Title: On the Compressibility of NP instances and Cryptographic Applications,
1On the Compressibility of NP instancesand
Cryptographic Applications,
Danny Harnik
Weizmann Institute of Science
Technion
2Key Idea of Cryptography
- Use the intractability of some problems for the
advantage of constructing secure systems
Almost any cryptographic task provably requires
using this idea. Large research effort devoted
to studying the relationship between cryptography
and complexity Cryptography and Complexity a
match made in heaven
3This talk
- Connections between
- Complexity
- Cryptography
- (A new kind of) Compressibility
4Maybe I can approximate it
Could we just postpone it ?
I cant find an algorithm for the problem
Solve it for some fixed parameters
Find an algorithm that usually works?
- Approaches for dealing with NP-complete problems
- Approximation algorithms
- Sub-exponential time algorithms
- Parameterized complexity
- Average case complexity
- Save it for the future
Garey and Johnson, 1979
5Compressing Instances
Do not require that x can be restored from Z(x) !
- Rather than solving a problem, we are interested
in compressing it to be solved sometime in the
future. - Compression should be answer preserving rather
than input preserving. - To compress a language L need efficient
algorithm Z and a language L such that - Z(x) ? L iff x ? L
- Z(x) ltlt x
L
L
z
6Why deal with compression?
- Compression allows storing problems succinctly to
be resolved in a future setting - The future may introduce new and faster
technologies (Quantum computers?) - New algorithms (maybe PNP??)
- Lots of time in the future
- Our actual motivation powerful implications of
compression for cryptography. - Both positive and negative
Bandwidth to the future
7Talk overview
- Introduce and define compression of NP instances.
- Example of compression Vertex Cover
- Motivation
- Cryptographic applications
- Collision Resistant Hashing from One-way
Functions - Complexity study of compression
- Witness Retrievability
- OT from one-way functions
- Impossibility
- Everlasting Security and Compression
- Open Problems
8General Impossibility
- If P?NP then cannot hope to have a general
compression - Given CNF formula ? of size m hard to come up
with an equivalent formula ? that is much shorter - Otherwise would be possible to apply compression
recursively on ? until can solve exhaustively - Deal with NP languages with relatively short
witnesses
9Compressing NP Instances Definition
- NP languages with short witnesses - two
parameters considered - m Instance length
- n Witness length
- For every x of length m, if x ? L then it has a
witness of length n. - The interesting case n ltlt m and n not too small
- Example satisfiability of CNF formula of m
clauses on n variables - Compression for L an efficient algorithm Z, a
polynomial p(, ) and a language L such that
for every x of length m - Z(x) ? L iff x ? L
- Z(x) lt p(n,logm)
L
L
10Notes on the Definition
- Compression for L an efficient algorithm Z a
polynomial p(, ) and a language L such that
for every x of length m - Z(x) ? L iff x ? L
- Z(x) lt p(n,logm)
- Length of Z(x) is dominated by witness length
- potentially, Z(x) can be significantly shorter
than x. - Why p(n, log m)? This may be relaxed
- For complexity study log m may be replaced by any
sub-polynomial function of m - For some applications a compression of m1-e
suffices. - Definition is only interesting when n ltlt m
- E.g. 3-SAT is not an interesting problem for
compression
11Example Vertex Cover
- Input a graph G(V,E)
- Question Is there a subset of n vertices that
covers every edge in E. - Parameters (up to a logV factor)
- m E
- n size of cover
m - Instance size n - Witness size
12Vertex Cover of size n in graph of size m
- Compression algorithm
- Remove all vertices that have more than n
neighbors - suppose k vertices were removed.
- If there are more than n2 edges left then answer
no. - Else store the remaining graph G (of size at
most n2) and the number k - Language L for compressed instance - vertex
cover with size n n - k
Such a vertex must be in the cover
- Correctness
- If a cover exists in original graph, then in G
- Every edge is covered by one of n vertices.
- Every vertex has degree n
- G has no more than n2 vertices
- Essentially the same witness
13What have we learned?
