Leadership, Organization, and Management for National Security Space

1
Leadership, Organization, and Managementfor
National Security Space

• NSS Independent Assessment Panel Report
• Tom Young, Chair
• LTG Edward Anderson
• VADM Lyle Bien
• Gen Ron Fogleman
• Keith Hall
• Gen Les Lyles
• Dr. Hans Mark
• September 2008
• Institute for Defense Analyses

2
Outline

• Conclusion
• Congressional Direction
• Context Significant Developments Since the 2001
  Space Commission
• Importance of National Security Space (NSS) to
  the Future Security of the United States
• Findings and Recommendations
• Conclusion

3
Conclusions

• Space capabilities underpin U.S. economic,
  technological, and military leadership
• Our leadership is in jeopardy today because
• Global access to technology is leveling
• Potential adversaries are gaining competitive
  military capabilities
• Essential elements of NSS leadership, management,
  and organization are ineffective developments
  since 9/11 have weakened the management focus on
  space
• Without significant changes in NSS management and
  organization, U.S. Space leadership will erode to
  the extent that it ceases to provide a
  competitive national security advantage
• Leadership can reverse this trend
• This call to action should be assigned the
  highest level of urgency and requires assignment
  of responsibility for implementation

4
Congressional Direction

• (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required-
  The Secretary of Defense shall select an
  appropriate entity outside the Department of
  Defense to conduct an independent review and
  assessment of the organization and management of
  the Department of Defense for national security
  in space.
• (b) Elements-The review and assessment required
  by this section shall address the following
• The requirements of the Department of Defense for
  national security space capabilities, as
  identified by the Department, and the efforts of
  the Department to fulfill such requirements.
• 2. The actions that could be taken by the
  Department to modify the organization and
  management of the Department over the near-term,
  medium-term, and long-term in order to strengthen
  United States national security in space, and the
  ability of the Department to implement its
  requirements and carry out the future space
  missions, including the following
• a) Actions to improve or enhance current
  interagency coordination processes regarding the
  operation of national security space assets,
  including improvements or enhancements in
  interoperability and communications.
• b) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship
  between the intelligence aspects of national
  security space (so-called black space) and the
  non-intelligence aspects of national security
  space (so-called white space).
• c) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in
  which military space issues are addressed by
  professional military education institutions
• d) Actions to create a specialized career field
  for military space acquisition personnel, to
  include an emphasis on long-term assignments,
  that could help develop and maintain a
  professional space acquisition cadre with
  technical expertise and institutional knowledge.

5
Significant Developments Since the 2001 Space
Commission

• Growing utilization of Space
• Increasing threat of a Space Pearl Harbor
• U.S. world space leadership eroding at an
  alarming rate
• Emergence of China and others as space powers
• Global leveling of access to emerging
  technologies
• Organizational changes that weaken NSS management
• Continued delays, cost overruns, and/or failures
  have impacted the ability to deliver next
  generation NSS capabilities, while experiencing
  increasing frailty of existing systems
• Continued consolidation of U.S. space industrial
  base

6
NSS Leadership Will Remain Vital for National
Well-Being

• Space capabilities underpin our world leadership
• U.S. military strategy, concepts of operations,
  and force structure and employment predicated on
  superior space capabilities
• Space-based capabilities underpin arms control
  and strategic deterrence
• Space enterprise is embedded in the fabric of our
  nations economy, providing technology
  leadership, preeminence, and sustainment of the
  industrial base
• Weather and environmental monitoring provide
  invaluable military and civil support
• At the same time, space has become a contested
  environment

7
Findings and Recommendations

• National Space Strategy
• Leadership
• Organization Management
• Other Noteworthy Observations Included in Our
  Report
• Space Vulnerabilities
• Consolidation of the Industrial Base
• Many Positive Activities

8
National Space Strategy

• No overarching National Space Strategy to achieve
  the goals of the National Space Policy
• NSS involves
• Military space -- Commercial Space
• Intelligence Community (IC) space -- DOE
• NASA -- NSF
• NOAA -- USDA/USGS
• DHS -- Allies
• Interagency planning and coordination of space
  activities is fragmented and unfocused
• Space preeminence is critical to the national
  security of the U.S.
• Strategy must be accompanied by a leadership
  mechanism to assure funding and implementation

9
Recommendation

• Establish and execute a National Space Strategy
• Assures U.S. space preeminence
• Integrates the various participants
• Establishes line of authority and accountability
• Delineates priorities
• The President should lead the effort, and
  re-establish the National Space Council, chaired
  by the National Security Advisor, with authority
  to implement the National Space Strategy, assign
  roles and responsibilities, and adjudicate
  requirements and resources.

