Initial Lessons Learned

1
Initial Lessons Learned
2
Lessons Learned Operation Iraqi Freedom EXSUM

• Table of Content
• 1) C2 of Patriot Forces
• 1-1 Patriot Defense Design Considerations
• 1-2 Table VIII Qualifications Insufficiently
  Prepare Units for Combat
• assigned missions
• 2) Patriot Engagement Operations
• 2-1 Patriot Engagement Operations
• 2-2 Patriot System Knowledge
• 3) Communications (AMD)
• 3-1 Force XXI Battle Command Requirements
• 3-2 Software Compatibility of AMDWS with the
  Other ATCCS
• 3-3 Division Command via TACSAT
• 3-4 Long-haul communication equipment shortfall
• 3-5 Integration PATRIOT into the Joint Data
  Network in KU
• 4) Personnel and Logistical Support
• 4-1 FAADC3I Contractor Support and Class IX
  Availability
• 5) Joint Air Operations
• 5-1 Tactical Ballistic Missile Early Warning
• 5-2 Information Flow Regarding Anomalies
  Experienced

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• Lessons Learned 1-1
• Issue Integration/Defense Design with other
  PATRIOT BNs (US and Allied) and other weapon
  systems was done on the fly.
• Discussion No information, documentation, or
  test results were available to the war fighter on
  how to successfully integrate multiple PATRIOT
  BNs or other endospheric weapon systems. Units
  within Israel and Kuwait (KU) have been operating
  with Host Nation PATRIOT and other weapons
  systems for a number of years. However, no data
  on the impact of operating in this manner was
  available prior to the start of OIF. Two
  critical areas that need closer review
• - Having two units in separate BNs linked via
  PATRIOT Automated Data Information Link (PADIL)
  providing coverage of the same asset resulted in
  the inefficient use of FUs in maximizing coverage
  of additional assets
• - Impact of having two separate endospheric
  weapon systems sharing the same battle and space
  covering the same assets
• Recommendation The Lower Tier Project Office
  (LTPO) should assess the impact of employing the
  system the way it was used during OIF and publish
  the results. USAADASCH branch must analyze
  results and determine how to best employ the
  weapon system to maximize effective coverage of
  multiple assets based on these results and
  produce the appropriate updates to TTP.
• Lead TSM-LT/DOTD

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 1-2
• Issue PATRIOT units focus on Table VIII
  qualifications limits their ability to execute
  assigned missions
• Discussion For the majority of PATRIOT units
  table eight gunnery certification is viewed as an
  end point in the unit training cycle. Table
  eight focuses on only 5 mission essential tasks
  march order the FU/BN fire distribution section
  (FDS), emplace the FU/BN FDS, conduct air defense
  operations, conduct missile reload operations,
  and conduct Reconnaissance, Selection and
  Occupation of Position (RSOP). These tasks are
  for the most part conducted in a controlled
  environment with no other distractions.
• This narrow focus on a limited number of tasks
  fails to train units on how to operate in a war
  time environment. The fixed site TBM only
  mentality has led PATRIOT units to believe that
  if they are successful at Table VIIIs they will
  be successful at war. Operation OIF highlighted
  some of the problems this approach has caused.
  PATRIOT units are not assessed on their ability
  to fight as part of an integrated task force.
  Units are not evaluated on their ability to
  provide highly qualified ADAFCOs to higher
  echelon units. Units are not assessed on their
  ability to develop and execute complex defense
  designs. Units are not assessed on their ability
  to receive a mission and execute it.
• Table VIII certification is only one part of a
  units training as it prepares for its annual
  external evaluation. At some point, a PATRIOT
  battery/ BN needs to be assessed on its ability
  to execute its mission and fight as part of a BN
  Task Force and / or higher echelon integrated
  task force.
• Recommendation USAADASCH relook what it takes
  to be qualified.
• For a unit to be considered qualified, it should
  not only be trained in the key Air Defense Tasks,
  but it should also be trained and qualified to
  operate as part of a larger, integrated and most
  likely joint task force. This approach may lead
  to a totally new training model. Review, update,
  and change current battery / BN requirements and
  establish measurable tasks, conditions, and
  standards for PATRIOT Gunnery Tables. Key to
  raising the level of expertise across the PATRIOT
  force is the use of external evaluations that
  will be used to assess the ability of unit to
  successfully execute Air Defense missions under a
  variety of conditions. USAADASCH establish
  policies and standards for conducting external
  evaluations that require they be conducted by a
  team of certified experts that have been
  assembled and trained for this purpose.
• Lead DOTD