- Some interesting languages have non-trivial
compression - But
- Instance of Vertex Cover has a small core
(kernel) that contains all the hardness of the
problem. - Not necessarily true for other NP problems.
- Compression of one NP-complete problem does not
imply compression for all of NP. - Clique, Dominating Set?
- The Karp reductions used for deriving
NP-completeness do not preserve the length of the
witness. - New witness may be polynomial in m (not n).
- Related to the parameterized complexity of vertex
cover. - Related notions investigated there
14Talk overview
- Introduce and define compression of NP instances.
- Example of compression Vertex Cover
- Motivation
- Cryptographic applications
- Collision Resistant Hashing from One-way
Functions - Complexity study of compression
- Everlasting Security and Compression
- Witness Retrievability
- OT from one-way functions
- Impossibility
- Open Problems
15Collision Resistant Hash
For all PPTM
Length reducing functions
- A collection of collision resistant hash
functions (CRH) is - a family H of hash functions s.t. for a random
h?RH it is hard to find a collision.
A pair x?x s.t. h(x)h(x)
- Efficiency
- Can sample h?RH
- Private/Public coins
- Can evaluate h(x)
- given h and x
-
Compression by 1 bit ?Compression to any poly
factors .
Wide range of cryptographic applications Signatur
es Merkle, Damgard Strong Commitments NY89
DPP91 Low Communication Protocols and CS Proofs
K92,M94,B01)
16One-way functions
- One-way function (OWF) f easy to compute but
hard to invert. - f(x) computable in poly-time
- No PPTM can find an inverse to yf(x) for a
random x - OWFs are the most fundamental building block in
computationally based crypto. - Necessary for most crypto tasks.
- Sufficient for many others (shared key
encryption).
- Current Status of CRH in Practice
- For both SHA-1 and MD5 serious weaknesses
discovered - NIST Workshop following Crypto 2006
- Related to the theoretical difficulties of
showing equivalence between OWFs and CRHs??
- CRH and OWFs
- (existence of) CRHs implies (existence of) OWFs
- But OWF not known to imply CRH
- No black box construction of CRH from OWF
Simon98
17CRH from OWF
E.g. SAT, Clique
- Theorem There exists a language L s.t. if there
is an errorless compression of L then there
exists a construction of CRH from any OWF.
- Overview of construction
- Choose a hash function g from a naive hash family
- with no computational hardness guarantees
- The selection function
- g defined by position i. gi(x) xi
- The new hash function h a commitment to i
- Output of h a compression of a formula ?
- ? ? gi(x) 1
m
x
gi
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
Intuitively finding a collision requires
guessing i.
18Commitment Schemes
- Hiding A computationally bounded receiver learns
nothing about the value i. - Binding s can only be opened to the value i.
- Commitments can be based on any OWF N89,
HILL90.
i
Commit Phase
Sender
Receiver
s
i
Reveal Phase
Sender
i
Receiver
s, v, i
v
Reveal Verification Algorithm
yes/no
Assume one-way functions on n bits are hard
19CRH from OWF?
- Theorem There exists a language L s.t. if there
is an errorless compression of L then there
exists a construction of CRH from any OWF.
- String s is a commitment to an index i?m
- For 1jm formula Cj,s,x is satisfiable iff s
is a commitment to j and xj1 - Formula Cs,x OR of all Cj,s,x
- ? Cs,x is satisfiable iff xi1
Can Generate Cj,s,x without knowing the value
i Cooks Theorem on the reveal verification
algorithm.
Cs,x is the OR of m formulas each of size
poly(n) Instance size mpoly(n) Witness size
opening of commitment - poly(n).
20CRH from OWF...
From mpoly(n) to m-1 bits
- Z - a compression algorithm for formula Cs,x
- Takes as input a formula C and outputs some
string - An h?H is described by a commitment s
- hs(x) Z(Cs,x)
- hs is indeed shrinking due to the compression.
- Let x?x be s.t. hs(x) hs(x).
- If s is a commitment to i then x(i)x(i).