10
Leadership

• No ones in charge
• No single authority responsible for NSS below the
  President
• Within DoD - authorities and responsibilities
  spread across OSD (USD(I), ASD(NII), USD(ATL),
  USD(P)), USAF, USN, USA, USMC, MDA, DARPA, and
  NRO
• Short of agreement between the SecDef and DNI,
  there is no effective mechanism to arrive at a
  unified budget, priorities, or program plan for
  NSS across DoD and the IC
• Diffused direction from multiple sources greatly
  complicates NSS implementation and assures
  inefficiency

11
Leadership (Contd)

• Stewardship
• In the face of competing demands, Air Force
  stewardship for NSS does not enjoy the same
  priority as other traditional Air Force missions
• Cultural Divide
• Intelligence space and military space have strong
  legacy cultures that make integration extremely
  difficult
• Commercial Capabilities
• Commercial space communications capabilities are
  treated as a resource available on the spot
  market as opposed to an integral element of NSS

12
Recommendation

• Establish a National Security Space Authority
  (NSSA)
• The Director will be a newly established
  Undersecretary of Defense for Space and Deputy
  DNI for Space, reporting to the SECDEF and DNI
• Will be the EA for Space and the NSS acquisition
  authority
• Shall have Milestone Decision Authority and be
  responsible for defining and formulating Major
  Force Program (MFP)-12 and will be the focal
  point for interagency coordination on NSS matters
• Provides single authority with responsibility and
  accountability for the planning and daily
  execution of the NSS program, including budget
• Provides single authority to integrate macro
  requirements, conduct trade studies, and
  determine most effective solution to a defined
  need.
• Analytical and technical support from a National
  Security Space Office (National Security Space
  Office)-like organization augmented with IC
  expertise is required to effectively execute this
  responsibility.

13
Organization Management

• Personnel
• Insufficient number of experienced space
  acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity
  of personnel in project management positions
• Diminished ability (and availability) to attract
  the nations best and brightest
• Requirements
• Requirements process does not assure requirements
  are consistent with available resources

14
Organization Management (Contd)

• Acquisition Practices
• Failure to implement proven acquisition practices
  continues to result in technical performance
  problems, cost growth, and schedule delays.
  Proven practices include
• Experienced, cradle to grave project management
  personnel in adequate numbers
• Requirements consistent with available resources
• Requirements rigorously controlled
• Budget to most probable cost including reserve
• Robust systems engineering capability
• Lack of Innovation
• Some on-orbit systems are experiencing technical
  difficulties and most constellations are aging
  and fragile
• Terminating legacy programs before new
  replacement programs are past their most risky
  development period
• NRO failures have created a situation where
  legacy systems are required to provide continuity
  of service
• As a result, NRO innovation has eroded

15
Recommendation

• Create a National Security Space Organization
  (NSSO)
• Assign to it the functions of the National
  Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space and
  Missile Systems Center, the Air Force Research
  Laboratories Space Vehicles Directorate, the
  operational functions of the Air Force Space
  Command (AFSPC) and other Service organizations
  now providing space capability.
• The merged organization will be the single space
  capability provider reporting to NSSA for
  requirements and acquisition and to AFSPC for
  organization, training, and equipping
  responsibilities.
• Spacecraft command, control, and data acquisition
  operations as well as launch will be the
  responsibility of the National Security Space
  Organization (NSSO) and the appropriate DNI
  organizations.

16
Recommendation

• Change DoD and Intelligence Community human
  resource management policies to emphasize
  technical competence, experience, and continuity
• Establish a career education, training, and
  experience path for the development of engineers
  and managers who are space acquisition
  professionals.
• Establish as the norm that space project
  management personnel be in a given position for
  sufficient time to maximize project successfour
  years without adverse effect upon an individuals
  career
• Support the current Space Cadre management and
  training program being implemented by the
  Services, as exemplified by the U.S. Air Force
  through AFSPC and Air Education and Training
  Command
• To be designated as a space acquisition
  professional, individuals must complete a
  multi-month space acquisition educational
  program, such as that offered by the Defense
  Acquisition University

17
Conclusions

• Space capabilities underpin U.S. economic,
  technological, and military leadership
• Our leadership is in jeopardy today because
• Global access to technology is leveling
• Potential adversaries are gaining competitive
  military capabilities
• Essential elements of NSS leadership, management,
  and organization are ineffective developments
  since 9/11 have weakend management focus on space
• Without significant changes in NSS management and
  organization, U.S. Space leadership will erode to
  the extent that it ceases to provide a
  competitive national security advantage
• Leadership can reverse this trend
• This call to action should be assigned the
  highest level of urgency and requires assignment
  of responsibility for implementation