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 2-1
• Issue Patriot Engagement operations (D)(T)
• Discussion
• Bridging the gap between MDMP (doctrinal and
  situational templates) and Patriot tactics,
  tabular entries, and firing doctrine
• Reduce target identification uncertainty with
  engagement criteria tied to threat and friendly
  platforms
• Increase friendly protect procedurally and
  technically
• Remote Launch Operations capture technical and
  tactical requirements
• Autonomous operations TBM Only is no longer
  an option
• Redundant Coverage advantages and disadvantages
• Based upon EMI, how far apart should Patriot
  Batteries be placed defending an asset
• Incorporate tactical reasoning/decision making
  Counter-TBM is not automatic WCS Free for TBMs
  presents risk in the SRBM fight
• Airspace Control and deconfliction remains a
  Joint problem
• METT-TC relationship with tabular settings
• Combat operations routine verification of Mode
  IV updating OPTASKLINK, radar registration
• Recommendation Include in new Patriot TTPs,
  doctrine during Joint Training Exercises and MRE
  standards

Sustain X Improve General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 2-2
• Issue General knowledge of PATRIOT
  Initialization tabular data and its origin/impact
  on how the air battle is fought is minimal.
• Discussion PATRIOT operators did not understand
  how the values for the systems initialization
  tabular entries were established. During
  discussion with soldiers in the area of
  responsibility (AOR) prior to and during OIF, it
  became clear that the operators did not
  understand the various tabular entries required
  for their system as outlined in the Tactical
  Standing Operating Procedure (TSOP), Area Air
  Defense Plan (AADP), and Special Instructions
  (SPINS). Operators did not know the purpose of
  the parameters, where it came from or why it was
  needed. When asked why a tabular entry was set
  to a specific value, the soldiers normally
  responded because the TSOP or the PATRIOT
  Information and Coordination Central (ICC) told
  us to set it to that number. The operators did
  not know why it was a particular number, who had
  established the value or what the setting would
  accomplish.
• Lack of expertise in this area limited the
  PATRIOT units ability to modify/change the
  weapon system parameters as the threat changes
  and provide accurate and timely input for the
  AADP and SPINS. Operators did not know what
  their system can and cannot do.
• Recommendation USAADASCH develop a formal
  training program to provide the PATRIOT operator
  with intermediate and advance level weapons
  system training. Recommend development of
  exportable training packages or courses that can
  be conducted via distance learning. Prior to
  assuming the duties of a PATRIOT TCO, TD, TCA, or
  TDA soldiers should be required to complete
  these courses. These courses should be annotated
  in their training record.
• Lead DOTD

Sustain X Improve General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 3-1
• Issue The Patriot battalion does not have a
  Force XXI battle command brigade and below
  (FBCB2) required for battle tracking. (MO)
• Discussion The division fielded FBCB2 as the
  standard for blue force tracking. The ADA
  battalion was not included in the fielding.
  During combat operations, the battalion had to
  locate an FBCB2 on the battlefield to get
  situational awareness. Even this was limited
  since none of the air defense assets were
  displayed on the FBCB2 screen. Not only did the
  lack of FBCB2 systems in the battalion hinder
  situational awareness, all division fragmentary
  orders (FRAGOs) and graphics were issued over
  FBCB2 , making it difficult for the battalion to
  track the battle and conduct simultaneous
  planning in support of the division.
• Recommendation At a minimum, issue one FBCB2
  terminal to each battery, the battalion TOC, and
  the battalion commander also ensure that each
  air defense weapon and radar system is displayed
  on the FBCB2 screen.
• Lead TSM-LT
• C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
• 3-1  PAT was/is not organic to DIV therefore
  did not receive FBCB2.   Avail. of
• FBCB2s and addit. EPLRs will be a real problem
  at this pt.