- If x and x differ in the jth bit, then conclude
that s is not a commitment to the value j!!
- The construction is inherently non-black-box.
- Uses the code of the verification of commitment.
- The compressed problem is never actually solved
OR
An adversary that finds a collision x?x can
deduce information about i contradicting the
hiding of the commitment
21Which languages suffice for hashing?
- For language L, OR(L) is
- x1, x2 xm where there 1 i m s.t. xi 2 L
- If possible to compress OR(SAT) for CNF formulas
on n variables and size poly(n), - then can get the CRH construction
- Claim this is no harder than compressing CNF
formulas of m clauses on n variables - Claim compressing Clique(m,n) suffices for CRH
- A complexity study of the relative hardness of
compression - VC0 ? VC1 ? VC2 ? ? VCNP
- Hierarchy based on the complexity of
verification after preprocessing
Compressible
22Talk overview
- Introduce and define compression of NP instances.
- Example of compression Vertex Cover
- Motivation
- Cryptographic applications
- Collision Resistant Hashing from One-way
Functions - Complexity study of compression
- Witness Retrievability
- OT from one-way functions
- Impossibility
- Everlasting Security and Compression
- Open Problems
23Witness Retrievability
- Suppose instance x ? L with witness wx.
- The compressed instance yZ(x) has witness wy to
y ? L. - A compression algorithm is witness retrievable if
it is possible to obtain wy in poly-time from y
and wx.
Z
Observation almost all natural compression
schemes are witness retrievable Or can easily be
converted
24Witness Retrievability
- Theorem There exists a language L such that if
there is a witness retrievable compression of L
then - Minicrypt Cryptomania
- It is possible to construct Oblivious Transfer
and PIR Protocols from any one-way function - OT is complete for Secure Computation !
- General framework that captures many
cryptographic tasks - public key crypto, auctions, voting, e-commerce
Impagliazzo and Rudich (89) proved no black box
construction of OT from OWF.
25Witness Retrievability
- Theorem There exists a language L such that if
there is a witness retrievable compression of L
then - Minicrypt Cryptomania
- It is possible to construct Oblivious Transfer
and PIR Protocols from any one-way function - OT is complete for Secure Computation !
- General framework that captures many
cryptographic tasks - public key crypto, auctions, voting, e-commerce
Impagliazzo and Rudich (89) proved no black box
construction of OT from OWF.
26Limitations of Witness Retrievability
- Theorem if one-way functions exist, then there
is no witness retrievable compression for SAT - Idea compression of SAT allows low bandwidth
broadcast encryption - A center and m users connected via a broadcast
channel - Users are given individual keys
- The center can transmit to any privileged
subset of the m users - The non-privileged users cannot reconstruct the
original message - Using their assigned keys
- Lower bound on encrypted message length
- Since possible to reconstruct precisely the
subset whp - ciphertext is at least m bits
27Broadcast Encryption and SAT Compression
- m pairs of commitments to 1 one pair per user
- hs10, s11i, hs20, s21i, , hsm0, sm1 i
- Key for user i reveal string for ith commitment
to 1 - hv10, v11i, hv20, v21i, , hvm0, vm1 i
- To broadcast a single bit b to a subset T ½ m
- Choose corresponding commitments sibi 2 T
- Construct formula ?T,b ? at least one commitment
sib is to 1 - Broadcast the compression Z(?T,b)
- For i 2 T to decrypt see whether vib yields
witness Z(?T,b) - Claim if compression is perfect, then vib
- for i 2 T yields a witness
- For i not in T does not yields a witness
28Talk overview
- Introduce and define compression of NP instances.