18
Where Are We Today?
19
Additional Materials
20
Tasks

• Review and assess the organization and management
  for National Security Space
• Assess the importance of National Security Space
  to the security of the United States
• Define actions required to correct identified
  deficiencies in NSS management and organization
  including
• Actions to improve or enhance interagency
  coordination
• Actions to improve or enhance the relationship
  between Intelligence space and military space
• Actions to improve or enhance a career field for
  space acquisition personnel which includes long
  term assignments and maintains a professional
  space acquisition cadre including necessary
  training
• Actions to improve or enhance the management of
  NSS programs

21
Approach

• Examined and received briefings on previous
  studies
• 2001 Space Commission Report
• 2003 Acquisition of National Security Space
  Program Report
• Rand study, Developing Space-Based Capabilities
  Has DoD Lost the Recipe?
• National Research Council study, Pre-Milestone A
  and Early-Phase Systems Engineering A
  Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air
  Force Acquisition
• Multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO)
  Studies
• Others
• Conducted Structured Reviews and Site Visits with
  key NSS organizations
• Conducted interviews with stakeholders across the
  NSS
• Conducted periodic discussions with Congressional
  Staff
• Panel Deliberations
• Subjected Findings and Recommendations to Senior
  Peer Review chaired by Dr. John Hamre

22
Congressional Direction

• (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required-
  The Secretary of Defense shall select an
  appropriate entity outside the Department of
  Defense to conduct an independent review and
  assessment of the organization and management of
  the Department of Defense for national security
  in space.
• (b) Elements-The review and assessment required
  by this section shall address the following
• The requirements of the Department of Defense for
  national security space capabilities, as
  identified by the Department, and the efforts of
  the Department to fulfill such requirements.
• 2. The actions that could be taken by the
  Department to modify the organization and
  management of the Department over the near-term,
  medium-term, and long-term in order to strengthen
  United States national security in space, and the
  ability of the Department to implement its
  requirements and carry out the future space
  missions, including the following
• a) Actions to improve or enhance current
  interagency coordination processes regarding the
  operation of national security space assets,
  including improvements or enhancements in
  interoperability and communications.
• b) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship
  between the intelligence aspects of national
  security space (so-called black space) and the
  non-intelligence aspects of national security
  space (so-called white space).
• c) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in
  which military space issues are addressed by
  professional military education institutions
• d) Actions to create a specialized career field
  for military space acquisition personnel, to
  include an emphasis on long-term assignments,
  that could help develop and maintain a
  professional space acquisition cadre with
  technical expertise and institutional knowledge.

23
Participants

• Study Liaisons
• Brian Green COL Patrick Frakes, USD(P)
• Larry Burgess Cynthia McKinley, USD(I)
• Brig Gen Don Alston, USAF
• Brig Gen Edward Bolton, NRO
• Chuck Alsup Shishu Gupta, DNI
• Brig Gen Mark Owen Lt Col Darren Johnson,
  STRATCOM
• Steve Huybrechts, ASD (NII)
• Rodney Liesveld, NASA

• Fact-Finding
• Congressional Staffs, GAO
• OSD, Joint Staff
• STRATCOM
• NRO
• SECAF (EA for Space), AFSPC, SMC, National
  Security Space Office
• Services
• NSA, NGA, DIA, CIA
• NOAA, NASA
• Commercial Space
• Independent Experts

IDA Study Team David Graham, Charles Cook HT
Johnson Marshall Kaplan Margaret Porteus Jim
Thorne David OReilly
24
What is National Security Space?

• Military Space
• Satellite Systems
• Satellite Operations
• Launch
• Space Ranges
• DARPA
• MDA
• Intelligence Space
• Satellite Systems
• Satellite Operations
• NOAA
• Weather
• Remote Sensing
• Commercial Space
• Communications
• Remote Sensing

• NASA
• Technology
• Project Management
• Other
• Department of Energy/National Labs
• Department of Agriculture (USDA)/U.S. Geological
  Survey (USGS)/LANDSAT
• Department of Homeland Security/National
  Applications Office
• National Science Foundation (NSF)/Space Weather
• Allies

25
NSS Organizations Today
Legend
Legend
Oversight
Oversight
President
President
Funding, Priorities
Funding, Priorities
Coordination of Operations
Coordination of Operations
Vice President
Congress
Vice President
Congress
Other (labeled)
Other (labeled)
Dual hat (for
JFCCs
)
Dual hat (for
JFCCs
)
NSC
OMB
OSTP
NSC
OMB
OSTP
SECDEF
DHS