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 3-2
• Issue Software compatibility of AMDWS with the
  other ATCCS. (M)
• Discussion During operational planning and
  execution, the battalion is required to provide
  the division a current air picture superimposed
  over the current airspace control measures
  (ACMs). On demand, the divisions leadership may
  also request that maneuver graphics be projected
  so that they can see where aircraft are in
  relation to the ground forces. Currently, these
  products are manually input into AMDWS by either
  the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) or
  air battle management operations center (ABMOC)
  operators, a slow and tedious process. These
  operators are duplicating the efforts of other
  operators who are entering the same graphic
  control measures into the Maneuver Control System
  (MCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data
  System (AFATDS), and the other ATCCSs.
• Recommendation Make the required software and
  hardware upgrades so AMDWS can communicate with
  the other ATCCSs so all the different graphic
  control measures can be uploaded via floppy disk
  or through the local area network (LAN).
• Lead TSM-LT
• C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
• 3-2 This is about making ABCS work....several
  systems still lack integration sw.

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 3-3
• Issue Division command via TACSAT. (M/O)
• Discussion From the time we destroyed the
  enemys observation posts on the international
  border to the divisions closure on OBJ LIONS,
  the battlespace was so dispersed in width and
  depth that FM communications between any units
  larger than infantry or armor battalion/task
  force-sized elements was unfeasible. BCTs were
  often more than 40 kilometers apart, forcing the
  division command to conduct all command and
  control functions via TACSAT. Though extremely
  effective in allowing the BCTs to communicate
  with each other and with the division over great
  distances, many of the other division assets were
  left in the dark because they did not have the
  ability to monitor the network. Though the air
  defense battalion commander and his tactical
  operations center (TOC) had one TACSAT radio each
  to monitor the division command network, the
  battalion was not able to monitor any of the
  other TACSAT networks, such as division
  operations and intelligence (OI), fire support,
  etc. The battalion also experienced the same
  problems the division had in trying to
  communicate through the depth and width of the
  divisions battlespace. Though it has the same
  communication requirements in terms of distance
  and number of networks as the division, the
  battalion was not allocated any resources to
  improve its ability to communicate internally.
  Though the battalion has a number of PRC-213 HF
  radios by MTOE, these radios are supposed to be
  used to pass SEW information and are unreliable
  at best. Although the division did receive some
  PRC-150 Harris HF radios that proved to be more
  reliable, only one was given to the battalion,
  hardly enough to assist it in conducting command
  and control within the unit. TACSAT radios proved
  reliable throughout the operation for the
  division. The same resources need to be provided
  to the divisions subordinate commands that have
  much the same requirements, to include the Air
  Defense Artillery Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO).
  Additionally, this issue highlights the need to
  have qualified ADAFCOs at higher echelon units to
  serve as an interface between them and Air
  Defense BNs and BDEs.
• Recommendation TACSAT radios need to be provided
  to the battalion and each battery so all
  battalion-level networks can be established as
  per our doctrine. If TACSAT radios are not
  available, then PRC-150 Harris HF radios must be
  fielded to replace these same networks.
• Lead DCD/TSM-LT