- Example of compression Vertex Cover
- Motivation
- Cryptographic applications
- Collision Resistant Hashing from One-way
Functions - Complexity study of compression
- Witness Retrievability
- OT from one-way functions
- Impossibility
- Everlasting Security and Compression
- Open Problems
29Everlasting Security
- Common to many cryptographic schemes
- leave a fingerprint that in the future can reveal
private information - Michael Rabins term everlasting security
- After a certain period of time, the adversarys
action will not affect the protected entities - Things not done online by the adversary will
not influence the security - Relevant
- bounded storage model
- forward secure storage Dziembowski
- Claim incompressibility is essential for
achieving efficiency in these setting
Adi Shamir Existing public-key schemes with
current key lengths are likely to be broken in
less than 30 years! RSA conference 06
30Compression and the Bounded Storage
ModelEverlasting Security
- The Bounded Storage Model (BSM) bounds the
storage space of an adversary rather than its
running time. - Two settings
- Parties share a secret key very efficient
encryption. - No key is shared - honest parties need very high
memory requirements (square root of the space the
adversary has). - Suggestion A Hybrid BSM model add a
(temporary) bound on the running time of the
adversary. Use this to exchange an initial secret
key. - Dziembowski and Maurer DM04 there exists a
hybrid scheme made with secure components that is
insecure. - Theorem If OR(SAT) is compressible then the
hybrid model is no more powerful than the
standard BSM. - All such schemes are insecure.
- Alternatively One cannot prove that a hybrid
scheme is secure without proving (or assuming)
the incompressibility of many interesting
languages.
31Discussion Open problems
- Given CNF formulae ?1 and ?2 on same variables
- (not necessarily with short witnesses)
- come up efficiently with a CNF formula ? that is
- Satisfiable if and only if ?1 v ?2 is satisfiable
- Shorter than ?1?2
- Due to the impossibility results for SAT witness
retrievable compression - a witness for either ?1 or ?2 cannot efficiently
yield a witness for ?.
Sufficiently short to apply recursively (1-?)
(?1?2)
- If impossible, hope for
- Hybrid Bounded Storage
- Derandomization Dubrov-Ishai
- Forward-secure storage Dziembowski
32Discussion Open problems
- Topic must be studied has too many interesting
implications/applications to be ignored - Many open questions
- Where is the line between compressible and not?
- somewhere in the low VCs?
- What about incompressibility?
- Dubrov Ishai a certain notion of
incompressibility yields results in
derandomization - How to have an efficient falsifiable assumption?
- Additional directions
- Other natural classification? Connection to
previous classifications? - Natural complete problem for VC1 ?
- Does error-prone compression imply CRH?
33Thank You.
Full Paper www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/naor/PAPERS
/compressibility.html Compressed version in FOCS
2006
34GapSAT and Some Speculation
- GapSAT - a promise problem
- Input A CNF formula (m clauses, n variables)
that is either - Satisfiable
- Any assignment satisfies at most a 1-1/(2n)
fraction of the clauses. - Compression for GapSAT choose a random subset of
O(n2) of the clauses. - With high probability maintains the
satisfiability of the original problem. - Idea Use the PCP theorem
Instance of GapSAT
Instance of SAT
PCP
Compressed Instance
Compress
- The problem the PCP reduction creates many new
variables (poly(m, n)). The witness is no longer
short! - Challenge gap amplification without introducing
many new variables.
35On Compression of search problems
- Decision problem does there exist a witness to
x?L? - Search problem find a witness to x?L (if it
exists). - Compression for search Z(x) contains the
information regarding a witness to x?L. - Theorem If there exists compression for
(decision) problems in a class C, then there
exists compression for the corresponding search
problems in C.
36Complexity Study
- Want to know which problems can be compressed
- For crypto positive applications want to know
which problems are sufficient - Can we use the compressibility of vertex cover?
- If clique is compressible, it is good enough?
- For crypto negative applications for which
problems is it reasonable to assume
incompressibility? - What about other types of problems search,
counting - How can a compression algorithm look like?
- Hybrid Bounded Storage
- Derandomization Dubrov-Ishai
- Forward-secure storage Dziembowski
37Compressible languages
- Variety of techniques allow compression
- L 2 P - trivial
- Vertex Cover, Minimum Fill-in find a small core
- Related to parameterized complexity
- Sparse languages (PRG-output) - hashing
- Sparse Subset Sum - hashing
- GapSAT sampling
- Call the class VC0
38W-Reductions and Compression
- Classical NP classification does not suffice for
compression - Similar to other approaches for dealing with
NP-hard problems - approximation, parameterized complexity etc
- new classifications introduced.