SECDEF
DHS

NASA
DNI
Commerce
NASA
DNI
Commerce
State, Other
State, Other
Milestone
Milestone
CIA
CIA
NOAA
Authority
NOAA
Authority
Military Advice
Military Advice
CJCS
CJCS
SecAF
SecAF
SecArmy
SecNavy
SecArmy
SecNavy
USD(P)
USD(P)
ASD(NII)
USD(I)
USD(ATL)
ASD(NII)
USD(I)
USD(ATL)
(EA for Space)
(EA for Space)
communication
communication
Milestone
Natl SecSpace Office
Chief
Authority
Chief
SMDC
SMDC
of Staff
of Staff
STRATCOM
STRATCOM
Service
Service
components
components
functional
functional
(org, train,
(org, train,
equip,)
equip,)
comp.
comp.
JFCC
-
ISR
JFCC
-
ISR
DIA
DIA
Dir DIA
Dir DIA
AFSPC
AFSPC
AFMC
AFMC
DISA
DISA
JFCC
-
GSI
JFCC
-
GSI
NSA
NSA
8th AF
8th AF
JFCC
-
IMD
JFCC
-
IMD
SMDC/ARSTRAT
SMDC/ARSTRAT
NGA
JFCC
-
NW
NGA
JFCC
-
NW
Dir NSA
Dir NSA
JTF
-
GNO
JTF
-
GNO
Dir DISA
Dir DISA
Acquires
Acquires
Acquires
Acquires
comms
comms
imagery
imagery
CTF 214
CTF 214
Missile
AFRL
Missile
AFRL
AFRL
20th AF
AFRL
20th AF
PEO
SMC
PEO
SMC
Commerc
.
Commerc
.
Commerc
.
Commerc
.
Defense Agcy
Defense Agcy
comms
imagery
comms
imagery
NRO
NRO
JFCC
-
Space
JFCC
-
Space
14th AF
14th AF
DARPA
ORS
DARPA
MUOS SPO
NOAA
NOAA
(NAVY)
NASA
Adv ISR
NASA
Adv ISR
NROC
JSpOC
NROC
JSpOC
Coordination of Operations
Coordination of Operations
26
The Proposed NSS Authority
SECDEF
DNI

• National Security
• Space Authority (NSSA)
• Assigned as
• USD(Space) and Dep DNI for Space
• Joint/ Interagency Staffing
• (USAF, CIA, USN, USA, USMC)
• Integrating Functions
• Policy
• Investment Strategy and Plans
• Technical Architectures
• Requirements
• Milestone Decision Authority
• Budgeting (MFP-12)
• Inter-agency Programmatic Coordination
• Space Infrastructure and Industrial Base

Advanced ISR
Coordinating Relationships
DIA
DISA
NGA
NSA
NASA
DARPASpace
Missile Defense Agcy
NOAA
Capability Providers (NSSO)
27
(No Transcript)
28
Space Vulnerability

• The risk of a space Pearl Harbor has increased
  markedly, resulting in
• Concern for the vulnerability of on-orbit assets
• Critical need for space situational awareness
• Necessity to devise credible deterrence and
  response options
• USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
  are beginning to address this important issue

29
Space Industrial Base

• Failure of industry to consistently implement
  proven management and engineering practices
• Export controls (e.g., International Traffic in
  Arms Regulation (ITAR)) have had the unintended
  consequences of limiting U.S. space industry
  competitiveness

30
The Proposed NSS Organization

• The Director will be a Uniformed 3 Star or a
  Civilian 3 Star Equivalent
• Reporting to AFSPC/CC for organize, train, and
  equip matters and to the NSSA for Policy,
  Requirements, and Acquisition matters
• A Joint Interagency Staffed Organization --
• comprised of the current Acquisition and Launch
  Resources assigned to the SMC, NRO, ORS, NRO ST,
  AFRL/SD, USN, USA
• To Facilitate Life Cycle Program Management
  Military Space OPS currently assigned to the
  Services and NRO Ops will be assigned to this
  organization.
• The IAP strongly believes that essential
  operating relationships will not be undermined
  through the consolidation of the military space
  and intelligence space operational centers.
• To this end, the IAP advocates that existing
  operational tasking relationships be retained
• Tasking for military space would remain with US
  Strategic Command by way of the Joint Force
  Component Command for Space.
• Tasking for imaging would remain the
  responsibility of the National Geospatial Agency.
  
• Tasking for signals intelligence would remain
  with the National Security Agency.
• Any subsequent realignments in operational
  relationships should be made only after careful
  study involving the customer communities and NSSO
  

31
Positive Activities

• There are pockets of excellence and positive
  trends
• Support to national leadership and warfighters
• Launch
• Commercial communications and imagery
• AFSPC future plans
• USSTRATCOM focus on space
• Implementation of acquisition corrective actions
  at the program level