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 3-4
• Issue Long-haul communication equipment is a
  major shortfall in current Patriot Brigades.
  (M/O)
• Discussion 2-43 ADA Battalion was with the
  battalion responsible for coverage of assets from
  northern Kuwait to central Iraq, it became
  impossible for firing batteries of 2-43 to
  transmit their Patriot Air Defense Information
  Link (PADIL) with organic UHF/line of site
  radios. The ability to command and control a
  battery is the battalions primary focus and the
  communication tying the battery to the battalion
  is the single point of failure in preventing a
  fully mission capable ICC from controlling the
  fires and providing a higher level of ID
  engagement authority.
• 2-43s MTOE authorized communication limited C2
  connectivity as the maneuver piece spread firing
  batteries out over 340 kilometers. Because the
  Brigade was tasked to provide direct support to
  the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, the Brigade
  S6 sought assistance from IMEF G6 to support the
  requirement for long-haul communications.
  Unfortunately, the IMEF had no AN/TRC-170 (TROPO)
  systems to spare.
• TROPO is the ideal form of long-haul
  communication for battery to battalion in Patriot
  because of the issue with time delay over SATCOM
  that could make the link less accurate if the
  information sent from the ECS isnt received by
  the ICC in 0.4 seconds or less. Because of the
  critical nature of command and control and the
  commanders intent to keep batteries from
  performing autonomous operations, the Brigade S6
  procured a deal with 11th Signal Brigade to
  receive 2 manned TROPO shelters and 2 unmanned
  TROPO shelters. The brigade manned the unmanned
  shelter with personnel assigned to 108th who had
  experience in the past with TROPO systems.
• If a Patriot Battalion is given a mission to
  extend resources to the limits experienced,
  measures should be taken to ensure they have the
  ability to maintain C2 over the distance spanned
  and also provide the direct support maintenance
  to the equipment providing the service.
• Recommendation An MTOE and doctrinal change to
  ensure communication equipment is available
• Lead 32nd AAMDC/DCD/CORP Bdes

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 3-5
• Issue Integrating PATRIOT into the Joint Data
  Network (JDN) in KU remained a significant
  challenge throughout the conflict
• Discussion Integrating PATRIOT into the JDN was
  accomplished however, false tracks and ghost
  tracks caused by PATRIOT degraded the overall air
  picture to a point that for safety of flight
  issues their tracks were dropped. Limited
  attempts were made at radar registration to
  resolve this issue. Units were not allowed to
  transmit on the JDN until after they crossed the
  LD. This issue is even more disturbing given the
  high probability that PATRIOT may be the only
  sensor to pick up SRBMs.
• Recommendation USAADASCH participate in working
  groups/forums to integrate ground based air
  defense systems into the JDN. The joint
  community must be made aware of its importance.
  Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Officers
  (ADAFCOs) must be trained on how to integrate
  PATRIOT into the NET and on procedures to trouble
  shoot problems that may arise.
• Lead TSM-LT/DOTD
• C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
• 3-3  Harris PRC-150 are not avail., limited qty
  avail. for SBCTs.  TACSAT radio
• per btry being worked initally between TSM and
  DCD...initial draft "think Paper"
• exists...meeting of SMEs to be held next week.
• 3-4  Army should have and provide long haul
  comms...this shortcoming makes the
• argument for a SIG BN with robust capab., to
  include long haul organic/belonging
• to AMD.

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 4-1
• Issue Inadequate FAADC3I contractor support and
  Class IX availability and delivery. (M)
• Discussion Because many of the FAAD/STC/Sentinel
  parts were under contractor control through the
  Contractor Logistics System (CLS), our ability to
  sustain combat power for Linebackers, Avengers,
  and Sentinels was problematic. The battalion had
  to rely upon telephone calls to CONUS and the use
  of FEDEX to secure and ship parts. Due to FAAD
  C3I.
• Recommendation The battalion experienced
  problems with the FAADC3I equipment and worked
  with civilian contractors to fix the problems.
  Some of the problems can and would have been
  fixed locally, if the necessary parts were
  available. Currently, the only contract support
  within theater is at Camp Doha, Kuwait, and they
  could not support the battalion once hostilities
  began.
• Recommendation Battalion needs to stock an
  authorized stockage list (ASL) from the Project
  Office for FAADC3I equipment (video cards,
  network cards, etc.).
• Lead TSM-LT/Units