- Key to classification is the type of reduction is
used - Definition L W-reduces to L if there exists a
polynomial time algorithm R and a polynomial
p(.,.) such that for instance x for L with
parameters m,n - R(x) ? L iff x ? L
- If R(x) ? L then it has a witness of length at
most p(n,logm). - Matching notion of compression-complete and
compression-hard languages for a class C
Witness
Claim If L W-reduces to L and L has a
compression algorithm then L has a compression
algorithm.
39The VC classification
- Aim a classification of NP with respect to
compression. - An indication of which languages are potentially
easier/harder to compress. - The VC classification
- The verification algorithm of a language plays a
central role in the classification. - Verification the verification algorithm
running on the instance after a preprocessing
stage.
Verification Complexity
witness
Verification algorithm
Preproc.
input
Yes/No
40The VC Classification
- VCk for k?2 - languages that have verification
in depth k. - VC1 languages that have local verification
read only poly(n, log m) locations of the
instance. Moral equivalent of sublinear. - VC0 all compressible languages
- VC VCm ( NP)
- Why Depth? Tradeoff between depth and of
variables - Standard technique (Cooks theorem) can reduce
depth of a verification circuit by adding new
variables. - Reducing depth without adding many variables
would entail a collapse in the hierarchy
Can be represented as a depth k (unbounded
fan-in) Circuit.
- Local verification yields natural families
- Graph embedding problems does a large graph
have a small graph embedded in it. Includes
Clique, long cycle, etc - Small Subset-Sum is there a small subset that
adds up to a target number.
Only non-trivial fact VC1 ? VC2
Claim VC0 ? VC1 ? VC2 ? ? VC
41One more class- VCOR
- OR(CircuitSAT)
- Input m circuits, each of size n
- Membership If at least one has a satisfying
assignment. - VCOR verification by an instance of
OR(CircuitSAT) - Complete problems The OR of any NP-complete
language is compression-complete for VCOR - e.g., OR(3-SAT), OR(Clique), etc
- Claim Clique is compression-hard for VCOR
- Compression of a language that is
compression-hard for VCOR suffices for crypto
apps! - E.g. OR(3-SAT), SAT, Clique
Claim VC0 ? VCOR ? VC1
42Classification
Class Languages / Compression Complete Language Compression-Hard
VC0 P, Sparse languages (PRG-output),Vertex Cover, Minimum Fill-in, GapSAT
VCOR OR(L) (for any L), OR(SAT), languages from crypto applications Clique, Long Path
VC1 Graph Embedding (Clique, Long Path, Long Cycle), Sparse SubsetSum, LocalCircuitSAT
VC2 OR of large CNFs, SAT DS, IP
VC3 Dominating Set (DS), Depth3CircuitSAT
VC4 Weighted SAT, Depth4CircuitSAT
VCO(logn) Integer Programming (IP), XOR(SAT)
VC CircuitSAT
43The VC classification
- Possibilities for the hierarchy
- If no compression of complete languages then a
full hierarchy. - Compression of a compression-complete language
collapses to VC0 everything from that point
down. - Collapse of VCk1 to VCk does not necessarily
entail further collapse. - The main question where is the border between
compressible and not?
44The Minicrypt Cryptomania question
- Minicrypt Cryptomania? is the most important
problem in complexity and cryptography where - We do not know the answer
- There is a good chance to resolve it in the near
future
Omer Reingold NL L is a contender for the title
45A more refined view
Trapdoor Permutations
IBE
cryptomania
PIR
CCA-Secure PKE
OT
Secure MPC
Secret Key Exchange
Public Key Encryption
2 rounds
minicrypt
Shared-key Encryption and Authentication
Signature Scheme
One-way functions
Computational Pseudorandomness
ZK Proofs for all of NP
Commitment scheme
Coin flipping
Efficient online memory checking
UOWHFs
46Separating the worlds
Trapdoor Permutations
cryptomania
PIR
CCA-Secure PKE
OT
Secure MPC
Public Key Encryption
SKE
minicrypt
Shared-key Encryption and Authentication
Signature Scheme
One-way functions
Computational Psuedorandomness
Impagliazzo and Rudich 1989 there is no blackbox
construction of OT from OWF.
