOZ (beginning of construction - 1962)
• TIHANGE (1967)
• Gas-Graphite technology limited to 700 MWe
• LMFBR technology (longer term)
• RAPSODIE (beginning of construction - 1961)
• PHENIX (beginning of construction- 1967)

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STRATEGIC APPROACH

• The PEON(1) Committee
• Reevaluate available options and propose graded
  approach crediting
• Security of Supply
• Political Independence
• Economic Independence (Hard Currency)
• Instability of Fossil Fuel markets
• French Economy Capabilities
• Budget
• Industry
• Cost-effectiveness

(1) Committe advising the French Government for
Nuclear
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STRATEGIC APPROACH

• Most Significant Conclusions
• Keep all options open for further decision
• Access to Plutonium remains an objective
• Fast breeders development needed
• Light Water Technology consistent with strategic
  issues
• BWRs, PWRs potential candidates
• Costs will govern decisions
• Develop technologies for Front/Backend of the
  Fuel Cycle

23
MILESTONES

• 12/1967 Authorization for two Gas-Cooled
  Reactors (GCRs) at Fessenheim (FSH)
• 07/1968 Appropriateness of GCRs at FSH
  questioned
• 05/1969 PEON Committee recommends
• Development of FBRs (Beyond PHENIX)
• Order for 4 to 5 LWRs before 1975
• Decisions on GCRs and Heavy Water Reactors before
  12/1970
• Purchase licenses from US vendors

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MILESTONES

• 11/1969 French Government decides for Light
  Water Reactors (LWRs)
• De facto stop for Natural Uranium GCRs
• Nuclear Leadership transfered to EDF
• 1970 2 PWRs at FSH
• 1971 1 PWR at Bugey (BGY)
• 1972 EDF decides for 2nd PWR at BGY, instead of
  BWR
• Cost was decisive
• 08/1975 French Government decides for PWRs
• Cost is the most important parameter for decision

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THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
THE PIONEERS
THE TRANSITION PHASE
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE

• THE PWR CONSTRUCTION
• PROGRAM
• 1973 1990

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TIME FOR DECISIONS

• 1973
• Oil share in energy consumption is 69
• OIl prices triple (unacceptably high)
• 1974
• Decision to develop a Nuclear Program
• Political Majority is pro-Nuclear
• Political Minority Reluctant
• Objective is 30 Nuclear of primary energy supply
  by 1990
• 1975
• 08/06 French Government choose PWRs

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FRENCH PWR PROGRAM
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TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS

• Before 1981
• 42 units decided by the French government
• Superphenix
• All orders confirmed except 1 (900 MWe)
• After 1981
• Program Reevaluation
• Political Reasons (e.g. Plogoff canceled)
• Economics Consumption Growth less than
  anticipated
• Orders on a Need to Basis
• Last 3 1400 MWe units delayed by EDF

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FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM
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WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

• Main reason is Political
• Government
• Controlled CEA and EDF
• Enforced key Decisions
• Made all decisions
• Kept program on track
• Provided help for enforcing decisions (at sites)
• Industrial Policy (Infrastructure)
• French Society
• Favored the Nuclear option
• Though opposition did exist

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WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

• Second reason is technical
• Standardized Program (series)
• Engineering and Construction cost
• Construction time
• Operating and maintenance cost
• Safety

Creusot Workshop in the 70s
32
32 3-Loop 900 MWe
20 4-Loop 1300 MWe
4 4-Loop 1450 MWe
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WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?

• Third reason is EDF policy
• Strong involvement in local development
• Relationship with local authorities (information
  development)
• Contracts with small businesses
• Public acceptance
• Open door policy / transparency
• Relations with opinion leaders and scientists

• Maintaining Infrastructure Capability
• Maintenance policy

34
COMMENTS

• French Government didnt provide subsidies or tax
  credits
• Program mostly financed by debt
• Advised EDF towards loans in
• Huge financial impact
• Authorized retail prices didnt reflect real
  program costs (increases moderate)

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LOOKING AT THE FUTURE
THE PIONEERS
THE TRANSITION PHASE
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

• THE REP 2000 PROGRAM
• 1985 2007
• GEN IV

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The CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT (1986)

• Huge impact on the european public
• Poor Communication by most organizations
• Increased NIMBY, BANANA
• Need to factor Severe Accidents into Design
• Realization that nuclear issues are transnational

37
PROGRAM SHAPING

• Discussions with several Countries
• Agreement with Germany (Political)
• Design Approach (EPR)
• Regulatory Approach
• Agreements with Belgium, Germany, UK, Spain,
  Italy (others later)
• International Programs (LWRs)
• Common Utility Requirements (EUR)

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NUCLEAR WASTES

• Waste issue is key for nuclear
• Approach must credit former decisions
• Outcomes are
• 12/30/1991 Law (1st Bataille Act)
• Defines RD orientations
• Defines Administrative Measures
• 06/28/2006 Law (2nd Bataille Act)
• Confirms RD orientations
• Sets Deadlines
• Technical Feasibility of Contemplated Solutions
• Site Selection
• Facility Commissioning

39
GEN IV

• Objectives well in-line with Frances strategy
• France decides to join GIF (2000)
• French proposals reflect constant strategy
• Fuel cycle closure (Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors)
• Waste management (Molten Salt Reactor)
• Former President Chirac decides GEN IV Reactor
  connected to the grid by 2020
• Only available technology is LMFBR
• Renewed interests in LMFBRs
• Agreements underway for
• Delineating RD program
• Recreating industrial infrastructure

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CONCLUSION

• Nuclear Program was a success
• Expertise existed
• National Commitment
• Long-term Strategy
• Capability to build on experience
• Stick to fundamentals
• Accept failures in the approach(Gas-Cooled
  Reactors)
• Endorse alternatives when needed
• No stone unturned
• Frontend / Backend of the Fuel Cycle

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CONCLUSION

• Program was a success (Contd)
• Public support
• But Chernobyl modified perspective
• Support for operating plants remained strong
• Less support for new constructions
• EDF policy with small business and local
  communities
• EDFs Industrial Policy
• Applied research on anticipated technologies
• Lead contractor / Vendors
• Standardization

42
CONCLUSION

• Program remains a success
• Financial performance / largest shareholder
  company in Europe

43
CONCLUSION

• Program remains a success (Contd)
• Stable electricity prices over long time period