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 5-1
• Issue Failure to receive TBM early warning (EW)
  through LINK-16 and mobile subscriber equipment
  (MSE) network. (M/O)
• Discussion When Iraq launched the first TBMs
  against Kuwait City and the 101st Air Assault
  divisions assembly area on G-1, the division
  received no TBM EW via the LINK-16 and MSE
  network. Though we had a great tactical digital
  information link (TADIL)-J/Link 16 connection
  throughout the battle and regularly tracked well
  over 100 aircraft simultaneously, we were not
  able to receive any TBM EW digitally. In fact,
  the only TBM EW we received throughout the battle
  was by monitoring the Air Force EW tactical
  satellite (TACSAT) network. There are only two
  ways the division can receive digital TBM EW
  through the Air and Missile Defense Work Station
  (AMDWS) system 1) directly from an Air Defense
  System Integrator (ADSI) and, 2) from another
  AMDWS that is hooked directly into an ADSI via
  MSE. Both have their shortfalls. First, the MSE
  based system required an MSE feed that was never
  stable and could not provide EW to AMDWS while on
  the move. Second, even though a TADIL-J feed can
  be received on the move and does not require MSE
  support, the relative short flight time of the
  missiles the enemy used and the time it took for
  joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) to identify
  and release the information through the Joint
  Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)
  network resulted in no TBM EW information to be
  distributed via TADIL-J.
• Recommendation The Army must invest in
  additional software and hardware improvements
  that would shorten the time it takes to process
  TBM EW information and release it to the units.
• Lead DCD/TSM-LT/TSM-UT
• C2 / Interoperability Branch Comment
• 5-1  How to effect/do TBM EW is a JTTP issue. 
  This could have gone/been
• done any of many ways via any/multiple
  means...PSC-5s, CTT/JTTs,
• etc.  JTIDS not usual means for getting this info
  to non-ADA.they don't have
• means to receive.

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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• Lessons Learned 5-2
• Issue Information flow between Prince Sultan Air
  Base (PSAB), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (KU), and
  Jordan did not occur. Information regarding
  anomalies experienced in various PATRIOT
  locations throughout the theater was not shared
  with each other.
• Discussion Spurious TBMs injected over the JDN
  by the Marine TAOC was observed in Jordan for a
  number of months prior to the start of OIF. TF
  1-7 had experienced it since their arrival. This
  information was not shared with PATRIOT units
  supporting the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
  in KU. When the TAOC in KU came on line the
  injection of spurious tracks was not expected.
  Had the 1-7 experience been shared throughout the
  AOR then the problem with spurious TBMs injected
  by outside sources could have been minimized.
• During discussions with soldiers in the AOR,
  ARM and TBM anomalies experienced by units in KU
  were not shared with units coming into theater or
  units in Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or
  Bahrain. Methods for disseminating information
  throughout the PATRIOT force and a system to
  conduct theater-wide training to counter
  anomalies as they were observed not in place.
• Recommendation LTPO and USAADASCH establish a
  real time PATRIOT data collection site. Upon
  observing an anomaly or system failure units
  should be able to log on to the site and enter
  the information. Units would also be able to
  search the site for similar problems experienced
  by other units. LTPO and the US Army Air Defense
  Artillery School (USAADASCH) would be responsible
  for reviewing the information entered on the site
  and recommending solutions to the units
  problems.
• Lead DOTD/6x

Sustain Improve X General Issue ADA Issue X
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TSM-LT Comments