ZK Proofs for all of NP
Commitment scheme
Coin flipping
Efficient online memory checking
UOWHFs
47Recent RSA Cryptographers Panel Feb 2006
- Adi Shamirs prediction no existing Public-key
Cryptoysystem will survive 30 years from now - Martin Hellman very little genetic diversity in
public-key cryptosystems. - RSA and Diffie-Hellman 1970s
- Elliptic curves 1980s
- Should add lattice based schemes
48Oblivious Transfer
- Impagliazzo (95) describes 5 possible worlds
based on different computational assumptions. - The top two worlds
- Minicrypt OWFs exist, some of crypto possible
(shared key encryption, commitments, signatures) - Cryptomania Oblivious Transfer (OT) exists,
almost anything possible.
Cryptomania
Minicrypt
Pessiland
Heuristica
Algoritmica
Cryptomania
Minicrypt
Pessiland
Heuristica
Algoritmica
- OT protocol
- Bob gets sc.
- Bob doesnt learn s1-c.
- Alice does not learn c.
OT is complete for Secure Computation ! General
framework that captures many cryptographic tasks
(e.g. public key crypto, auctions, voting,
e-commerce)
- OWFs not known to imply OT
- Impagliazzo and Rudich (89) prove that there is
no black box construction of OT from OWF.
c
s0,s1
sc
49OT from OWF?
E.g., SAT, Clique
- Theorem There exists a language L such that if
there is a witness retrievable compression of L
then - Minicrypt Cryptomania
- Suppose instance x ? L with witness wx.
- The compressed instance yZ(x) has witness wy to
y ? L. - Compression is witness retrievable if it is
possible to obtain wy in poly-time from y and wx.
Z
50OT from OWF?
- Theorem There exists a language L such that if
there is a witness retrievable compression of L
then Minicrypt Cryptomania
- Proof
- Construct a Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
protocol. PIR implies OT DMO00. - Input Database x of m bits.
- Given a commitment s to an index i?m, define
the circuit Cs,x - as in the CRH case
- Cs,x is satisfiable iff x(i)1
- Cs,x is the OR of m circuits, each of size n
- PIR protocol
- Alice holds m bit database x.
- Bob holds index i.
- Bob learns x(i).
- Alice does not learn i.
- Total communication is less than m bits!
i?m
x?0,1m
x(i)
51OT from OWF, cont.
- Theorem There exists a language L such that if
there is a witness retrievable compression of L
then Minicrypt Cryptomania
- Proof
- Bob creates a commitment s to his choice index
i?m. Sends s to Alice. - Alice generates the circuit Cs,x based on x and
s. - Alice sends Z(Cs,x) to Bob.
- Z(Cs,x) contains the information about the bit
x(i). - Bob can retrieve it using the witness retrieval
property. - Security
- Bobs i is hidden by the commitment
- total communication is low.
i
x
x(i)
Generates a 2-message PIR Sufficient also
for Public Key Encryption from any OWF!
52Definitions
- DepthkCircuitSAT
- Input a circuit C of depth k
- size m and n variables (unbounded fanin)
- Membership If C has a satisfying assignment?
- LocalCircuitSAT
- Input
- a string x of length m
- a circuit C over nn log m variables.
- Membership if there exists a list I of n
location in x such that C(X(I), I) 1
x
k
1?
x
1?
53Complete problems
- By Definition
- For VCk DepthkCircuitSAT, possible to restrict
top gate to AND. - For VC1 LocalCircuitSAT
- Notable
- SAT is complete for VC2
- CircuitSAT is complete for all of VC (NP)