• The issue in 1-1 was simply we have never modeled
  the interaction between Patriot and Arrow. 
  Therefore operators did not have sufficient
  information to develop TTPs.  That modeling and
  the development of the TTPs was done just before
  the war.  The second issue was the defense design
  in KU.  We have never modeled, and therefore
  explored the dynamics, of defense design of 2-1
  with KU units under them in a MICC/SICC
  relationship.  Again, we did that modeling and
  analysis just before the war and discovered some
  possible unintended consequences with the defense
  design the unit had established.
• 3-1 The recommendation the originator makes, may
  not be the appropriate solution for the problem
  he describes.
•  2-1 We have been heavily engaged in the Army
  locking down the ABCS version and decided what is
  Good Enough funding and fixing and putting in
  the field next year.  Those AMDWS issues will be
  fixed in our January version which will go to
  test at Ft Hood in April.
•  USAADASCH CID Insights From OIF Slide  Although
  implied, I would simply state that all Army AMD
  platforms need the same PHID technologies used by
  other Joint Services.

16
Center for Army Lessons Learned USAADASCH CID
Insights From OIF

• Ground to Air CID Insights
• The low reliability of positive electronic
  means of identification continues to mandate the
  upgrading of equipment, training and use of
  procedural methods of identification.
• Exercising the Joint Identification Authority
  from the Area Air Defense Commander down to the
  lowest fight element is critical.
• Every effort must be made to avoid autonomous
  fire units. Robust communications are key to
  CID.
• Tactical Control Officers must continuously
  maintain situational awareness of all friendly
  and enemy activity.
• Tactical Control Officers must continuously
  work to resolve and report all unknown tracks on
  their scopes.
• Joint datalink architectures must be designed
  to support the identification and engagement
  authority functions.
• New technologies/techniques as well as IFF and
  ESM upgrades must be explored to provide positive
  friendly/hostile identification at the lowest
  command level possible.

Source USAADAC
17
Review of Significant Actions

• 19/20 March G-Day
• Two Iraqi surface-to-surface missiles fired at
  Coalition forces in Kuwait were reported to have
  been successfully intercepted by air defenses.
  Another missile was reported to have landed near
  Camp Commando in Kuwait no casualties were
  suffered. The Patriot batteries successfully
  intercepted and destroyed two tactical ballistic
  missiles during an attack on Kuwait at
  approximately 1224 p.m. and 130 p.m. (424 a.m.
  and 530 a.m. EST). Their guidance and control
  system locked onto the ballistic missiles,
  successfully engaging the targets with Hit to
  Kill PAC III and Guidance Enhanced Missiles
  (GEM).
• 22/23 March
• An RAF GR4 Tornado aircraft from RAF Marham,
  which was returning from an operational mission,
  was engaged near the Kuwaiti border by a Patriot
  missile battery. Both aircrew were killed. The
  next of kin have been informed.
• 23/24 March
• Also in the vicinity of An-Nasiriyah, a United
  States Army supply convoy was ambushed by
  irregular Iraqi forces. A number of American
  service members were wounded in that action. As a
  result of that action, 12 U.S. service members
  are reported missing.

18
Review of Significant Actions

• 24/25 March
• During combat air operations at approximately
  340 p.m. local time Monday, a U.S. F-16 fighter
  engaged a U.S. Patriot battery approximately 30
  miles south of An-Najaf, Iraq. The F-16 pilot
  executed the strike against the Patriot while
  en-route to a mission near Baghdad. No soldiers
  were injured or killed by the strike. The
  incident is under review to ensure the future
  safety of the Patriot crews and aircrews.
• 28/29 March
• USCENTCOM describes missile defense activity as
  follows about 12 missiles have been fired. We
  believe them to be in the Ababil-100 or Al-Samoud
  family, and those have been launched from within
  Iraq toward Kuwait. We're seeing a rate of about
  one per day at this point, and all of the
  threatening launches have been intercepted by
  Patriot missiles. Additionally, we have
  established combat air patrols near the areas
  where most of the launches are occurring. We have
  been successful in destroying a number of
  launchers before and after they're fired, and
  we're actively hunting for them.
• 1/2 April
• US troops rescued a female soldier held prisoner
  by the Iraqis. US Marines captured at Al Hillah
  two of the Al Samoud II missiles which
  contravened UN resolutions.